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A B S T R ACT 
In the early years of the fifteenth century, the impact of 
English invasion, civil war and military defeat forced the French 
monarchy to seek military assistance from its allies abroad. Large 
numbers of men from this source served in French armies throughout the 
century, and this thesis sets out to examine this rather neglected 
phenomenon. The first part is a chronological survey of the history 
of this involvement, which can be divided into three phases. In the 
first, large foreign armies operated as separate units alongside the 
French and were involved in the major battles of the period such as 
Bauge, Cravant and Verneuil. After the siege of Orleans, these 
arm~es broke up into a host of smaller companies without any close 
central organisation and only under very limited royal control. After 
the reforms of 1445, the system of Compagnies d'Ordonnance restored 
this and tied the soldiers into the royal patronage network, giving 
the king a theorexical monopoly of organised military force. In the 
second half, various themes are studied in more detail; the close 
involvement of French diplomacy with matters of recruitment, the 
or~g~ns of the soldiers and the potential rewards and problems which 
service of the French crown might bring them. It then studies the 
alternatives to royal serv~ce, the problems of discipline and the 
political dangers which these posed. A re-examination of the actual 
effects of the 1445 reforms leads into an attempt to comprehend the 
realities of the life of soldier and captain on a day to day basis, 
concluding with an e~~ination of the relationship between the 
soldiers and the native French population. The thesis concludes 
that the role of foreign troops in sustaining the Valois dynasty 
was considerable and their experiences illuminate the realities of 
military service in the later middle ages. 
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Introduction 
In some fields there has never been any shortage of writings on 
the fifteenth century half of the Hundred Years \.Jar. The biblio-
graphies of work on French his tory produced annually shmv a very 
considerable volume each year. Most of this, however, is concen-
trated on a few of the more picturesque aspects. French produc-
tion tends to concentrate firmly on Jeanne d'Arc at all levels 
(serious, popular and plain lunatic fringe) while English language 
studies have been rather thin on the ground and concerned more with 
the glories of Agincourt or the problems and diplomacy of the 
Lancastrian government in France than with its French enemies. 
Part of this is due to the state of the sources; from 1415 orc to the 
1440's documentation is very disorganised and sparse. Part, one 
suspects, is due to an understandable distaste on the part of French 
historians for a period when France carne as near as she was to for 
many centuries to losing most of her political identity to a foreign 
invader; the general diversion of French historical endeavour from 
the narrowly political and diplomatic to social and economic fields, 
perhaps combined with a certain bias against a century when France was 
anything but "0ne and indi visible"on the poli tical front has seen to 
it that, while sp/(ndid social and economic studies of individual 
regions and provinces exist, surprisingly little seems to have changed 
on the political front since Beaucourt was producing his still-funda-
mental work on the reign of Charles VIr in the l8io's, Many 
areas of the actual conduct of the war which occupied so much of the 
time of royal government, and which is the ever-present backcloth to 
so much of the social and economic change of the period still reQain 
obscure. One of these has been the role and activities of the very 
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considerable numbers of foreign soldiers who served in the French 
royal armies in this period. 
Certainly they have never quite been completely forgotten; any 
reader of Sir Walter Scott who read "Quentin Durward" would be aware 
of the existence of Scottish units in France, and to a certain extent 
the mythology of the"Auld Alliance" remains potent on both sides of 
the North Sea (I myself, while working in France, found it alluded to 
(in conversation) by Frenchmen of no historical training.) Detailed 
studies of what it actually meant in the fifteenth century (one of 
the periods when the Franco-Scottish diplomatic alignment was at its 
most conspicuously effective), as well as ones on the role of other 
foreigners in France have, however, been notable by their absence. 
Certainly they appear on the fringes of other subjects. p S Le~ITis 
notes the grants of considerable lands and titles to favoured foreign 
soldiers but never digresses from his maln subject to pursue the 
matter in detail. Foreigners appear on the edges of Vale's biography 
of Charles VII, but again his maln interests do not lead him into a 
closer examination of their role. Even Contamine in his fundamental 
study of the French armies of the later middle ages seems, to my mind, 
to rather underplay the importance of the foreign element in these 
armles. The section on the Kingdom of Bourges, which was the time 
of greatest involvement by such elements is comparatively short and 
devotes much space to the collapse of French military administration 
which makes the careers of all soldiers in this period so hard to 
fo lImIT. His attitude to the foreigners seems to be that they are in 
themselves a symptom of the collapse of royal control; a fair enough 
conclusion as far as it goes but bv no means the last word which can 
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be said on the subject. Indeed, the only major work on the life 
and career of one of the leaders of such foreign troops dates back 
some hundred years - Jules Quicherat's biography of the spectacular 
and perhaps atypical career of Rodrigo de Villandrando. This 
sparked off quite a Villandrando industry in the columns of French 
learned journals with local archivists and antiquaries combing their 
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localities for traces of the passageof the great Ecorcheur (one so~e-
times gets the impression that some areas in the south of France were 
really rather disappointed if they failed to find any),- perhaps the 
first time in history that Villandrando had ever been positively 
welcome anywhere. Other nineteenth-century writers like Francisque-
Michel and Forbes-Leith produced works on the Scots in France, but 
their interpretations are often at fault and their statements of fact 
downright misleading; the former in particular has an irritating 
habit of not quoting his sources and a determination to find Scottish 
ancestry for large numbers of noble families in France, even where the 
evidence, to say the least, is thin. 
Nevertheless, this generally untilled field lS potentially a 
fertile one. Henry V was to die raving that he could not escape from 
the Scots; a Scot became briefly Constable of France and perhaps the 
greatest Anglo-Scottish battle between Bannockburn and Flodden was to be 
fought in France. This suggests very considerable armies and an 
important role for Scots and other foreigners in the French armies. It 
is the purpose of this study to examlne just how substantial a role 
they did play. Because of the limited state of knowledge at the present 
(especially given that military history has been unfashionable until 
within the last twenty years and has tended to be left to retired 
military men of limited historical training) it has to operate on at 
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least two levels. The first half is largely a narrative history 
which attempts to trace the fate of foreign troops from the 
beginning of their large-scale employment in the aftermath of Agincourt 
to the reign of Louis XI when a new orientation begins to appear as 
far as such recruitment was concerned. It IS largely a tale of 
battles fought (often major ones; Verneuil, the greatest battle in 
which foreigners were to be heavily involved, was one of the main 
battles of the war if one of the most neglected) and troo~_ move-
ments, though with much to say about the diplomacy of recr~itment, 
the importance of non-royal directed warfare and, after 1445, the 
organisation and operations of the ~agnie s d' ot:-donnance_. The 
second half is more analytical in its aim; foreign troops are used 
as a group in the light of whose careers one can examIne certain 
problems not peculiar to them In addition to trying to look at them 
more In their own right. In this section we shall examIne such 
matters as recruitment, the reward and problems of service, the 
difficulties which they caused in the matter of discipline, their 
style of life in the army after 1445 and their success or failure In 
adapting to French society. This format permits one to examine 
wider issues concerning the French royal army as a whole, the actual 
effects of the 1445 reform on the lives of those, both soldiers and 
civilians involved in it, the old debate over the profits of war to 
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those involved in it, the actual role of Ecorcheur companIes In 
French warfare and their relationship with the crown. In addition, 
the operations of French diplomacy in the 1420's are bound to come 
under examination. 
It has not always been easy to produce a coherent narrative; 
the sources tor this period are highlv disjointed, since the Revolution 
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destroyed much of what were always at best fragmentary official 
records, and the largest of the foreign groups, the Army of Scotland, 
was almost completely cut off from the mainstream of French military 
administration. This means that some questions are always likely 
to remain unanswerable. For instance it becomes almost impossible 
to make any estimate worthy of serious consideration of the actual 
numbers of foreign troops engaged outside very vague limits. 
Chronicle accounts do not always record the presence of foreigners 
in the armies engaged ~n the battles they report, and involvement 
must often be guessed at rather than firmly proven. Town records, 
especially in the case of Tours, are invaluable in reconstructing 
the relationship between towns and the armies of the da:y while 
giving information on movement of forces too humble to attract the 
attention of other writers, while the letters of remission in the 
JJ series of the Archives Nationales are invaluable for information 
about daily life in the ordonnance companies with a few glances back 
to earlier days. With the kind of comprehensive aid which Quicherat 
was able to inspire, it might be possible to find out much more about 
the activities of foreign soldiers at a local level, but a lifetime 
could be spent combing the archives of large and small tmvns alike 
without anything of very great moment coming to light and it seemed 
better to place the results of my researches to date on record, patchy 
though the picture which they give sometimes is, in the hope that if 
there are radical deficiencies they can be corrected by other research-
ers. There are other problems as well; as a Scot working from a 
Scottish university, I have always been conscious that there is a real 
danger that the Scottish elenent in the story will come to blot out 
the others. If there seems to be a heavy concentration on the Scots, 
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this is not because I have been unaware of the problems of balance 
but rather because the evidence itself commands this bias. There 
can be little doubt that the Scots were by far the most numerous of 
the foreign 3rouPS in France and their compatriots cer~ainly maintain-
ed a deep interest in their exploits overseas; indeed the two Scottish 
chronicles which cover the 1420's concentrate so deeply on the events 
in France that purely domestic Scottish affairs are relegated to a very 
inferior position. This did not happen either in Spain or in Italy. 
In addition, the official record in France seems to be much more con-
cerned with the Scots than with other nationalities because of their 
greater numbers and military importance in the context of the royal 
armies (the picture may well have been rather different in the more 
independent companies, but there is far less material on their inter-
nalorganisation). 
Inevitably a work of this kind could not have proceeded without 
a considerable amount of assistance and encouragement from very many 
people; far more than I can hope to mention here. First should come 
my parents, who have supported me through the three years of my 
researches in every possible way with great generosity. In many way s , 
it was my father who initially inspired a youthful interest in military 
history from the experiences of his mvn life as a regular soldier in 
war and peace. I hope this study will be an adequate product of this 
interest. I would also like to thank the Carnegie Trust for the 
Universities of Scotland, ~Yhose grant of a scholarship enabled ::1e to 
pay the bills on both sides of the Channel during my travels and 
researches. The study itself ones a vast amount to the aid and council 
given by my supervlsor, Professor Kenneth Fowler of the University of 
Edinburgh, whose guidance has often been crucial in setting me on the 
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track of source material which I might otherwise have missed. I 
should also like to express my gratitude to all the staff at both the 
universities which I have attended. The department of ~ediaeval 
History at St. Andrews has aided my work even after I left its 
fifteenth century precincts for the 1960's concrete of Edinburgh 
University Department of History; my thanks go to all in both 
departments who have helped me, especially Miss A J Kettle, Dr. G 
Parker, Mr. A Goodman and Dr. M G Dickson. In France, I obviously 
owe much to the staffs of the Bibliotheque Nationale, Archives 
Nationales and the various Archives Departmentales and Municipales who 
have guided me on the various stages of my travels through the records 
of fifteenth century France. My special thanks eo to Professor 
Pierre Capra of the University of Bordeaux for his very generous 
hospitality and help during my visit to his most beautifnl city during 
one of the coldest Easters on record, and to Miss Laura Hamson, then 
of the University of Alberta and student of mediaeval Bourges for 
fascinating diseussions about this city, its contacts with foreigners, 
and the realities of France in that period. Indeed, I should like 
to record my thanks to my various friends, both professionally 
interested and purely amateur, who have had to put up with my sometimes 
curious interest and concerns and have done so with amazing tolerance; 
thanks especially to Sue ~~illdig and Sarah Hardy for their much-
appreciated friendship both during and after the sometimes rather 
lonely months in Paris and above all to Lesley Pattinson for her deep 
and abiding concern for and interest in my doings at all times. 
Finally, specially large thanks are due to my aunt, :'fiss May Hunter for 
her near miraculous transformation of a very messy typescript indeed 
into its present splendid state. I can only hope that the resulting 
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thesis is worthy of the great amounts of help and friendship which 
the author has received from these and many more besides too numerous 
to mention by name in the course of its creation. 
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Chapter 1. The Beginnings Foreign Troops in France to 1418. 
"Depuis XXXIII anz enca et des devant a eu plusieurs divisions 
) 
civiles en ce royaume, soubz umbre et par Ie moyen desquelles les 
seigneurs ont leve et mis sus plusieurs gens de guerre avecques 
lesquels se sont mis gens de peuple et y sont venus a cause de ce 
plusieurs estrangiers, tant Escossoys, Espagnos, Lombars Arragon-
ois et gens de toutes nacions estrenges" (1). Jean Juvenal des 
Ursins, lamenting the state of the nation at the Estates of Orl~ns 
in 1439 was in no doubt as to the date and cause of the beginnings 
of the employment on a large scale of foreign troops in France. 
Civil strife was to blame in his eyes and that had begun on a 
serious scale around 1406. 
As so often in the thunderous pronouncements of Jean Juvenal 
and other sermonisers and moralists of his ilk, this admirably 
straightforward explanation, while it has much to commend it, 1S 
nevertheless rather misleading as far as foreign soldiers are 
concerned. Such figures were no strangers in France well before 
the suggested date. The kings of France had for many years filled 
the gaps in their traditional armies with specialists hired beyond 
the boundaries of the kingdom. The unfortunate Genoese crossbow-
men slaughtered on the slopes of Cr{cy in 1346 are merely the most 
conspicuous representatives of their type, and this failure did 
nothing to discourage' the early Valois from using their services (2). 
Cazelles (3) records the careers of several foreigners in the 
(1) BN Fonds Francais (hereafter FF) 2701 f8ro 
(2) Contamine has suggested that the majority of them were not in 
fact professional soldiers at all, but rather oarsmen and other 
sailors for the royal galleys pressed into service (P. Contamine 
La Vie Quotidienne Pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans Paris, 1976 
p. 248-9. 
(3) R. Cazelles La Sociite Politique et la Crise de la Royaute~sous 
Philippe de Valois Paris 1958 p. 275-7. 
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service of Philip VI, and the reorganised armies of Charles V under 
du Guesclin and Clisson showed an overwhelming majority of foreign-
ers (Genoese, Spaniards and others) amongst their infantry forces (4). 
Even the mounted (and thus more noble) men at arms could boast their 
foreigners, most notably the Welsh exiles Owen de Galles (Owain 
Lawgoch, last descendant of the Princes of Gwynedd) and Jean \~yn 
and their Welsh followings as well as isolated foreigners in other 
companies (5). This essentially traditional mixture of specialist 
companies and smallish groups of political exiles and more or less 
chivalrically-inspired foreigners entering the French service for 
longer or shorter periods continued into the early years of the 
fifteenth century (6). 
The disorders which began in this period, however, certainly 
stimulated recruitment as well as producing conditions in parts of 
France reminiscent on a smaller scale of the days of the great 
companies of the 1370's. Most of the princes involved in the 
fighting were to recruit troops from abroad. John the Fearless 
bolstered his armies with strangers to his Burgundian dominions 
particularly freely; Highland Scots in 1411,(7), Savoyards, Lombards 
(a band headed by a Lombard and three Savoyards was very active on 
his behalf in 1416-7), (8) and Spaniards (the later-notorious 
(4) 
. -' ......, . 
P. Contamine Guerre, Etat et Soc~ete a la F~n du Moyen Age; 
Etudes sur le~s~A~rm--e~e~s--d~e--s--R-o~i-s--d~e~F~r-a-n-c--e~1~3~3~7~-~1~4~9~4~P~a-r-1~'-s=-and 
: o[ ItAl'UL' 1972 (hereafter GES) p.155. 
(5) id p. 154. For individual careers, see id p.576-7, 592-3 and 
AD Carr 'Welshmen tvc the Hundred Years War' The Welsh History 
Review Vol. IV No. 1 p.3l-5. 
(6) 4-5000 Genoese crossbowmen served at the siege of Calais in 1~06 
(Enguerrand de Monstrelet Chronique ed. L Douet d'Arcq Paris 1858 
Vol. 1 p. 135), and other foreign nobles like the Earl of Crawford 
served with the French at around this time (J. Balfour Paul The 
Scots Peerage Edinburgh 1904-14 Vol. III p.16. 
(7) R. Vaughan John the Fearless London 1966 pp. 87, 260. 
(8) Monstrelet Vol. III pp. 150, 153, 180. 
I 
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"Ecorcheur" Rodrigo de Villandrando was to begin his French career 
in the company of the Burgundian Villiers de l'Isle Adam) (9). He 
was not alone. A Lombard Knight was prominent amongst the Armagnac 
forces deployed against John in 1411 (10), while the town authorit-
,; 
ies of St. Jean d'Angely held a German called "Anequin de 
Constances", the servant of a Lombard man at arms in the company 
of the Bastard of Bourbon in prison accused of the theft of four 
cattle from one Guillamme Raoul de Poursay. He, however, failed 
to appear in court, so Anequin was duly freed on 30th November 1413, 
chivalrously pardoning the injuries he had suffered out of concern 
for the honour of his captain (11). 
At this point, however, much the most numerous of these 
foreigners were the English; as yet neutral in the wars and able 
to intervene easily from Calais. Again, the Burgundians were the 
biggest hirers. Duke John began his hirings in 1411 (12) and 
English forces helped to take him to victory in 1412; many 
quittances issued to English soldiers at the end of this year when 
they were freed to go home survive (13). There were, however, 
Englishmen in the Armagnac armies as well; a circumstance not 
without its dangers for their paymasters; according to Lef~vre de 
(9) J. Quicherat Ronrig4(de Villandrando Paris 1879 p. 8-11. 
(10) Monstrelet Vol. II p. 228. 
(11) Archives Communales de St. Jean d'Ang~ly, printed in Archives 
Historiques de la Sainto~?e et de l'Aunis Vol. XXXII Parisi 
Saintes 1902 p. 94. 
(12) Monstrelet Vol. II p. 172. 
(13) ego BN Clairambault 49 no. 147 (Thomas Fox), 85 no. 136-7 
(Nicolle Peythole) and 100 no. 30 (Alixandre Sadrahan - though 
in this case there seems to be some doubt as to whether he was 
English or Scottish) 
4 
, 
St. Remy, Soissons was betrayed to the Armagnacs by an English 
soldier in 1414 (14). On a much grander scale was the attempt to 
involve a large English army under the Duke of Clarence in the 
summer of 1412; an expedition which in some ways foreshadowed 
the Agincourt compaign and ended with the Duke being bought off 
by his nominal hirers (15). Large-scale foreign intervention in 
French affairs was in th~ air at this time; John the Fearless was 
to make a formal treaty with the Earl of Douglas when the latter 
was in considerable embarrassment in Flanders and in danger of a 
spell in prison for unpaid debts. Douglas agreed to come to help 
John when required with no less than 4,000 men (16). 
In the case of the English, one can indeed speculate as to 
W;hat might have happened had Henry V not chosen to fish i~ the 
troubled waters of French politics on his own account. It is 
possible to imagine a situation in which England could have acted 
as a major supplier of mercenary forces to one side or the other 
(whether on an official basis or not) without attempting any formal 
conquest of France - a role similar to that fulfilled by Scotland 
vis-i-vis the French after 1420. No doubt, though, she would 
have driven much harder bargains about advantages to be conceded 
by the French faction thus aided in return. Instead of this 
potentially advantageous semi-neutrality, however, Henry V was to 
decide in favour of asserting his highly dubious claims to the throne 
of France, a decision which was to lead to a marked quickening ~n 
(14) Jean Ie F~vre de St. R~my Chronique ed. F. Morand Paris ·1876-81 
Vol. I p. 164; also Monstrelet Vol. III p.7. 
(15) Vaughan p. 97. 
(16) id p. 260. 
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the pace of foreign involvement on the French side as well. The 
shattering defeat of Agincourt on 25th October 1415, with its con-
sequent effects on the military capacity of the French aristocracy 
combined with the continuing civil war against the Duke of Burgundy 
stimulated the need for allies and military aid. Indeed, even 
during the campaign leading up to the battle, foreign troops can 
be found; one Jehan de Seville with a company of mounted crossbow-
~ 
men under the Comte de Vendome appears in the Caux area in Septem-
ber 1415 (17). The aftermath of defeat encouraged efforts to 
Lncrease this involvement; according to a rather later royal 
ordtn ance, it was at about this time that Scotland was first looked 
to as a possible source of aid (18). More immediately, an 
embassy consisting of Hugues Comberel, councillor of the Chambre 
des Aides and Antoine Grielle, clerk of the Chambre des Comptes 
went to Genoa in the winter of 1415-6 to recruit crossbowmen (19). 
This was a rather delicate operation, since Genoa was technically 
in revolt against France, but a generous distribution of money 
succeeded in raising 660 crossbowmen under six captains, including 
such famous Genoese names as Jacques Doria and Franco Spinola. 
They were to reach Aigues~rtes for official mustering on 7th May 
1416 and march northwards from Genoa and Castile to retake Harfleur 
and entered Paris two by two in good array according to Jean Juvenal 
des Ursins, who noted with surprise that there were only three or 
four horses in the whole troop (20). He put their numbers at a 
(17) Clairambault 103 no. 99, 100. 
(18) Ordonnances des Rois de France de la Trois~me Race Vol. X p.362. 
(19) The accounts of the embassy are to be found in Fonds Latin 
(hereafter FL) 54l4A f59ro-6lvo. 
(20) Jean Juvenal des Ursins Histoire de Charles VI ed. ~ichaud et 
Poujoulet Paris 1836 p. 531-2. 
6 
thousand and had them commanded by nine captains the chief of whom 
was one Baptiste Grimaldi. It is at least possible that other 
men could have been recruited by the ambassadors, and Baptiste 
Grimaldi indeed appears at the head of 157 crossbowmen with eight 
subordinate and unnamed captains in the garrison of Lisieux 1n 
August of the following year (21); equally well, Jean Juvenal 
could have confused the year. The monk of St. Denis manages to 
boost their numbers to 5,000 with the addition of Spanish auxil-
iaries (22). These certainly existed and were not restricted to 
the traditional Crossbowmen. Recruitment was eased by the 1406 
treaty with Castile which allowed Castilian subjects to serve in 
the French forces without penalty (23) but the exact scope of 
such recruitment is very hard to judge in the absence of any 
detailed recruitment accounts. Some can be identified from 
musters which have survived; the forces of the Constable reviewed 
in Paris in January 1416 included such figures as Diego de Madrigal 
with twelve esquires, and the probably Catalan company of Jaimet 
I 
de Peyrussa (24) while other Spanish groups are to be found in the 
ranks of Arnault de Barbazan's men (Jehan de Salcedo and Sanzo de 
Laredo (25)) or operating apparently independently (Alphonso de 
Caumont (26)). 
(21) Clairambault 165 no. 67. 
(22) Le Religeux de St. Denis Chronique ed. L. Bellacuet Paris 
1852 Vol VI p. 11-13. 
, 
(23) G. Daumet Etude sur l'Alliance de la France et de la Castyle 
au l4e et l5e Siecles Paris 1898 p.70. 
(24) Clairambault 68 no. 33, 85, no.78. 
(25) Clairambault 65 no.22, 100 no.13l. 
(26) Clairambault no. 146 no. 76-81. 
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The majority of these men probably served either on board 
the combined Franco-Castilian fleet attempting the blockade at Har-
f1eur or in- the land army co-operating with it during the un-
successful siege (27). Others were put into Norman garrisons dur-
ing this campaign, such as Pierre de Bilbao and his twelve esquires 
at Mon.t ~ilILLlfflLr, in the Caux in June 1416 (28). 
Again, the winter saw recruitment abroad (it is perhaps to 
this general period that the assertion of Hughues d'Arpajon, appear-
ing before the Par1ement and giving a review of his career in June 
1423, that he had been sent to Lombardy by the Constable to assemble 
men to the number of 3,500 and bring them to France, should be 
dated (29)) and the spring and summer of 1417 was full of the move-
ments of men from the south tmvards the seat of the war. In July 
of that year, the consuls af Montferrand had to cope with the on-
set of some 1500 crossbowmen under Louis de Giustella (perhaps 
Guastella, near Parma) marching from Genoa to serve the king. 
His men were so spread out along the road that the column took from 
the 22nd to the 24th to assemble fully in the town. Hhen they were 
all present, the captain went before the consuls to demand aid from 
them as a royal town against the garrison of "Nonette" which had 
captured some of his men. He wished the help of the town in 
effecting an armed rescue. The consuls, highly embarrassed by the 
whole affair, begged him to move on because of the dangers his men 
were bringing to the town, and in the end were forced to bribe him 
(27) For an account of these operations, Rel. de St. Denis Vol.VI 
p. 36-41, 66-7, 98-9. 
(28) Clairambault 14 no. 182. 
(29) Archives Nationales (hereafter fu~) X2a f2vo-3ro. 
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to go, captives apparently unredeemed (30). It may have been 
the same troop which passed through Or1~ns in August (though the 
captain there is called the Seigneur de Caste11e) whose commander 
had to be given presents of food and tuns of wine to keep his men 
from pillaging (31), Such troops were widely distributed round 
France; Genoese soldiers entered the garrison of P~onne in the 
north about this time (32) and Jean Juvena1 records another group 
on guard at St. Jacques gate in Paris against the Burgundians (33), 
whi1 st a Spanish group can be found serving under the Sene)<il,a1 of 
Poitou in November 1417 (34). Slightly later, the guard. of Lyon 
agains't Burgundian attack was entrusted to such people as Mathieu 
de Pa1me (Palma ?) and Barte1emy de Savoye with oth~constab1es 
of troops of crossbowmen of equally foreign origins (35). Sig-
nificant1y, in the light of what was to follow, the Scots begin 
to make an appearance on French battlefields at this time; the 
Parlement of Paris found itself sitting on the case of a Scot con-
,-
testing the Prevot's jurisdiction over a prisoner he had taken in 
Paris itself; he claimed that whatever the regulations concerning 
pr~soners taken in walled towns might be for the French, he, as an 
ally, was only bound by the normal rules of war (36). This fore-
shadows the kind of relationship which later Scottish soldiers were 
(30) A Thomas 'Soldats Italiens au Service de la France IUt 1417' 
Annales du Midi Vol. tV. 1892 p. 69-70. 
(31) Archives D{partmentales (hereafter AD) Loiret, Town Accounts 
of Orl~ans, CC 546 f13vo. 
(32) Monstrelet Vol. III p. 183. 
(33) Juvena1 des Ursins p. 536. 
(34) FF 25766 no. 740-1 bis. 
(35) FF 7858 f332ro-3vo. 
(36) AN X1a 4791 f2l0ro, quoted in :1 Keen The Laws of T.Jar in the 
Late :1iddle Ages London 1965 p. 18. 
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to have with their allies and nominal superiors; it also displays 
very early the kind of attitude with which many Scots were to part-
icipate in the war in France. 
The absence of complete royal accounts for this period makes 
any guesses about the fate of such soldiers very hazardous; even 
identification is an uncertain business and most of the information 
comes in a very fragmented form ~p1it up amongst collections made 
for genealogical purposes or otherwise preserved by chance from the 
destructive impulses of the Revolution. Their generally humble 
origins confuse the situation still further; such men rarely fig-
ure in chronicle accounts and when they do, only appear as a kind 
of anonymous mass. One can hypothesise a little about the destiny 
of the Genoese, but they remain largely elusive. Many, no doubt, 
were taken by the English in Normandy during the course of the 
English advance during 1417-18 and ':,7ere sent back. to Genoa (37) by 
Henry V; when Rouen eventually fell in 1419 one Luca the Italian 
was expressly excluded from a general measure allowing foreign 
troops to depart (38). The Genoese in Paris were much less fortun-
ate; when the city fell to the Burgundians on 29th May 1418 they 
were slaughtered in the strets as the upholders of a government 
well-hated by many Parisians. Jean Juvena1 records his sorrow for 
these essentially innocent victims "Mais ce fut grand pitie des 
pauvres Genovois qui n'estoient que soudoyers"(39). This was by 
no means the end of such companies, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, but their relative importance was never to be the same 
again and they slowly disappear from the records (if not perhaps 
(37) Rymer Foedera First Edition London 1709 etc, Vo1.IX p. 659. 
(38) id p. 667. 
(39) Juvena1 des Ursins p. 541. 
10 
from real life; who can tell how many groups of Genoese crossbow-
men or their Spanish equivalents served peacefully in garrisons 
well away from the main theat~es of war?). Isolated ones can be 
found surprisingly late; as late as 1445 a Genoese called Jehan 
du Chasteau who had come to France some thirty years earlier to 
serve in the wars appealed to the king for letters of remission 
concerning a murder co~tted after his release from an English 
prison in which he had spent some time. He, however, had settled 
in France, judging by the fact that he stated in his appeal that 
he had a wife and three children (40). It would perhaps be too 
much of a coincidence to identify him with another Genoese called 
Jehan du Chastel who was favoured with the aid of St. Katherine de 
Fierboys in a trial by battle in 1428 (41). On the whole though 
times were changing as far as the employment of foreign troops went. 
The defeat of Agincourt, which put such a large quantity of the 
French aristocracy out of the military reckoning, the continuation 
and intensification of the parallel wars against the English in 
Normandy and the Burgundians in the north and round Paris, which 
progressively reduced the areas loyal to the king (and, when mad 
King Charles fell into Burgundian hands, loyal to the Dauphin Charles, 
as Regent of the kingdom) and the considerable confusion as to who 
had the right to represent the crown in France,with the consequent 
confusion and uncertainty as to loyalties - all of these were to 
lead to a much increased military role for foreign troops. The 
three parallel musters on 24th June 1418 in Bourges of the Spanish 
companies of Guille Hersart, Jaime de Perussa and Antoine de 
(40) ~~ JJ 177 no. 175. 
(41) Le Livre des Miracles de Sainte Katherine de Fierbovs, 1375-
1470 ed. Y Chauvin, Archives Historiques du Poitou Vol. LX 
1976 p. 55-7 no. 104. 
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, Pronnente (42) suggest that some kind of Spanish company of men 
at arms may have been being organised, while the Italian Luquin 
Ris went into garrison in Mflun in July 1418 with no less than 
46 men at arms as against 29 crossbowmen (43). The real shift 
probably came in this summer, when the Dauphin was trying to 
establish his administration in Bourges and organising his armed 
forces on the basis of the much-truncated kingdom still left to 
him. From this moment on, foreign troops were considerably more 
than the essentially auxiliary forces they had been in the past; 
they were to become, for the next decade and more, a major, and 
at times, preponderant element in the French royal arm~es. It 
is this development to which I shall now turn in the next chapter. 
(42) Clairambault 59 no. 163, 85 no. 76. 
(43) Clairambault 95 no. 105. 
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Chapter II. The Time of the Great Armies - ~ercenaries 1418-1429. 
The summer of 1418 found both parties ~n the Burgundian-Armag-
nac confrontation looking for foreign aid and reinforcement. Per-
haps predictably the first potential source of this aid to be 
looked to was that traditional ally of France, Scotland. Both 
Armagnac and Burgundian embassies crossed the seas in 1418 (1) and, 
while the Armagnac one was to be crowned with success, this did not 
mean that contacts between the Regent Albany, uncle of the captive 
James I, who was at that point still in English hands, and Burgundy 
were automatically broken off. Indeed it was by no means a fore-
gone conclusion that Scotland would support the claims of the 
Dauphin to be the true head of the French kingdom; one should not 
forget that until the disastrous assassination of Duke John at 
Montereau in the late summer of 1419 there was no Burgundian alli-
ance with England to simplify the issue and the royal family itself 
was totally split on the question. It ~s even possible that the 
Scots made some effort to encourage the French factions to patch up 
their differences in the face of English attack; the truce negot-
iated ~n the summer of 1419 may have had as one aim the easing of 
Scottish military intervention. 
The Armagnac embassy, however, did yield immediate results. 
Not much is known about it or its composition beyond the presence 
of the governor of La Rochelle, the Sieur de Plusquall,c on it (2) or 
about the arguments and inducements used to persuade the Regent and 
the Scottish Estates to agree to the requested aid. Perhaps they 
(1) G du 7resne de Beaucourt Histoire de Charles VII Paris l88l-Y~ 
Vol. I p. 306-8. R Nicholson Scotland in the later '1iddle 
Ages Edinburgh 1974 p. 249. 
en D d'.\ussy La Sai0to:,/-= pendant la Guerre de Cent A0S La Roc~elle 
1894 p. 31. 
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were fairly similar to those used by the parallel embassy which 
went to Castile on a similar errand in September 1419(3). Here 
the French ambassadors ask,:;Jfor an army to be sent against the 
English, ancient enemies of France and Castile as soon as possible 
"for the great honour of the King of Castile" under a corrnnander of 
the highest rank. The troops thus requested would be paid for six 
months. The ambassadors were to go on to give a full account of 
the needs of France and remind the Castilians of past French aid to 
Castile. One could imagine a fairly similar line being used in 
Scotland; apparently the appeals to honour and gratitude were more 
appreciated in Scotland since, while the Scots responded, Castile 
remained deaf to entreaty. Before we consider the forces voted by 
the Estates, however, it is worth looking at what may well have been 
a parallel activity of the ambassadors. This was the recruitment 
of companies which were prepared to set out for France straight away 
to bolster the Dauphin's forces in the lands which were coming to 
be known as the Kingdom of Bourges. Certainly Scottish forces 
begin to .appear in quite substantial numbers in this period, and it 
seems logical to assume that the ambassadors In Scotland were 
largely responsible. 
In this summer of 1418, the Dauphin was fully occupied consol-
idating his hold on a kingdom riddled with disr~~.,ion and doubtful 
loyalties. It is doubtful if Charles, as Dauphin or ki~was ever 
to draw fully on the potential military resources of the areas 
which remained nominally loyal to him in the dark days of the 1420's, 
and at this period his hold over much of the country was highly 
uncertain. Foreign troops were badly needed to fill the gaps and 
recruitment from all quarters proceeded rapidly. Traditional 
(3) FLat 602~ f12 
14 
companies of Italian crossbowmen were still recruited (Guillaume 
Rain and Luquin Brisol both from Piedmont with a combined force of 
some 146 men were retained at Villeneuf-iis-Avignon on the 11th 
November 1418 (4))but more and more they yield place to the 
Scots in increasing numbers. ~ichel de Normanville, Captain of 
a hundred Scottish archers was retained at Loches on 22nd ~ovember 
and elements of his company to the number of 29 moved on to take 
part in the siege of Burgundian-held Tours in December (5). One 
Jehan Stewart, also captain of a hundred archers was retained from 
the 7th October at Niort, which suggests that he had arrived at 
La Rochelle or another port loyal to the Dauphin in that area 
shortly before. (6). Other Scottish troops were sent to reinforce 
garrlsons. On 3rd November Loys d'Escrouilles, commander of the 
/ 
Scots in the garrlson of Melun, issued a receipt for no less than 
102 tuns of wine from the Sieur de Milly out of a total of 200 in 
his possession (7). These were to be distributed, it would seem, 
amongst the troops under his command. 
The following year, well before the much-awaited Scottish army 
reached France, this process continued. Their numbers were suffic-
iently noticeable for Jean Juvenal des Ursins to note the arrival 
and activities of two Scottish knights, Thomas Quelsatry and 
Guillaume du Glas (8) at this time. They are no doubt to be iden-
tified with Guillaume Douglas and his chief lieutenant Thomas Kil-
patrick who appear at t~~e head of 150 men at arms and 300 archers 
(4) FF 7858 f339ro-vo. 
(5) ide f346vo. 
(6) FF 32510 f355ro. 
(7) Clairambault 43 no. 138. 
(8) Juvenal des Ursins p. 546. 
15 
on 27th May at Mthun -sur-'i~v~.t (9). A full list of subordinate 
commanders is given, but the totals of troops fall short by about 
a third of the stated total company strength; perhaps several of 
the"chambres" or subordinate sub-divisions of these companies were 
posted elsewhere and missed review at that point. They reappear 
at Puiset-en-Beauce in August 1419 after a summer of heavy fighting 
at the western end of the line of English advance in Lower Normandy 
and Mainecentring on the Sarthe round Fresnay-le~Vicomte which 
Jean Juvenal recorded (10). This may form the basis of Francisque-
Michel's typically garbled account of the flight and loss of banner 
of a Douglas of Drumlanrig at Yresnay (11). Certainly we find 
Douglas and his men passing review at'Montereau fault Yonne on 
4th September 1419; no doubt they formed part of the forces cover-
ing the Dauphinist side of the fatal bridge before, during and 
after the meeting (12). Several other Scottish companies entered 
the Dauphinist forces during 1419; Guillaume Bel, captain of 30 men 
at arms and 80 archers entered service at Sancerre on 22nd February 
and moved to Gien with 13 of his Esquires (men at arms) in March, 
while Thomas du Seton with 38 men at arms and 120 archers and 
another Guillaume Douglas (there uere two men of that name in France; 
they lie buried together in Orltans Cathedral) with 100 and 200 
respectively recently come from Scotland appear in the accounts of 
Mace Heron, one of the Tr~oriers de}GuerreSfor the period 18th 
August 1418 - 20th October 1419 (13). 
(9) FF 32510 f360ro, 7858 f36lro. 
(10) Juvenal des Ursins p. 546. 
, 
Seton is presumably to be 
(11) J Francisque-Michel Les Ecossais en France, Les Francais en 
Ecosse London 1862 p~.~1-1~8~.~~~----~~~~~----~5~-----
(12) FF 7858 f36lro. 
(13) FF 32510 f362vo. 
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identified with the Thomas D~ston, captain of slightly smaller forces 
in May and June of the year (14). In May, too, Jehan of Liborne 
(perhaps Lorne) was paid for the services of his cnmpany of 18 men 
at arms and 56 archers fighting in Normandy, Maine and Perche under 
the Vicomte de Narbonne (15); an interesting example of Scottish 
forces being mixed with French ones in action (and indeed with 
other foreigners, since at the end of the same month Emilio de 
Plaisence (Piacenza) and his 19 men at arms are paid for their ser-
vice in the same company)(16). There is even an ancestor to the 
later Scots bodyguard of the king in the form of the company of 
James Colbourne and his 38 mounted archers in the Dauphin's own 
company in Septemher (17). Perhaps he can be identified with one 
Jehan Kocbourg (Cockburn ?) reviewed at Bourges in October (18). 
By October, however, the situation was to alter drastically. 
The days of piecemeal reinforcement by the almost random arrival 
of individual Scottish companies to be plunged into the fighting 
in Lower Normandy and the west were to be superseded by intervention 
on a very different scale. The Armagnac embassy in Scotland, 
which we left in the summer of 1418 organising the passage of the 
companies we have been discussing, were looking for something much 
grander. This they obtained from the Scottish Estates, which 
assented to the sending of a force of some 6,000 men under the 
Earl of Buchan, Chamberlain of Scotland and son of the Regent by his 
(14) Clairambault 40 no. 122-3, FF 24000 p.6l. 
(15) Clairambault 65 no. 86. 
(16) Clairambault 86 no. 103. 
(17) FF 24000 p.14. 
(18) Clairambault 33 no. 31. 
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second marriage (19) and the Earl of Wigtown eldest sonl of the 
Earl of Douglas and Buchan's brother-in-law. How many Scots 
actually went to France is very hard to say. The Dauphin claimed 
that 6,000 men had actually gone (20) but this seems an improbably 
high figure given the resources of Scotland (a subject to which I 
. shall return later) and the probability of exaggeration in morale-
boosting letters. Whatever the numbers, such a substantial force 
posed transport problems which could only be solved by Castilian 
help. Negotiations for this began on 22nd March 1419 and were 
successfully completed on 28th June; Castile was to provide a 
fleet of forty ships, each of at least 150 tons and manned by 4,000 
sailors and crossbowmen and 200 men at arms to repel English 
attempts at interception on the way to Scotland. Wages of 119,000 
francs d.' or were paid in advance. The fleet was to assemble off 
Belle Isle and wait there ten days before sailing on to Scotland (21). 
Amazingly, Daumet believed that the fleet never sailed; in the 
light of events an incredible blunder. Preparations on this scale 
were impossible to conceal and by August the government of John, Duke 
of Bedford in England was becoming seriously concerned. On the 12th 
the Earls of Devon and Cornwall were instructed to set out to inter-
cept with their own fleet of twelve ships and "balingers"(smaller, 
barge-like vessels). When it became obvious that these forces were 
likely to be inadequate, one John Hunt was ordered to requisition 
ships allover the south-western ports if necessary (22). By 5th 
September, with the Spanish fleet off Belle Isle, Henry V, campaigning 
(19) The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland ed. G. Burnett Edinburgh 1880 
Vol. IV p. L. 
(20) FF 25710 no. 3. 
(21) d'Aussy p. 31, Daumet p. 73-4. 
(22) Rymer Vol. IX p. 791-2. 
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in France, was concerned about the possibility of a combined 
Franco-Castilian attack on Bayonne and other parts of English 
Gascony (23). In fact the fleet went north as planned, evading 
interception and loading its cargo of troops in September (One of 
the Scottish commanders, John Stewart of Darnley, was still in 
Scotland on the 21st of the month) (24). The return voyage was less 
peaceful; off La Rochelle, the English did manage to make an inter-
ception but were defeated and the fleet came safely to harbour late 
in October (25). The Spanish ships remained in the area for some 
time; 'I on 19th November the town council of St. Jean d'Angely 
found itself having to entertain a Spanish knight come to seek pro-
visions for the fleet. These were not necessarily always forthcom-
ing, since two more Spaniards came back later with a letter from 
the admiral complaining that supplies had not been delivered. 
There were other comings and goings between the town and the fleet; 
the admiral's minstrel and his companion had also to be entertained(26). 
News of the victory reached far; in Lyons on the 1st January 1420 
the Dauphin himself ordered payment to "Sance de Sa'udry" a Spanish 
squire for his services in the defeat of the English and the damage 
done to his ship (27). It is possible that some of the troops who 
served on the fleet may have been tempted into more permanent service; 
certainly, despite the lack of formal Castilian aid, Spanish troops 
can be found in France at this time. The inevitable crossbowmen 
appear in large numbers in 1418 with four companies some 1260 
strong passing review at Nanteuil on 3rd September and some passing 
from there to take part in the siege of Tours (28). Alongside them 
(23)Ryrner id p. 794-5. 
(24)A Stuart A Genealogical History of the Stewarts London 1798 p.115. 
(25)d'Aussy p. 32. 
(26)Arch. Hist. de la Saintoqv .. e et de l'Aunis t XlCXII p. 307-8. 
(27)FF 25710 no. 5. 
(28)~~ K59 no. 20, 12-15, ~5-6. 
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one finds Rodrigo de Alarice and 17 men at arms in the company of 
the Count of Vertus (29) and through the summer of 1419 a steady 
drift of smallish Spanish companies parallel to that of the Scots 
(though much less numerous) can be observed. Jehan d'Avila, 
knight batchelor, and four men at arms entered service on 13th 
November at M{hun- sur~ 'i~v/"~ (30). Some Italians can also be found 
in addition to the one alluded to above fighting in Normandy; 
Bartelmy Ie Lombart and his 18 men at arms passed review at St. 
Brisson on 24th February 1419 (31) and Luqin Ris, already a veteran 
of French warfare, with 19 men at arms was near Le Yans on 24th 
October 1418 (32) after leaving his crossbowmen in M~lun. 
It was, however, the hour of the Scots. The Dauphin informed 
his supporters of their arrival with joy and issued their leaders 
with gifts. The stable accounts illustrate this; on 31st Novem-
ber three coursers were bought and one given later to the Earl of 
Wigtown. Thomas Seton received a similar present shortly after-
wards (33). By no means all the French nobles were totally con-
~inced of the real military utility of the Scots and the Scottish 
chroniclers record some sneers behind their backs (34). The Dauph-
in, who needed them too badly to be able to afford to heed chis 
(29) FF 7858 348vo. 
(30) id 36Ovo. 
(31) id 345ro. 
(32) FF 25766 no. 759-60. 
(33) AN KK53 f2,5 
(34) Book of Pluscarden ed. F Skene Edinburgh l8qO p. 357, Fordun 
Scotichronicon with Bower's Continuation ed. £Goodall 
Edinburgh 1775 p. 359. 
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criticism ignored it, and indeed before the end of the year was pre-
paring the ground for further recruitment in Scotland. As early 
as 27th December he was considering sending Buchan and Wigtown back 
to recruit further and two days later, another letter was sent to the 
Earl of Mar who had expressed an interest in joining the expedition 
to encourage him to come himself and recruit as many other lords as 
he could for the same purpose (35). 
The Scottish forces now available first had to be deployed, 
however. The army was split up; one portion w~~into the garrisons 
facing the Anglo-Burgundians in the Seine valley upstream of Paris 
and in Maine and Anjou in the west (36) while another, perhaps larger, 
set off with the Dauphin on a tour of Languedoc in early spring 1420 
aimed at neutralising the last flickers of Burgundian support in the 
south and assuring the loyalty of the towns and nobility of the 
region (37). Traces of these men can be found in the surviving re-
cords; Marc Balize with his trumpeter, 17 men at arms and 78 arch-
ers at Carcassonne on the 12th March (38) and Andro Banantin with a 
company which fluctuates between 15 and 25 archers moving from L{"LI~ 
on 16th May to Toulouse on 16th June to finish at Cha teaune~f-su~ 
Loire on 25th July (39). He is referred to at times as forming 
part of the Dauphin's bodyguard (40), and he remained in this function 
at least until September, serving alongside other foreign forces in 
this unit. Christin Chambre, a man with a long career before him 
(35) NAF 1001 llro-14vo. 
(36) Scotichronicon p. 459 Jean Raoulet 'Chronique' in Jean Chartier 
Chronique de Charles VII, Roi de France ed. Vallet de Virivil1e 
Paris 1858 Vol. III p. 170 
(37) Raou1et p. 171. 
(38) C1airambau1t 9 no. 28. 
(39) C1airambau1t 10 nos. 185-9, 11 nos. 1-4, 17 no.16. 
(40) C1airambau1t 11 no. 1-4. 
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received the substantial sum of 1066 livres ~ sols tou~ois 
the services of his company in the same role for April 1&2C (~l) 
and Jehan Gonsalle was paid for his company of 2~ mounted c-::-oss-
bowmen i:l February and March (:'2). 
On the whole, however, t~e Scottis~ forces who =or=~c :~e 
bulk of the =oreign troops in France r~ai~ec inactive ~~ 1~20. 
~e fact that their commanders were absent for ~ch o~ the C~-
paigning season in search of rein£orc~ents ~y have contributed 
to this. Buchan and Wigtown, in obedience to the orders of 
December, went home some time i~ 1~20. The eating is rat~er un-
certain; Buchan was probably still i~ ?rance at the end ...,= ,,~~V v .... _C .. 
when he was given a ~orse out of a group ?urchased on :~e 27:~ of 
the month (~3). 3y the 28th July he was back i~ Scotlanc where 
he presented his accounts as chamberlai~ in person rather than by 
deputy (44), only to be back in France by t~e end 0: Au~~st when he, 
with ~igtown and Darnley were again given horses, this ti=e :ro~ a 
batch purchased on 12th August (45). How 2anV ~en this brief .. 
visit produced and the exact date 0= their arrival is uncertain; 
3eaucourt places the number at ~-5,OOO and makes the= arrive i~ 
1421 (~6) but there is very little docucentary evidence to back t~is 
up. Beyond noting that the ~assy cid take place, and accepting 
that s~e reinforcements may have followed from it, however, there 
is very little that one can say with certainty about it. 
before this reinforce~ent, however, some of tbe Scottish forces 
~l) Clairambau1t 28 no. 25. 
(~2) C1airambault 54 no. 23-~. 
(~3) A..'\ KK53 rSvo. 
(:.:..) Exchequer Rolls of Scotland Vol. P.T p. 333. 
(45) A..'\ KK53 fllro. 
(:'6) Beaucourt Vol. I p. 335. 
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were involved in action; those in the garrisons of the river towns 
upstream of Paris. Henry V with his new Burgundian allies laid 
siege to M~lun which had quantities of Scots in its garrison. That 
Henry was aware of the Scottish role in the French armies opposing 
him is apparent from his production of the rather sad figure of the 
captive King of Scots at M~lun in an attempt to persuade the Scots 
to surrender (47). .The stratagem was a failure; the Scots fought 
on and when the town surrendered on the 17th of September, the 
surrender treaty specifically handed English deserters and Scots 
over to the mercy of the English king (48) (a clause to be repeated 
at all later surrenders even when it is less certain that any such 
were present X49). Henry's reaction was simple and brutal; he 
hanged twenty Scots out of hand as traitors to King James (50). 
There are other signs that the English king was becoming concerned 
about the reinforcement of the French army by Scots; the flurry 
of safe conducts granted to Scottish nobles wishing to see their king 
from this time on testifies to a hope that James could influence them 
against taking French service (51) and even perhaps divert some to 
the English side. Indeed, on 30th May 1421 the Earl of Douglas 
(Wigtown's father) was to swear on the gospels to serve Henry from 
the following Easter with 200 men at arms and the same number of 
archers (52), and it is possible to argue that the negotiations for 
(47) Raoulet p. 167-8. 
(48) Monstrelet Vol. IV p. 13. 
\ /. 72 (49) Monstrelet Vol. IV p. 94, Lefevre de St. RemyVol. II p. , 
Jean de Waurin Rec"~'il des Chroniques et Anciennes {5ro .. "..us de 
la Grant Bretaigne ~ Present Nomme Angleterre edt Hardy London 
1868 (Rolls Series), Vo1.I p. 405, Vo1.II p.13, FF 23018 f42Ovo. 
(50) Scotichronicon p. 462. 
(51) e.g. Rymer Vol.X p.18-9, 99-100, 127-8, 153-4 etc. 
(52) id p. 123-4. 
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James' ransom were only begun seriously at this time in the same 
hope of stemming the flow of Scottish aid to France. The surpris-
ing thing is, perhaps, that such a supposedly brilliant strategist 
as Henry V never attempted to cut off the supply in the most con-
crete way by attempting to take La Rochelle, by then the only port 
safely in French hands instead of resorting to such doubtfully 
effective diplomatic means. The failure of his efforts to open an 
effective front in the south-west no doubt militated against such a 
move, but it is also likely that his forces were at full stretch in 
the Seine valley already; hardly a good augury for the future 
strength of English rule in France. 
Certainly, these diplomatic moves in London did not affect the 
Scottish troops in France. The loyalty of their commanders had been 
fortified by a generous distribution of lands by the Dauphin; 
A 
Ch,t\ :. illon-sur ..... rndre to Buchan, Langeais to Seton (who appears thus 
titled in an undated quittance of the period) (53), Dun Ie Roi to 
Wigtown and Concressault to Darnley (54). The army itself had 
been reorganised too, it seems, with the birth of what the French 
were to refer to as the "Army of Scotland". By August 1420, 
Darnley is referred to in the Stable accounts as Constable of Scot-
land (55) which means constable of the Scottish army in France. 
Other signs of this improved internal organisation are evident as 
well. On 12th September, the two William Douglases and Thomas 
"Corpatrick", the latter now called Marshal of the Army of Scotland 
appear in the accounts being paid for their services (56). 
(53) Clairambault 103 no. 90. 
(54) Pluscarden p. 354 AD Cher C793 l7vo. 
(55) AN KK53 fllvo. 
(56) Clairambault ~l no. 143. 
This 
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also illustrates the integration of the men who crossed earlier 
into the main Scottish army. The administrative consequences of 
this reorganisation were considerable, and, for the historian trying 
to trace the activities of the army, very annoying since the Army 
of Scotland, which presumably ~ad its own administration was kept 
almost totally separate from the rest of the French military admin-
istration. While not all Scots belonged to the Army of Scotland, 
and the central administration was in a state of some chaos at this 
point anyway (57), the effective separation of the Scots from the 
rest of the army means that all records have vanished long ago. 
The records of some of Buchan's recruiting ventures, which survived 
until the 18th century would have cast some light on the actual 
organisation of the Scottish army, but they, like so much of the 
archival material of this period went up in flames at the Revolution(58) 
Given this detached position, it was perhaps predictable that the 
Scottish commanders were given privileges with regard to payment of 
their troops. In November 1422, John Stewart of Darnley as Con-
stable in command of all Scottish forces was paid various monies 
for his men "non obstant que Ie nombre des gens d'armes et de 
trait .•. ne soit declaree es dittes lettres" and indeed in early 1423 
when he was ordered to take his men to the Nivernais and Auxerrois 
against the Burgundians, in order to be sure that his men would 
march he was paid 30,000 1ivres tournois in advance for two months 
wages "sans ce que de lui ne des Ecossois il feust tenu de faire ... 
aucunes montres ni revues". (59) This obviously left much scope 
(57) Contamine GES p. 240-53. 
(58) L Mirot 'Dom B~vy et 1es Comptes des Tresoriers des Guerres-
Essai de Restitution d'un fonds Disparu de 1a Charnbre des Comptes' 
Bib1iothe~ue de l'Eco1e des Chartes t82 1925 p. 295. 
(59) Stuart p. 396-9, giving transcriptions of documents now lost. 
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for embezzlement on the part of the commanders; it also means a 
desperate shortage of documentary evidence about the strength and 
movements of the Scottish forces in France for most of their life 
as an independent unit. 
For 1421, however, one has little trouble in following thei~ 
progress from the chronicles, for this was to be the year of their 
greatest victory. Henry V had left France early in the new year, 
leaving his brother, the Duke of Clarence to campaign in the west, 
where the Army of Scotland was operating along with French forces 
under the Sieur de Lafayette. In March the armies faced each other 
/ near Bauge. With Easter coming on, a truce was apparently arranged 
until this holiest weekend was past (60), though the English had 
issued a formal challenge to battle (61). Clarence, however, break-
ing the truce, decided to surprise the allied army (that, at least is 
what the Scottish chroniclers claim) on the Saturday before Easter 
and advanced with such rapidity to accomplish this that he left his 
archers behind (62) and caught the unsuspecting Scots playing ball 
on the banks of a stream behind which their main army lay (63). A 
hastily assembled group of some hundred Scots archers held the only 
bridge under the command of Sir Hugh Kennedy and Robert Stewart of 
Railston against the full weight of the English assault until the 
main Franco-Scottish army had time to organise. When Clarence and 
his men broke through, it was only to find themselves faced with even 
harder fighting against the dismounted allied army. The English 
slowly crumpled under mounting pressure and the death of the Duke of 
(60) Pluscarden P. 354. 
( 61) Juvenal des Ursins p. 564. 
(62) Pluscarden p. 354, Perceval de Cagny Chronique edt H Maranville, 
Paris 1902 p. 119. 
(63) Pluscarden p. 35!t. 
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Clarence,. which the Scottish chroniclers try to make the result of 
a single combat with Buchan, though in a rather confused form, which 
perhaps suggests the real confusion of the duke's death, with several 
Scots (and others - Chastellain has him killed by a Frenchman) hack-
ing at him before he died, turned defeat into disaster. The defeat-
ed English had to pretend to be French to cross the Sarthe safely (64). 
It was a disaster for the English - a windfall for the Scots. The 
Earl of Somerset was taken by Laurence Vernon, the Earl of Huntingdon 
by Sir John Sibbald and other noble captives were made. The Scottish 
commanders, writing to the Dauphin on the evening after the battle, 
sent Clarence's banner with their dispatch and his coronet passed from 
hand to hand in the Scottish army to sett~e debts (65). English 
losses were heavy (Cousinot's estimate of 1050 dead and 600 captured 
seems reasonable) (66) and the news of French victory spread widely; 
in Italy Antonio Morosini received garbled reports which claimed that 
the English had lost 6,000 men (67). 
For the Dauphin, it was a vindication of his recruitment of the 
Scots. If the Scottish chronicles are to be believed, the French 
tried to steal the glory of victory from the Scots and were only 
found out when it became clear that the latter had the majority of 
the prisoners; Charles is reputed to have scolded his nobles for 
having described the Scots as "Mangeurs de moutons et sacs de vin" 
in the past. Certainly the profits flowed to the Scottish leaders. 
(64) For accounts of the battle; Pluscarden p. 354-6, Scotichronicon 
p. 461, Georges Chastellain 'Chronique' in Oeuvres ed. Kervyn 
de Lettenhove Brussels 1863 Vol.I p. 223-5, Juvenal des Ursins 
p. 564-5. 
(65) Pluscarden p. 355-6, Scotichronicon p. 461, Beaucourt Vol.I 
p. 220-1. 
(66) Cousinot de Montreuil 'Gestes des Nobles Francais 'in Chronique 
de la Pucelle ed. Vallet de Viriville Paris 1859 p. 180. 
(67) Antonio :1orosini Chronique ed. Lef~vre-Pont q lis Paris 1898 
p. 199-203. 
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/ Vernon sold the Earl of Somerset to the Dauphin for 40,000 ecus 
and, in addition to receiving the lordship of Montreui1-Bonin in 
Poitou, was still being paid on money owed thirty years later (69). 
In more immediate terms, he and Sibbald were treated to a meal by 
the Dauphin (70). Buchan too, reaped his rewards, being made 
Constable, the highest military officer in France, at some time 
in the year (clothing for the ceremony was ordered in May)(7l). 
Victory even called the Dauphin forth to take the field in person. 
With the army's staff work improved by the posting of the disting-
uished astrologer Germain de Tibouville to Buchan's military house-
hold (72), the combined forces struck into Perche, taking Montmirail 
on the way (73). According to Chastellain, the army, six thousand 
strong attacked Alencon. 
-' 
The garrison, hard pressed, called for 
relief from the Earl of Salisbury, the senior English commander in 
France at that moment. He raised an army only by dint of calling 
out all the garrison troops in Normandy and even then when the 
armies actually faced each other he did not feel strong enough to 
offer battle and withdrew northwards losing some 300 men from his 
rearguard as it was harrassed by the advancing Franco-Scottish army; 
hardly an encouraging sign for the English if one defeat left them 
too weak to risk battle (74). The process of mopping up now isol-
ated towns continued. Gaillardon was stormed with great slaughter 
(69) For size of ransom, see Arsenal 4522 f18vo. Lordship i~ Poitou, 
see H Filleau Dictionnaire des FamilIes de l'ancien P01tou 
Poitiers 184.)'-54 Vol. II p. 791, for continual payment, FF 325 tl 
f140ro (account for l45l)al~o AN K168 no. 21. 
(70) AN KK50 f2vo. 
(71) ide f9vo. 
(72) Simon de Phares Recw~il des Plus C~lebres Astrologues et Quelque\ 
Hommes Doctes ed. Wicke,-'heimer Paris 1929 p. 250-1. 
(73) Perceval de Cagny p.12l, Juvenal des Ursins p. 566. 
(74) Chastellain Vol.I p.227-30. 
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as the advance towards Chartres continued; in this town, while 
English prisoners were spared for ransom, Burgundian supporters 
were murdered (75). The anonymous Bourgeois of Paris complains 
of Scots raiding round the city in this period (76). In this 
campaign too, one finds a receipt issued by Wigtown, now elevated 
to Count of Longueville as his reward for victory, for a linen 
banner and a four wheeled cart from the master of the artillery 
(perhaps to carry his share of the plunder 1)(77). These days of 
easy campaigning were to end abruptly before Chartres was reached 
with the return of Henry from England with fresh troops. He pushed 
down as far as Chartres but the allied armies evaded battle and 
Henry settled down to recapture positions lost in the course of the 
disastrous summer. By 15th August he in his turn was besieging 
I 
Dreux and the feudal landholders of the Dauphine as well as the 
town militias were called out to relieve the place. They were 
ordered to assemble at Blois, with the Lords of Scotland and other 
I~ 
captains assembling at Vendome(78). There is no record as to 
whether any such expedition took place, though the Scottish army was 
apparently engaged on successful campaigning around Beaugency in 
September which was reported by royal letters to the Consuls of 
Lyons (79). By the winter of 1421, as the Scots settled into winter 
quarters (Darnley's brother with 17 men at arms at Rochefoucault, 
for instance (80)) the Dauphin was yet again casting around for 
further foreign reinforcement. 
(75) Pluscarden p. 358-9, Scotichronicon p. 462, Juvenal des :Jrsins 
p. 566. 
(76) Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris edt Tuetey Paris 1881 p. 139. 
(77) Clairambault 41 no. 144. 
(78) Ordonnances Vol.XI p. 126. 
(79) J Deniau La Commune de Lyon et La Guerre Bourguignon~(1417-35) 
Paris 1934 p. 405. 
(80) Stuart p. 120. 
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Certainly, more troops had been acquired during the course of 
1420-1. tn 
autumn 1420, the Spanish in the Burgundian army had deserted to the 
Dauphin en bloc, including Villandrando. In his case the transfer 
of allegiance could be more nominal than real; in February 1421 
he was to help his old commander L'Isle-Adam to escape from the 
Vicomte de Narbonne in the Gatinais (81). This did his career 
with the Dauphin no apparent harm s~nce on 2nd April he and his 
19 men-at-arms were paid 320lt as part of Amaury de Severac's 
company (82). Other Spaniards flit through the fragmentary re-
cords; Diego de Sales with 19 men at arms in Jehan de Torcy's 
company at Beaugency on 12th September 1420 and Pierre de Seville 
with 14 in the same place on 10th October of the same year (83). 
In the winter of 1421, however, the Dauphin was looking over 
the Alps for more substantial aid than these Burgundian deserters 
could give. He wanted Italian troops from his Visconti ally in 
Milan to break the stalemate which was in some danger of developing 
with neither side strong enough to win outright victory. Already 
in 1421 a contingent under "Le Borgne Caqueran" (his real name is 
hopelessly lost in the mists of French mispronounciation) had come 
into his service and been used againat the Burgundians threatening 
t~e communications with Lyon and the south-east; on 20th June he 
I 
had taken La Charite-sur-Loire from the independent commander in the 
Burgundian pay Perrinet Gressart, and followed this by the capture 
of Cosne on 20th August. 
(81) Quicherat p. 12, 18. 
(82) FF 24000 p. 18. 
These successes brought him due rewards; 
(83) Clairambault 100 no. 119, 103 no.97. 
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he was made captain of Queyras and Lord of St. Georges l'Esperanche 
in the Dauphin( (84). Now he was to be reinforced; if 1419-21 
had" been the time of the Scots, 1422 was to be the year of the 
"Lombards" (so-called, it would appear, more from their recruiting 
ground than necessarily their area of origin within Italy). On 
26th November the Dauphin was to be found pawning or selling crown 
lands to raise the 6,000 {cus needed to pay for infantry (targons) 
and heavily armoured cavalry from Lombardy. These were to be re-
cruited by Bertrand de St. Aust and Philippe de Grimault (perhaps 
a Grimaldi in French disguise) (85). On March 31st the entire 
revenues of the Dauphint were devoted entirely to the war effort, 
with more lands to be placed on sale or otherwise used to raise the 
money necessary to pay the army, both native and foreign (Scottish 
and Lombard contingents) (86). In 1422 the promised Lombards had 
duly come; while Theaulde de Va1pergue, another man with a long 
French career before him, brought his 250 men at arms over the Alps, 
another French embassy of Jean Cateran and Antoine Dosuen, sent over 
the Alps in their turn to look for men in Lombardy succeeded in 
hiring a number of captains with an indeterminate number of lances 
for one year. These lances were arranged according to Italian 
custom with three men in them (one man at arms, one "valet", less 
armoured who could be used as a light cavalryman and a page) and 
were to be paid 46! ecus per lance for the year (87). Imbert de 
Groslee, Bai1li de Macon and Senechal of Lyon was given pay for his 
(84) Deniau p. 409,H de Flamare Le Nivernais pendant La Guerre de 
Cent Ans Paris 1913-25 Vol. I p. 136. 
(85) Ordonnances Vol. XI p. 141-2. 
(86) id p. 159. 
(87) Arsenal 4522 f17ro-vo. For Italian Lance structure, see X 
Mallett Mercenaries and their masters, Warfare in Renaissance 
Italy London 1974 p. 148. 
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200 crossb9wmen and targons defending Lyonswhile Jean Van of Lombardy 
received money for his 130 "enfans a pied" in the garrison of La 
Charitl (88). The general impression is one of great bustle in the 
south-east and Dauphine'; by 5th June the Consuls of Lyons, men with 
a healthy fear of all troops in passage were in negotiation with 
Valpergue over allowing his men through the town, stating that they 
would only let them through in groups of fifty at a time, each 
/ 
following a prearranged route. The Senechal, de Groslee, interven-
ed on the 8th to settle matters and the Lombards duly passed through 
the town (89). 
In the end these much-heralded reinforcements did comparative-
~little of note (or at least enough note to reach chroniclers' ears). 
1422 was a fairly quiet year in military terms. Henry V remained 
in the Seine valley concentrating on the reduction of remaining 
Dauphinist strongholds south of Paris. The Scottish army remained 
in the west where Buchan was to take Avranches (90), while the Lom-
bards seem to have remained in the east opposing the comparatively 
quiescent Burgundians. Some at least, however, did reach Bourges 
where they were added to the immediate military household of 
Charles (91) who, with the death of his mad father had now become 
Charles VII. The more important death, however, had come earlier; 
that of the old man's newly designated heir, Henry V of England. 
The Scottish chroniclers record his final days with some relish; 
struck down with dysentry (or St. Fia~es's disease) after his troops 
(88) Arsenal 4522 f17ro. 
(89) Deniau p. 411-2, CGuigue Registres Consulaires de 1a Ville de 
Lyon Vol.II Lyon 1926 p.8. 
(90) Scotichronicon p. 463. 
(91) Stuart p. 11. 
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had pillaged a monastery dedicated to the saint, who was also 
known as St. Fergus and was the sou of a Scottish king, he expired 
raving about Scots "That is an accursed nation. Wherever I go I 
find them under my nose. No wonder they are savage and revenge-
ful in life when they wreak such cruel vengeance after death"(92). 
Despite this morale-boosting event, and the consequent politi-
cal reorganisation on the English side to cope with a king who was 
a child under a year old with John, Duke of Benford taking over as 
Regent in France, the beginning of 1423 brought disturbing weakness-
es in the position of the new king Charles to light. To break up 
the continuing English siege operations in the Seine 8Aslw., a large 
combined force of French, Scots and Lombards was assembled under 
Buchan in February; on 26th January the Sieur de Fontaines was paid 
for moving his men up to join Buchan (93). On the road north, 
however, the operation collapsed in confusion and acrimony. Accord-
ing to Cousinot, the army broke up because it was unpaid (94) and 
the admittedly pro-Burgundian Bourgeois of Paris reports a furious 
Buchan saying that he had been betrayed by Tanguy du Chaste1 (95) 
and returning to Scotland in annoyance. On the other hand, the 
anonymous Chronicle des Cordeliers and Monstre1et report a bitter 
dispute between Buchan and his subordinate commanders about the 
order of battle.(96). In the light of subsequent events this div-
lSlon at the highest levels of command has a ring of truth about it; 
one suspects that the French never fully accepted the idea of a 
(92) Pluscarden p. 358. 
(93) FF32510 f365ro. 
(94) Cousinot p.189. 
(95) Bourgeois de Paris p. 184. 
(96) FF23018 f~33ro. Monstre1et Vo1.IV p. 137. 
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foreigner as supreme commander of their armies and did their best 
to make his life difficult. The question of pay, too, sounds like-
ly, especially since we know that as far back as 25th May 1422 Tan-
guy du Chastel was lending the king 5415 ;cus to cover part of the 
wages of the Army of Scotland (97). With the slow disintegration 
of the French military administration throughout this period ~vas combined 
the chronic financial weakness of the Dauphin compelled to run a 
full-scale administration on the revenues of only part of France. 
In theory he could hope to extract around half a million livres or 
more from the lands under his control (and indeed in 1424 was to be 
voted a total ofl.3 million)i the problems of collection were however no 
doubt severe and his ability to enforce payment limited by the need 
to maintain loyalty. Military expenses were taking up a vast pro-
portion of the available finance; the accounts of the Tresoriers 
des-Guerres in Langued~il alone (and they were, in this confus~c 
period far from being the only people paying military expenses) for 
the period December 1422-3 show outgoings of 219,412 It (98) . 
How much of this went to foreign troops is uncertain, though we 
know that the Army of Scotland was paid 30,000 It as the wages for 
two months which would mean that it was eating up a huge proportion 
of available funds. The general impression is of severe financial 
problems and pay often in arrears being supplemented by irregular 
levies, but this general question will be dealt with in more detail 
in the second half of this work. Certainly a lack of pay and the 
collapse of the Seine operations did not mean a break-up of the 






Arsenal l7vo., Contamine GES p. 241, 245-50. 
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later in the year (99) and another Scottish force under Darn1ey 
helped to repel an English thrust towards Bourges at Issod 'J,#~\ (100) 
in the early summer. Nevertheless worrying cracks ;Tere beginning 
to appear in the French military structure and the relationship 
with its foreign auxiliaries. 
Almost from the beginning, for instance, the Scots had shown 
a distressing tendency to indiscipline. As early as 31st December 
1420 the tax 'lfficia1s of the Tours area were paying twelve livres 
to a deputation sent to the Dauphin's chancellor at Chinon seeking 
orders which would make Scottish troops pillaging the area round 
the city move on (101); the beginning of a theme which was to run 
like a repeated motto through the deliberations of the town admin-
istration for the next fifteen years or so. O·ne cou ld count 
the costs involved in the entertainment of passing Scottish military 
dignitaries as useful and necessary expenditure to keep them on 
good terms with the town (and both Tours and Orleans were generous 
in their gifts); both Darnley's brother and Buchan received gifts 
from Orleans in 1421 while to improve the reception of certain re-
quests made to Buchan in May 1422 he was presented with wine, armour 
and plate (102). Other presentations followed more severe pressure 
and reflect a less pleasant reality. The Countess of Buchan was 
given the equiualent of a civic reception at Tours in June 1422 with 
twelve torches burning at her entry as she brought news that her 
husband was gathering up Scots pillaging Touraine; these stragglers 
(99) Cousinot p. 190. 
(100) Perceval de Cagny p. 129. 
(101) AD Indre-et-Loire EE2. 
(102) AD Loiret CC 548 7vo. 8vo. 2lvo. For similar gifts presented 
by Tours AD Indre-et-Loire CC 19 83vo. 
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from the army had already occasioned another trip to the court at 
Chinon to complain (103). It would appear that Buchan was not 
unduly successful; by the following month Scots were to be found 
laying siege to Montrichard and pillaging in the countryside. 
Another pair of Scottish commanders, Guille Bell and Colin Descer-
ville were sent to try their powers of persuasion, the latter 
prodded by his wife who lived in Tours herself and received visits 
from the councillors (as well, no doubt, as a part of the 300 It 
which this apparently successful operation cost the town) (104). 
By 1423 the Tourangeq~yhad few illusions; when three Scottish 
commanders visited the town on 7th March they were well entertained 
in the hope that they could be persuaded to keep their men upstream 
of the town and move on as soon as possible (105). The expense 
seems to have been worthwhile; there are no reports of pillage on 
this occasion. 
Nobody was safe from the depredations of the Scots; the 
Dauphin's household accounts for the first half of 1421 record the 
~ loss by the ma1tre de la chambre des deniers of 527 livres parisis 
stolen by the Earl of Buchan's men operating from his lands at 
Ghatillon-sur-Indre as well as a trip by one of the royal household 
in early March with one Jehan de Crenat (could he perhaps be the 
Bishop-elect of Caithness much used in embassies to Scotland at this 
period and who seems to have acted as some kind of recruiting-agent 
in Scotland?) to retrieve the accounts and archives of the house-
hold stolen along with a horseload of silver. 
(103) AD Indre~t-Loire CC 19 f84ro, 86ro-vo. 
(104) id 86vo, 87ro. 
(105) id CC 20 f66vo. 
The accounts were 
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recovered, but the money had to be left to Buchan to enable him to 
buy a horse; presumably this was his reward for helping in the 
recovery of the rest (106). Not surprisingly Scots archers of the 
boydguard seem to have been much used on escort duties when money 
was being transferred (107). At the other end of the social scale, 
a partridge-hunter called Jean de Pons of Grand Musnet near Vierzon 
in Berry was taken along with six other men w~rking in the fields 
by a party of Scots (who probably belonged to Darnley's army fight-
ing the English around Bourges) on 6th June 1423 and hanged from 
the nearest tree because the Scots had been having trouble with the 
local people. Jean, however, prayed to St. Katherine of Fierboys 
and was saved by her when the rope broke (108). 
The trouble which these auxiliaries might cause and the pro-
blems posed by their payment did not discourage Charles from wanting 
to recruit still more. The Scottish archers of his bodyguard were 
retained: Jehan du Cygne was paid for his 26 men from 3rd January 
1423, and recruitment continued (109). Caqueran was sent back to 
Lombardy in search of more men from there (110). Further efforts 
were made to tap Castilian resources on an organised basis; the 
4r .... (~~I~~I'0f Tours had gone in January 1420 to visit the kirg and other 
great nobles to discuss the "great affairs" of the Dauphin (111), 
while in 1421 efforts were even made to persuade the Castilians to 
pay some of the costs of the Scottish army (112). Instructions 
(106) AN KK50 l5ro, l3ro. 
(107) id f13vo. l4ro. 
(108) Miracles ~v. St( Katherine p. 49 no.95. 
(109) FF 32510 364ro. 
(110) id 364vo. 
(Ill) Clairambault 52 no.78. 
(112) Daumet p. 81. 
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for Ambassadors to Castile were issued in November 1422 which dealt 
with attempts to hire Castilian ,galleys, to tempt the Castilians into 
an attack on English-held Guienne, which they claimed was weakly 
held, with an army of 5-600 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers. Nothing 
came of these approaches either. In the end, it was again to Scot-
land that Charles was forced to look~ In the rather confusing 
entries to Dom Bevy's genealogical compilation (113), one 4'~drew 
Kainzie, noted in 1419 as one of Darnley's men is paid 1,000 livres 
in 1422 to go and do recruiting in Scotland (114). It is probable 
that a steady trickle of small groups found their way to France 
throughout this period, but something rather grander was in the a1r 
from late 1422 onwards. On 20th October of that year we find the 
king making financial arrangements for the transport, feeding and 
, 
wages of up to 8,000 men with some 9,300ecus and a portion of one 
of the crowns to be pawned for extra money. Some of this was to 
go to Scotland with an embassy; the rest was scattered around 
twenty small depositaries in La Rochelle) Niort and other towns in 
the west (115). Perhaps the appointment of Darnley's brother as 
captain of the Tower of the "chesne" in La Rochelle generally in 
control of the harbour area (116) in the same part of late 1422 is 
connected with this. Certainly the departure of the Earl of Buchan 
in 1423 was not simply due to annoyance at the failure of his oper-
ations; he was to head the embassy to Scotland. On 17th May, the 
king stated that the Lords of Scotland "de leur grant liberalite se 
soit gracieusement offers et presentes nous aider et secourir 
(113) On this, see Mirot, though he makes a much rosier estimate of 
the completeness and general useability of this than I would. 
(114) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. III under Kainzie (the volumes are largely 
unpaginated). 
(115) AN J ~ 7 5 no. 98, (3,4). 
(116) Stuart p. 121. 
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moyennant que nous leur deussions envoyer certaine somme d'argent, 
navires, vivres et autres choses". To expedite the organisation 
of this expedition, the king intended to send an embassy over, and 
this was to be given the fullest powers to deal with shippers in all 
matters concerning timing, costs, hiring and all other relevant 
matters. These powers are backed with repeated promises not to 
query any costs they might incur in any way, resounding orders to 
the Chambre des Comptes to pass all bills without any dispute, and 
if all else failed, "plain pouvoir, auctorite et mandement especial 
de y obliger et submettre tous et chacuns de nos biens, meuble et 
immeubles, presents et avenir" (117). Backed by these promises 
(in themselves a considerable commentary on the operations of the 
financial office and the dubious nature and effectiveness of royal 
promises of payment under more normal circumstances), the earl and 
his fellow ambassadors set forth for Scotland in early summer 1423. 
The absence of Buchan certainly did not condemn the Army of 
Scotland to an inactive role in the summer of 1423. After the 
operations in Berry, Darnley (now rewarded further for his loyal 
services by the gift of Aubigny-suL-N~re in Berry, given to aid him 
in maintaining his estate) on 22nd March 1423 (118) moved into 
Champagne against the Burgundians. According to Berry Herald, he 
was supposed to be moving to the relief of Mousson but disobeyed 
orders to exploit an opportunity which had arisen (119). A Savoy-
ard in Burgundian service, the Bastard cr Baume had defected to the 
(117)",.,: Marchegay quotes 
l'Histoire Maritime 
Savantes 6th series 
this in extenso in 'Documents Relatifs a , .," / 
au XVe Siecle' Revue Des Soc:'et:td" 
tIl 1875 p. 161-3. 
(118) AN K168 no. 20, AD Cher C 1046 39vo-4lro. 
(119) Gilles Ie Bouvier (Herault Berri) 'Chronique de Charles VII' 
in Godefroy Histoire de Charles VII p. 369. 
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French side with some of his men, and after a summer of betrayal and 
counter-betrayal, was besieging the rest of his former company in 
Cxavant in the Morvannais (120). Darnley linked up with him despite 
a lack of cannon which was never remedied (121) and the move seems 
to have been supported by the king since he was reinforced by a 
mixture of Spaniards and other more or less undisciplined routier 
forces under Severac and Ventadour (122) to the number of 400 men 
at arms. The garrison were at the limits of their resistance when 
relief arrived with Anglo-Burgundian military co-operation actually 
being effective for once. To proceed to the relief they had, 
however, to force a passage of the Yonne against a French army well 
positioned on a hill overlooking the main bridge. It was a grim 
battle, the best description of which is to be found in the anonymous 
chronicle known as the "Livre des Trahisons" wri tten by a man W*Oa4' 141 
strongly inclined to take as an eye-witness (123). The Earl of 
Salisbury, commander of the English army, had his men assail the 
French across the bridge while other sections of his army sought 
another crossing-point upstream (124); some of them went into the 
river to wade across in the teethd Scottish archery, aided by a 
Lombard contingent "tous armes en harness complet" in holding the 
bridge against the English. The combination of English archery 
and cannonfire pushed the Scots back far enough to aid the Burgund-
ians in crossing and to expose the Lombard flank to English archery 
at closer range which began to expose weaknesses in their armour 
(120) Waurin Vol.II p. 42-60. 
(121) Bouvier p. 369. 
(122) id p. 370 'Les Vigilles de Charles VII' in Les Poesies de 
Martial de Paris dit d'Auvergne ed. Coustelier Paris 1724 
Vo1.I p. 50-1. 
(123) 'Livre des Trahisons de France envers 1a Maison de Bourgogne' 
in Chroniquss Relatives a l'Histoire de 1a Belgique sous la 
Domination des Dues de Bourgogne ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove 
Brussels 1870-6 Vo1.II p. 169-70. 
(124) FF 23018 f438vo-9ro. 
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until theifled for the horses (it was noted by all the chroniclers 
that the French fought on foot in this battle "tous a piet comme les 
Engles ll as the Livre des Trahisons puts it) to the loud curses and 
insults of the Scots thus left to their fate. The French, now 
assailed on three sides as the forces which had crossed upstream came 
into the fight and the garrison sallied out to help, crumpled and 
collapsed. Their' losses in dead and captured were heavy and var-
iously estimated; Martial d'Auvergne puts them at 1,000 while the 
official English list of enemy slain and taken comes up with the 
optimistic figure of 8,000 (125). The bulk, both from this list 
andother chronicle accounts seem to have been Scots (126), perhaps 
I 
as Waurin says because they were in the vanguard and had the hard-
est fighting (127). Darnley himself was captured and lost an 
eye (128) and lengthy lists of more or less recognisable Scottish 
names can be found in all the accounts (129) as having been killed 
or captured. Not only the noble and notable suffered; the 
occasional ferocity which could erupt even among combat~nts from 
time to time can be guessed at from the entry in the French accounts 
concerning the payment of ransoms of twenty Scots archers by the 
king to save them from hanging (130) and another ordinary Scottish 
soldier, a 17 year old archer called Peter Forest who was probably 
captured at this battle lay for two years in an English prison 
unable to find any way of paying a ransom until, fearing he would 
(125) Martial d'Auvergne p. 51 Letters and Papers Illustrative of~i1r;w4~'>J.;ri+£'r::iJ;'I"i'.1 
J:M~c.!'n~/trlYJ;he Reign of Henry VI ed. Rev. J. Stevenson, Rolls Series 
London 1861 Vol.II Part II p.385 quoting Harleian Hs 782 f51. 
(126) Monstrelet Vol.IV p.16l. 
(127) Waurin Vo1.II p. 68; he puts losses at around 4,000. 
(128) id p. 68, Monstre1et p. 62. 
(129) id p.62, Waurin p. 69. 
(130) Arsenal 4522 f19ro. 
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die there, he joined the English army (131). Another Scot 
carried an arrowhead about in his head for 8 years from Cravant 
until St. Katherine appeared to him in a dream and extracted it for 
him (132). The king on the other hand did his best to minimise 
the defeat; in a letter which speaks volumes about the ambiguous 
situation of foreign troops written to the Consuls of Lyon he says 
"Tous ~loyes n'y avoit il au dit si~ge que tres peu et connne rien 
des nobles de nostre royaume mais seulement Escoz, Espaignaulx et 
autre gens estrangiers qui avoient accoustume de vivre sur Ie pays, 
et par quoy Ie dommage n'en est pas si grant" (133) 
However scornful Charles might choose to be, he could hardly 
do without these same foreigners. Whether the Lombards who played 
such an inglorious role at Cravant were part of the reinforcement 
brought by Caqueran is uncertain; if fHfY W_~l>i# they were to redeem 
themselves in September at La Bussi~re in the M~connais when, under 
/ 
the command of Imbert de Gros1ee they defeated the Burgundian forces 
threatening Lyon. The 5-600 Lombard men at arms under Caqueran and 
Va1pergue played a major part in the victory with their heavy armour 
and their habit of armouring their horses giving them a big advan-
tage (134). The Marshal of Burgundy was captured and traded for 
Darn1ey (135) (though there must have been a cash ransom as well, 
since he was given 500 It towards it in 1425 (136) and as late as 
(131) AN JJ 179 no. 136. 
(132) Miracles ~'. Stt.Katherine p. 69 no. 113. , 
(133) L Cail1et Etude sur 1es Relations de la Commune de Lyon avec 
Charles VII et Louis XI Paris-Lyon 1909 p. 106-7. 
(134) Bouvier p. 370, Cousinot p. 221 on armoured Lombard horses, 
P1uscarden p. 361. 
(135) Bouvier p. 370, Cousinot p. 221. 
(136) Lady Elizabeth Cust Some Account of the -»:4~"\-; of Aubig:1Y 
in France (1422-1672) London 1891 p. 10-11, :lGA Vale Charles VII 
London 1974 p. 33. 
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26th January 1427 was writing to the Lyonnais asking for financial 
/ 
help in repaying 6,000 ecus borrowed from Tanguy du Chastel for the 
same purpose (13!)). The victory brought the Lombards profit in 
their turn; on 2nd October the king was to write sternly reminding 
the Consuls of Lyon that half of the 2,500 1ivres to be raised in 
taxes in the town was earmarked for new armour for the Lombard 
troops and demanding that they cease to hold up payment (138). 
It is no doubt these men who figure in another set of accounts as 
having. entered service on 26th July under the Count of Va1pergue 
and pass review at St. Laurent de Baigny near Lyon on 1st October 
with the "Count" (in fact, if this is Theau1de, his claim to the 
title is highly dubious) and his nine lieutenants named at the head 
of a force of 200 lances (139). At some time, probably in the 
following spring the full Lombard force of 600 cavalry and 1,000 
infantry (140) moved into the Nivernais and captured Cufy and La 
Guierche, aided in the =ormer enterprise at least by none other 
than Vi1landrando and the Spaniards of his company (141). 
During this summer of 1423, the Earl of Buchan was fully 
occupied in Scotland raising yet another army to support the French 
cause. His mission gained an added urgency with the start of 
negotiations with the English over the ransom of King James. One 
of the main English demands as contained in the instructions to the 
English ambassadors of 6th July was that the Scottish troops in 
(137) Cai11et p. 85-6. 
(138) Cai11et p. 338-9 (No. XXXVII). 
(139) FF 32510 f364vo-5ro. 
(140) Bouvier p. 370. 
(141) id p. 370, Raou1et p. 183-4, Martial d'Auvergne p. 52, F1amare 
Vol. I p. 176. 
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in France be withdrawn as well as an assurance that no more would 
go there (142) and it was a Scottish negotiating triumph that the 
final treaty contained no such demands when it was signed in 
December (143). By then, however, the arrangements for the army 
were well underway. Agreement had been reached at Stirling on 
6th October; the French as usual agreed to provide the transports 
while the Scots allowed French recruitment in Scotland and promised 
not to aid the English or Burgundians in any way. Scots were to 
be given full rights in France (144) • Arrangements for the hire 
of ships were well in hand. An agreement 'pith Perruche de la Sau 
which has survived gives some idea of the terms; Perruche, master 
of the balinger Sainte Marie, a Castilian Captain, agrees to remain 
at Dumbarton (where he was apparently moored when the contract was 
drawn up) or Greenock from the 6th November for a month. He was 
to be paid I! ecus per ton of his 140 ton ship, half to be paid in 
Scotland and half at La Rochelle a month after the Scots had been 
landed. A bonus of a thousand crowns was to be split among the 
twelve Spanish captains involved in ratio to their tonnage, and 
sundry other clauses c () vered compensation for the loss of the ship 
or extra expenses caused by bad weather. The ambassadors solemnly 
engaged royal property to ensure that he would be paid in time, 
promised to press the king to houour his debts to Perruche and his 
fellow-captains and, in the final analysis, agreed to pay themselves 
out of their own resources if all else failed; at the head of the 
(142) Rymer Vol. X p. 294-5. 
(143) id p.302-7 For the provisions expressly excluding the Scots 
ln France from the truce, see p.33l. 
(144) AN J 677 no. 20. 
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group of ambassadors we find the Earl of Douglas who had agreed to 
cross to France and replace Wigtown, who had returned to Scotland 
with the embassy (145). All these transactions are dated 26th 
October. Perhaps predictably, payment was late and probably never 
made in full; a full list of captains, including Perruche, has 
survived. In this, the king asks for more time to pay the debts 
in full following a partial distribution (146). Perruche clearly 
had little faith in the assignments of local tax revenues distribut-
ed in this partial repayment; his misfortunes are known to us 
because he gave all the documents (including the assignment of 433 
crowns) to the Abbey of Orbestier as security for a loan of 347 
crowns. (147). The very considerable discount which the abbey 
charged indicates the proble,matical nature of their chances of 
obtaining repayment from royal officials. The overstretched nature 
of royal finances is apparent elsewhere; Henri de Plusquall~~ 
as governor of La Rochelle, was forced to plunge himself deep into 
debt to local merchants to finance the transport of the Scottish 
army. He had to cross to Scotland personally on the king's behalf: 
unable to repay him, Charles granted him the lands of Taillebourg 
in February 1424 in the hope that this would enable him to repay 
some of the debts (148). Indeed the financial situation was so 
serious that in January, Charles disbanded all the companies of men 
at arms in the kingdom apart from the Scots, the Lombards and a few 
others due to the cost of paying them. Under the circumstances, 
(145) Marchegay p. 160-3. On the same day, Douglas formally promls-
ed to cross by 6th December - AN J 680 no. 80. 
(146) Stevenson Vol.II Part I p. 18-23. 
(147) Marchegay p. 163. 
(148) AN J 183 no. 136, 141. 
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however, this desperate manoeuvre was never effectively carried 
out (149). Despite these problems, the Scots sailed for France; 
the fleet was split up by storms with some landing at St. Mahe-de-
Fine-Posterne (150) as well as La Rochelle. St. Jean d'Ang~ly, 
after giving a dinnercr fish to a Scottishffiquire called Thomas 
Onel and his five companions in February, found itself called upon 
to give "good cheer" to Buchan and Douglas in the shape of wine, 
fish and a torchlit entry with the mayor going out to meet them with 
the best accompaniment possible (151) on 27th March. 
The Scottish army marched towards Bourges immediately. Doug-
las in his turn was lavishly rewarded for his adhesion to the 
French cause. He was first named "Lieutenant-General sur Ie fait 
de guerre pour tout Ie Royaume J.< ia France" - an unusual ti tIe whose 
precise significance is far from clear. It seems possible to me 
that it was intended to give him some kind of equal status with 
Buchan - perhaps as commander of the Army of Scotland - while Buchan 
as Constable commanded the French forces in some kind of joint 
command. Following this elevation he was also glven the Duchy of 
Touraine. This had been Charles' duchy before his accession to 
the throne. The donation included the towns of Tours and Loches 
and was given in hereditary right as much for the past services of 
Wigtown as for those which Douglas was expected to perform (152). 
Donation was made at Bourges on 19th April; the news provoked a 
flurry of activity in Tours which sent a messenger on the 24th to 
(149) Doat 9 p. 279. 
(150) Cousinot p. 195. 
(151) Arch Hist Sainto*~e Vol.XXXII p. 342, 345. 
(152) AN XIa 8604 f45ro-46vo. AN J680 no. 79, FLat 10187 f2ro-3vo. 
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find out the truth of rumours concerning the donation (153) and 
proceeded to begin preparations for the entry of the new Duke (154). 
In Bourges, the Scottish army was reviewed on the 24th and its 
numbers put at 2,500 men at arms and 4,000 archers, while Darnley 
had his own contingent of 150 men at arms (by this point he was out 
of captivity and had not gone on the pilgrimage sometimes attribut-
ed to him in this period (155), although he drops out of the records 
for most of the year and could have been almost anywhere). In 
comparison, Arthur of Richemont, the Breton recently deserted from 
the English camp, had 2,000 men at arms and 1,500 archers (156). 
Even allowing for some exaggeration, the size of the Scottish army 
is amazing (especially since there may well have been Scottish 
companies not included in this review), considering that the pop-
ulation of Scotland for this period was in the half million range 
and her greatest military efforts rarely produced armies of much 
above 20,000 men. 
This done, Douglas set off to make formal entry to his new 
duchy. On 3rd May, one of his councillors visited the council of 
Tours; the next day a deputacion set off to meet him at Loches to 
conduct him to the city which he entered on the 7th at 3 o'clock in 
afternoon, receiving the keys of the city at the Porte de la Roche 
(157), It was a splendid spectacle, though how sincere the 
(153) Indre-et-Loire BB 22 (Volume unfoliated) deliberation of 
24th April CC 21 85ro. 
(154) id BB 22 29th, 30th April. 
\ . . 
(155) A Grandilhon Ville d'Aubigny-sur/~ere - Inventalre Sommalre 
des Archives Communales Anterieur ~ 1790 Bourges 1931 p. 4. 
(156) FF 20684 p. 541-2 for all review strengths. 
(157) Indre-e~-Loire BB 22 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th May. 
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professions of joy and fidelity of the notables of the city (which 
the previous winter had been buying torches and lanterns to patrol 
the streets effectively at night for fear of the Scots) could be is 
another matter (158). Certainly the honeymoon was brief; by 19th 
June the council was sending deputations to Douglas to complain 
about the behaviour of his men and to ask him to move them out of 
the town, an errand repeated on 5th July (159). Matters probably 
only really improved when the army marched out to fight the English 
on -4th August (160); all the gifts distributed to Douglas' son 
James, Buchan or Adam Douglas, the captain of the town for his 
namesake,seem to have made little difference (161). 
In the meantime, Charles was still looking for extra troops 
from Milan. On 29th June Francesco Maria Visconti agreed to a 
treaty at Abiate by which he promised to send whatever troops Milan 
could spare in four months. How many troops actually came is un-
certain; perhaps very few given that Visconti was at war with 
Venice at this time (although he did inform the captains of the 
quarters of Milan of the alliance in February 1425 (162)). The 
discipline of the Italians already in France left much to be desir-
ed in any case; the Abbey of Selles-surCher suffered the visitation 
of the king and his men in this period during which the Lombards 
particularly distinguished themselves in their damage to the monastic 
lands and properties. The king had to give 1,500 It 1n compensation 
to the abbey (163). 
(158) id 6th February. 
(159) id 19th June, 5th July. 
(160) id 4th August. 
(161) id CC 21 f94ro-vo. 
(162) AN J 505 nos. 5-7. 
(163) AD Loire-et-Cher 30 H 32 p. 209. 
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In August the armies came into action in an attempt to raise 
the siege of Ivry under siege of Bedford. The Scots left Tours on 
4th August to meet up with Narbonne who had most of the Spanish 
troops and some Lombards in his company (164), while Caqueran and 
his Lombards passed through Tours on the 13th on the way to the 
scene of action (165). The army was unable to relieve Ivry but 
gained something from the expedition by tricking Verneuil into 
pAsr ire 1v4 ... ~J 
surrender; this was achieved by the ruse of marching~a group of 
Scots who claimed to be Englishmen captured in a great defeat in-
flictad on Be~ford (166). There was an expectation of battle in 
the air; "\ the notaries of Chateaudun had done brisk business on the 
march north drawing up the wills of Scottish soldiers a~d taking 
their property into safe keeping (167). Bedford moved to face the 
combined army amid a flurry of chivalric challenges ar.d responses; 
Buchan challenged Salisbury to single combat which Bedford refused 
to allow him to accept, then suggested that the two commanders 
should mediate ~eace between their respective kings (168). Bedford 
not to be outdone, sent a herald to invite Douglas for a drink; he 
replied that he would be delighted since he had been unable to find 
him in England and had come to France to find him (169). 
The battle which was joined on the 17th, however, had little 
(164) Cousinot p. 222, Raoulet p. 186. 




Bourgeois de Paris p. 195-6, Waurin Vol.II p. 105. 
~ Augis 'La Bataille de Verneuil (Jeudi 17 Aout 1424) vue de 
Chateaudun' in Bulletin TrimestrLH i de la Societe" Dunoise 
p. 117-8. 
'Chronique de Gilles de Roye' in Chroniques reI. a la Dom. des 
Ducs de Bour. en Belgique Vol.I p. 192. 
(169) Bouvier p. 371. 
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of these chivalric niceties about it. It was one of the greatest 
and least known of the Hundred Years War, and no adequate modern 
account has been put together from the confused narration of the 
chroniclers; a confusion which seems to me to reflect a fundament-
al confusion about the organisation and planning on the French side. 
It seems certain that there was dispute amongst the French command-
ers about how the battle should be fought. Whether, as Berry 
Herald suggests, a reluctant Douglas who wished to stand on the 
defensive, was pulled into battle by Narbonne (170) who simply began 
marching with his "battle", or whether it was the Scots in their 
over-confidence who forced the issue (171) is uncertain and probably lost 
forever in the recriminations after defeat. The English, drawn up 
all dismounted with wings composed of archers and baggage and horses 
in the rear, faced a French army with two cavalry wings, one on the 
right composed of 500 lances of Lombards with armoured horseJ (172). 
It seems probable that the French centre, with the Scots (largely 
dismounted) and Narbonne's men attacked out of synchronisation and 
probably out of breath (173) whilst the cavalry wings unleashed 
their charge. The Lombards certainly seem to have smashed through 
the English archers opposed to them (one can, I think, discount 
Cousinot's claim that they fled without coming to grips, since all 
other sources are unanimous on this at least) (174) but instead of 
(170) ID 
(171) Jean Chartier Vol. I p.42. 
(172) Thomas Basin Histoire d~ Charles VII ed. C Samaran Paris 1933 
Vol.I p. 93, Cousinot p. 224. For the English horses "Tous 
'. "'. lies ensemble" in the rear, see Pierre de Fenln MemOlres ed. 
Dupont Paris 1837 p. 220-1. 
(173) Cousinot p. 225, Bouvier p. 371, Waurin p. 112-3. 
(174) Cousinot p. 197-8, 225, as against him see, for instance, Basin 
p. 95, Bourgeois de Paris p. 197, Bouvier p. 372 etc. 
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remaining to break up the English reserves they scattered to 
pillage the English baggage (175) slaughtering horses and servants 
and sending fugitives fleeing far and wide, whose tales of disas-
ter provoked a minor revolt in part of Normandy (176). What 
exactly the cavalry on the other wing achieved is obscure (though 
Cousinot gives them credit for the success of the Lombards); . ln 
the centre the battle rapidly became a grim slaughtering match with 
no prisoners taken on the orders of Douglas (177). In the end 
it seems that Narbonne's nen broke as the English deployed their 
reserves to leave the unsupported Scots to bear the brunt of the 
defeat as the night fell (178). It was one of the bloodiest 
battles of the war; Waurin said it was the greatest he had ever 
seen and estimated the French dead at 6,000 while the English had 
lost 1,600 (179). Buchan and Douglas were dead on the field with 
large numbers of their compatriots (180) (Raoulet estimated 4,000, 
which seems more reasonable than the 7,000 of Pluscarden (181)). 
After the battle was over, with the English in posseSS10n of the 
field, the Lombards returned expecting to find the battle won by 
the French and had to struggle back across a stream under English 
archery to escape, losing a banner in the process - (since a squire 
(175) ide 
(176) AN JJ 
Paris 
On English reserves, see Monstrelet Vol.IV p. 194. 
172 no. 629 quoted in Chronique de St. Michel ed. S Luce 
- I 
l879.\·p. 142-3. 
(177) Basin p. 97, Scotichronicon p. 463. 
(178) Raoulet p. 187. 
(179) Waurin p. 116. 
(180) For some kind of "official" English list see Stevenson Vol.II 
Part II p. 395 (from Harleian ms 782); all chronicles glve 
different lists. 
(18l)Raoulet p. 187, Pluscarden p. 359 
51 
from the Dauphine' was killed at this point, one suspects that the 
other cavalry had reacted in the same way). The following day 
Bedford advanced to the recapture of Verneui1 where the garrison was 
captured, including 3-400 Scots,some of whom he gave safe conducts 
to Scotland (183). He at least had not been impressed with the 
Lombards, whom he accused of killing servants and horses rather 
than fighting (184). 
The only effective French field army was now broken, but the 
English had themselves been too badly mauled to follow up their 
advantage. Thomas Basin consoled himself with the thought that the 
Scots had been planning to take over wide areas of central France 
for themselves (185); this apparently echoed the feelings 6f the 
citizens of Tours who, on hearing of the death of Douglas on the 
19th from a Scottish "varlet" had.acted by the 22nd to pay the wages 
of the lieutenant of the now-dead captain to make sure that his 
Scottish garrison moved out after the castle had been blockaded to 
make sure that no Scots entered to take over the town (186). Sim-
ilar methods were used to clear Scottish garrisons out of other 
castles in Touraine which they had held for Douglas (187). 
galloped to and fro along the Loire valley to inform the king (188), 
who on 21st October granted Touraine to Isabel of Anjou, his sister-
in-law (189) (despite the claims of Douglas' widow to a share (190)). 
(183) de Roye p. 192-3. 
(184) Bouvier p. 372, FF 23018 f450ro. 
(185) Basin p. 97-101. 
(186) Indre-et-Loire BB 22 19th, 
(187) id CC 21 f95vo. 
(188) id f86ro. 
(189) AN XIa 8604 f69vo-7Ovo. 
(190) FLat 10187 f~ro-6vo. 
22nd August. 
52 
Despite Bedford's expressed confidence that the majority of 
the Scots had been wiped out (191), the Army of Scotland was far from 
finished as a serious force. On the other hand, the debacle of 
Verneui1 more or less marked the end of large-scale recruitment abroad. 
Charles might try to hearten his faithful subjects with the news of 
fresh reinforcements from Scotland under the Earl of Mar or Italy 
under the Marquis of Ferrara (192) but none of them ever appeared 
in France. Nor was there much real likelihood of this happening 
with Italy full of its own wars and Scotland, exhausted by its 
efforts, ruled by a newly-freed king walking a difficult tightrope 
between England and France. Efforts were made to involve Castile 
more closely again, with embassies in 1426 and again in 1428. The 
first sought 2,000 men,at-arms, including some two to three hundred 
light horsemen (homes a la genete), or at least a few hundred men 
at-arms, to be paid for six months by the Castilians themselves 
when they entered service in spring of 1427. The embassies of 
1428 repeat the now-familiar tale; 2-3,000 men-at-arms and 5-6,000 
infantry paid by the Castilian crown with French promises of event-
ual repayment aided by the Castilian fleet which would operate out 
of La Rochelle where provisions had been laid in (193). In neith-
er case did the Castilians produce any more than vague promises for 
the future. In practice, the type of recruitment done in Spain was 
probably more accurately typified by the surviving contracts con-
cerning Bernard Albert, an Aragonese squire who served under the 
Count of Foix in Languedoc in 1426-7 with 100 men at arms and the 
(191) FF 23018 f45lro-vo. 
(192) Beaucourt Vol.II p.79. 
(193) FLat 6024 nos. 18-9, 24, 26, 28. 
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same number of infantry ("saquements"). He had a written contract 
by which he agreed to serve with these forces for four months , 
being paid 14,100 moutons for this period. He was paid, though 
the governor of Montpellier had to borrow from local merchants to 
satisfy him (194); the exact number and importance of such short-
term contracts for troops is unknown and probably impossible to 
discover. 
Negotiations with Scotland continued as well, and led to some 
piecemeal reinforcement. In 1428 a grand French Embassy headed by 
Darnley went to Scotland to negotiate a marriage treaty between the 
Dauphin ~ouis and James I's daughter Margaret (it seems to me that 
the Scotichronicon account of an embassy in 1425 can be discounted 
since there is no other reference to it and the few details given 
fit the 1428 one equally well (195)). During this embassy Alain 
Chartier made a speech lauding the courage and fidelity of the Scots 
to the skies and made much of the alliance between the nations (196). 
The negotiations are well documented; the marriage was agreed in 
principle on 17th July, with the provision of an escort of 6,000 men 
for Margaret while she was crossing to France (197); in return the 
Duchy of Sainto~C~c was given to James on 10th November (198). While 
in Scotland where the embassy was lodged at Linlithgow, Darnley re-
ceived the lands of Torbolton from King James (199) and probably 
made the gift of ornaments to Glasgow Cathedral which survives in 
(194) Clairambault 136 no. 5, AN K 62 no. 33, Pi~ces Originales, 20 
Dossier Albert no. 3. 
(195) Scotichronicon p. 484. 
(196) FLat 8757 f47ro-53vo. 
(197) AN J 678 nos. 21-6, Acts of the Parliament of Scotland ed. t 
Thomson London 1814 Vol.II p.26-8. 
(198) AN J 678 no. 27. 
(199) Cust p. 15, Exchequer Rolls Vol.IV p. 485. 
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French sources (200). A return Scottish embassy went to France to 
finalise the agreements; the English prepared to intercept it think-
ing that the 6,000 troops were on board (201) but they failed and 
it seems unlikely that there were so many soldiers with the embassy. 
One of the Scottish ambassadors, Patrick Ogilvy of Auchterhouse, 
Sheriff of Angus and justiciar north of the Forth drops out of the 
Exchequer accounts in 1428 and remained in France to fight (202). 
Very little of this diplomatic activity affected the situation 
of the troops already in France (except ~n so far as their command-
ers were involved as ambassadors). In fact, the period between 
/ 
Verneuil and the siege of Orleans was a notably uneventful one with 
little real fighting. English attention was drawn away by the 
strange episode of Humphrey of Gloucester's war in Holland against the 
Duke of Burgundy while the French had their own internal dissenJions 
to worry about. The appointment of the Breton, Arthur of Richemont 
was to lead to a sever~ struggle for influence at court, which 
spilled over into armed conflict at times (for instance the attack 
on Bourges by sections of Richemont's army in 1425). Inevitably 
the foreigners were drawn in; if Richemont's19th-century biograph-
er)Cosneau,claims that the Scots were with him (203) there seems to 
be ample evidence that the majority of Scots and Lombards remained 
loyal to the king first (204) and Richemont himself in a letter to 
Lyons lamented that his enemies at court had been recruiting men of 
"e'trange langue" against him (205). No doubt in these troubled 
(200) FF 26295 no. 881. 
(201) Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England 
ed. :;ir Harris Ni cO'las London 1834 Vol.II p. 323. 
(202) Exchequer Rolls Vol.IV p. 406, 432, Scotichronicon p. 484. 
(203) E Cosneau Le Connetable de Richemont Paris 1886 p. 150. 
(204) Bou~ier p. 375. 
(205) Caillet p. 91-2. 
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times the importance of the Scottish bodyguard grew considerably. 
Jehan du Cygne appears in the accounts as first squire of the body 
in the ,.accounts from July 1425-6 (206), while by 1427 his position 
has been taken over by Christin Chambre, who also figures in the 
earlier accounts, but is stated to be captain of the bodyguard in 
a lawsuit in this year concerning various lands which had belonged 
to Buchan (207). It seems possible that some at least of the 
smallish Scottish companies which figure in the accounts (such as 
that of Gilbert de 1a Haye at Bourges) at about this time could 
have had similar functions (208). Certainly none of the command-
. ers lost their favour at court. Darn1ey was in this period in 
steady receipt of money and other favours; a payment in November 
1425 (209) was followed in February by 300 It to buy armour for his 
men. In the end, the money which he owed Tanguy du Chaste1 for his 
ransom was repaid by the king by allowing him to draw on the mint 
profits of St. Andr~-~es-Avignon in February 1427, and he was even 
well enough off to lend money to the king in his turn, as a receipt 
dated 25th July 1428 shows (210). He was further rewarded for his 
services in March 1427 by the gift of the county of Evreux (a doubt-
fu1 honour since it was wholly under English occupation); the king 
I 
could, if he so wished buy it back for 50,000 ecus (211). His 
final reward came in February 1428 with the privilege of quartering 
the arms of France with his own ones (212). 
(206) FF 32510 f37Ovo. 
(207) id f371ro,AN X2a 18 f121vo.-4ro. 
(208) FF 20684 p. 546. 
(209) FF 24000 p. 478. 
(210) PO Dossier Stuart nos. 2-4. 
(211) AN K 168 no. 682, AN XIa 8604 f10Ovo, AN J 216 no. 20, Stuart 
p. 144. 
(212) Stuart id, Cust p. 12-4. 
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The Lombards too remained in favour; November 1425 found 
Va1pergue in La Marche being paid to keep his men from foraging 
there, while the following month he was paid for a good horse (213). 
In 1430 he even had the honour of being selected to represent France 
in a kind of five-a-side jousting international against Burgundy at 
Arras (214). His co11eagu~,Caqueran, who remained more on his 
estates in Dauphine was also in receipt of royal favour in the shape 
of payments from the Lyon tail1e revenue. It is significant that 
he won this ltF'T£R..A L(!lirrH-) tug-of-war for revenues which may well have 
been assigned twice over, his main opponent veing the Parlement of 
Poitiers (with Richemont himself another possible contender). The 
payment of the 1270 francs due took several months from August 1425 
to May the following year, but he was paid in full; a striking con-
trast with the fate of the ship-owners mentioned earlier (215). 
The implication is that, to be paid in this period, it helped to be 
a soldier, especially one reasonably near at hand and with links 
with the town meant to raise the money (Caqueran had \O~(w~rof 
business factor in Lyon, who was involved with the raising of the 
money; it is possible that he had money invested in the town (216)). 
As far as actual fighting in this period was concerned, the 
only serious campaigning seems to have been in the west, with an 
English advance in Maine and on the frontiers of Brittany. In 
/ 
March 1427 Darnley and his men assembled at Mehun-sur- 1 ~Vri for the 
(213) PO Dossier Valpergue nos. 2-3. 
(214) Chastellain Vol.II p.2l-2. 
(215) Gu~ue 12.[&-15,(0- COllljiU.llIt:.{5 Vol.II p. 145-7, 156-8, 160, 162-3, 
171, 177, 179. 
(216) Guigue p. 157. 
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relief of St. J~M[£ de Beuvron; in April he was paid 1700 It at 
Angers for his services at Pontorson (217). The campaign was 
largely successful with the dismounted Scottish troops being of 
considerable use against the English (218), though it was plagued 
by disputes between Richemont and Darnley's lieutenant Jehan Oul-
chart (219). The garrison of Pontorson was left in the joint 
hands of Guillaume Hamilton and Bernard de Comminge (220) and the 
army advanced as far as Le Mans (221) before having to move back 
eastwards to raise the English siege of MontargLs. There, the 
English lines of investment were assaulted by the Scottish infan-
try under Hugh Kennedy (at night according to Raoulet, at lunch-
time claims Cousinot) and, after heavy fighting in which the English 
encampment was burned, the English withdrew before all the siege-
works had been taken (222). Darnley himself played little part in 
the fighting, remaining with Richemont at Jargeau (223). 
The armies in the field were not the only troops active in 
France at this point. It seems likely that the large armies were 
beginning to split up into smaller companies; certainly the surviv-
ing accounts give that impression for the Scottish companies. It 
is, for instance, in this period that the Scottish company of Thomas 
Moras first appears in the south (224); this uniquely well-documented 
(217) FF 20684 p.548-9. 
(218) Guillaume Gruel Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont ed. A Ie Vav-
asseur Paris 1890 p. 50-1, Stuart p. 141. 
(219) Gruel p. 56. 
(220) FF 20684 p. 550. 
(221) Cousinot p. 202. 
(222) Raoulet p. 192, Gruel p. 58-9, Cousinot p. 245-6. 
(223) Bouvier p. 372. 
(22~) FF 25767 no. 137 etc. 
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company I shall deal with in more detail in the next chapter. 
Other wandering groups were rather more formidable. The deliber-
ations of the council of Tours take on an air of near paranoid 
fear of Scots from this time on. When a group of 100-120 Scots 
were sent to bolster the garrisons of Touraine in November 1424, 
a frantic council got the local commanders together to work out 
the best way of splitting them up to keep them under control (225j. 
In October of that year they had had to delay the departure of their 
delegation to the Estates at Poitiers until a large enough convoy 
could be put together for fear of the Scots on the road (226). To 
tell the full tale of the protracted lamentation which makes up the 
deliberations for this period would be long and tedious; hardly a 
year passed without complaint about depradations of the Scots. These 
took all kinds of forms; straightforward pillage like that conduct-
ed by the Lord of "Polloc" (Pollock?) early in 1425 (227), payments 
to move Scots out of castles in the Touraine area (228) and to stop 
garrisons plundering (one of the worst offenders in this matter was 
one Albaron Sabbate, who may have been Italian (229)), extortion 
of money from the town by a Scottish captain called Tourneboeuf in 
repayment of damages he claimed had been done to him by people from 
Tours (230) and straightforward capture of castles which the area 
had to buy back with extra taxes, as in the case of Langeais in 
1428 (231). (It should be remembered that Langeais had had a 
(225) Indre~et-Loire BB 23 3ro-4ro. CC 22 96vo. 
(226) id CC 22 l14ro-vo. 
(227) id BB 23 l3vo. 
(228) id BB 23 20ro. 
(229) id BB 24 22ro. 44ro-45vo. 
(230) id BB 24 83ro, 87vo. 
(231) id EE 2 dated 4th August 1428. 
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Scottish lord at one point and the pillagers may have considered 
themselves as defending the legitimate interests of his descend-
ants). In addition, the council of Tours was for much of the 
1420's engaged on the lengthy and complex process of persuading 
somebody to pay the debts left by Douglas and his son, James. 
Despite all their petitioning both Charles and their new lady Isa-
bel of Anjou, it seems probable that they were never repaid in full 
(232) (they came to the considerable sum of 2540 It). The fear of 
the Scots reached such a pitch that when Richemont's men approached 
the walls with their lady in July 1425, the prospect of companies 
full of "grant numbre ,e gens darmes et detrait estranges coe 
escossays lombars et autres qui pairroient faire moult demaulx en 
" lad ville si ilz'y entroient ou pais denviron" (233) was so fright-
ening that they ordered a census of all Scots within the walls to 
be taken and all of them, even including a friar, expelled from the 
town while the emergency lasted. (The list drawn up runs to eight-
een names and shows that the same Lord of Polloc had a house in the 
town). 
The Loire valley was the favourite area of Scottish depradation, 
from the western end where in March 1427 the agents of the captive 
Charles d'Orle~ns gathering his belongings for his captivity in 
England from Saumur were compelled to hire a military escort for 
fear of the Scots on the road (234), across to the centre where it 
was said that none dared travel from Orleans to Blois for fear of 
them in 1428 (235). They were not the only foreign soldiers in the 
area; a couple of Florentines in the garrison of Montilz near Blois 
(232) id BB 23 22ro, 26ro. BB 24 l6ro. etc. 
(233) id BB 23 37vo. 
(234) AN KK 269 f52vo. 
(235) Bernard Edeine La Sologne Paris 1974 p. 128 note 199 (quotation 
unattributed) 
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passed their time in 1428 carrying off a local girl who happened 
to be the mistress of a Parisian merchant whom they killed when he 
next came to the area (236). Other parts cf France were equally 
affected by pillage. Villandrando, for instance, was operating 
in the south on behalf of the Bourbon family and the Counts of 
Pardiac in private warfare (237). In September 1428 he took St. 
/ 
Andre-des-Ribes in Languedoc (238); by late October he was near 
Lyon and pressing the town for moneyo His demands were too high 
for the council who showed unexpected fight and were prepared to 
use the money to hire troops of their own for the Bail1i to lead 
against him. The latter, however, was markedly unenthusiastic 
about the idea (he may have been an old acquaintance of Vi1landrando) 
and in the end the town was forced to let him negotiate the cheap-
est withdrawal he could manage, with a gift of 80 ecus to help him 
in his task (239). The pillagers did not always have things their 
own way, however, as the story of Michel Ambilton, a Scot who came 
to Fierboys in May 1429, illustrates; he and a group of his fellow 
Scots had been on the frontiers of Brittany the previous Easter and, 
near Clisson the local Bretons had ambushed them and hanged him. 
He had been saved by the saint after hanging from Good Friday after-
noon until after Mass on Sunday (240). 
By then, however, momentous events had occurred. The English 
armies, reinforced from home and aided by the Burgundians moved to 
(236) AN JJ 180 no. 28. 
(237) Quicherat p. 30-4. 
(238) C Devic and J.Vai~ttte Histoire Generale de 
ed. Toulouse 1885 Vol. IX p. 1101. 
Languedoc ~ e\.J 
(239) Giugue p. 288-91, Deniau p. 544-5, Quicherat p. 35-7. 
(240) Miracles di St~, Katherine p. 57-60 no. 104. 
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/ . 
besiege Orleans ~n October 1428. They were never strong enough 
to blockade the town totally, and it is possible that the garrison 
outnumbered the attackers considerably. At the time of the 
English attack, there were already foreign troops in the town; an 
Aragonese knight called Messire Mathias helped in the defence of 
the Tourelles (241). The first reinforcement on the 25th after 
the fall of the Tourelles included Valpergue with Lombard infantry 
carrying big shields (242) and the billeting arrangements made on 
the 27th include payments for taking c~ the Scots ox La Hire (243). 
Already there were Scottish casualties; William Douglas of Drumlan-
rig and his namesake of "Kyrros" were killed in the fighting round 
the town on the 21st and buried in the cathedral to which they had 
given cloth and money; perhaps the Scottish bishop John Carmich-
ael conducted the service (244). The relief forces being gathered 
had a strong foreign element; a group of Scottish captains with 
combined forces of 169 men at arms and 400 archers were paid in 
I ~ September at Orleans and Chateaudun; for one at least, Jehan 
Wishart, we can work out his progress to the siege (245). Paid at 
Chinon in October, he was given armour at Blois and reached Orleans 
in November (246). Valpergue was involved in a sortie on 6th Jan-
uary 1429 (247); perhaps it was in this that one of his men lost 
(241) Proces de Conda,rrmation et de Rehabil itation de Jeanne d' Arc 
dite La Puce1le ed. J Quicherat 1841 Vo1.IV p. 98 (Journal 
of the siege). 
(242) id p. 101, Waurin Vo1.I1 p. 251. 
(243) AD Loiret A 2178 f20ro-vo. 
(244) 
(245) 
Charles de la Saussey (Carl Sausseyo) Annales Ecclesia~Aurel­
iensis Paris 1615 p. 596. 
FF 7858 4lvo-42ro. (parallel figures for ~ll referen~es to this 
source appear in J Loise1eur 'Compte des depenses.fa~tes par 
Charles VII Pour Secourir Orleans Pertd:1nt 1(. S1~ge de 1 ~28' 
. / I '. 1 '0 l' . XI in Mernoires de la Soc1ete Archeolog1que de r eana~s t 
1868) p. 92-3; 164-209. 
(246) ide 
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the horse replaced hy the king (248). Another Aragonese knight 
fought in the next sortie on the 30th (249), whilst both Valpergue 
and another Spaniard, Fernando da Civile (Seville ?) were sent on 
embassies to the king to hasten relief forces (250). Out beyond 
Orleans the armies were rallying. Ogilvy was paid 600 It to 
assemble his men for the coming battle in January and Darnley was paid 
3,900 on the final day of the month to gather his men in all haste 
to cross the Loire to link up with other captains (251). On 8th 
February, his brother William entered the town with a portion of 
the army, only to march out on the 11th to join up with Darn1ey 
and the other French captains in their attempt to intercept the 
English provision-convoy at Rouvray on the 12th (252). The re suI t 
was a predictable piece of botched staff-work on the part of the 
combined army, with a bitter dispute over whether to attack on foot 
or mounted. In the end it appears that Darn1ey went in on foot 
with his men supported by a section of the French forces, to assault 
the English drawn up behind their waggons and went down to bloody 
de f eat (253). The anonymous author of the mystery play of the siege 
was ~n no doubt as to who was to blame; his stage directions state 
that the majority of the French under the Count of Clermont left 
,I 
the Scots and Dunois who supported them to their fate( n'ont point 
de secours des Francais du Conte de Clermont ne de ses gens, r!lt:.A.; 
les regardent sans coup ferie") (254). 
(248) FF 7858 f47vo • 
... 
(249) Proces p. 116. 
(250) id p. 117, FF 7858 f45ro-vo. 
(251) FF 7858 f46vo-47ro. 
(252) Proc~s p. 117-20. 
Vo 1. IV 3 ') W . p 1 I I ') 55 -,~ Co u sino t p. 26"; . (253) Monstrelet p. 11-_, aur~n.o. p. - -, 
(254) .'" .' d'O 1 / ed. F Gue'r"r4 and E dL Certain Le ~~stere du S~ege r eans ~ -
Paris 1862 p. 341. See also Waurin p. 256 about Constable 
attacking thinking he was supported by the French. 
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Darnley and his brother, the last of the major commanders of 
the original Army of Scotland, lay dead. Darnley, ever-popular 
in Orl~ans which he had once promised to aid in case of dispute 
with the king as if he were speaking on behalf of his own country-
men (255), was buried in the cathedral, followed by his wife, and 
a special service of remembrance was said for them to the Revolution 
(256). The Mystery gives him a splendid eulogy spoken by Dunois, 
himself one of the heroes of the play (257). His death marked 
the effective end of a period in the employment of foreign troops 
in France, that of the large, coherent armies operating as separ-
ate large-scale units. A new period, that in which many small 
companies drifting in and out of royal service fought as part of 
larger armies was about to begin. 
(255) L6iret CC 540 f16ro. 
(256) Saussayo p. 596, Francisque-Michel Vol.I p. 161. 
(257) Mistere p. 343. 
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Chapter III. The Time of the Independent Companies. 
The defeat and death of Darnley at Rouvray was :ar from mark-
ing the end of foreign, and especially Scottish, involvement in the 
. /. 
war ~n general or the Orleans c~palgn in particular. There was 
even some semblance of continuity in the increasingly shadowy 
title of Constable of the Army of Scotland, since Darnley's son, 
Alan can be found holding it in the mid-1430's (1). The remains 
of the army fell back into Orle~ns and figured in the garrison 
alongside the other foreigners, where they can from time to time 
be seen; when the rations were distributed on 21st March, the 
Scots collected 3! tuns of wine and the same number of muids of 
corn; when their total is added to those given to that gi-reE. to 
Valpergue and the Aragonese Cernay it appears that foreign soldiers 
were taking about a third of the rations distributed (2). Other 
small payments show the town pay~ng for food for Scots or giving 
assistance to wounded Scots (3) and accounts which show some of 
the payments to the garrison record Jehan Oulchart with 27 men at 
arms and 69 archers and Valpergue with 30 and 39 respectively (4). 
In addition, other foreigners like fue Spaniard Alfonso de Partada 
receive casual mention in the Journal of the siege and elsewhere (5). 
Some, certainly, marched out with C1erman~ on the 18th to rejoin 
the king, but foreign participation in the garrison remained high (6). 
(1) FF 32510 f375ro., Stuart p. 165. 
(2) \ / Pl' D Journal dU; Siege d 'Orleans 1428-9 Augmente de us~el..~>· ocuments, 
Notarnment des Comptes 1~/*Vi11e 1429 30 ed. P Ch~rpent~e: and 
C Cuissard Orleans 1896 p. 397 the documents ~n quest~on are 
now lost. 
(3) id p. 212, 224, 236. 
(4) FF 7858 f47ro . 
(5) 
... 
Proces .. .. de Jeanne d'Arc Vol. III p. 21~ . 
(6) id Vo1.IV p. 130. 
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Outside the walls too, the army formed . . to J01n the provision 
convoy which was to bring Jeanne d'Arc into the city. Ogilvy with 
a company of 60 men-at-arms and 300 archers, plus some smaller 
companies joined the relief force (7); and amongst the supplies 
to be taken in were seven sheafs of arrows intended to replenish 
the supplies of some Scots who had shot off all theirs at the 
English. 
The epic of the relief and the raising of the siege has been 
told too often to require repetition. Hugh Kennedy was prominent 
in the storming of the Tourelles as his appearance in the Mystery 
indicates (8), and one of the witnesses of the rehabilitation triAl 
of Jeanne remembered an incident in Orle~ns when she rebuked a 
Scottish soldier for looting food, only to be told that she had 
eaten some ·of it herself (9). The triumph was as usual exaggerat-
ed; Morosini, informed by one Giorgio de Valperga, recorded the 
death of Bedford and the capture of the Duke of Burgundy (10). The 
disarray of the English forces allowed an easy follow-up to clear 
the remaining English forces out of the Loire valley. Valpergue 
certainly participated in this sweep with his men, who were noted 
as having taken part in the storming of Beaugency (11). The part-
icipation of the Scottish forces in this campaign and the victory 
over the English army at Patay is less certain despite the asser-
tions of Forbes Leith (12). Certainly Ogilvy was paid 3849 lt as 
(7) FF 7858 f48ro. 
(8) ~ist~re p. 500, 527. 
(9) Proc~s Vol. III p.8l. 
(10) Morosini Vol. III p. 167. 
(11) FF 7858 f52ro. Chartier Vo1.1 p.83. 
(12) W Forbes Leith The Scots :fen-at-Arms and T_iieguards 
Edinburgh 1882 Vo1.1 p.~2. 
ln ?rance 
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payment for services undertaken in May and June in the afte~ath of 
the siege; there is no indication as to where this actually took 
place, though one assumes that the Loire Valley is the most likely 
theatre of operations (13). 
Certainly they were mustered with considerable numbers of 
other foreign troops for the campaign directed at Rheims and the 
coronation of Charles. One of the irritating copies made by 
18th century genealogist of the accounts of the Tr~soriers-deJ -
Guerr~5casts some light on this, though with hardly any figures 
and in a vague and jumbled way (14). Most of the familiar names 
appear at least once: Wishart, Chambre, Ferrando de Civile or 
Tourneboeuf as well as men to become known over the following 
period, such as Alan Forty or Robert Houston. Some idea of their 
relative weight in the army can perhaps be guessed at when the 
figures for payments made in Berry at the end of the campaign are 
seen; eight captains out of a group of 34 which was paid then 
(though this ~las by no means the full tally of captains involved, 
even going on internal evidence of the same document). They re-
ceived 230 ~cus out of 1733, which, making the bold assumption that 
money was handed out in some sort of ratio of importance,would 
give slightly above 13.25% The structure of the distribution 
suggests that we are dealing with a cluster of small companies; 
only Wishart has 100, Houston 40 and the rest between ten and 
twenty (15). These figures should be taken with extreme caution, 
(13) Loiseleur p. 200. 
(l~) FF 20684 p. 556-67. 
(15) id p. 565-6. 
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especially s~nce ~ch notable figures as Ogilvy or de Civile are 
not included, but they are the nearest to a kind of statistical 
picture of foreign involvement in a campaign in this period that 
we are likely to have. 
Their presence can certainly be detected from time to time 
in the chronicle accounts; at the confrontation of Montespilloy, 
for example, where the hastily scraped together Anglo-Burgundian 
forces faced the French without battle being joined. ~.fuat little 
fighting there was took the form of sharp skirmishes between the 
dismounted Scottish archers and some Picard troops in which both 
sides were held to have fought with great courage, the ever-obser-
vant author of the "Livre des Trahisons" noting the support given 
to the Scots by their infantry armed with steel guisarms (16). 
Scots from the newly-established garrison in Laigny under Hugh 
Kennedy raided up to the walls of Paris (17). The accounts them-
selves permit us to glimpse some Scots under Houston at Senlis 
when that surrendered (18) and the despatch of Ogilvy and another 
sizeable group to the siege of La Charit~ after the main campa~gn 
was over (19). The town, back ~n the hands of Perrinet Gressart 
resisted the winter siege. 
The main theatre of campaigning was now transferred to the 
Champagne-Brie region and the areas round Paris. The counter-
stroke was to be largely in the hands of the Burgundians to whose 
control Bedford had been compelled to transfer the area. His 
control over Paris was far from secure; early in 1430 a plot was 
(16) Monstrelet Vol. IV p. 346, \vaurin rol.II? 328, Livre des 
Trahisons p. 198. 
(17) Chartier Vol.I p. 117-8. 
(18) FF 2068~ p. 562. 
(19) id p. 567. 
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uncovered to capture the city by smuggling a troops of Scots 
disguised as English into the city; they were then to open the 
gates of the city after dark to the French (20). On the other 
hand, Charles seems to have been almost unable to raise adequate 
forces to counter the threat, pressed for money as he was and with 
the available armed forces near anarchy (illustrated by a case 
before Parlement which opposed two French commanders who had fought 
a kind of private war into which the Scots of Guillaume Hameston 
in garrison near La Lude in Anjou had been drawn when one of the 
parties stole some of their horses)(2l). No doubt we can inter-
pret the complaints from Orl:ans that Scots were ravaging in the 
Sologne (22)and the familiar lamentations from Tours about the 
activities of Scottish raiders (this time the company of a Thomas 
Blaye which was stealing such quantities of livestock that nobody 
dared pasture animals in the area); this being in May (23) there 
are s1gns that forces were being moved towards the theatre of war. 
Eight out of the 28 captains noted in the accounts as crossing the 
Seine to the "pays de France" to fight the English were foreign 
(24), while Kennedy was given wine when he and other captains 
passed through the town on 4th May (25). 
\ 
The heart of the campa1gn was the s1ege of Comp~egne, into which wer 
sent reinforcements including Jeanne d'Arc and some at least of 
(20) Stevenson Letters and Papers Vol.I p. 41 (the Bou~ois of Paris 
gives an account of a similar plot which he dates in 1433; 
perhaps a confusion on his part or a sign that the ploy was re-
garded as too effective to be abandoned after the first failure). 
(21) AN X2a 18 f186vo. 
(22) Loiret CC 700 piece 47. 
(23) Indre-et-Loire BB 24 f256vo. 
(24) FF 20684 p. 570. 
(25) Loiret CC 701 piece 15. 
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Va1pergue's Italians (his own participation is somewhat uncertain); 
if he did, he avoided capture in the disastrous sortie made towards 
A 
Pont l'Ev ~que in which some of his men took part (26) and other 
chronicle evidence which shows him rai('ing round the siege lines to 
relieve the pressure suggests that he never in fact entered the 
town (27). 
To counter-balance this disappointment, in another areacr the 
Franco-Burgundian confrontation things went very much more the way 
of the French and their allies. The Pri~ce of Orange, a Burgund-
ian vassal, following up a quarrel with the town of Lyon mustered 
a Burgundian army to take the city and follow up by invading a 
." . Dauphl.ne dral.ned of troops by wars ~'1:sewhere and defended largely 
by the fifty Lombard lances of Caqueran and Giorgio Bois sent to 
this normally quiet area after their debacle at Verneui1 (28). 
" In this moment of crisis, the Bai11i of Lyon, Imbert de Groslee 
took the bold step of hiring Rodrigo de Vi11andrando, who had 
passed 1429 raiding Languedoc and causing the citizens of Brioude 
to go to law with the churchmen of the town over their participa-
tion in the defence arrangements (29). On 21st May his men had 
crossed the bridge at Vienne and embarked on a campaign to clear 
out Orangist strongholds with the Bai1li and his Lombard troops (30) 
(26) 'Chronique des Pays Bas, de France, d'Angleterre et de Tournai' 
in RecU~il des Chroniques de Flandrts edt JJ de Smet Brussels 
1856 Vol. III p. 415. 
(27) Waurin p. 373-3, Chaste11ain Vo1.I1 p. 90. 
(28) Quicherat p. 40, 49. 
(29) AN Xla 9199 f145vo. 
(30) For the original sources for this campaign, 'Documents Histor-
iqu~ Inedit,sur Ie Dauphine' in Bulletin de 1a Societe~Statis­
tique de l'Ise~e 3rd series Vol. VI ~ontbeliard l87~ p.3l8-28. 
There are full accounts in Quicherat p.42-Sl and Deniau p.3Sl-8. 
70 
before the main enemy offensive could develop. On 10th June the 
Orangist army advancing through the woods between Anthon and Colom-
bier to attempt the relief of the latter (which had already fallen 
to the combined forces) was ambushed while deploying before Colom-
bier and completely routed losing heavily in dead and captured. 
Villandrando's personal profit was immense, both in terms of ran-
soms (31) and the gift to him of land taken from the enemy, by the 
king early in 1431 (32). The victory was followed up by a devas-
tating invasion of Burgundian territory, culminating in the capture 
of Orange itself (33). The following year, however, after a brief 
attack into the same area (34), he turned back to the perhaps more 
congenial business of fighting private wars in Languedoc and ex-
tracting money from Millau by threatening to pillage the town under 
letters of marque to recover debts he claimed were owed to him by 
a merchant of the town (35). 
Villandrando's switch may well prove an inability to pay on the 
part of the part of the royal government (though he figures in the 
accounts for 1431)(36), which seems to have been general in both 
camps if one judges from the apparent lull in military activity. 
There was some limited fighting in the west where Richemont, effect-
ively in exile from court was helped in the fighting round Pouanc~ 
by Scottish forces (37) and spasmodic fighting round Paris, but 
(31) Quicherat p. 51, p. 215-6 (Piece Justificative V). 
(32) id p.55, p.2l6-8 (PJ VI). 
(33) id p.52-4. 
(34) id p.61. 
(35) id p.65-7, '/i.Ti-IV}t1.A5 l~tJVt{J?o OC t;ILL!1l1tJ(4Ndu £11 l"·'C(lrth[f 
Annales du Midi Vol.II 1890 p.2l0-2. 
(36) FF 20684 p. 571. 
(37) Cosneau p. 187. 
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little large-scale campaigning. Such important units as the 
royal bodyguard were paid, naturally, but it may be significant 
that Chambre only received a pay dated as being due on 22nd 
August 1431 in the following February (38). A soldier in favour 
like Valpergue could also maintain his income with gifts, often 
taken from royal taxes; he had by 1434 managed to associate his 
brother Antoine in his good fortune and this appears to mark the 
arrival of the tentacular clan of Valpergues into the French 
service (39). 
The most notable fighting of this period came in the summer 
of 1432 when Bedford moved to attack Lagny, one of the French 
garrisons dangerously near Paris. The garrison included Hugh 
Kennedy and his Scots, whom Basin described as being skilled at 
holding fortified places (40). It was a hard and bitter siege 
which burned itself into the memories of those who had been in the 
garrison, such as one veteran of the royal bodyguard who nearly 
thirty years later remembered how he had eaten his horse there (41). 
To head the relief forces including the Lombards of George Boys, 
Villandrando came back from his pillagings in the south and in blaz-
ing August heat they fought their way through the Burgundian forces 
sent to intercept them to run the convoy of food in by the river 
gate as the garrison sallied forth (42). The main body of the 
army, however, bypassed the siege lines to threaten Paris which 
(38) Clairambault 219 no. 39. 
(39) PO 2924 doGsier Valpergue nos. 4-8. 
(40) Basin Vol.I p. 169. 
(41) AN JJ 190 no. 125. 
(42) Chartier Vol.I p. 144-5; for 
Quicherat. For the Lombards 
detailed account of campaign, 
JJ 179 no. 27 p. 72-8. 
see 
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drove Bedford to raise the siege in haste, leaving his camp to be 
plundered at leisure. 
This was to be very nearly the last campaign in which French 
and Burgundian forces clashed. Negotiations, which had never quite 
been broken off at any point, culminated in the great diplomatic 
occasion of the Congress of Arras, in which the Papal legates tried 
to conclude a satisfactory peace for all the parties. Valpergue 
is listed as one of the French negotiating team for the conference 
(43), which ended with the English walking out and France and 
Burgundy patching up peace; this left the English, already facing 
severe unrest in Normandy, to fight on alone against the combined 
Franco-Burgundian forces. It also threatened to leave a large 
number of soldiers unemp:oyed and looking for employment in a large 
number of what might be called "parallel" wars, to which I propose 
to turn my attention now. 
It may seem rather curious in a thesis which is supposedly 
about men who served in the royal armies to spend as much time as I 
shall be doing in this chapter to the activities of soldiers engaged 
in private war or simply involved in the most persistent of the 
parallel wars - that which set soldier against civilian in town and 
country alike. The problem is that to exclude such activities 
would give a totally misleading picture of the actual course of 
events as well as of the life and careers of my chosen subjects. 
A man could have many roles at one time or another in his career; 
Villandrando is the outstanding example of this, by turns royal 
captain, supporter of the interests of La Tremoille or the Bourbon 
family, hired sword of the papacy or a claimant to the see of A1bi 
(43) Chartier p. 186, Perceval de Cagny p. 198. 
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and straightforward brigand without seeing any contradiction and 
without losing any of his honorific titles and credit at court (at 
least until 1437 and his overstepping the mark by a direct affront 
to the king). The chaotic state of royal finances encouraged the 
trend; it is doubtful if the king could pay anything like the 
number of men he might at times need for periods of active campaigning 
on a regular basis, so for muchcr the 1430's he was compelled to 
turn a blind eye to pillage and a search for alternative employment 
in the private wars which he was unable to prevent. The surviving 
blanket remissions given not for individual incidents but for a 
whole range of offences usually refer to lack of pay as a major 
excuse for the damage committed (44). 
This alternative employment had never been hard to find even 
~n the days before the Treaty of Arras. As far back as July 1424 
the enemies of Georges de la Tremoil1e accused him of filling up his 
castles in the Auvergne with foreign troops and stated roundly that 
"des gens de Tremouille (were) pis que les Angloiz" (45). Plenty 
of cases can be found where parties are accused in Parlement of 
hiring troops to assist their chances of winning a dispute "par voie 
de faicte", and the spectacular affairs which involved full-scale 
armies whose commanders could become figures with their own policies 
and alliance systems in their own right (such as Villandrando) are 
only the tip of an iceberg of violence. To give one example, in 
1430 the monks of the abbey of Absie in the G~tinais elected Bernard 
d'Appelvoisin as abbot despite the claims of Louis Rouault. The 
(44) See, for instance JJ 176 no. 18, JJ 179 no. 15,27 (the former 
~n Quicherat p. 271-2 PJ XXXVIII.' 
(45) ~~ X2a 18 f26vo-7ro. 
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disappointed candidate hired a group of soldiers about eighty 
strong - the majority of them Scots - who, under the command of 
his brother-in-law stormed the abbey and installed him as abbot. 
The case, which went to Parlement,was only settled five years lat-
er in fines all round (46). 
. Certainly more reputable employment could be found; a sem~-
independent magnate like the Duke of Brittany was ~n the market for 
soldiers, and the ducal accounts for 1430-1 show a Scottish company 
under James Bron and Thomas Marshall coming to offer their servic-
es, which seem to have been accepted since Scots figure later 
amongst the ducal troops (47). Even Villandrando seems to have 
considered the idea of Breton service at this time (48). The real 
profits probably remained in fighting private wars, and the Spaniard 
well placed as he was to become by his marriage to an illegitimate 
daughter of the Bourbon family, did especially well out of this. 
It is not my intention to give another exhaustive account of the 
exceptional career of this already well-studied (perhaps over-
studied to the extent of over-shadowing other interesting and perhaps 
more typical figures) captain, but a rapid glance at his activities 
before the conclusion of peace at Arras shows both how far he was 
, 
set on the ways which became typical of the so-called Ecorcheur 
captains and how successful he was in finding employment for his 
men. In 1431, we find him acting as La Tremoille's man in the 
south, in autumn 1432 fighting the Anjou interest in the west ~n 
the same service (an enterprise which ended for once in his de-
feat at the Ponts de ctl. by Jean de B(:~il, who in his highly 
(46) AN XLa 9199 f327ro-vo, 328vo, 41Svo. printed ~n 'RecUeil des 
Documents concernant Ie Paitau' ed. P Guerin in Archives 
Historiques du Poitou XXIX 1898. 
( -+ 7) FF 115 42 p • 15, 16, 26. 
(48) id p. 22. 
75 
highly fictionalised memoirs-cum-hook of advice for young soldiers 
was to remember his exploit with pride (49)), 1433 spent fighting 
for the pope in the Comtat Venaf\·.~:in around Avignon and 1434 passed 
in a ferocious ravaging of Burgundian lands (50). This itinerary 
should show just how hard it is to split the pillage and private 
warfare from the periods of royal serVlce. It will be remembered 
that he was fighting for the king at Lagny before the adventure in 
Anjou in 1432 ~ and after his defeat at ~e) Pi)''17J-rfA.-(I~ when he had 
spent a period pillaging the countryside with his usual ferocity, 
he was given his promotion to royal councillor and chamberlain (51); 
a symbol of Tremoille power at court, no doubt, but also a proof 
that what counted as "royal" war was not as simple as it might at 
first seem. On the other hand, his attacks on Burgundian lands 
in 1434, despite being aimed at nominal royal enemies seem to have 
been little more than plundering expeditions with comparatively 
little purely military purpose. Indeed it is very hard to tell 
"legitimate" war from this kind of plundering affair given the 
prevailing structures of war; a war without fronts where isolated 
garrisons glared at each other from behind their walls or sallied 
out on expeditions to pillage a countryside whLch nob'Jdy "held" in 
a modern sense. The effects of such tactics are illustrated by 
the accounts of a Burgundian official in the Nivernais during 
Villandrando's attack in 1434 where he is to be found paying people 
to check the woods round the town of Decise to see if raiders were 
hidden there (52). That the troops thus engaged could be regarded 
(49) Jean de B~~il Le Jouvenc~1 ed.L Lecestre Paris 1887 p.XLV-LII. 
(50) For this period, see Quicherat p. 66-112. 
(51) id p. 84. 
(52) Flamare Vol.II p. 108~~~ 
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as a menace even to their own side emerges clearly from the accounts 
of Troyes in the heart of the war-zone, where much effort was ex-
pended in 1433 moving men away from the country round the town; 
a task not made easier by the fact that the billets assigned to the 
men in question had been stolen by Italian troops under Antoine 
Baretta (53). 
This suggests that to many, even in the actual areas of fight-
~ng, the real war was not against the nominal Anglo-Burgundian enemy 
but rather the obscure, little recorded war between soldier and 
civilian. This seems to have been the accompaniment to any milit-
ary activity; a necessary concomitant of irregular pay and a high 
degree of dispersal on the part of companies on the move. On the 
whole, the towns were safe behind their walls (often repaired at 
the onset of pillaging soldiers as at Millau in 1431 and Albi ~n 
1433 when Villandrando passed near (54)); on the other hand as 
Albi also indicates, the normal way of shifting these unwelcome 
neighbours was to pay them to go away (55). Tours, better placed 
to gain royal aid made a practice of writing to the king or his 
favourites to invoke assistance in moving pillagers. This could 
have some effect; in May 1433 Charles sent two members of the royal 
bodyguard to persuade a group of Scots to go away (56). No doubt 
(53) 'Le plus Ancien Registre des Deliberations du Conseil de la 
Ville de Troyes (1429-33)'ed. A Roserot in Collection des 
Documents In/dits Relatif ~ la ville de Troyes et a la 
Champagne Meridionale published by socilt?Academique de 
l'Aube III p. 886. 
(54) 'Documents sur la ville de Millau - Memorial des Privileges 
Livres des comptes des Consuls Boursiers, Deliberations 
Communales' ed. J Arti~res in Archives Historiques du Rouergue 
VII 1930 p. 292, E Jolibois Inventaire Sommaire des Archives 
Communales Anterieur a 1790 - Albi Paris 1869 p. 43 (CC 134). 
(55) id p. 43 (CC 183- August 1431). 
(56) Indre-et-Loire BB 25 l66ro, CC 25 lOSro. 
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this kind of diplomacy involved the distribution of money from 
royal resources as an added persuasion during the negotiations; it 
may even be that pillage of an area close to royal concerns was a 
calculated way of pressurising the government into paying arrears 
of pay owed. On the other hand, in July of the same year, Tours 
had to pay itself for a most curious document which survives copied 
into the council deliberations; a protection agreement drawn up in 
the style of a treaty between independent powers concluded with a 
captain who called himself the Bastard of Scotland and was not above 
using a royal style in his pronouncements. This agreement began 
"We James Stewart, Bastard of Scotland" and went on to lay down 
rules; none of his captains was to claim lodgings within five 
leagues of Tours or damage property; if any did so he would deal 
with them himself. A:l travellers were taken under his protection. 
Tours paid him 6,000 ~us for this agreement which was to last for 
three months (57). Perhaps this sort of thing was common form; 
certainly it says much about the state of affairs even in central 
France, near the heart of royal power. Some kind of modus vivendi 
could often be worked out between captain and town; Villandrando 
seems to have enjoyed fairly good relations with Lyon, whose citiz-
ens gave him presents and where he invested his money (58) (though 
at the same time they were sending deputations to the king to com-
plain about the damage done in the countryside by his men, and the 
Duchess of Bourbon was living in fear in a convent in the city which 
(57) id BB 25 172vo-3ro. 
(58) Quicherat p. 255-6 (PJ XXVIII), Guigue p. 353, Deniau p. 569. 
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had to be locked in case his men came for her (59)), but the 
norm was hostility and suspicion on the part of townsmen, brutal-
ity and rapacity on the part of the captains. 
Much of this brutality was in fact inflicted on the countr~l-
side rather than the defended towns. Some impression can be drawn 
from the letters of remission, though these are rare for the l430s 
since the series only takes up in 1440 and for an earlier period one 
relies on people seeking pardon for old offences. The picture lS 
one of petty oppressions followed by petty vengeance. a fierce , 
little war waged in anonymity. It is a cardinal mistake to assume 
from the lamentations put into the mouths of the "poor peasants" 
by sympathetic members of other orders in society that they were 
poor humble and defenceless, bearing exaction in helpless patience. 
If no peasant army could have stood up to soldiers in the open 
field, the picture is very different for isolated soldiers or even 
small groups caught, often at night, moving through a hostile en-
vironment where every man carried a weapon. Sometimes the exploit-
ation of the population by the soldiers can be seen being organised 
in a systematic way; one case is recorded in the Auvergne of a 
local man acting as a kind of sub-contractor of terror and pillace 
on Villandrando's behalf and aided by some of his men. He passed 
captives on to Villandrando to arrange the purchase of their free-
dom until the local population rose against him in April 1432 and 
killed him and some of his gang. On_his body was a list of men of 
Villandrando's company authorised to pillage in that particular 
area (60). This level of sophisticacion is rare, however; the 
(59) Quicherat p. 247-8 (PJ XXII), Guigue p. 361, Deniau p. 568. 
(60) AN JJ 191 no. 45 - Printed in A Chassaing Spicilegium Brivatense-
Rec(JI?,i.1 de Documents Re1atifs au Brivadois et a l' Au\'ergne 
Paris 1884 p. 524-6 
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normal pattern is of small thefts and individual brutalities 
followed by individual vengeance on whatever soldiers were to hand 
and vulnerable (61) (sometimes followed by the sale of their 
property) • 
The maj or companles which fill so much space in the records c,f 
the period were not the only military forces around in this period; 
by some accident of survival the records of a small, obscure com-
pany survive for a reasonably lengthy time. The company of Thomas 
Moras has left records of musters from 1426 to 1439. This was a 
largely Scottish affair operating as part of the Count of Foix's 
army in the south, and we shall have much occasion to return to it 
for such matters as turnover and length of service; for the moment 
it suffices to point out that, unlike so many of the grander com-
panies which took the attention of historians, this group of men 
remained operating in a limited geographical area. Their 
musters (62) cover a kind of circuit in which Carcasonne, B~ziers 
and Montpellier recur frequently, while the personnel remain very 
stable, with only a curious drop in numbers from thirty to twelve 
and in status from ':cuyers' to archers in 1437 marking a major 
upheaval (63). This lS an almost unlque opportunity to look at 
the basic unit of war In this period, though alas we know nothing 
at all about the activities of the company. 
There was thus plenty of precedent for what was to mark the 
post-Arras period most strongly; the activities of the free and 
, 
semi-free companies known as the Ecorcheurs. In fact, t~1e famous 
(61) AN JJ 179 no. 76 (Quicherat p. 266-9 PJ ~~VI) See JJ 190 no.22 
for more organised resistance. 
(62) Handily listed in chronological order in Contamine GES p. 615. 
(63) This will be dealt with in more detail in a later chapter. 
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accounts of the great meeting of the various commanders in danger 
of unemployment ~n the Loire Valley, as given and repeated by 
people like Tuetey and Quicherat (64), if not perhaps complete 
inventions, perhaps exaggerate the novelty of the occasion. The 
sequel, in terms of activities of the companies, differed in hard-
ly any particulars from what had gone before. They continued to 
move round France with great rapidity fighting local private wars 
and plundering by turns when not recruited to fight the king's own 
wars. TheseWI~l be dealt with later in the chapter; an artif-
icial division but necessary to avoid this work turning into a mere 
account of the various paths cut by different companies as well as 
providing some kind of back-cloth against which the constraints 
imposed on royal military activity can be understood. 
, 
The relationship of the Ecorcheurs with the king was ~n fact 
rather ambiguous. Villandrando, as so often, is our best document-
ed example. In 1438 he could be regarded as sufficiently the 
king's man for the latter to send him orders commanding him to 
respect friendly Burgundian lands (65) or to move his men away from 
Tours in 1435 and 1437 (66), the latter case permitting him to make 
some appropriately chivalrous remarks about his respect for the 
Queen and Dauphine. On the other hand, only shortly after these 
compliments, he was to draw down on himself the full wrath of the 
king (and indeed available royal military strength) when his men 
proceeded to imprison members of the royal household as part of a 
I 
(64) Quicherat p. 121, A Tuetey Les Ecorcheurs sous Charles VII 
Montbeliard 1874 Vol.I p. 9-10. 
(65) Tuetey p. 39. 
(66) Indre_et-Loire BB 25 f300ro-vo, BE 26 f177vo; cc 26 48ro, 
l12vo-printed Quicherat p. 274-5 PJ XXIX, p. 287-90 PJ XLVIII. 
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Bourbon plot against Charles and was forced to flee to imperial 
territory (67) leaving his garr~sons to the fury of the populace 
. 
~n many places. The most that can be said is that Villandrando 
was always very reluctant to confront either the king or the 
Dauphin directly, even though this did sometimes limit his ability 
to operate effectively as in 1439 when the presence of the king in 
the south restricted the area he could pillage (68). Less immed-
iate royal interference, however, cut very little ice; when the 
inhabitants of Albi tried to save the town during the quarrel 
over the bishopric, into which Villandrando was drawn to provide 
military backing for one side, by placing it under royal protection, 
he simply demolished the fleurs de lys on the walls (69). 
Under these circumstances, the areas of operation of the com-
panies had to work out their own salvation. Normally this meant 
paying them to go away. ~fuen in November 1438 he returned from 
fighting the king's wars in English. Guienne the Bas Pays d'Auvergne 
promptly assigned a proportion of the taxation revenue to him to 
make him move his men away. In April 1439 it was the turn of 
Toulouse (70). On a more humble level, the small town of ~lo*'al-
,t!J,J'Gers had to do much the same during this same campaign being 
squeezed for 71 ~cus and considerable amounts of provisions. The 
town accounts for the following year are full of repayments of the 
money borrowed to meet the demands (71). Less commonly, the local 
(67) Bouvier p. 394-5, Perceval de Cagny p. 233-4, Quicherat p. 141-3. 
(68) Quicherat p. 169-70. 
( 6 9 ) i d p. 1 30 . 
(70) PO 3002 dossier Villandrando nos. 3,5. 
(71) 'Comptes de Montr/al-j~,Gers' ed. A Breuils, Archives Histori-
ques de la Gironde no. 31 (1896) p. 127, 132-4, no. 32 (1897) 
pI, 3, 4, 11, 14-15, 17. 
82 
communities were prepared to spend money on resisting the onset. 
The aid raised by the estates of Languedoc at Beziers in ~ovember 
1436 had this purpose (72). In its turn, these occasions were 
an opportunity for soldiers to find alternative employment, as 
the accounts of Thomas Moras' company demonstrates: he was paid 
to defend Languedoc in May 1437 (73). On the other hand, this 
was a dangerous affair for the hiring communities since the de-
fenders could be as big a hazard as the routiers they were meant 
to be fighting as the Estates of Rouer.gue discovered to their 
cost in 1437 (74) and some of the funds raised by such men as the 
Count of Foix should not be taken too seriously as payments for 
defence but rather as a kind of protection-money for him. 
Villandrando indeed shows signs of having recognised the 
potential profits to be made in this area and at one point opened 
negotiations with the £states of Rouergue in 1438, to become the 
accredited protector of the area for a certain fee and thus supp-
lant the Armagnac family in that role. This would have made 
some sense since they had signally failed to protect Rouergue from 
him and the Estates were prepared to make the agreement until the 
Armagnacs intervened (75). It was an interesting experiment, 
which along with the use of legal and quasi-legal excuses for ex-
tortion (the recovery of debts owed to his men, for instance), 
" . . . 
suggests that the Ecorcheur captains had rather more soph~st~catlon 
in their methods than the rather crude pillaging generally attrib-
uted to them. 
(72) FF 26062 no. 3024. 
(73) PO 2043 dossier :1oras no. 28. 
( 74) A Thomas ,J R.oiJ Itl (~O -()[lJ I u..'" /I iJ( ~"dO £~ /L()i) Cl..frfl { t
J 
IT II J/I't,~ E\ 11 ~~1 /\ Vv! C , t{;{';, t' :'.J.~~ 
(75) id p. 216-8. 
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Certainly Villandrando had at his command sufficient forces 
to make him quite a considerable force in the land. In 1436, 
for instance, when he entered the Albi affair as the military arm 
of Robert Dauphin, one of the claimants to the see of Albi in a 
dispute which appears at length in the Parlement records and was 
still exercising the minds of the royal council some twenty years 
later, he is supposed to have mustered some 7,000-8,000 men (76) 
in an international company which included Scottish troops (77) but 
seems to have had a hard core of fellow-Spaniards. \.Ji th forces 
on this scale, it is hardly surprising that the crown was limited 
Ln its military capacity, especially since there are very strong 
~ 
suggestions that the Ecorcheurs, when they served in the royal 
armies, were their strongest element. 
The concentration on Villandrando is regrettable, though forc-
ed by the sources. Hhere they permit one to follow the activities 
of the other captains, the picture which emerges is very similar, 
if on a smaller scale. Needless to say, the foreign companLes 
were heavily involved in this activity, to the extent th,1.t the 
term "Rodrigues" became synonymous with Ecorcheur in some regions 
and a couplet in the anonymous "Complaint ou le helas du pouvre 
cornmun et des pouvres laboreurs de France" runs -
"Car s'ilz pensoient bien en Rodrigues 
Et Escocois et leurs complices" (78) 
With this kind of reputation, it was hardly surprising that the 
6,000 men promised in the 1428 marriage agreement between Scotland 
(76) Devic and Vainette Vol. IX p. 1122-4, AN X2a 22 f34ro-vo. 
(77) AN X2a 22 35ro. 
(78) Quicherat p. 138-9. 
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and France were never sent. When the fleet was prepared to carry 
the Dauphine Margaret 0.£ Scotland to France in 1436, their serV1C-
es were politely declined by the French ambassadors due to the 
"grans charges sur les pays et subjectz dudit Roy de France" (79) 
and the escort was limited to that necessary to beat off the pot-
ential threat of English interception. The citizens of Tours, 
still plagued by Scots, would no doubt have heartily approved of 
royal policy in this field. In August 1436 they had called out 
the town guard to make sure that the men of Guille Stewart did 
not approach too close to the town, and the council paid one of the 
men charged with guarding the gate for his wounds and the loss of 
a hat during a scuffle with Scots trying to enter the town after 
foraging in the surrounding countryside at this time (80). The 
Italian companies were equally involved 1n the world of pillage. 
In summer 1438 the men of Baretta and Joniface de Valpergue 
" (Theaulde's brother and a notable t.corcheur) defied rO:Tal orders 
and joined Floques and other French captains in a devastating att-
ack on the Avallonais in Burgundian territory which wa£ only con-
eluded when plague broke out in the area (81). 
It would be tempting to see a clear-cut ending to this period 
of chaos and disorganisation in 1439 with the withdrawal of Villan-
drando to Spain with many of his men and the recruitment of his 
principal lieutenant, Salazar, into royal service (82) to fight the 
(79) FF 17330 f123ro. 
(80) Indre-et-Loire CC 26 f47vo, l12ro. 
(81) E Pe ti 7' 'LEfS i corcheurs dans l' Av allonai s' in Bulle tin de 1 a 
Societe d'Etudes d'Avallon Vol. VI 1864 p. 108. 
(82) 
, 
Quicherat p. 174-8 MBoudet St. Flour et sa Prevote penc~nt 
les RBvo1tes Des Armagnacs et des Bourbons au XVe Si~cle 
Paris 1909 p.4, A Courty 'Cet Inconnu lehan de Sal~zar,. 
Sire de Libourne 1462-79' in Revue Historique et Archeolo~laue 
du Libournais Vol. 33 no. 117 1965 p. 73. 
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noble rehels of the Praguerie. Certainly one modern scholar has 
seen Villandrando's departure for Spain as a recognition that the 
days of the free companies were numbered, due to increasing royal 
concern about the military situation (83) and thus a sign that the 
times were changing. I do not myself think that this explanation 
is tenable~ Villandrando seems to ~ave intended to return to France 
and only abandoned the idea when it became apparent that his future 
lay ~n Spain, fighting as a pillar of monarchical authority there 
(84) • Garrisons were still holding out in his name in France 
over a year after he crossed the Pyrenees. On the other hand, 
, 
Ecorcheur activity continued pretty well unaffected by royal inter-
ference for several years, with Salazar well to the fore; indeed 
it would have been very hard to suppress it, as is suggested by a 
letter of remission granted to Jean of Novara, an Italian engaged 
in such activities who finally bought remission in 1446. His 
appeal was eased by the support of Theaulde de Valpergue, now 
risen high in the royal administration as Bailli of Lyon but with 
I 
a family, many of whose members were heavily involved in Ecorcheur 
activities (85). The interplay between the different levels of 
military activity was complex and this should be remembered as a 
constant backdrop of war against the English from 1435 to the 
truces of 1444-5. 
Nei ther in the northern nor the south-western theatres of \Var 
was this marked by any great and memorable battles. In the north, 
in the valley of the Seine and the Ile de France, the war bogged 
(83) P Solon 'Popular Response to Standing >1ilitary Forces ~n 
15th Century France' in Studies in the Renaissance XIX 1972 
p. 92. 
(84) Quicherat p. 189-90. 
(85) AN JJ 178 no. 77, also published ~n Tuetey Vol. II p. 476-7. 
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down into a slow dislodging of English garrisons from positions 
occupied in some cases for more than twenty years. As Capi taine 
Belotte noted for another area at a slightly earlier period, it 
was essentially a struggle of comparatively small forces in which 
treason and bribery were as essential as purely ~ilitary strength 
in gaining the surrender of positions (86). The English willing-
ness to recruit Scottish captives and deserters into their forces 
could cost them dear in these circumstances. In February 1436 
the castle of Vincennes commanding the eastern approaches to Paris 
/ was betrayed to the French by one such Scot, who was paid 500 ecus 
as a reward (87). The largest operations were a series of sieges 
of major English garrisons for which a large proportion of the 
forces available to the French crown were mustered together. 
By great good fortune, reasonably complete figures of the 
besieging armies have survived for two of these affairs, which allow 
us to calculate their structure and especially the importance of 
foreign contingents in them. In 1437, from August to October, the 
• I' " royal army laid s~ege to Montereau fault Yonne. In its numbe rs 
were the men of the Scots Jehan de Montgommery, David Haliday and 
Alan Forty along with the Spaniard, Ferrando da Civile (the latter 
now captain of Villeneuve Ie Roi at a wage of 600 It per year); 
their combined forces added up to 266 men-at .... arms and Jj 0 archers 
or 18.2% and 18.9% of the army respectively (88). At Meaux two 
years later the number of companies was greater (six instead of 
(86) 
/ 
Capt. Belotte 'Les Operations Mi1itaires dans 1a Vallee de 1a 
Seine aux Confins de 1a Bourgogne et de la Cham)?a~e de 1429 
~ 1435' in Cahiers d'Histoire Mi1itaire-Copr_ite d'Etude de 
l'Histoire Mi1itaire en VI~ Region ~etz 1970 Cahier 3 
p. 115-6. 
(87) Bouvier p. 392, Bour3eois de Paris p. 311. 
(88) FF 32510 f381vo. 
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four) though they were generally smaller in what was a larger army. 
The total for the foreigners came to 222 men at arms and 392 
archers plus 17 "guisarmers" - the latter a group of rather uncer-
tain functions. This gave percentages of 15.2 for the men at 
arms, 13.4 for the archers and 34.6 for the very small group of 
guisarme rs • The largest single company was that of the Italians 
Boniface de Valpergue and Jehan Baretta who supplied over half the 
men at arms (126) and a high proportion of the archers (140); the 
other companies were Scottish under Montgornmery, Forty, Haliday, 
Turnbull and Rannequin Kennedy (89). A Scot was given the lands 
of Gournay for being the first man in the city when it was storm-
ed (90). There was a certain continuity in command; the same 
cormnanders appear on the list of those paid for "Entertainment" 
during subsequent operations in Normandy and Bar (91). This last 
was drawn up as part of the abortive attempt at reform of 1439 
since the compan~es thus recorded and hired for royal service 
were supposed to be reformed and purged of their disruptive elements. 
In practice it illustrates rather better the importance of Ecorcheur 
captains in the royal forces; we have already met Baretta in 
I 
Champagne and he operated in traditional Ecorcheur fashion in Quercy 
. 1432 where ~n some of his men fought a pitched battle with the ~n-
habitants (92) . Kennedy had fallen foul of Tours due to his 
1,,IIt,<{AI PI Ftt£~( tf ,~j TVvtt~{ U'fl.f~ 
pillaging in 1433 ( 93) as had Turnbull in an earlier period. It , 
(89) id f383ro-vo. 
(90) Chabannes Vol. II p. Ill. 
(91) FF 32510 f384vo. 
(92) AN JJ 190 no. 22. 
(93) Indre-et-Loire BB 25 f133vo-4ro. 
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. 
~s evident that when there was severe fighting in prospect, the 
royal armies were forced to turn to those who had made their entry 
, 
into the military life in the ranks of the Ecorcheur bands; they 
were the most effective soldiers available. The chronicle accounts 
tend to reinforce this appearance. In the sieges of Louviers and 
Pontoise in 1440 and 1441 respectively their role is noted, with 
Salazar and Valpergue particularly well recorded. Salazar, re-
ported as having 300 lances under his command at the latter, was 
supposed to have made a considerable profit in terms of captured 
Englishmen after the final assault (94). In fact the order of 
assault has survived, and serves to underline the importance of the 
ecorcheurs even in an army under immediate royal command. Atter 
assigning various sections of the wall to different captains, includ-
/ 
ing such French leaders of the Ecorcheurs as La Hire and Etienne 
de Vignolles, the area around the gate was given to those under the 
royal banner along with the troops of Boniface and Salazar who 
were supported by the royal bodyguard of Scots organised in two 
groups to attack in relays (95). Bouvier notes the role of the 
latter ~n guarding those making the assault (96). The fact was 
that the king simply could not do without the services of those who 
at other times pillaged and murdered his subjects at will, and all 
schemes for military reform were to be weakened by this fact. A 
certain degree of turnover among the commanders of the foreign 
companies did not affect the realities of the situation. Amongst 
(94) Bouvier p. 416, de Roye (Chrons. ReI. a Be1g. sous Bourg) 
Vol. I p. 267. 
(95) 'L'Assaut de Pontoise (1ge Septembre 1441)' l ~ ~archegay 1n 
Revue des Soci~t~s ~avantes 4th Series Vol. IV 1866 p. 471. 
(96) Bouvier p. 416. 
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the Scots, for instance, Ogi1vy disappears at about this period 
(he was, it seems sent to Scotland about 1430 on an embassy (97) 
and, according to Balfour Paul drowned at some later date on s~m-
i1ar diplomatic business (98)) but his place in the Scottish ranks 
was filled by the rather obscure Jehan de Montgommery without 
there being any real change in the level of Scottish activity ~n 
France at this time. 
/ 
The close identity between "royal" warfare and Ecorcheur 
activities is especially clear in the south west where one could 
say that the king was normally simply another employer hiring such 
men as Vil1andrando for his own purposes to wage war in their own 
way. Vi11andrando's attack in 1438 on English Gascony was, apart 
from the fact that it carried royal approval and was undertaken 
partly to recover favour with the king after the banishment of 
the previous year, very little different from any other pillaging 
raid. Even the financial arrangements had a very similar look; 
the payment raised by the royal officials to pay his men had 
rather the look of other amounts raised elsewhere, to pay him to 
go away (99). From the point of view of the inhabitants of 
English Gascony the exact status of the invaders mattered little 
as they swept with fire and sword past Bordeaux and into the 
/ I 
Medoc (100). The Ecorcheur army was reinforced by troops under 
A1bret as well as a Scottish contingent under John Stewart, younger 
(97) FF 20684 p. 574. 
(98) Balfour Paul Vol. I p. 109. 
(99) PO 3002 Dossier Villandrando no. 2. 
'\ 
{lOO) Quicherat pl. 152-60, H Ribadieu La Conquete de la Gui~nne par 
1es Francais Bordeaux 1866 p. 128-9, ~lap in :,lGA Vale English 
Gascony Map III. 
90 
son of Darnley and lord of the French lands of the family in 
succession to his brother Alan (101). At the same time as Villan-
/ drando was extracting food and money from Monrealc.J!.I.-{;ers,' Jehan 
Stuart, cappitayne deu Scots' was being given his share of gifts 
by the consuls as well (102). Even with this reinforcement, 
the limitations as well as the strengths of this mode of warfare 
were well illustrated in this raid. While those involved made 
considerable personal profits and the economy of the enemy terri-
tories was badly disrupted, the real military ga~ns were small. 
Despite a limited victory in the field over the local forces, the 
invading army lacked the strength to assault Bordeaux itself, 
and without cannon could only think in terms of a long siege which 
the very devastation they wrought in the countryside made imposs-
ible. Much of the territory captured was lost over the following 
years when the army assembled for the invasion had dispersed (103). 
The scale of the operations had spread panic along the Pyrenees; 
the Kingdom of Navarre was expecting invasion itself at any moment; 
a worry amply justified when Villandrando tramped through the 
country on his way back to Castile doing the damage one might ex-
pect and causing much disruption. No less than six years later, 
the Navarrt.).C crown VIlJi still paying for wine requisitioned for the 
garrisons which watched his march (104). 
In the matter of suppressing rebellions, too, the crown acted 
(101) Stuart p. 165-7. 
(102) Mortrtal- du--Gers (AR Gironde Vol. 31 p. 127). 
(103) Quicherat p. 152-60. 
(104) J R Castro Catalogo del Archivo General de ~avarra-Seccion 
des Cornptv_~ rwdL();Vt1- 1963-8 Vol. 43 p. 191; !t4 p. 80, 183, 316; 
!t6 p. 200-1. 
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~n a manner very like that of its subjects when they chose to pur-
sue their private claims by military means. Perhap s the mo st 
important military factor in the suppression of the Praguerie was 
the adhesion of Jehan de Salazar to the royal side. The story 
makes interesting reading. He had been opera~ing in defiance of 
the royal ordJn'ance on military reform which was itself one of the 
factors in sparking the revolt (105), in Languedoc despite promis-
es of good behaviour made to the Dauphin in early 1439 (106) and 
the consuls of Albi feared that he would launch an attack on that 
city in collaboration with the Bastard of Bourbon (107). Royal 
force s had indeed been as semb led to suppres shim \vhen the rebe Il-
ion intervened and the king opted to buy his support for 6,000 It 
plus the lands of Issoudun (108) and the honour of being made an 
esquire of France. This was a severe blow to the rebel cause, 
since the long-standing connection between Villandrando and the 
Bourbons should have made the support of Salazar for the latter 
almost automatic. The receipt of royal pay and favour did nothing 
for the behaviour of Salazar's troops; in April 1441 the consuls 
of Montferrand were faced with an embarrassing problem concerning 
a prisoner taken during the rebellion while pillaging the area. 
He had been taken for a supporter of the Duke of Bourbon but it new 
transpired that he belonged to Salazar's company and was thus on 
the royal side and had to be released with his expenses paid (lest, 
no doubt, his captain use the affair as an excuse to make trouble 
(105) For the text of this see Ordonnances Vol. XIII p. 306-13. 
(106) Baudet p. 4. 
(107) Jolibois Inventairf; Albi p. 46. 
(108) Quicherat p. 188, Ccurty p. 73. 
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for the town (109). Certainly the defection of Salazar had 
proved very profitable to him; in addition to his irmnediate re-
wards from the king, he received the lands of Chaudesaigue from 
the Count of Armagnac (110) as well as a rash of gifts ranging 
from whole sheep to candles from the still-nervous consuls of 
Montferrand in May 1442 (111). 
In fact the rebellion helps to illustrate the close involve-
ment of military force and political power and jockeying for 
position at court. Many soldiers, less spectacularly strong 
than a Villandrando were very closely tied into the patronage 
systems of the great houses and were affected by their fate. 
Alan Forty was arrested, along with other captains, apparently as 
a blow against the Bourbon grouping, at an early stage in the 
rebellion (112), and a close examination of the list of defaults 
in the Parlement records of this period perhaps illustrate certain 
alignments among foreign soldiers. On 1st March 1442, for in-
stance, one was granted to the Infirmurial'1 of the Abbey of"Bourge-
dedeols" against the Abbot of St. Andre',..les"'Avignon (another Bourbon 
illegitimate son) and sundry others including a Jehan Fueum alias 
the Bastard of Scotland (113). Salazar's own men helped in the 
arrest of Guillaume de Menhi-Penhi (no doubt the Scot Guillaume 
Monnypenny, to become such a notable diplomat in the l450s and 60s) 
an esquire of the stable of the Dauphin on the way back from 
(l09) Teilhard de Chardin Inyenta;re .. Clermont-Ferrand, Fonds de 
Montferrand p. 454. 
(110) Courty p. 74. 
(Ill) Teilhard de Chardin p. 455. 
(112) Vale Charles VII p. 79. !if ~(lJ1(/t(J mfte r1) AL.AA/ FU:,,/,) 
(113) AN X2a f145vo-6ro. 
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pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostella (114). On the royal side, 
~·1ontgommery can be found wi th Pierre de Brt.z:' in 1440 and he , 
along with Boniface de Valpergue, was on the list of captains to 
be retained as part of the abortive reform (115). 
Those who had already established themselves ~n royal favour 
were far from neglected. Christy Chambre, whose role as captain 
of the bodyguard became especially crucial at time of political 
disturbance was, from the scattered evidence, paid regularly in this 
period for the services of his men (116) and a Nicolle Chambre, 
perhaps a younger brother or even a son, appears in the accounts 
at this period (117). Theaulde de Valperg~ progressed in royal 
favour as well. In March 1435 he was appointed Bailli of Lyon 
and Senechal of M~con despite a certain unwillingness on the part 
of the town to make him captain as well (118). He remained ~n 
control thereafter, using his office to gain him the maximum pro-
fit for himself and incidentally for his family; one of his big-
gest clashes with the town council came over several shipments of 
grain which he wanted to run through the city free of toll to 
help towards the payment of the ransom of a brother who was held 
by the English. After much dispute, the council was forced 
to give way (119). There were other conflicts during his term of 
office as well; at one point he sent troops into the cloister of 
St. Jean in the course of a quarrel with the canons (120). 
(114) Quicherat p. 328 PJ LXXVII. 
(115) FF 32510 f372vo. 
(116) PO 659 Dossier Chambre nos. 3-7. 
(117) FF 32510 f373ro. 
(118) Guigue p. ~16-7, Deniau p. 598. 
(119) Guigue p. 4~6, Deniau p. 599. 
(1~0) Deniau p. 600. 
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Normally, though, the town saw little of him Since he was away 
serving the king in the wars. The entry in the town accounts for 
18th April 1436 which records the arrival of his herald to tell the 
citizens of the fall of Paris is much more typical of the contacts 
he had with those he was supposed to govern (121). His non-resid-
ence did not impair his favour at court or his ability to find 
places for his relatives in royal military service. A Louis de 
Valpergue appears in the aftermath of the 1439 reform at the head 
of one of the companies paid to suppress the remaining groups of 
pillagers (122). Other captains flourished in rather more ob-
scure areas; the Spaniard Martin Garcia, later to spring to 
prominence, was paid 160 It on 8th August 1441 as 'viguier et 
garde' of Pont St. Esprit in Languedoc (123). 
The largest single campaign of this period of slowly diminish-
lng militarJ activity before the truces carne in 1442 with the maJ0r 
royal campaign in the south west to relieve the English siege of 
Tartas; the last of the gains of 1438 to remain in French hands 
and of far more importance to Charles' position in the fluid poli-
tics of the area than of real military importance. The royal army 
had to be raised in a hurry to meet the deadline set for the hand-
ing over of the town to the English by the garrison commander if 
relief failed to appear. This is turn would have meant the 
defection of much of the Albret family to the English. In the 
event the campaign was a complete success; the English were too 
(121) Guigue p. 458. 
(122) Mathieu d'Escouchy Chronique ed. G de Beaucourt Paris 
1863 Vol. III p. 9. 
(123) FF 20583 no. 53. 
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weak to risk battle and Tartas was saved. If one can believe 
Leseur's muddled chronology, the companies of both Martin Garcia 
and Robin Pettylow (fetillot) were engaged ~n fighting at Dax and 
St. Sever after the actual relief (124). The latter, Scottish in 
origin and of very obscure background (this ~s the earliest refer-
ence to his activities, though according to Francisque-Michel and 
Forbes-Leith he had served with distinction in the south for many 
years (125)) was to become a figure of major importance later 
but, given the known muddle of Leseur's chronology, it would 
perhaps be rash to be too certain of his participation at the 
/ 
"Journee de Tartas". Another important captain \vho was to claim 
involvement in this operation on rather dubious grounds was Salazar 
himself. Many years later, while defending himself against a murder 
charge, he gave a summary of his career which included service at 
Tartas but, while he had certainly been in the south in January 
1442 (the accounts of Albi show a gift to him in January of that 
year (126)) by the time of the campaign he seems to have been fully 
occupied reaching an alliance with the Duke of Burgundy at the 
other end of France (127). Even leaving these dubious cases aside, 
there was certain foreign participation in the campaign, and again 
it ~s best proved from the accounts of the long-suffering consuls 
of MotiXJal- J~.f. -Gers. On 23rd August 1442 they had had the honour 
(124) Guillaume Leseur Histoire de Gaston IV Comte de Foix ed. 
H Courteault Paris 1893-6 Vol. I p. 3, 12, 31. 
(125) Francisque-Michel p. 165, Forbes-Leith p. 63. 
(126) Jolibois p. 44. 
(127) Courty p. 70, Quicherat p. 194. 
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of a royal entry after the successful conclusion of the carnpal~n 
(128); whether this made up for the exactions of the captains he 
left behind to defend the ground won is a matter for speculation. 
Certainly they were soon having to support the troops of Jehan 
Estoart (Stewart) who were based in the countryside around and 
the following year one Boniface (probably Valpergue) arrived on 
7th April with a royal sergeant to collect money from them for 
the garrison at Bazas and to summon them to send representatives 
to Condom to hear royal orders (129). He was apparently cap-
. . ' ta1n of Labarr1ere - the beginning of another association with 
the south west which was to last many years. 
On the whole, however, despite the Dieppe campalgn of 1~43, 
the war was running down to a series of local truces which would 
build up into the full-scale one of Tours in 1444. This in turn 
posed its problems; what to do with the armies now in the field 
to maintain their capabilities to wage war should the truce fail, 
but also to prevent them from becoming a danger to order in the 
kingdom. One royal expedient in this area had already been tried 
in the winter of 1438-9. At this time Charles had aided his 
brother-in-law Ren~ of Anjou in his struggle to gain possession 
of the Duchy of Lorraine by allowing him to recruit troops from 
the ranks of those more or less permanently in the royal service. 
Rene' hirnse lf 'tvas far away pursuing his dreams of the :Je apo 1 i tan 
inheritance, and his regency council was hard pressed to maintain 
his claims in Lorraine against the Count of Vaudemont until the 
(128) :'-1 A Breui1s 'La Campagne de Charles VII en Gascogne - Un.e 
Conspiration du Dauphin en 1446' in Revue des Questions 
Ristoriques Vol. 57 1895 p. 112. 
(129) Mo~~a~ J~~Gers (AR Gironde 32) p. 19, 2~, 25. 
97 
French military aid arrived. As well as the French captains like 
La Hire, the main foreign commanders such as Montgommery and Boni-
face de Valpergue were able to find employment for their ~en ~n 
Lorraine. 
The accounts of the ducal receiver Othin d'Amance suggest 
that this was a fairly lucrative affair. Valpergue was paid 
467ft4st for a month's service plus part of the down payment made 
on hiring him, followed by 662 1 l3s 4d for the following two 
months. This was only part of the money he was due, but it is 
not certain whether he was paid the rest of the money recorded as 
being due to him in the accounts (a sum amounting to as much 
again) (130). Montgommery and Baretta received similarly im-
pressive sums (131), all for service periods running from mid-
November 1438 to mid-February l43Q, when the companies presumably 
returned to French royal service. Another member of the Valpergue 
clan makes an appearance in these accounts; a cous~n called 
Jeannot who seems to have shared command with Boniface and provides 
additional proof of how far company leadership could be a familv 
affai r. 
, 
He figures as Boniface's lieutenant in Bevy's compilation, 
though without much in the way of dates to give a bearing on his 
career (132). 
From the point of view of King Charles this experiment of 
exporting violence by lending troops to allies and relatives in 
need of military aid had been a real success. It aided a relative 
" l'" I'l". d1 Othin d' Amance' ed.f LO~lt6e in Documents sur 
"t;o '" ,11 .. t) ,,' " , 
l'Histoire d, }orraine",Vol: I ~anc? 1855 p. 1-;5 IPUhilS:1ed 
by the Societe d'Arch7olog~e Lorra~n~. 
(130) 
(131) id p. 144. 
(132) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. IV 'Valpergue'. 
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in his hour of need, reinforcing the close links between the 
house of Anjou and the king, solved the problem of coping with 
unemployed troops during the winter by finding them employment at 
no cost to the exchequer, spared those of his subjects who would 
otherwise have suffered from the depredations of these men and 
returned the companies in fighting trim to face the English In the 
coming summer's campaign. It is even possible that he may himself 
have received some money for allowing the transfer of the men in-
volved, though there is no proof for this. 
As the prospect of an uneasy general truce began to bulk 
larger on the horizon, this kind of solution to one of the perennial 
problems of late mediaeval governments, how to cope with the dis-
bandment of large numbers of armed men after their services were no 
longer required, took on increasingly attractive tones. As early 
as 1441 men disbanded after the capture of Pontoise had created 
problems around Tours (133). In addition, the discipline of the 
forces still in royal pay was little improved on what it had always 
been. In April 1443 the consuls of Montferrand were agaln exerClS-
ed by the exactions of foreign troops. In this case money had to 
be found to gain the freedom of men held by Turnbull ('Tournaboule') 
because one of his men had had (or so he claimed) a steel crossbow 
stolen in the town the previous Sunday (134). 
In addition, the dangers of the political connections between 
the military captains and the great magnates of the realm was agaln 
underlined by the rebellion of Jean IV Count of Armagnac. 
(133) Indre-et-Loire CC 28 fl18ro. 
(134) Teilhard de Chardin p. ~56. 
The main 
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military force on which he was relying was that of Salazar, whose 
service he had secured by the gift of the lands of Chaudesaigues 
in 1441 (135) and who had been a consistent Armagnac supporter 
thereafter. Indeed the first hostile acts of the count had been 
performed by Salazar attacking royal lands in Rouergue (136). 
A royal army was assembled to chastise him and the revolt crumbled 
rapidly. Salazar, trapped at Rodez, surrendered rapidly to the 
Dauphin in early 1444 (137). According to Bouvier, he lost his 
command to Martin Garcia at that point, but this seems unli~ely 
since he made his peace very rapidly with the Dauphin (with whom 
he seems to have enjoyed generally good relations). In December 
his troops ~ere allowed to pass through the town of Albi because 
the Dauphin ordered the councillors to let him through instead of 
forcing him to skirt it by the 'chemin des molins' (138) and 
indeed he allowed himself to be bought over to the royal side ~n 
time for his men to participate in the siege of L'Isle Jourdain 
(139) • Nevertheless, several of his men were still buying their 
individual letters of remission for their misdeeds during the re-
bellion several years later, so perhaps forgiveness was not as 
comp lete as this suggests (140). There are suggestions that 
Armagnac had sought other sources of potential military aid ~n 
simi lar ways. In March 1444, during the siege of S~v~rac, the 
(135) Courty p. 74. 
(136) id p. 75. 
(137) Bouvier p. 424-5, Courty p. 75-6. 
(138) Jolibois p. 47. 
(139 ) Courty p. 77. 
(140) e g ~\.N' J J 177 no. 104. 
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Dauphin wrote to safeguard Jehan Stewart in his possession of 
the lands of Courbarrieu which Armagnac had g~ven him lest the 
Senechal of Quercy confiscate them in the general takeover of 
Armagnac lands (141). Stewart had remained loyal to the crown 
when the crisis broke, but it is not unduly imaginative to see 
the gift in the context of a quest for military support from such 
men as the apparently hard-up Stewart (142). 
The downfall of Armagnac was to bring its own profits to other 
foreign soldiers. Theaulde de Val~ergue went south with the royal 
armies and was rewarded for his efforts not merely by his member-
ship of the commission which interrogated the Count at Carcassonne 
(143) but ~n a more concrete fashion by being one of those placed 
~n charge of the administration of the confiscated lands (l~~). 
This post perhaps illustrates a tendency for him at least, and 
perhaps other commanders later to become more royal administrators 
and less soldiers as their careers progressed. 
At the end of that campaign, however, the question of alter-
native employment for the companies was becoming acute. It was 
to be solved by two separate campaigns - one in the familiar 
territory of Lorraine to aid Ren~ again, this time against the town 
of Metz - and a second one under the command of the Dauphin under-
taken at the request of Frederick of Hapsburg to aid Zurich against 
the Swiss, and especially Basle. Certainly there was a growing 
need to relieve the pressure on the kingdom as complaints about the 
behaviour of the troops continued to flow in; in February, the 
(141) Devic and Vai))~tte Vol. II p. 7 • 
(142) Stuart p. 165, Cust. p. 22. 
(143) ~1athieu d'Escouchy Vol. III p. 139. 
(144) Bouvier p. 425. 
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citizens of Orleans were complaining about the ravages of Scottish 
soldiers in the suburbs and surrounding countrJside (145). In 
a fit of considerable optimism they even sent a herald to the Scots 
themselves to demand the cessation of such activities and the re-
storation of the plunder, which included church property. \'hether 
this piece of municipal enterprise was rewarded with any success 
is unknown, though the fact that they were reduced to the time-hon-
oured expedient of sending letters to the nearest royal officials 
to complain and look for help suggests it was not. At much the 
same time, the Sen·~r,·.hal of Poitou's lieutenant had 2,000 men to 
lodge in his jurisdiction, and one of their number, a German, dis-
tinguished himself by persuading a compatriot, the daughter of a 
German merchant settled in France to learn the language, to run 
away with him. For this, he was killed by one of the members of 
the garrison sent after them by the abbot ~n whose charge she had 
been left (146). 
Certainly the gathering of the arm~es for the campa~gns beyond 
the boundaries of the kingdom was a great success, with a huge 
gathering of very disparate forces especially for the Dauphin's army. 
The armies assembled even included a considerable English contin-
gent released by the truce and a government operating under similar 
pressures. Most notable amongst these was a company under '·1atthew 
Gough (147). The Dauphin's army, however, was largely a drawing 
, 
together of all the Ecorcheur forces for what was to be the last 
(145) Loiret CC 657 f40ro, 4lvo. 
(146) AH Poitou XXVI 1896 p. 177-85 (Publication of ~~ JJ 176 no.213) 
(147) Tuetey Vol. II p. 518. 
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of the great Ecorcheur pillaging campaigns, with the foreign 
element especially notable. The list of the commanders drawn up 
by the Commander of the Order of St. John's priory of St. Antoine 
de Viennois d'Issenheim for the benefit of a rightlv worried 
Strasbourg council gives some illustration of this (148). 
The Scots are represented by three names: the'Sieur d'Azay', 
Pettilot arid Montgommery. In fact, Montgommery himself was the 
Lord of Azay, having acquired Azay Ie Rideau by marriage to the 
lady of the place at some point before April 1442 when he is re-
corded as holding the place in his wife's right (149). Petti lot 
we have a little more certain information about; according to the 
B~vy compilation, he was at Pontoise at some time in 1~44 with 
37 men at arms and 64 archers (150) and his company was certainly 
in the Nivernais in February of that year when one of the members 
was involved in a dispute over billets (151). The 'Lombards' 
include Boniface de Valpergue, whose company had just returned from 
pillaging in the Auvergne (perhaps on the way from the campaign 
against Armagnac to the assembly point for the Swiss expedition) 
in which individual members had committed murders for which they 
were to seek remission later (152) and a certain Lord Ga1ias who 
is unknown unless he is the Ga1ias Jambe who appears in var~ous 
records of this period and who certainly commanded some men who had 
(148) For this, see id p. 517. 
(149) Abbe C Chevalier 'La Ville d'Azay-le-Rideau au XVe et XVIe' 
in Bulletin de la Soci{t{ Arch~ologique de Touraine 1873 p. 
and PJ III. 
(150) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. IV'Pettylow'. 
(151) AN JJ 176 no. 226. 
(152) &~ JJ ~77 no. 1~6. 
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served in Italian companies at other points in their careers (lS3). 
Finally, the Spaniards included Salazar, Conques and Gonsalvez; 
the Spanish contingent was of considerable size and importance and 
Salazar high in the overall command of the army (154). Indeed, 
the Spaniards provided the bodyguard for the Dauphin in the shape 
of a group four hundred strong under Chausse de Savac (15S). 
This ill-organised, chaotic army only set forth on the cam-
paign late in the season, beginning its march on 9th August (156). 
The tale of the campaign has been told fully by Tuetey and hardly 
needs repeating here. The Burgundians, too often the victims of 
Ecorcheur raiding in the past, mobilised their forces in case of 
invasion. the town of Montbeliardfound itself forced to let the 
army ~n lest it be stormed, relations ~ith the nominal hirer, the 
King of the Romans, became strained but in the end the army reached 
its objective at Basle. Beneath the walls of the city a ferocious 
battle was fought against a fairly small Swiss force, which, though 
I 
wiped out itself, inflicted severe losses on the Ecorcheur army 
in the process. The Spanish seem to have suffered especially 
.' 
heavy casualties in this battle of St. Jacques, or the 'Journee des 
Suisses' as it was remembered by those who had been involved in it. 
(157) . One pilgrim to Fierboys recounted the fearful wounds done 
(153) For instance the soldier seeking remission in the previous 
note was by the time he gained it, serving under Galeas Jambe. 
(154) Tuetey Vol. I p. 167. 
(155) id p. 159. ~Oj ~CC~,./'/i" 
(156 ) P R Gaussin Louis XIA - Un Roi Entre Deux ~ondes Paris 1976 , 
p. 33. 
(157) Tuetey Vol. I p. 219. 
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to him in this battle; they ranged from an elbow s~shed by a 
halbard to seven wounds on one thigh, but Gachie de Blazon (perha?s 
himself a Spaniard) lived to tell the tale alone of his company (158). 
In fact, the immediate aftermath of the battle produced a complete 
reversal of alignments and the dispersal of the attacking army. 
Louis was in a difficult position despite his victory; he hardly 
dared to assault Basle (still headquarters of what remained of the 
now-schismatic church council and thus a claimant for the spiritual 
I 
leadership of Christendom) with his army of Ecorcheurs, for fear 
of the diplomatic repercussions of a full-scale sacking of the 
city. An advance into Swiss territory would be most hazardous 
with winter coming on, and Louis had seen the potential value of 
Swiss infantry in the battle. He opened negotiations with the 
Swiss and left the Hapsburgs effectively in the cold, while his 
army broke up into its component companies and dispersed across 
Hapsburg held Alsace pillaging as they went. The diplomatic side 
of the campaign was duly brought to a conclusion in late October 
1444 with a treaty of friendship and alliance bet'tveen Louis and 
the Swiss by which he undertook to settle their quarrels with the 
Austrian Hapsburgs in return (or so Escouchy claimed) for promises 
to supply him with 4,000 troops when he might need them (15~). 
By then, the army which had set forth that August had broken 
up into a series of loosely-connected companles spread over ~uch 
of Alsace and Lorraine fighting local wars with the authorities, 
whether local feudal landholders or the cities, whenever their 
pillages were opposed. The Dauphin, nominally still in command 
(158) Miracles ~.t_ St. Katherine p. 104 no. 170. 
(159) \1athieu d'Escouchy Vol. I p. 23-4, B de !1androt Re13tions de 
Charles VII et Louis XI avec les Cantons Suisses ::> . :ric>: 
1881 p. 7. 
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of these' scattered forces did nothing to prevent this behaviour· , 
indeed he was well to the fore in the fighting which this occupa-
tion of Alsace entailed and was wounded during the siege of 
Dambach (160). Part of the problem was, no doubt, a lack of 
payment to the troops by the notoriously impecunious Frederick, 
compounded by his amazing folly in agreeing to a temporary occupa-
tion of Alsace by the army in the initial treaty; most, one sus-
peets was a simple desire to plunder relatively undamaged lands 
while the opportunity was there. 
MOnt gommery , for instance, moved off into the Breisgau and 
would probably have pushed further into Germany proper had the 
routes through the Black Forest not been blocked against him (161) 
so he joined the rest of the army in the Alsace region. Pettilot's 
Scots remained with the Dauphin, and his brother was killed at the 
siege of Dambach as well (162). The Spaniards, about a thousand 
strong in this area, were assigned the Dambach area when the 
territory was more or less divided up amongst the companies for 
their own purposes (163). 
This occupation lasted throughout the winter of 1444-5 with 
more or less continuoU~ fighting as a consequence. The Italians 
were mostly engaged in fighting against the city militia of Stras-
, 
bourg, which resisted the assault of the Ecorcheurs with some 
success. Indeed, their tactics of using fire to burn the occupy-
ing forces out of their bases in the countryside round the city were 
I 
so effective that Am~ de Valpergue (evidently another member of the 
(160) Tuetey Vol. I p. 284. 
(161) id p. 238. 
(162) id p. 286. 
(163) id p. 293. 
106 
clan commanding a section of the Italian troops in Alsace) was 
moved to send a herald to the city carrying a letter in which he 
complained bitterly about this way of waging war and threatened 
dire retaliation if it was not given up (164). This curious 
tribute to the grip of ideas about what constituted "bon Guerre" 
on the mind of at least one hardened professional, despite its 
Latin formulation, did Am~ little good; he was captured by the 
city militia at Blaesheim in January 1445 and had a ransom of 
4,000 florins set on him (165). Indeed despite their consider-
able numbers and military experience, things did not by any 
means go all the way of the invaders (whose numbers were perhaps 
inflated by a contingent of camp-followers, abnormally high even 
for this period) (166). In a fight near Ebermunster, for example, 
between some 800 Scots and the same militia, Montgommery was 
killed (167). His body, rescued from the field, was returned to 
Scotland, preserved in a mixture of oil and wine - this pickling 
being done apparently at royal expense - s~nce an entry in the 
accounts of Jehan Xaincoins for the year ending in September l4~6 
refers to a payment of 600 It to Nicolle Chambre for the purchases 
of spices and other materials necessary for the packing and pre-
servation of the body of Jehan de Montgommery on its journey home 
to Scotland (168). Memories of Montgommery as a notably wealthy 
man survived his death: ~n April 1449 two soldiers in Pettilot's 
company in Guienne came to blmvs after a quarrel which began wi th 
(164) id p. 311-2. 
(165) id p. 316. 
(166) Gaussin p. 32. 
(167) Tue tey Vol. I p. 317. 
(168) FF 32511 flO2ro. 
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a reminiscence of how Montgommery had left his wife a dress worth 
I 
2,000 ecus (169) and ended in a murder. It seems from this that 
Pettilot may well have inherited the command of what was left of 
MOntgommery's company. He himself was to have a narrow escape 
from the same fate when the final contingents of the army began to 
withdraw from Alsace in the first two weeks of March 1445. One 
of the last groups, including the Scots, was ambushed by local 
troops in the Val de Liepire on the 18th of the month and heavily 
defeated. Pettilot was badly wounded in the battle and his life 
was despaired of, but he lived to fight again and even to exact com-
pensation for his losses from the French taxpayer (170). How 
many of the 3,000 Scots who went into the campaign returned from 
Alsace is unknown, but it is possible that casualties among all 
the companies were heavy (171). Whether this was a deliberate 
objective of the campaign is a matter for speculation; it 
certainly aided royal plans for reform. 
Meanwhile the king himself with many of the main French 
commanders and their companies not engaged on the Swiss expedition 
had been involved in an operation of rather less scope but very 
similar effects, aimed against the city of Metz in its quarrel with 
Rene of Anjou as Duke of Lorraine. In this affair as well, the 
French monarchy had no scruples about hiring English soldiers ~n 
time of truce between the countries. That the usual strains 
involved in joint operations between troops of different national 
(169) AN JJ 179 no. 309. 
(170) Tuetey Vol. I p. 330-1, PO 2252 Dossier Pettilot no. 3. 
(171) For this figure see id p. 293-4, Vol. II p. 520. 
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backgrounds in the French service were increased by this atte~pt 
to make former enemies fight side by side is illustrated by the 
incident recorded 
. 
late November 1444. 1n Three men approached 
/ 
the defenders of the Pont Remond and explained that they were 
English soldiers who had deserted from the garrison at Servigny 
after a quarrel with the French there in which they had killed 
the captain. After a stay in the city prisons until their story 
was checked, they were released and allowed to join the city's 
own defenders (172). It 1S probable that the royal guard part-
icipated in this campaign as well; we certainly find payments to 
Nicolle Chambre, now apparently joint commander of the bodyguard 
with Christy, for a trip to Germany rather earlier ln the same 
year in search of recruits. He was paid for t\.,o men whom he 
found there, presumably crossbowmen, to J01n the group of special-
ist German crannequiniers who figure as part of the guard at this 
period (173). 
All this fighting beyond the frontiers of the kingdom did 
not cOwpletely quieten private strife at home, or even the 
involvement of professional military forces in private quarrels; 
we find 1n the pleadings before Parlement reference to a Spanish 
captain ln a struggle in the west between the Lord of Pons and 
Pregent de C~etivy (174) in the spring of 1445. Nevertheless, 
the expedient of exporting violence had proved fairly successful 
1n clearing the land of the worst of the pillagers. As the 
(172) Saulcy and Hugueni~ Relation du Si~ge de Metz en 1~4~ par 
Charles VII et Rene d'Anjou Metz 1835 p. 156. 
(173) FF 32511 f82vo. 
(174) AN X2a 24 f74ro, 83vo. 
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battered companles straggled out of Alsace and Lorraine in the 
spring of 1445, it seems that their numbers had been sufficiently 
reduced for the royal plans of reform to have a reasonable chance 
of success,whether their bleeding of the companies had been a 
deliberate policy or simply a fortunate accident which eased 
matters greatly. 
In addition, the actual arrangements which had been made for 
the organisation of the truce may well have exercised a consider-
able influence on what was eventually to happen in the French 
army. The clauses in the truce arrangements which set about 
replacing the irregular exactions of garrisons (the so-calied 
"patis") with regular collections ln what was effectively a tax-
ation system for the support of the troops involved has consider-
able similarities with the system which prevailed in France as 
a whole after 1445; there, too, troops were supported from the 
proceeds of regular taxation. It is probable that the troops 
raised from the armies of both sides for the campaigns beyond the 
frontiers of France came from companies and garrisons not included 
in these arrangements, which wer::largely confined to ~ormandy, 
Maine Anjou and Perche, though Picardy and Burgundy had the option 
of setting up a similar system (175). The truce permitted French 
reorganisation; the patis arrangements perhaps suggested some of 
the lines which this reorganisation should follow. 
(175) For this see K. Fowler 'Truces' in The Hundred Years War 
ed. K. Fowler London 1971 p. 207-9. For the text of 
the arrangements see A Huguet Aspects de la Guerre de 
Cent Ans en Picardie :laritime 1400 - 1450 Paris l~~~ 
Vol. II p. 495-6. 
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Certainly the reform ordonnance which was issued by Charles 
during this lull in June 1445 was one of the most important events 
in the history of French military organisation. It has also 
been one of the most misunderstood, both in its alms and its 
effects. In the next chapter it is my purpose to examine the 
fate of the foreign companies in this upheaval, both to see their 
contribution to the final campaigns of the war and to study the 
kind of army which the reform actually produced in the light of 
their experience. This may perhaps permit us to see the 
intentions and achievements of those who framed it in a more 
realistic light. 
III 
Chapter lv. All the King's Men: The Time of the Ordonnance 
Companies. 
In the summer of 1445, Charles promulgated the ordonnance, 
the actual text of which has long been lost, by which the compan-
. 
~es were reformed, reorganised and placed under closer royal 
control. The exact details of the structure of the forces thus 
created are lost as well, and none of the most contemporary 
chroniclers give much in the way of supplementary detail. Martial 
d'Auvergne, writing at a time in the 1480s when the whole affair 
had already slipped into the semi-mythological past golden age of 
Charles' later years, talks of a simple division into fifteen 
companies each with a round hundred lances (1). This, however, 
seems impossibly schematic and over-simplified, especially since 
Contamine's efforts at reconstruction of the lists of captains 
have produced a group of some 24 men who can be proved to have 
held command (2) at this time, with companies of very varying sizes. 
, 
For some captains it was a disaster; the Ecorcheur Antoine de 
Chabannes appeared before the king clad in deepest mourning to 
complain that taking away his men was like taking away his life (3). 
This emotional appeal had no effect; he still lost his command. 
Laudatory poets of a very much later generation saw this ordonnance 
as the beginning of a period of military good conduct and even 
popularity, as the evil men were chased from the companies (4), 
(1) Martial d'Auvergne Vol. I p. 219-20. 
(2) Contamine GES p.400, 597. 
(3) Histolrt,··lt Chabannes Vol. II, p. 31. 
(4) See for instance Martial d'Auvergne Vol. I p. 81 or Dict 
" . V Morale sur Ie Manti en de Justice of Henri Baude in Les ers 
de Maistre Henri Baude, Poete du XVe Siec1e Receul~i~' e~ 
Pub1i s avec 1es Actes qui Concernent sa Vie J. QUlcherat 
Paris 1856 p. 92. 
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while Louis XI is supposed to have regarded it as the start of a 
new era. What then happened and how were the specifically 
foreign companies affected by the changes? 
The reorganisation did not mean the end of the foreign soldiers 
~n the French royal arm~es; far from it. No less than four com-
panies specifically for them \Vere set up, each with a foreign 
commander. Two were Scottish under Pettilot and the previously-
obscure Robert Cunningham who was probably the successor of Hont-
gommery, one Spanish under Martin Garcia and the fourth Italian 
under Boniface de Valpergue. The Scots of the royal bodyguard 
should perhaps also be counted in this calculation. The total 
foreign elements were probably around three hundred lances with 
the two Scottish commanders having fifty each, if the rather vague 
. ' references ~n Bevy can be trusted (5) (though Contamine gives 
Cunningham 40, for which one can a~so find references in the same 
source) (6). The commanders thus retained need little introduc-
tion: Cunningham, though not appearing in the sources before, may 
have been related to Montgornmery (a letter of rem~ss~on of rather 
later date refers to a Montgommery as a relative of his (7» and 
Garcia, also known as Enriquez (which can be confusing) seems to 
have been the illegitimate offspring of a member of the noble 
Castilian house of Gijon (8). On the other hand, there were 
definite losers as well. Salazar lost his company to Garcia, as 
did the other Spanish commanders in Switzerland, such as Conques 
(5 ) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. I Cunningham, Vol. IV Pettylow. 
(6) Contamine GES p. 400. 
(7) AN JJ 185 no. 306. 
(8) Daumet p. 86. 
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and Gonsalez. While the latter two faded quietly from the French 
scene, Salazar remained in full possession of his lands (9) and was 
perhaps not completely out of favour if a payment of 300 It to him 
in the royal accounts for 1447 ;i typical (10). He ::lay even have 
played a certain military role to judge from a later entry in the 
same accounts in which he is paid sixty livres for his expenses 
while with the king when the French moved up forces to compel the 
English withdrawal from Le Mans, as provided by the truce arrange-
ments (11). Another apparent loser is Ste~.,art of Aubigny, despi te 
the claims of the various family historians that he played a con-
tinuingrole in the army (12); on the other hand, there is a 
tantalising entry in B~vy which attributes the command of some 
25 lances at about this time to him (13). It seems rather doubt-
ful that he could have completely escaped the notice of the var~ous 
sources in this role, however, and he never appears on the pension 
. . " lists, so one is forced to suspect a degree of confus~on ~n Bevy 
(unless he served as a subordinate to one of the other proven 
Scottish captains). The whole group of minor commanders of the 
later 1430s have also disappeared; Turnbull and Forty and 
Baretta and their like. 
For those whose position had been confirmed and regularised 
by the ordonnance, the profits were considerable and equally regular. 
The captains were given a permanent position on the royal payroll 
(9) Courty p. 77-8. 
(10) FF 32511 f124vo. 
(11) id f125ro. 
(12) Stuart p. 167, Cust p. 2~. 
(13) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol.I Aubigny. 
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and, over and above their normal wages as commanders of companies, 
were in receipt of regular pensions and irregular gifts. In the 
account of Jean Xaincoins for 1446-7 one finds the four foreign 
captains receiving their regular 3-400 It pensions annually (l~) 
with in addition a whole range of occasional gifts. Boniface de 
Valpergue we find being given payment for travel expenses (15), 
Cunningham for expenses incurred by living in court at Tours (16) 
Other gifts were paid out of different sources of roy.al income. 
In 1446 the Languedoc aides were made to pay for gifts of armour 
to Pettilot and Cunningham as well as 275 It given to Garcia to 
allow him to visit his relatives in Castile (17). At the very 
highest level of rewards, Pettilot was given the ~ands and lord-
ship of Sauveterre-en-Guienne in August 1448 out of the properties 
confiscated from the Armagnacs (18). 
Naturally the captains and men best integrated into the 
structures of royal patronage were those of the royal bodyguard, 
who figure repeatedly in the royal accounts. The Chambre brothers, 
in addition to their normal pays, collected a whole range of other 
payments for various serVlces. Their regular \Vages were high ~n 
any case. Nicole was apparently paid 800 It per month and 
Christy 600 (19), with such extras as payments for the upkeep of 
prisoners (20), the customary supplements for living expenses 
(14) FF 32511 fllOro, l2lvo. 
(15 ) id fl16vo. 
(16) id f125ro. 
(17) FF 23259 f5vo, 8ro. 
(18) AN JJ 179 no. 178. 
(19) FF 32511 f99ro. 
(20) id fl08vo. 
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the maintenance of one's 'etat' (21) and the provision of horses, 
assignments on the salt revenues or Languedoc taxation receipts (22), 
even the cost of a new wardrobe for Nicole's wife to enable her to 
play her part at the wedding of Eleanor of Scotland to a Hapsburg 
prince (23) in 1449. 
This kind of royal munificence was not, of course, simple 
generosity. It was integral to the whole purpose of the reform, 
the nationalisation of violence to the profit of the king alone, 
to be achieved, at least partially, by the process of tying the 
soldier to the fountainhead of royal patronage; a concern which 
seems to have been of much more concern to those who framed the 
reform than any hypothetical improvement in discipline. This 
connection extended below the level of the captains to the ranks 
of the comp anies. Naturally the guard, always the unit most 
closely integrated into the patronage system, were the maln bene-
ficiaries. The money was sometimes given to the unit as a whole, 
channelled through the captains (for such matters as the prOVlSlon 
of new clothes or the perennial problem of the upkeep of horses (24)) 
or individually to such as Gilbert de la Haye given 200 It as 
reward for loyal service in the guard and for his support In 
Scotland (25), Guillaume Actuisson given 600 as a wedding present 
(26) or Donot Macasselin given a suit or armour (27). It was not 
(21) id flllvo. 
(22) PO 659 Dossier Chambre nos. 8, 9. 
(23) FF 23259 f17ro. 
(24) FF 32511 fl09vo, 104vo, FF 23259 f11ro. 
(25) FF 32511 fl01ro. 
(26) id f124vo. 
(27) FF 23259 f14vo. 
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confined to members of the guard, however~ one finds payments to 
Arne de Valpergue to help him pay his ransom to the English (28). 
This closer connection with the distribution of royal favours 
and money undoubtedly helped to make those retained in the reformed 
. 
compan~es accept the changed situation. Even ordinary men at 
arms were able to hope for a share of profits of royal favour if 
they were fortunate. In addition, the actual effects of the re-
form at company level were probably less drastic than one might 
. . 
~mag~ne • Many captains lost their commands, but I suspect that 
relatively far fewer soldiers were disbanded and that the maJor-
ity found their way into a royal company sooner or later. There 
were certainly some disbandments; references to safe conducts for 
such men exist (29), but the majority of those who had followed 
the profession of arms were probably able to continue ~n it under 
the new dispensation. In addition to the companies, there seem 
to have remained a considerable number of captains of var~ous 
castles who were outside the new structures and whose garr~sons 
were not drawn from them to provide employment for men unable to 
keep a place in the compan~es; the Scot, Alexander Mcqueen or 
McCann who figures regularly ~n accounts of this period as captain 
of the bridge of Samois (30) ~s merely one example of a consider-
able group. \.Jhile this helped to avoid the nightmare of the 
creation of free compan~es by unemployed soldiers, it inevitably 
affected the new forces. The majority of the men ~n their ranks 
(28) FF 32511 f124ro. 
(29) 'Notices et Extraits des Chartes et de5l'1aIlIAS
Crf Cj. Appart2.,a"t au 
Briti~ Museum de Londres' Vallet de Virivi1le in Bibliotheque 
de l'Ecole de Chartes Vol. VIII 1846 p. 12~-5. 
(30) FF 32511 fl02vo, 110vo, lllro, 122ro. etc. 
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I 
had learned their trade in the days of the Ecorcheurs and their 
newly-respectable status did nothing to change their attitude to 
their surroundings. One could get rid of Salazar; one could 
not get rid of his men so easily. Interpretations of the reform 
which stress the improved discipline of the companies ignore this 
fact at their peril. 
The documentation which has survived tends to underline this 
reali ty. In July 1447 Pettilot was paid 300 lt by the estates of 
",-
Gevau~n to move his company out and take them to Comminges: a 
transaction which resembles those to which Villandrando had been 
given in his prime (31). At much the same time :fartin Garcia was 
being paid to remove his company from Velay and take it to Guienne 
(32) • Despite the optimistic claims of such people as ~artial 
d'Auvergne and Baude, the army was never popular with those who 
had to endure its presence for any length of time (33). The 
long-suffering consuls of Modrtal~4~-Gers met on 10th June 1447 
to discuss the misdeeds of the garrison of Condom and the behaviour 
of the captain of the Lombards who was ravaging the countryside 
(probably one of the Valpergues, though this is impossible to 
prove} (34). This kind of problem is reflected in a court case 
which reached Parlement in the summer of 1448 between one Cyprian 
de Montflour and a local nobleman from the Beaujolais called Tastin 
de la Garde. Cyprian claimed to have lost nine horses and goods 
worth in total 800 ~cus to Tastin when the latter had attacked him 
(31) PO 2252 Dos sier Petti10t !l0. I - . 
(32) PO 1277 Dossier Garcie no. 2. 
(33) See Solon's article pass~m for instance. 
! AH Gironde 32 p. 52-3. (34) Comptes de ~1on""re al 
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and his men billeted there. Tastin brought a counter-case claim-
ing that Cyprian's Italian troops had done him some 2,000 ~cus 
worth of damage in their pillaging, and from the welter of claims 
and counter-claims a picture of effective warfare between the local 
nobility and royal troops emerges clearly. The exact date of the 
matters at issue is obscure and perhaps not very important; the 
really significant fact is that Cyprian in 1448 was a member of an 
ordonnance company in the supposedly purged army (35). The burden 
of supporting the troops was, in addition, met very largely from 
locally levied taxes; we find payments to Cunningham for his 40 
lances in the Montagnes d'Auvergne (36) made in this manner. This 
provoked little popular rebellion on an organised scale (though 
much evasion and attempts to move the burden on to other shoulders 
by administrative means) (37) but the presence of the sol"diers 
whose benefit the taxes were being raised for was sometimes necess-
ary to compel their collection. There was even a momentary 
attempt at resistance in the Armagnac lands in 1446 when Auch and 
Vic tried to refuse to accept troops and Lectore refortified its 
walls. The rebellion was reported by Theaulde de Valpergue to 
the Parlement of Toulouse, but it petered out ignominiously when 
Garcia's company appeared on the scene; the town of Riscle, whose 
accounts preserve the records of ~he abortive revolt found itself 
having to maintain two lances (later reduced to one) and in 1448 
was paying 22 'cus for its own garrison over and above 16 ecus and 
(35) AN X2a 24 f257vo-9vo., 263ro. 
(36) po 838 Dossier de Conigan nos. 7-9. 
(37) Solon p. 80-5, 90-1. 
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12 sous of subsidy to Garcia (38). 
This role of the army of the French monarchy in the second 
half of the fifteenth century as a mechanism for converting tax 
revenue into patronage should not be under-estimated. Never-
theless, the question of what to do with the force thus created 
remained. Charles looked towards intervention in Italy mo~entarily; 
Theaulde de Valpergue was sent to Milan as ambassador (39) and paid 
500 lt for his travel expenses (40). Other negotiations were 
pursued with the Swiss to make sure of their support, or at least 
neutrality in the event of such a move (41). The paralle 1 
negotiations which saw Eleanor of Scotland married to Sigismund of 
Austria were conducted by Guillaume Monneypenny, evidently recover-
ed from his misfortunes at the time of the Praguerie and launched 
on a lengthy diplomatic career (42). 
This exploration of potential employment of the reorganised 
army outside the kingdom in the east was never to come about. On 
12th March, 1449, the Aragonese captain in the English serv~ce, 
\ 
Francois de Surienne, stormed the Breton town of Fougeres and the 
'? 
new struc~ure was to be tried out against the oldest enemy of all. 
The beginning of actual hostilities in August brought about a 
redeployment of companies from their peace-time stations to Lhe 
two theatres of war in Normandy and the south-west. The former 
(38) Comptes de la Ville de Riscle 1441-1507 in Archives Historiques 
del4Gascogne 12-13 1886-92 ed. P Parfouru and J de Casslade de 
Pont Vol. I p. 26-8, 33. 
(39) Vale Charles VII p. 105. 
(40) FF 32511 f127ro. 
(~l) de :1ondrot p. 14-5. 
(!t2) id p. 16-7. 
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was the first royal objective, and some of the foreign companies 
participated in this campaign. In fact, the main concentration 
of foreign troops had been in the sout~ and centre; Pettilot's 
men had been based in the Toulousain where they had left many 
traces in the Notarial registers (43), Garcia and the Italians were 
probably in much the same area while Cunningham's company was still 
in the Haut Pays d'Auvergne. Their presence was far from univer-
sally welcome; in May two of his men were given remission for the 
murder of an inhabitant of Aurillac after a brawl hetween a page 
and a local youth (44). No doubt the withdrawal of his men to 
fight in Normandy, illustrated by a quittance issued by Cunningham 
for the payment of his men in the Auvergne and then in ~ormandy on 
5th December (45) came as a welcome relief. 
The actual history of the ~orman campaign has been often 
enough told to requ1re no detailed elaboration. Cunningham and 
his men reached the duchy in time to participate in the s1ege of 
Rauen in October (46) and joined in what at times was more like a 
triumphal progress than a serious campaign through Normandy. They 
were not the only foreigners involved in the campaign; the dip lom-
atic specialist Monneypenny was knighted by the king when battle 
was expected at one point in the siege (47), while Theaulde de 
Valpergue had been with the royal army from the start of the 
(43) P Wolff Comrnerces et Marchands de Toulouse (Vers l350-vers 1450) 
Paris 1954 p. 59. 
(44) AN JJ 179 no. 318. 
(45) PO 838 Dossier de Conigan no. 10. 
(46) Chartier Vol. II p. 154. 
(47) id p. 142, d'Escouchy Vol. I p. 215. 
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1\ 
campa1gn serving at Louviers and Chateau-Gaillard (48) and was 
to receive his reward after the fall of Rouen where he entered the 
city at the head of 300 a rcht.rr of the royal bodyguard richly 
dressed (49). It was not all parades, however, and Cunningham's 
company were involved in the one decisive battle of the campaign 
at Formigny where the last English field army in Normandy was 
defeated. They were apparently in the vanguard of the Count of 
Clermont's small but efficient army in what was, for its importance, 
a remarkably small-scale battle and seem to have distinguished 
themselves in the fighting (50). The mopping up of the remaining 
English garrisons followed the victory; at the s1ege of Bayeux 
Cunningham and his men were dug in round the Cordeliers and by this 
time had some of the infantry militia of Franc Archiers attached 
to them, perhaps in the hope of stiffening these rather unreliable 
elements (51). At Caen, where the royal army arrived to reinforce 
the siege and which was to have considerable significance 1n 
Cunningham's career some five years later, his men distinguished 
themselves in fighting round the church steeple at Barneville (52). 
After the fall of the town, one of Cunningham's men was to operate 
a highly profitable protection racket with the aid of an English 
pr1soner before deserting with the profits (53). Meanwhile the 
(48) Chartier Vol. II p. Ill, 134, Gilles de Bouvier 'Le Recouvrernent 
de Norm~~d~ in Narratives of the Expulsion of the English from 
Normandy ed. J Stevenson London 1863 p. 288. 
(49) d'Escouchy Vol. I p. 235, Bouvier Recouvrement p. 315, Chartier 
Vol. II p. 161, Bouvier p. 446. 
(50) Bouvier Recouvrement p. 333, Chartier Vol. II p. 205, '<iaur-in 
Vol. V p. 152, Bouvier p. 449, Jacques du Clercq ~~moires ed. 
ReiffenbLrg B~ussels 1823 p. 364. 
(51) Bouvier Recouv!"ement p. 340, Chartier Vol. II p. 205, \~aurin 
Vo 1. V p. 154. 
(52) Robert Blonde l' D:. tQG4ct(..ciof'1l. . .' . ~ormann1ae 1n ~arratives e~. 
Stevenson p. 98, Cosneau p. 449. 
(53) ~~ JJ 185 no. 306. 
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campaign drew to an inevitable conclusion with the taking of Cher-
bourg, where Cunningham was also involved (54). In the lis ts of 
those who had distinguished themselves, Cunningham was mentioned 
for his valour, while Valpergue, who had remained with the royal 
party and had taken part in the final sieges as well (55), was 
among those who had helped administratively, especially in raising 
money; interesting proof of changed status (56). 
To the victors went the rewards: Cunningham was g~ven 570 lt 
from the revenues of Dun le Roi, of which he was captain, early ~n 
1451 as repayment of monies sent to the Chambre des Comptes (57). 
Valpergue remained in the duc~y on royal business travelling 
around in an attempt to bring order to the troops now lodged there 
and suppress pillaging, a service for ~.,hich he was paid 200 lt in 
October 1450 (58) - the kind of profitable career in the developing 
military bureaucracy in which several old soldiers were to spend 
their declining years. He had also been involved in other 
administrative functions such as interrogating the captured Osbert 
Mundeford after the fall of Pont-Audemer (59). Monneypenny had 
his expenses as part of the royal entourage during the conquest 
paid for him, as well as going on a diplomatic mission to Scotland 
to tell the news of the campa~gn (60). There were even payments 
to a Genoese gunner for making a new type of cart to transport 
(54) Chartier Vol. II p. 225, du Clercq p. 388. 
(55 ) Chartier Vol. II p. 216. 
(56) Bouvier Recouvrement p. 372, Chartier Vol. II p. 237, 239, 
Haurin Vo 1. V p. 164-5, Bouvier p. 457-8. 
(57) FF 23271 p. 429. 
(58) FF 26079 no. 6261. 
(50, d'Escouchy Vol. III p. 354. 
(60 ) FF 23260 p. 3, 7 . 
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artillery at less cost, and, apparently, without horses (61). 
In the south the war also seems to have got underway in the 
summer of 1449. According to the testimony of a member of Petti-
lot's company at Fierboys, the company had been in action against 
"brigands" somewhere in the south at this time, and it is at least 
possible that Gascon supporters of the English are meant by this (62). 
Certainly as early as 1449 Pettilot appears ~n the registers of 
Montr/al-~~: ... Gers to recruit crossbowmen, and on 22nd August 1450 he 
demanded money from the consuls to help his ordonnance troops (63). 
Certainly in October of that year, after the fall of Bazas,forces 
under Orval engaged in a large-scale plundering raid across 
English-held territory towards Bordeaux. The English forces, 
backed by the town militia came out to intercept the raiders and 
met them near Blanquefort. There the small French army spectacu-
larly routed their more numerous enemies, inflicting heavy losses 
~n dead and captured (64). 
The following year the conquest of the south-west was begun 
in earnest with a multi-pronged offensive aimed at the rema~n~ng 
English strongholds. Garcia, whose men had moved through the 
Armagnac lands on the way to the theatre of war (one of them died 
/ 
at Vic, where he left 25 ecus to the local church for the repose of 
his soul) (65) with the concomitant extortion as the consuls of 
Riscle paid to feed him in January as a means of dissuading his men 
from pillage (66) joined up with Pettilot under the command of 
(61) idp.6. 
(62) :liracles d, St~, Katherine p. 118-20 no. 194. 
(63) Monttta1-d&l_Gers AH Gir v :ide no. 32 ~. 75,82. 
(64) d'Escouchy Vol.I p. 322, Chartier Vol. II p. 246, ~ibadieu ~. 175-8 
(65) Riscle AH G~scogne 12-13, p.5l. 
(66) id p. 51. 
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Foix and Orval at the sieges of Arques and Dax (67). Xeanwhile 
Theaulde de Valpergue joined up with the army of Dunois and was 
heavily involved with the diplomacy of victory helping to negotiate 
the surrenders d first Fronsac, then Bordeaux (68) which he was 
the first man to enter. After this easy success, the entire French 
army moved south to Bayonne, the last English foothold in the area. 
Dunois' army now included Cunningham's company; whether this had 
played any part in the earlier stages of the conquest is uncertain 
(69) • The army was drawn up round the town with Cunningham and 
/ 
Boniface de Valpergue on the Bearn side under Dunois, while Foix's 
army, including Pettilot and Garcia, ~vere on the Faubourg de St. 
t Leon, with Garcia' men defending a fortified church which they had 
captured in an early stage of the siege (70). Theau1de de Val-
pergue, whose attachment to the army ~s uncertain (he is placed in 
different commands by different chroniclers) was apparently mostly 
engaged in the surrender negotiations, which culminated in a peace-
ful surrender on 14th August (71). This was probably speeded up 
by the appearance of a white cross (the symbol of the French) ln 
the sky at the hour ordained for surrender, a "miracle" which Dunois 
was not at all slow to stress in his letters to the king, also 
stressing that Garcia's Spaniards were among those to see the sight 
most clearly (72). After the surrender, Garcia was placed in 
(67) Chartier Vol.II p. 265, T~aurin Vol.V p. 175, du Clercq p. ~t\17, 
Ribadieu p. 189. 
(68) Chartier Vol.II p. 271, 305, Waurin Vol.V p. 181, du Clercq 
p • .+15. 
(69) Chartier Vol.II p. 315. 
(70) id p. 318, Leseur Vol.I p. 206-10, Bouvier p. 464-5. 
(71) Chartier Vol.II p. 318, FF 5028 f184ro. 
(72) FF 5028 f183vo. 
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charge of the town as governor (73). 
This should, perhaps, have been the end. In the late summer 
of 1452, after considerable secret negotiation (74) the region 
rose against French rule and was given English support in the shape 
of an army under Talbot which reached the Gironde estuary ~n 
October. Apparently Theaulde de Valpergue ':/al; still in the 
area as a member of Clermont's council perhaps conducting similar 
business to that he had done in Normandy, since there are referenc-
es to him conducting musters in this period (75); He narrowly 
escaped capture on the river and was only saved by the efforts of 
various archers from his brother's company (76). Through the 
winter Talbot consolidated his hold on the region (though Garcia ~n 
Bayonne seems to have been left pretty well undisturbed), while 
Charles prepared a counter-stroke which would be decisive. Negot-
iations were even opened with the Swiss to provide infantry re~n-
forcements to bolster the army; pay of five Rhine florins per day 
was offered, with a month in advance (a great change from the days 
when Charles had hoped to get his allies to provide men at their 
expense) . The Swiss were, however, at this time, far from keen on 
the idea of letting foreigners hire their men so the negotiations 
carne to nothing (77) and Clermont's army advanced into Guienne 
without this aid. As it was, the army was far too strong for 
Talbot's limited forces, and the English commander was compelled to 
(73) Chartier Vol.II p. 322, Waurin Vol.V p. 192, Leseur Vol.r 
p. 218, du Clercq p. 419. 
(74) Vale English Gascony p. 142-5. 
(75) Arsenal 4522 f24ro. 
(76) d'Escouchy Vol.r p. 414-5. 
(77) de Mandrot p. 26. 
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wait until the French divided their forces before attacking the 
smaller of the 3ections at Castillon, where he was utterly routed. 
In the French army under Loheac was to be found Pettilot and his 
Scots (78). Theaulde de Valpergue, who had spent much of the 
spring of 1453 engaged in raising troops on behalf of the Count of 
Foix to serve in the army of the reconquest (79), led them into 
action at the siege of Cadillac after the battle (80). As the 
campaign turned into a huge pillaging expedition, the foreign 
contingents were well to the fore, with Valpergue operating round 
, / 
Libourne and St. Emilion (81) and Pettilot ravaging the Medoc with 
fire and sword, while the main army was besieging Bordeaux for the 
second time (82). With the surrender of the capital in October, 
the war was finally and definit~vely over. This did not entail 
unemployment for the soldiers who had been engaged in gaining the 
victory. Valpergue remained in Guienne to help \vith the adminis-
tration of the reconquered province, beginning with the construction 
of two new castles in Bordeaux (83), while Pettilot became captain 
of Chiteauneuf in the middle of the M{doc he had so convincingly 
devas tated (84). 
Nevertheless, the comLng of peace did usher in a new period in 
the life of the military establishment, a period of tranquility and 
( 78) Leseur Vol. II p. 13. 
( 79) id p. 328-30. 
(80) id p. 21. 
( 81) Chartier VA 1. III p. 10. 
(82) Ribadieu p. 329. 
(83) Chartier Vol.III p. 47, Waurin Vol.V p. 251, Leseur Vol.II p.29, 
• I 7') 3 Bouvle~ p. 4 -- • 
(8~) Chartier Vol.III p.ll, Bouvier p. 470. 
127 
comparative stability in the command of the companies and in their 
deployment. The Spanish company remained under Garcia and the 
Italian one under Boniface de Valpergue until his death, which must 
have happened at some point in 1460, since his executors issued a 
receipt for his wages ~n October of that year (85). His successor 
t k f t · th h th . hI. ~s no nown or cer a~n, oug ere was one s~nce t e tresor~er-
des·guerre£ accounts for 1461 talk of troops under a 'Captain of 
Lombardy' (86); perhaps the rather shadowy figure of Galeas Jambe~ 
who was certainly in the same area at the time and afterjtook over. 
The company may, however, have been losing some of its separate 
identity by this time. The Scots had a slightly ~re complex 
history. The two companies set up in 1445 survived apart until 
the disgrace of Cunningham in 1455, after which they seem to have 
been merged under Pettilot. The guard, perhaps predictably, had 
much the most complex series of changes. At some time in 1449 the 
Chambre family relin~uished command; by September payments were 
being made to Patrick Folcart and Thomas Halliday who had taken over 
the company (87). The Chambres do not seem at this point to have 
fallen from favour; Nicolle was still in receipt of various presents 
such as money for a new suit of armour (88) as well as a pens~on 
of 600 It. drawn, it would seem, on the salt revenues of Sainto~~~ 
(89) which was still being paid in 1459 (90). There is even an 
( 85) PO 2924 Dossier Valpergue no. 12. 
(86) FF 20692 p. 190. 
(87) FF 23259 f22ro. 
( 88) FF 32511 f142vo. 
(89 ) id f164ro. 
(90) PO 659 Dossier Chambre no. 10. 
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account in a letter of remission of the troubles caused in a village 
in Poitou by men from what is called "Chambre's company" in 1456; 
what this actually means is uncertain and there ~s a severe lack of 
supporting evidence (apart from another of Bevy's enigmatic entries 
which has Nicolle Chambre as commander of some troops in the 
l450s (91) which might explain the reference (92)). The ne~., joint 
command of the guard lasted until 1454 when one Claude de C~eau-
neuf joined the other two, to be joined in his turn by Michel de 
Beauvilliers the following year. In 1457 the structure changed 
again, with Helyon de Brouage replacing Beauvilliers and Halliday 
disappearing. By the following year, however, Brouage had in his 
turn departed and the Folcart-Ch~eauneuf combination lasted out 
the reign (93). Perhaps this continued changing reflects the 
troubled side of the final years of the reign, with a good deal of 
tension at court and the vital necessity of trustworthy commanders 
for the military forces closest to the royal person. 
The ordinary ordonnance companies were much less affected by 
such changes of leadership, as we have seen. Their deployment 
remained more or less stable in this period as well. The foreign 
companies were very much concentrated in the south-west, around 
Bayonne and in other strong points of the Sln/chaussee of the Landes; 
indeed there is record of Cunningham's men being moved there as well 
(91) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. I Chambre. 
(92) AN JJ 187 no. 208 (published AH Poitou XXXV p. 9-14. 
(93) Forbes Leith Vol. II p. 16, 17, 20-2 (publication of the full 
muster rolls and accounts of the Guard companies in ~F 8000). 
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at some point 1n 1453 perhaps as a consequence of the Castillon 
campaign and continuing T,-lorry about English attacks in the region 
(94). The different groups did not always live in harmony by any 
means; the same letter of remission which records the movements 
mentioned above, goes on to talk of frequent brawls in Bayonne 
between Scots and Spaniards and transfers of the worst offenders 
to other garrisons in the hope that this would ease the situation 
(in this particular case the scheme failed because some Spaniards 
turned up in the town, with the inevitable result of a brawl and 
a dead Spaniard) (95). All the evidence from letters of re-
mission and the like suggests that Pettilot's men remained spread 
across the various garrisons of the Landes and even slightly 
further north for the entire period. In January 1461 the company 
was reviewed, partly at Dax and Bayonne under Pettilot and partly 
~ at Lectore under Geoffrey de Va1pergue (probably another member of 
the family) (96). The Italians are less conspicuous, though the 
career of their commander suggests that they T,.;rere probably based 1n 
the same region. Certainly a muster of part of the company of 
Galias Jambe has survived, which was taken at the same time, and 
probably as part of the same commission, as that concerning 
Petillot's men. This seems to have a fair mixture of Italians 
in its ranks, as the strange names recorded suggest, and a few 
more clearly identifiable ones prove (Bartolomeo Dalixandre, 
Jehan Lombart or Bartolomeo de Peise, for instance) (97). 
(94) AN JJ 187 no. 289. 
(95) id 
(96) AN K 69 no. 42 bis, FF 25778 no. 1905. 
(97) FF 25778 no. 1906. 
On the 
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other hand, obvious non-Italians such as Yvonnet le Breton can be 
found in the ranks, which suggests that the original national 
position of the company was beginning to break up. Garcia's 
Spaniards were also based in the Bayonne region, though some sec-
tions of his company were rather slow in joining their commander 
there since in 1453 Garcia's lieutenant had to be paid to move his 
men out of Riscle, and one of his men who had left the serv~ce 
(perhaps deserted) had his belongings sold in Vic (98) . They 
moved north into the SaintoY\.,Gl(. on his promotion to the senechal of 
that reg~on in 1459. Their presence in the region is well record-
ed in the volumes of letters of remission concerning them and 
their pillages in the area (99). 
On the whole, then, the companies tended to follow their cap-
tains when they were g~ven administrative office outside the strict-
ly military sphere. This duplication of civil and military functions 
was to become ever more common in later years, and, while it might 
make sense under certain circumstances, ~n the long term it was 
likely to produce absenteeism from some at least of the offices and 
their consequent neglect. This exercise of office by deputy was 
deeply embedded in the office-holding system however, and the army 
was rapidly to become another extension of the same structure. 
The career of Petti lot as sen~chal of the Landes illustrates 
one of the problems posed by combining civil and military power in 
(98) Riscle AH Gascogne 12-3 p. 58. 
(99) eg AN JJ 190 nos. 58, 167 (published ~n A de Reilhac Jean de 
Reilhac, Secretaire, :1aitre des Comptes, General des Finances 
et Ambassadeur des Rois Charles VII, Louis XI et Charles VIII -
Documents pour servir ~ l'Histoire de ces Regnes 1455-99 Paris 
1886-7 Vol. IIp. 267-9, 271-3, Vol. III p. 14 2~. 
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the hands of the same man. He was appointed in 1454 and remained 
there to the end of the reign. Much of his energy seems to have 
been spent in a very lengthy legal battle with the senechal of 
Guienne over their respective rights of jurisdiction (with Pettilot 
trying to avoid subordination to Bordeaux). In the pleadings 
before the Grand>Jours of Bordeaux on the sub~ect (for the battle 
was well and truly joined when the first of these sessions met in 
1456 and was to continue at the second in 1459 without any clear-
cut solution) the Guienne side produced stories of considerable 
misgovernment and oppression by the sen~hal and his officials 
which, even though produced in a forum ~.,here ritualised vilifica-
tion of the opposition was common form ring fairly true (100). The 
proceedings of the ephemeral local estates which flickered into 
being at this period, combined with the complaints of the Albret 
family about the violations of their privileges and those of their 
tenants in 1458, help to amplify the picture. They are especially 
full of complaints about the behaviour of troops billeted in the 
region, who were apparently not paying for their accommodation and 
the other services provided for them by those they were billeted 
with. Further complaints were made about the damage they caused 
on the way to and from reviews. The situation was so bad, the 
towns claimed, that they were unable to pay the taxes levied for 
the refortification of Bayonne, because of this oppression. Ad-
mittedly this can be seen as another familiar and almost ritualised 
appeal by communities unwilling to pay taxes, but there seems, from 
(100) L Cadier La Se;:chaussee des Lannes sous Charles VII - Adminis-
tration Royale et Etats Provinciaux Paris 1885 p. 22 I 
Registres des Grand Jours de Bordeaux, ed. Barckhausen in 
Archives Historiques de la Gironde Vol. IX 1373 p. 80-3, 272, 
346-8, 360, 363-4. 
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other sources, to have been considerable tension at local level 
between troops and townspeople in the south-west, and such indiv-
idual actions alluded to as the seizure of 82 beds in Bayonne in 
defiance of privileges by one of Pettilot's subordinates suggest 
that there was some concrete reality behind the familiar lamenta-
tions (101). The royal response, perhaps delivered bv Pettilot 
himself, was placatory; orders would be given to the local 
commanders to see that payment was made, if need be by stopping the 
pay of offenders. Since the men claimed that the troops based 
in Bordeaux did not have to pay for their accommodation and used 
this as an excuse for refusing to pay themselves, efforts would 
also be made to see that the Bordeaux men paid as well (102). 
How effective these prom~ses were ~s a matter for pure speculation; 
it ~s perhaps worthy of note that ~n the following year the towns 
had a new gr~evance to pursue: they wanted troops billeted in the 
town to pay local taxes (103). Certainly these local problems 
did not affect Pettilot's position at court, where he continued to 
rece~ve favours in the shape of an accumulation of military and 
quasi-military commands most of 1;vhich he must have perfonned large-
ly by deputy. His service on the comm~ss ~on \vhich deal t 1;vi th a 
potential pro-English plot in 1454 (104) was understandable ~n the 
light of' his position in the region, and his holding of the cap-
taincies of Dax and St. Sever also made sense given his command of 
the companies which held the towns (indeed, his captaincy in Dax 
~101 ) Cadier p. 44-5, 80-1. 
(102) id p. 80-1. 
( 103) id p. 85-6. 
(104) Ribadieu p. 380. 
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preceded his elevation to be sen~hal by some three years 3ince 
he was appointed in September 1451 (105)). It also rounded his 
income out nicely (106). Other captaincies made rather less 
Unrnediate sense. In August 1457 he was made captain of ~ontoise 
in Toulousain; this, however, he lost in January 1459 since he 
could not perform the functions adequately without pay and the 
authorities in Toulouse who should have done this had made such 
trouble that he had been left effectively unpaid throughout his 
tenure (107). In compensation, perhaps, he was made captain of 
Maurier in Armagnac and apparently had no problem in collecting his 
wages in this post (108). 
It is reasonable to assume that the other foreign captains had 
fairly similar careers in this period, though none ~s quite as well 
documented. Garcia, for instance, served as mayor of Bayonne at 
least until 1455 (10~), but achieved his promotion to major adminis-
trative status in March 1459 when he became senechal of SaintoA~e 
(110) where, despite the occasional troubles caused by his troops, 
his stay was not marked by any major dispute. He seems to have 
accumulated fewer extra posts, though he had some of the same 
problems as Petti10t in extracting his due from those meant to pay 
him. As early as 1453 the diocese of Mirepoix ,.;as refusing to pay 
its share of the tax revenues intended to support Garcia and 
(105) PO 2252 Dossier Pettilot no. 5. 
(106) FF 20580 f5ro. 
(107) PO 2252 Pettilot nos. 10, 11. 
(108) id no. 9. 
( 109) FF 20580 f5vo. 
(110) FF 21405 p. 131. 
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Pettilot in Bayonne and Dax. As a result their men were not being 
paid which was to the "tresgrant pre]· udice et d . d arnma1ge .••. enos 
dites villes •••• et de nos pays denviron par faulte de garde et 
deffense". (111) 
The Valpergue family was as usual well positioned in terms of 
offices of profit held. Theaulde, for instance, though fully 
occupied in the south-west, managed to maintain his connections 
with (and wages from) Lyon until very late. In February 1459 the 
king was trying to extract his back. pay as captain of the tm-m for 
"him to enable him to pay his debts in the area (112). Bj- then he 
had been named as governor of Bayonne, a post he had held at least 
from 1457 when he inspected the privileges of Albret in the 
region (113). In the period before this, he had been Commis au 
~ I I 
Gouvernement de la Senechaussee de Guienne; part of the commission 
charged with running the conquered territories. In this role :le 
drew his wages in February 1454 (114); in this role also he appears 
briefly in the record of the 1456 Gran~Jours of Bordeaux (115). 
Inevitably, perhaps, he combined this with other offices - as castell-
an of Severac from 1451 onwards (116) to October 1461 at least and 
the captaincy of Lectore which he held in October 1461 as well (117). 
By then he was governor of Bayonne, paid from Bordeaux (118) and 
(111) PO 1277 Dossier Garcie no. 5. 
(112) Caillet p. 537-8. 
(113) Cadier p. 74-5. 
(114) FF 26082 no. 6649. 
(115) Grand~Jours AH Gironde IX p. 115, 180, 218. 
(116) FF 26081 no. 6458, FF 26083 no. 6882, PO 2924 Dossier Va1pergue 
nos. 13-4, 16, 19, 20, 22. 
(117) idno. 21. 
(118) FF 26086 no. 7322. 
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involved in reviewing and paying the troops at Bayonne and St. -, 
~ver in October 1460 (119). His brother was almost as active, 
though perhaps not quite so highly placed. His regular pension 
was drawn from Armagnac tax revenues (120) and his main occupa-
tions were in the south as well, but he found time to go on an 
embassy to Geneva on royal business with the Duke of Savoy (121). 
His main office was probably the mayorship of Bayonne - a post 
which he held at his death in 1460 (as we saw his executors were 
concerned to collect wages still owing him) and which he must 
have taken over at least by 1457 since he was issuing payment orders 
in that function from that date (122). 
The rather cosy \vorld of the post-war commanders, accumulating 
offices and captaincies to be performed by deputy is, however, only 
one aspect of the life of the soldier in peacetime. If the rewards 
for faithful service were considerable, so were the pitfalls posed 
by questions of loyalty. It was also a dangerous time of intrigue 
and tension, and the army was far from insulated from the conse-
quences of the quarrels between King and Dauphin. Indeed, the 
foreign companies were especially affected. The Guard were ~n-
evitably at the heart of politics and much affected by them. As 
early as 1446 the potential problems were well illustrated in the 
story of the Dauphin's plottings of that year as revealed by Antoine 
de Chabannes, interrogated in September of that year. 
(119) id no. 7438. 
(120) FF 2886 f15vo. 
(121) Chabannes Preuves Vol. I p. 229-30. 
Even if the 
(122) E Delaurens Inventaire Sormnaire des A.rchives Communa:es de i" ./011,- de. 
Bayonne Anterieur a 1790 Bayonne 1894 Vol.I p. 100-3. 
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details of his testimony are perhaps suspect, they reveal ~uch 
about the mechanics of such plotting as well as the prerequisites 
for succes s. He alleged that at Chinon the Dauphin had pointed at 
one of the Scots of the guard and said "See those who keep the 
kingdom of France in subjection" ("Voyez la ceulx qui tiennent Ie 
Royme de France en subjection"), who by their presence prevented 
people from doing many things which they would othenvise do 
("et que se neust estre Ie garde on entrepris beaucoup des choses 
\ . ") que on n .:; pas fa~t . To gain the access to the royal person which 
was vital to his plot, he planned to buy over Chambre, captain at 
that point,or if that failed to ovenvhelm them with his own men whom 
Chabannes was to aid in recruiting. Despite a certain confidence 
that he was potentially corruptable, Chambre remained loyal and the 
whole plot petered out in failure. Nevertheless the story well 
illustrates the crucial importance of the royal guard and explains 
why they were such a well treated unit at all times (123). 
The failure of this particular plot did not bring tension to 
an end. The estrangement between Charles and his son lasted 
through the l450s until Louis' precipitate flight to Flanders and 
Burgundian protection in 1456, and indeed beyond. In the period 
when he was in the Dauphin!, with his own group of followers in 
effective exile from court, the plotting seems to have continued. 
This perhaps accounts for the curious case of Robert Cunningham. 
On 8th August 1455, he, along with several of his subordinates, 
appeared before royal courts charged \vith treason. The case went 
(123) FF 20427 f3ro-4vo. Vale Charles VII p. 100-3. 
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back five years to the siege of Caen where, it was alleged, his 
lieutenant John Campbell with Guillaume Cunningham, Robert Johnston 
and James Haliburton had entered into an agreement with the C~~ 
of Somerset to capture one of the main French commanders (the list 
given included such men as Dunois and Jacques Coeur) and guide an 
English force of 1500 men out of the city. Of these, five hundred 
were to capture the king himself, while the remaining thousand 
spread havoc . the French camp (124) • l.n For this they were to be 
paid 4,000 
I 
and fifty ecus pounds sterling. Campbell was found 
guilty and executed; his quarters were hung over the gates of 
Paris (125). The fate of the other conspirators 1.S uncertain, 
and that of Cunningham, who was apparently involved in the plot as 
well, was to become a matter for intense diplomatic activity. 
The truth of the charges can only be guessed at; on the face of it, 
it seems rather odd that such detailed charges should have been 
brought at such a distance in time from the alleged plot. There 
is little background available on the case, so we do not know how 
it was supposed to have come to light; nevertheless one is left 
with a SUsp1.C1.on that whatever may have happened at Caen, the 
actual prosecution had more to do with the tensions at court 1.n 
1455 than anything else. 
This suspicion is heightened by the diplomatic uproar which the 
affair provoked and which lasted for the better part of two years 
until Cunningham was definitively sentenced. Even before the case 
reached court the royal council was concerned about this aspect. The 
arrival of Bishop Spence of Galloway on 19th Mav 1455 at the head of 
(124) Dupuy 38 fS9ro. 
( 125) i d f 88 ro . 
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a Scottish embassy bearing a letter from King James II which de-
manded that justice be done, while assuring Charles that he would 
wish very severe punishment if the accusations were true. The 
case was put to a committee which included Dunois and Folcart with 
whom the ambassadors had to discuss the matter (126). Five days 
later on the 25th the council returned to the case and ordered the 
gathering together of all Cunningham's correspondence for examina-
tion, whether it related to the case in hand or not, a significant 
move. which suggests strongly that there were other matters 0= 
concern to be dealt with (127). In fact, despite the efforts to 
allay Scottish concern, the case was to be a matter for diplomatic 
correspondence for two more years. In January 1457 Charles felt 
it necessary to include the affair in a letter to James. He 
regretted the incident but stated firmly that it had been necessary, 
as the confessions of those involved proved (128). In February of 
the same year, the confession of Campbell was shown to the Scottish 
ambassadors to prove that justice had indeed been done (129), and 
in the end the repeated Scottish petitions irritated Charles enough 
for him to state shortly that he had done what he had done only 
after mature consideration and in the light of the confessions of 
those involved (130). Nevertheless, it appears to have had some 
positive results since Cunningham was spared the fate of Campbell; 
on the 15th August he had to beg mercy of the king and submit to 
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offices, including his command, and was forbidden on the pain of 
confiscation of all his goods to come within ten leagues of the 
king's person for the next three years (131). These provisions 
suggest again that the real concern was the danger to the person 
of the monarch, and there is a strong probability that the case 
had much to do with the Dauphin, especially in the light of 
Cunningham's return to favour when Louis came to the throne. It 
also indicates a very real concern about the loyalty of the soldiers 
in a period of tension. 
The diplomatic negotiations concerning Cunningham reveal that 
other Scots had fallen foul of the prevailing susp~c~ons at court. 
By the time of the letter of Charles to James in January 1457, 
Thomas Halliday, joint commander of the guard, was apparently in 
prlson as well (132). 11uch less is known about his case, and it 
is uncertain whether he was ever actually brought to trial. A 
close look at the muster rolls of the guard, however, reveals 
something very strange. One of the sub-units of the Guard, a body 
of about 48 archers underwent a spectacular change in personnel in 
this period. In the muster records of 1457, eight men are replac-
ed, and in the following year another eleven depart (133). A 
turnover of nearly 40% in the course of two years is most unusual 
and the only comparison is the upheaval when Louis came to the 
throne in 1461. With one of the commanders In prison at the 3affie 
time, it seems at least possible that political explanations should 
(131) FF 5908 f87ro. 
(132) Stevenson Letters and Papers Vol.I p. 348-51, FLat 10187 
f50ro. 
(133) Forbes Leith Vol.II p. 21,23. 
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be sought here as well. No doubt the peculiarly politically 
sensitive nature of the unit, whose members slept in the royal 
lodging as well as mounting guard outside (134) made a close 
concern for the loyalty of the rank and file as well as the 
commanders inevitable. 
The climate of suspicion persisted to the end of the re1gn; 
we find records of two more Scots being arrested in 1459, though 
their supposed crimes are again obscure (135). Perhaps the 
strange entry in the accounts of Mathieu Beauvarlet, Tresorier de 
Guerre, for 1457, concerning a payment to a Thomas Cunningham in 
order that he might leave the realm as he had been ordered to, 
indicates another case (136) It even appears that royal disfav-
our fell on those no longer actively involved in the military 
establishment. After the accession of King Louis, on 15th August 
1461 Katherine Henyne, widow of Nicolle Chambre, appealed to him 
on behalf of her children to ga1n possession of certain lands in 
.// 'f' the Sene chaussee 0 Sa1nto,,~.e. The gist of her appeal was that 
she and her family had suffered for their loyalty to Louis under 
the previous reign: Nicolle had been "desappointie de tant de bien 
et honneur" and had ended his days "charge de dettes" (137). The 
exact truth of this appeal is almost impossible to ascertain. If 
he fell from favour, it must have been after 1459 since his pension 
(134) As illustrated by the purchase of materials which were made 
up into "paillasses" for members of the guard to sleep on 
while fully armed, recorded in the Argenterie accounts 
AN KK 5 1 f 95 vo . 
(135) Beaucourt Vol. IV p. 435. 
(136) FF 32511 p191ro. 
(137) FF 20486 f191ro. 
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was still being paid then, and his previous career hardly suggests 
a zealous supporter of the Dauphin. On the other hand, in the 
tense atmosphere of the closing reign he . j~t-cr well have fallen 
into royal disfavour. Whether Katherine was trying to take ad-
vantage of the change to steal a march on local rivals or other-
wise not telling the full truth, the fact that she thought it 
worth her effort to make an appeal in these terms indicates the 
amount of dispossessing and other punishment for dubious loyalty 
being meted out towards the end of the reign, and how precarious 
the enjoyment of royal favour could be. 
Indeed, as the life of the old king slowly drew to its close, 
those who had managed to rema~n in favour with him to the end had 
plenty of reasons to be concerned about their future under a new 
monarch who made little effort to hi~his dislike of those who had 
served his father faithfully. In his Burgundian-financed exile in 
Flanders, Louis was building up a counter-court staffed with his 
own men like the Savoyard Jacques de Valpergue (whose relationship 
with the others of this name is uncertain), another Boniface de 
Valpergue whom he had made captain of Grane in the Dauphin( (138) 
and the Scot, Thomas Scuyer or Stuier who appears on a list of his 
officers in March 1448 (139). These men would seek their rewards 
when their king came to his own, and one can well imagine the worries 
of those in place, often men who had spent most of their adult lives 
~n France and had grown old with the king they served; now their 
careers would be in suspense from the moment he died. 
(138) J Vaesen, E Charavay and B de Mandrot Lettres de Louis XI, Roi 
de France Paris 1883-1909 Vol.I p. 25-6, 120-2. 
(139) id p. 223. See also PO Dossier Stuyer no. 2. 
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Their concern about the future was well founded. The scale 
of the purge of the ranks of the commanders of the ordonnance may 
well have surprised even the most pessimistic. According to the 
calculations cr Contamine, no less than 75% of the captains in 
place in January 1461 had lost their commands by the end of the 
year (140). Even intensive backstairs intrigue could not save 
those whom Louis had decided to destroy, as the fate of Antoine de 
Chabannes illustrates. The new king regarded him as a deadly 
enemy, and such former allies as the Boniface de Valpergue in Louis' 
entourage not only did nothing to help him, but even considered 
imprisoning his messengers. It was said that another old associate, 
Salazar, wanted. to arrange for the complete destruction of his 
position and the confiscation of all his goods (141). No doubt 
Chabannes, who had more to fear than most, intrigued more desperate-
ly than his fellows, but his efforts and their ultimate failure could 
probably be paralleled for the other commanders. Certainly the 
foreign companies and their commanders were not immune from the 
effects of this sweeping purge, the dangers of which were to become 
apparent. Garcia, replaced by Salazar in command of what had 
originally been the latter's company and given the princely sum of 
120 It apparently in compensation (142) simply disappears from the 
records and his ultimate fate is uncertain. It is possible that 
he may have settled in France since in 1466 one finds payments to a 
page at court called Grimon Garcia to go to visit his parents in 
(140) Contamine GES p. 405-6. 
(141) Chabannes Histoire Vol.II p. 66-8, de Reilhac Vol. I p.lOS-Q 
(quoting Clairambault 481 f9ro-14vo). 
(142) FF 32511 f248ro. 
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Bordeaux (143). Salazar resumed command on 13th August (144) and 
one finds payments to him for distribution to ten gentlemen of his 
company, perhaps the senior men at arms, in accoun~_for the same year. 
On the same date, the Scottish company changed hands. Pettilot 
vanishes from the records even more completely and it ~s possible 
that death may have eased the change-over in this case. The new 
dispensation saw the division of the company into two fifty lance 
sections again, under Robert Cunningham (appointed on 13th August 
as well, to complete the transformation of his fortunes with the 
change of kings) (146) and Thomas Scuyer, Bailli of Caen and an 
old servant of the new king, who took command at Bordeaux on 24th 
March 1462 (147). The Italians survived rather better; Theaulde 
de Valpergue remained in office in the first few months of the 
reign and may well have died in harness. Louis remained active, 
though ~n a diplomatic capacity rather than a military one (148). 
Indeed the Italian company seems to have disappeared, perhaps 
assimilated into the army as a largely French unit. 
Predictably the major upheaval comes in the ranks of the Guard. 
There Folcart lost his position on the change of monarch and was 
replaced by a group of six captains, including Thomas Scuyer and 
Cunningham (149). The effective commander for day to day adminis-
tration would appear to have been Scuyer's brother Guille, aided by 
(143) id f252ro, FF 20685 f383. 
(144) FF 20692 p. 192. 
(145) FF 32511 f230ro. 
(146) FF 20692 p. 192, FF 6971 f24Ovo. 
(147) id 
(148) FF 32511 f253vo. FF 20685 p. 387. 
(1~9) Forbes Leith Vol. II p. 25. 
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Alexander Barry who had been one of the men at arms of the Guard 
(150) . There was a considerable structural upheaval as well; 
the group of about 25-30 men-at~arms, which had existed before, 
simply vanished, while one of the two units of archers received 
some 23 new members on top of a body of 47 (151). The new format 
f 
. , . 
was 0 two un~ts, an el~te of about 25 known as 'Archiers du 
Corps' and a group of about 75 'Archiers de la Garde', and the 
16 German crossbowmen who were attached to the unit in the prev~ous 
reign vanished as well. The figures are rather difficult to be 
precise about, since the muster records do not seem to record all 
the changes which one can deduce from the nominal rolls. For 
instance, the probable brothers Herbert and Tassin Xacsonnel 
(Maxwell?) who lost their places in the upheaval of 1457-8 return 
to the ranks without any formal references in the records of 
comings and goings (152). Hhatever the exact numbers invo lved, 
the unit's complexion and composition was drastically altered. 
Folcart, no doubt disgruntled \vith the turn of events, transferred 
his services to Charles of France, Louis' younger brother (153) 
and commanded his bodyguard, which may well have had a Scottish 
element in it. Of those who had apparently suffered under Charles, 
Thomas Halliday's fate is the most obscure. One account shows 
payments to him as a member of the Guard in 1466, but he never 
reappears on the rolls of any of the companies (154). 
(150) id p. 27. 
(151) id p. 25-6, 27-30. 
(152 ) id p. 23, 28. 
(153) H Stein Charles de France, FrJre de Louis XI Paris 1921 ? 1-3S. 
(154 ) FF 20685 p. 379. 
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These changes do not seem to have affected the capacities of 
the companies involved unduly in the short term, and many of them 
were to be plunged into action almost straight away in Catalonia 
to support Louis' ally John II of Aragon against the rebellious 
province (and also exploit the situation to grab the detached 
provinces of Gerdagne and Roussillon on the French side of the 
Pyrenees for himself). Cunningham (and possibly Stuyer, who ~ay 
well be the 'Thorn' of Leseur's chronicle account) was part of the 
army under the Count of Foix which crossed the mountains in the 
summer of 1462 to carry the war into enemy territory and relieve 
the hard-pressed John. His troops forced the pass of Salses to 
aid at the relief of Gerona; both Cunningham and 'Thorn' participat-
ed in the triumphal entry to the city in July. The Scots were in 
the vanguard at the Battle of Torreilhas, storming the hill on which 
the Catalans were drawn up and fighting "merveilles bien et vailla-
ment" (155). They participated in the rest of the campa~gn - the 
abortive siege of Barcelona, the successful one of Tarragona ~n 
which they stormed the section of the walls near the f)O.N1,fllC."fI~ 
church and the final section of the campaign which ended with the 
entxy to Saragossa (156). Involvement in hard fighting did not 
curb the flashes of indiscipline and often fatal internal conflict 
inside the companies; in Harch 1463, wi th the company back in 
France, the king was to issue letters of remission to one member who 
had killed another 'while in the Kingdom of Aragon' in the course 
of a dispute about billeting (157). 
(155) Leseur Vol. II p. 118,121,140,147-8. 
(156) id p. 177-87. 
(157) ~~ JJ 198 no. 543. 
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Salazar's men, hased in the south as well, were also involved 
in this compaigning. In mid-July 1462, we find his men advancing 
on Perthus which they helped to take (158), and ~~~~ seem to have 
spent their efforts in the campaigning in Cerdagne and Roussillon. 
Their behaviour certainly left much to be desired; ~n December some 
of his men were involved in skirmishes with villagers in St. Colombe 
near St. Sever when they set about requisitioning food from the 
village (159), and other such affairs can be found in this period 
involving his men (160). This did nothing to affect the favour 
Salazar enjoyed with the king, who had given him the lordship of 
Libourne on 1st July of that year (161) (in which capacity he 
rapidly found himself embroiled in a series of disputes with his new 
subordinates as to the limits of his authority and jurisdiction (162)). 
He was made captain of Libourne as well, holding this along with the 
captaincy of Bourg in the familiar pattern established in the 
previous decade (163). 
By 1464, however, the main French arm~es were out of Catalonia 
and the companies had been distributed to garrisons across France. 
The records left by the reviews, which took place every three 
months, give some idea of the distribution of the compan~es. The 
Scots were back in their old territory of the Auvergne; Scuyer's 
men were reviewed on the 14th April at Issoire and three months 
a( lu . .(jj Xl 
(158) Lettres~Vol.II p. 63. 
(159) de Reilhac Vol. III p. 161-3 (letter of remission published) 
(160) eg AN JJ 198 no. 445. 
(161) Courty p. 65-6, PO 2609 Dossier Salazar no. 50. 
(162) Courty p. 67-8. 
(163) PO 2609 Dossier Salazar no. 51. 
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later in dispersed groups at St. Poursin, Guisset, Escurolles, 
Aigueperse, Clermont and Maringues (164). This degree of dis-
persal was more or less forced on the captains by local hostil-
ity to the billeting of troops and perhaps supply difficulties 
as well. Cunningham's half of the company was almost equally 
dispersed through the same region; on 1st May his men mustered 
at St. Flour, on 1st August at Brioude, Lansac and Aleyne (165). 
It was no doubt the presence of Scottish troops in the Auvergne 
which explains the presence of Alexander Barry of the Guard amongst 
the group charged to put the men at arms in that area in order 
(and, one assumes, to pay them) (166) in the course of 1464. 
Salazar's men, meanwhile, were reviewed at Vienne in the Dauphin: 
(167) • 
While the ma1n 'active service' units were dispersed across 
the country, the royal Guard units were rather differently occupied. 
The account for royal stables organisation (which include much of 
the expenditure on the Guard units) for the years October 1463 to 
September 1465 have survived. In the first year, the total spent 
on the unit from this account was 3629 It l2s. This was largely 
concerned with an annual reuniforming of the Guard for a royal 
entry to Paris; the equipment was issued at St. Cloud where it 
had come from Chartres via Paris and Nogent (168)and consisted of 
the red, white and green jackets familiar from the Adoration of the 
Magi of the Hours of Etienne Chevalier painted in the previous 
(164) FF 6971 f240ro. 
(165) ide 
(166) FF 26090 no. ~52. 
(167) FF 6871 f240ro. 
(168) A'J KK 65 flOOro-112vo. 
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. 
re1gn, new plumes for helmets, new arrow-cases and arm-guards with 
pennons for the units as well. The captains were given superior 
equipment, as were the 25 archers of the senior unit (169). This 
splendid equipment was replaced the following year, with the 
addition of new standards. One of these depicted St. Michael and 
the Dragon, the other a large sun (the latter motif being repeated 
on the jacket of the captain)(170). For more normal occasions, 
the brigandines worn by the men were recovered with white fustian 
over the course of the year (171). Seven men were issued with 
new helmets at a total cost of 271 l7s 6dt (172). 
The splendour with which the Guard units were fitted out did 
not mean, however, that they had become purely parade-ground soldiers, 
as events were to show. By 1464, the clouds of discontent and 
rebellion were beginning to loom: tensions bet\veen Louis and his 
brothers (as illustrated by a letter which the king was forced to 
send in November 1462 ordering his chancellor to take Aubigny_sur_ 
Nere and Concressault into his hands to give them to the rightful 
owners - the territory in question stil~in the hands of the Stewart 
family, had been seized by Charles' officers (173)), tension with 
the Duke of Brittany, tension with Burgundy, tension with many of 
the great land owners and the whole compounded by Louis' dangerous 
creation of enemies in the persons of those whom he had deprived of 
their offices and positions, especially in the army. In his old 
(169) id flOOro-112vo. 
(170) id f2l8ro-24vo. 
(171) id f225ro-27vo. 
(172) id f23lvo. 
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( 173) Lettr's" Vol. II p. 85-6. 
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age, Louis was to admit that such a massive purge had been a 
serious error of judgement and, implicitly, to admit that there 
were limits to how far any king dared to manipulate the patronage 
system for the satisfaction of his personal grudges. There were 
limits to royal action, lengths beyond which it was dangerous to go 
and the near-success of the coalition of rebellious pr~nces behind 
their manifesto in what was to be called the Guerre du Bien Publique 
was to illustrate graphically the dangers and, perhaps, the weak-
nesses of the military organisation which Louis was relying on. 
The Guerre du Bien Publique awaits its historian, and I have 
no intention of telling the full story here, but evidence concern-
~ng th= role of the foreign companies has perhaps been overlooked 
and is of interest 
. illustrating what may have actually some ~n 
happened in some other cases. After all, the Milanese ambassador 
could write confidently that the coalition of rebels had only the 
men from their own lands to support them (174) while the king had 
his army, yet that army was quite surprisingly ineffectual when it 
came to the crunch. One is tempted to ask why the rebels were not 
simply crushed by the forces of the royal ordonnance. Some comp an-
ies certainly took the field; in April 200 lances under Crussol 
and Salazar moved into Berry against the forces of the princes 
operating there (175), but in the overall picture the standing 
forces of the royal ordonnance are curiously hard to find. Indeed, 
Louis was forced into practices reminiscent of the worst days of 
the 14205; Galleazzo Sforza, son of ~is ally Francesco S~orza, 
(174) DdPeches des Ambassadeurs Milanais en France sous Louis XI et 
Francois Sforza ed. de ~'landrot and C. Samaran, Paris. 
1920~Vol.III p. 161. 
(175) Letters Vol.II p. 264. 
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Duke of Milan, was brought into the kingdom with an expeditionary 
force. On 27th June he was appointed royal lieutenant in the 
Lyonnais and Dauphine'(176) and fought through the summer in the 
Maconnais and southern Burgundy (177). This, it would appear to 
me, is something of an admission that, in the face of a major up-
rising, the royal army was simply not adequate for its task. 
Part of the reason for this inadequacy may be suggested by a 
letter written as early as 23rd March from a loyal supporter of the 
king in the Auvergne. This states that the majority of the Scottish 
company of Cunningham and Scuyer based in the region were simply 
remaining in their billets. A proportion of the company had simply 
deserted and marched off to the rebels in the Bourbonnais under 
Jehan de Roux (who may perhaps be identified with the man of that 
name, also known as James Ros and probably a Scot called Ross) who 
turns up as captain of some sixteen lances in the arm1es of Charles 
of Fr~nce (178)) while the rest were uncertain as to which side to 
join and were being further persuaded by Patrick Folcart who had 
been sent to draw them to the rebel side in turn (179). In this 
case a company had been effectively neutralised despite the known 
l0yalty of its commanders, and it seems far from unlikely that 
similar con=usions of loyalty and individual desertions, combined 
with a general pose of passive attentism could have seriously 
limited the effectiveness of other companies, especially where a 
former commander could appeal to his old followers. 
(176) id p. 321-2. 
(177) id p. 351-2. 
(178) Stein p. 585 (printing of FF 21477 f2-6). 
(179) FF 6971 f161ro-vo. 
151 
CertainlY when the crunch came in the campaigning round Paris 
in the summer, it was far from certain that the king had an over-
whelming military superiority on his side. Charles of France 
could field quite respectable forces and could even muster under 
his own Scots guard under Patrick Folcart and George Bannaytin 
numbering 13 men·at arms and 34 archers (180), while the Angevin 
forces of Duke of Calabria were bolstered by a contingent of some 
5-600 Swiss who, after the battle, \.;rere to be disciplined by their 
own authorities for aiding a rebellion against a friendly monarch 
(181) • In the key battle at Montlhery on 16th July the foreign 
companies on the royal side were well engaged. This sprawl ing, 
chaotic battle saw Salazar well to the fore, while the royal guard 
distinguished themselves engaging the enemy (182) and helped to 
rescue the king when he was in danger, taking him from the field 
safely (183). The unit was still far from being a purely parade-
ground affair; it suffered its casualties in the heart of the 
battle, losing four dead (184) (whether the change of captaincy 
from Guill Stuyer to his brother Thomas is connected \Vith the 
events of the year is uncertain, though possible (185)). In an 
interesting sidelight on the events of the year, the newly-made 
ceremonial uniforms of the Guard seem to have spent most of the 
summer on the road between Tours and Paris, follo\Ving a tortuous 
(180) FF 23262 p. 33. 
(181) de Mandrot ~cL4rrOiil5_·~VfC. L{"S :,i'/r!JliI.\ l.rIlIE, f) ')-1 
(182) P de Commynes Memoires ed J Calmette and G Durville Paris 
1924 Vol.I p. 30. 
(183) Journal de Jean de Roye, Connu Sous Ie ~om de Chrnnique 
Scandaleuse ed. B de Mandrot Paris 1894 Vol.I p. 66-7. 
(184) Forbes Leith Vol. II p. 36. 
(185) id p. 34, 36. 
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route to avoid the fighting and rebel troops and only catching up 
witp their destined owners early in the following year at Rouen 
(186) • Meanwhile, as the campaign drifted into an unavailing 
siege of Paris by the confederate princes, Salazar and his men 
were much involved; his men contested the passage of the seine 
by the enemy until driven back by artillery fire (187) and formed 
part of the garrison of the city. On October 6th a party of 
them sallied out from the bastide St. Antoine in splendid array, 
somewhat spoiling the effect, however, when the trumpeter was 
thrown by his horse and broke his neck (188). Despite their 
prominence in the fighting, not all of Salazar's men were engaged 
round Paris; one of the French members of the company spent much 
of this period fighting out a personal feud which had merged into 
an attempt to enforce a royal confiscation In the south (189). 
Nevertheless in a royalist propaganda song about Montlhery both 
S~lazar and the Scots were much praised (190). 
The conclusion of peace, which enabled Louis to break up the 
opposition and gather some at least of the rebels back into his 
service, saw a certain redeployment of the foreign companies. 
Cunningham, now sole commander of the hundred Scottish lances, 
presumably restored to strength after the desertions of the year 
before, established his forces across Champagne; In October 1466 
they were spread across some fourteen towns including Tonneins~ Bar 
(186) AN KK 65 f236ro-vo. 
(187) Coromynes Vol.I p. 45. 
(188) de Roye p. 126-7. 
(189) k~ JJ 194 no. 5~ (in de Reilhac Vol.III p. 193-6). 
(190) A Ie Roux de Lincy Chants Historiques et Populaires du Temps 
de Charles VII et de Louis XI Paris 1857 p. 103. 
153 
sur_Aube, Sens and Chablis (191). Salazar and his men were in 
Berry at the same period, based round Bourges (192); this distri-
bution, which may have had something to do with the grant of 
IssociU n to him (193), is confirmed by the almost inevitable evidence 
of a letter of remission concerning a member of his company who got 
himself into trouble during the stay in Berry (194). The foreign 
companies and their commanders were indeed to participate in most 
of the major campaigns of the rest of the reign. Cunningham and 
Salazar were sent to the aid of Liege in the period before the 
interview of Peronne (195). In 1469, renewed fighting in Spain 
took them to the south; ~n July of that year, Cunningham's com-
pany mustered at Vabix in Rouergue (196), where another letter of 
remission confirms their presence (197). On 20th March of the 
following year they were at Gien in Berry (198) and by July had 
returned to the Sens, Me1un and Montargis area again (199). The 
company was to remain at a fairly regular strength of 95-100 lances, 
and Robert Cunningham was succee~ed by another Cunningham, a son 
(or perhaps some other relative), Joachim, Lord of La Roche when he 
stepped up to take over the command of the guard at some point in 
the pp.riod 1474-5. Joachim is noted as commander of the Scottish 
company by July 1475 (200). The company was to survive for many 
years, with the Cunninghams and the Stewarts of Aubigny setting up 
(191) FF 6971 f244ro. 
(192) ide 
(193) Courty p. 79. 
(194) AN JJ 202 no. 65. 
(195) de Roye Vo1.I p. 183. 
(196) FF 25779 no. 19. 
(197) AN JJ 196 no. 87. 
(198) FF '25779 no. 26. 
(199) C1airambault 235 no. 133. 
(200) C1airambau1t 109 no. 106. 
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a quasi-monopoly of its command in the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries under such distinguished commanders as Beraud 
and Robert Stewart (201) who served with such distinction in the 
Italian wars. One finds a certain Jehan Cunningham in command 
of forty lances in 1494 (202) and Jacques, Lord of Cherveux (the 
title which Robert held) paid as captain of Enyat in 1510 (203) 
but by that time the family was no doubt thoroughly French in all 
but name. 
Salazar was perhaps the most hardy survivor, with his company 
remaining active deep into his old age. He fought ~n Catalonia 
in 1469, where he was excused the normal rules of review by being 
allowed to collect the pay of men not actually present (204), and 
his men were involved in much of the fighting against the Burgundians. 
In 1471 he occupied Amiens, and during this found himself involved 
in the murder of one of his subordinates by some of his relatives 
~n the company. The case went to Parlement, and, while his guilt 
was never fully proven, strong susp~c~ons were cast on his behav-
iour (20S)and the case was not fully resolved u~til after his 
death. This behaviour did nothing to lower his favour with the 
king, and he retained his command to playa heroic role in the siege 
of Beauvais in the following year, where his men made a sortie which 
wrecked the Burgundian camp and threw their guns into the ditch 
before being repulsed: S~lazar's horse died under him after he had 
(201) Contamine GES p. 420, Cust p. 25-35. 
(202) Clairambau1t 109 no. 107. 
(203) C1airambau1t 154 no. 101. 
(204) PO Dossier Salazar no. 62. 
(205) Courty p. 69-70 A Thomas 'Jean de Salazar et 1~ Guet-apens 
d'Amiens (23 Jui11et 1~71) Bib1iotheque de l'Eco1e;de Chartes 
Vol. 82 1925 p. 123-61. 
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regained the shelter of the walls (206). His lengthy career only 
closed with him near~ng the age of eighty, when he was surprised by 
the Burgundians at Gray during the campaigning against the duchy 
and county of Burgundy which follmved the death of Charles the 
Bold at Nancy in 1477. In the ensuing fighting, the town was 
set on fire and he was badly burned. He died at Troyes two years 
later in 1479, his career under something of a cloud because of 
this reverse and being unable to command his company again (207). 
Despite leaving four sons, none of them seem to have inherited his 
position as commander of the company and they too sank into the 
ranks of the French nobility. One, Tristan, entered the church 
and became Archbishop of Sens at the end of the century, building 
the Paris palace which still bears the name of his see. 
Needless to say, the Guard survived as well. Thomas Scuyer 
combined the captaincy of these units with the Captaincy of 
Falaise, for which he was paid 190 It in October 1473 for sixteen 
pieces of artillery (208). In addition, he was Baron of Baso-
ches (209). In his capacity as captain of the Guard, he was paid 
/ 
from many disparate sources, including the taxes of the Dauphine 
(210) . He seems to have been replaced by Robert Cunningham in 
October 1474 (at least Cunningham was paid his wages with effect 
from that date (2ll))and retired to Normandy where we find him 
collecting wage arrears early in 1475 (212). 
(206) de Roye Vol. I p. 278-9. 
(207) Courty p. 81. 
He probab 1y died 
(208) PO Dossier Escuyer no. 6. See also Clairambault 99 nos. 
78-9, 81-2. 
(20~) PO Dossier Escuyer no. 7. 
(210) PO Dossier Stuer no. 4. 
(211) C1airambau1t 34 no. 37, AN KK67 (accounts for the Guard 
October 1474-September 1475) 
(212) PO Dossier Escuyer nos. 8,9. 
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shortly thereafter since no more is heard of him. Ona Hector 
Scuyer, however, was Captain of Falaise in 1483 (213). His 
brother Guillaume, whom he succeeded as captain of the guard, 
was Lord of Villereau and Montresson (214) and collected a con-
siderable pension of 1,000 It annually for the early l470s (215) 
dropping out of the records at some time after 1474. 
The group of Scots around that perpetual intriguer, Charles 
of France, remained intact until his death. Patrick Folcart 
commanded the prince's guards, which may well have formed a kind 
of parallel Scots guard throughout this ,eriod, with the aid of 
various other Scots such as George Valentine (216) who acted as 
his lieutenant, James Ross (217) and his cousin James Hoc (or Hogg) 
(218) • The guard unit he commanded was some forty strong, with 
various groups of supplementary archers, mostly Scots, listed as 
well (219), while Ross is listed as commanding a company of 18 
lances beside this (220). In addition to his purely military 
tasks, Folcart was made Sen~chal of Sainto~e (221), acted as 
ambassador to Rome on behalf of Charles in 1471 (222) and collect-
ed lands and captaincies on a considerable scale in the Duchy of 
Guienne. A full list of his offices has survived and makes 
(213) Clairambault 199 no. 80. 
(214) PO Dossier Escuyer no. 5. 
(215) id nos. 3-5. 
(216 ) Stein p. 623 (FF 21477 f5l-9) . 
(217) id p. 659 (id f8-20). 
(218) id p. 797 (FF 32262 f484-93). 
(219, id p. 662-3, 780 (FF 21477 f8-20, 
(220) id p. 586 (FF 21477 f2-6). 
FF 32263 f484-93). 
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impressive reading (223) since in 1471 he was drawing some 4,400 It 
plus gifts and the Evenues of his own personal possessions. The 
other Scots in Charles' service did well too, though on a rather 
more modest scale, collecting captaincies and other lands as rewards 
for their services (224). Even after the death of his protector, 
Folcart at least managed to keep his position under Louis since he 
seems to have held on to his lands and many of his offices. He even 
returned briefly to the ranks of the royal guard as one of the 
captains by June 1473 (225), though he vanishes from the scene short-
ly thereafter and does not seem to have left any posterity who made 
any mark on history. 
The various companies whose fates we have been examining sur-
vived for differing lengths of time. Salazar's was the first to 
disappear as none of his children succeeded him in the command. 
It was, by the end, probably more French than Spanish in composition 
and any prospect of it ever acquiring its Spanish complexion again 
was to be doomed in the long term by the changing political scene 
which was to bring France and the Spanish kingdom into increasing 
conflict. No doubt it went the way of other units; glven a new 
commander, a steady change in the ranks followed, but there is no 
concrete information on its fate. The Scottish company was much 
more tenacious in its survival serving in Italy and beyond. It 
had the advantage of a clear succession of commanders and a very 
solid ethnic identity initially (if anything, the company was more 
solidly Scottish at least in terms of the names of its men In 1470 
than it seems to have been twenty years earlier). 
(223) id p. 788-9 (FF 2l~77 f65). 
(22~) id p. 793, 802 (FF 32263 £485-93). 
(225) PO Dossier Folcart no. 6. 
By the early 
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years of the sixteenth century, however, while the names remain 
very Scottish, it seems probable that their possessors were 
second or third generation Franco-Scots, the children and grand-
children of the initial men who had entered French service (though 
it is always possible that some native-born Scots did cross the sea 
to Jo~n it). In the long term, certainly, it was to become simply 
another regiment of the French army under the Ancien Regime: . 1n 
the end it was to be the first regiment of the Gendarmerie du Roi 
until that organisation was abolished in the l780s. The Guard 
was destined for an even longer history, and remained a more active 
link between Scotland and France with the tradition of service in 
it for children of the Scottish nobility becoming established by 
the sixteenth century (it was still Scots-speaking, at least in 
part in the l550s, if the graffiti which bored members carved in 
the walls of the Chapel at Chenonceaux are anything to go by). In 
the course of the years, however, with the increasing estrangement 
between Scotland and France caused by t~e closer links with England 
this ceased to be the case, and by the eighteenth century the Guard 
was largely a parade unit staffed by very young children of often 
impoverished southern gentlemen on the way to command positions in 
active regiments. Even the Jacobite connection did very little 
to change this state of affairs; exiled Jacobites found positions 
elsewhere in the French serv~ce. The Guard was finally abolished 
with the fall of Charles X as late as 1830, but by then it was 
little more than a fossilised survivor of a once-vital tradition. 
Indeed, a date around 1470 1S probably as good a place as any 
to draw this study to a close. The tradition of mercenary recruit-
ment which had dominated in the last sixty years ~vas slowly dying 
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and a new one was about to take its place. Louis certainly took 
a keen interest in hiring foreign specialists; in 1475 one finds 
a payment to a Martin de Salzedo, captain of a troop of a hundred 
genneters or Spanish-style cavalry (226), and further such forces 
were raised by him under, for instance, the Neapolit~n Boffile 
de Juge (227) who was to rise to very high office in the kingdom. 
These companies, however, did not gain a permanent place in the 
military organisation of the kingdom. On the other hand, the 
increasing reliance of Louis on Swiss infantry in his wars from 
1474 onwards was to be of great long-term importance (228), but 
the tradition thus established, which was to last into the Italian 
wars and beyond, would require another study, and would take one 
into a very different world from that which we have been considering 
here. 
As far as Scotland was concerned too, the age of large-scale 
direct involvement in the military affairs of France was coming to 
an end. James III might be tempted by offers of territorial 
concessions in Brittany made by Louis XI in return for the services 
of Scottish troops, and the question of the Duchy of Sainton~e 
granted to James I by Charles VII back in 1428 remained firmly on 
the agenda of Scottish diplomatic contacts with France until 1473 
at least, but the Scottish nobility and Parliament were far from 
impressed and refused the co-operation which would have been 
necessary for these expeditions to have been mounted (229). 
(226) FF 20685 p. 678. 
(227) Contamine GES p. 284. 
(228) id p. 308-10. 
(229) NAT NacDougall 'Foreign R~lations: England and France' in 
Scottish Society in the Fifteenth Century ed. J. Brown London 
1977 p. 108, J Brown 'The Exercise of Po~.;er' in id p. 41. 
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Certainly the alliance between France and Scotland remained in 
force, and was to draw Scotland into wars on behalf of her allv 
(in 1513, for instance), while French troops were to cross the 
seas 1n their turn in the l540s and 50s to protect Scotland from 
English occupation, but never again did anything on the same 
scale and level of intensity as that of the l420s and 30s occur. 
The large-scale export of Scottish soldiers was to be directed 
in different directions in later years - to the lands around the 
Baltic and especially to Sweden. A foretaste of this connection 
(though the troops engaged were, in this case, supporting 
James IV's uncle and ally King Hans of Denmark against Swedish 
and Norwegian rebels) carne in 1502 when some 2,000 Scottish soldiers 
were sent to Norway, though with limited success (230). 
Let us then stop in this period when one tradition of recruit-
ment of foreign troops ID fight the wars of the king of France was 
in the process of fossilising into a limited number of increasingly 
naturalised units in an organised army, and before a new tradition 
had formed to replace it. Certainly, if one looks hard at the 
muster rolls of French commanded companies, one can still find 
isolated names of foreign, usually Scottish, appearance (as in the 
// 
company of de Breze at Harfleur in 1520 where Jehan Stuart, Henry 
Moquelin and Andre Logan all appear as archers (231), a fact which 
should serve as a reminder that many foreigners served in the ranks 
of French commanded companies outside the specifically national 
(230) B Crawford 'Foreign Relations: Scandinavia' 1n id p. 91-3. 
(231) Clairambault 123 no. 103. 
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ones, even though they do not perforce appear in this section of 
this study. One can also find Scots among the criminal elements 
of the Parisian population, who may well have been deserters from 
the army (232). By 1470 or so, hmoJ'ever, the period which this 
study has set out to describe and explain is over. In the future 
very different forms of organisation and recruitment, drawing on 
different sources of men who were expected to perform different 
military functions were to prevail. 
(232) de Roye Vol. I p. 325-6. 
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Conclusion to Part One 
Having reached the end of this first, largely chronological 
survey of history of foreign involvement in the military affairs of 
France in the period from Agincourt to the middle years of the reign 
of Louis XI, it is time to pause a moment before going on to 
consider other matters. 
The involvement can be divided into three major phases. In 
the first, which began with the disaster of Agincourt and developed 
under the impact of full-scale English invasion and increasing 
civil strife in France, recruitment of foreigners shifted from 
the traditional employment of specialist forces to fill gaps in 
the royal armies to an ever-increasing importation of non-special-
ist troops of the kind which the resources of the kingdom had 
normally managed to provide. The importation of ,.,hat were effect-
ively full-scale foreign (especially Scottish) armies to fight 
as part of the French forces was made necessary by the slaughter 
of so much of the French nobility at Agincourt and the loss of 
such a large amount of territory to English invasion and the 
defection of Burgundy to an English alliance. This latter height-
ened the internal political tensions in the kingdom, confused 
loyalties and made the support of many of the great 
for the government of Charles, both as regent and as king, highly 
uncertain. These conditions made the employment of foreigners 
almost a necessity, and attempts to recruit troops from traditional 
p.llies became a major preoccupation of French diplomacy in this 
pe riod. The very large Scottish forces sent in response to this 
appeal were of such importance that they formed a virtually 
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independent force outside the control of the established military 
organisation and bureaucracy, while Scots held many of the highest 
military posts in France, despite the problems which this caused 
in the field. 
This phase ended \vi th the final break-up of the Army of Scot-
land after its defeat at Rouvray. After this, the various foreign 
companies operated -as independent units, drifting into and out of 
royal service depending on the situation of the moment and the 
state of the royal finances. In this they were joined by many 
French companies. This floating armed population, only under the 
vaguest kind of royal control, formed a constant reservoir of armed 
men who could be recruited by private individuals with quarrels 
to pursue and enough cash to pay them. Some of these commanders 
forged close links with major noble families (most notably 
Villandrando's alliance with the Bourbons) to the benefit of both 
sides. The foreign companies were very noticeable in this 
confusing and chaotic world, whether acting in the royal armies 
during the campaigns against the English, fighting the quarrels of 
others or simply pillaging their way across a hostile landscape. 
With the turning tide of the main war, there was less enthusiasm 
for further recruitment of foreign troops and concern about the grave 
dangers which links between the company commanders and the great 
of the kingdom posed for royal authority. With the coming of 
peace (or at least some years of uneasy truce), attempts had to 
be made to solve the problem. 
The third phase thus begins with the reform of 1~~5, which 
sought to solve the problem by tying the captains and their men to 
the king by creating a permanent army ~n which the majority of the 
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troops available could be employed. The result was to tie the 
captains and their men into the system of patronage which ensured 
the loyalty of those who were important for the stability of the 
kingdom. The foreign companies were included in this system lrith - , 
three companies of purely foreign lances initially as well as the 
guard units. These companies served in the remaining fighting of 
the war and survived well into the times of peace beyond, despite 
their often doubtful disciplinary record. Their captains collected 
the fruits of favour in the shape of offices and honours, often 
held in plurality and exercised by deputy. The main aim of the 
reforms, to gain a royal mono~oly of the sources of organised 
force, was highly successful, except when an inexperienced monarch 
like Louis XI threw the system out of balance in the quest for 
personal revenge and thus made successful rebellion possible. For 
the foreign companies, however, this was a period of slow assimila-
tion into the framework of the French army and a slow loss of 
ethnic identity as the ranks came to be filled by men born ~n France 
of foreign parents. 
It is my hope that this first section has opened the way to a 
proper assessment of the role played by foreign troops ~n France ~n 
this period, which was greater than commonly realised. Indeed, at 
times in the l420s one suspects that the Valois monarchy might have 
been hard pressed to survive without their aid, while their numbers 
remained significant until the end of the period studied. In the 
second half of this study, I wish to turn from the world of high 
politics, diplomacy and warfare to focus on the soldiers and their 
captains in their own right. I shall be directing mv attention 
165 
to such matters as recruitment, the kind of careers which they 
had, what profits (if any) they gained from their service, the 
conditions of life in the companies in which they fought and 
lived; to examine the vexed question of discipline again and 




Chapter V. The Process of Recruitment. 
The examination of the careers of foreign troops in France must, 
it seems to me, begin outside the borders of France and within those 
of their homelands. It is necessary for us to find out about the 
means by which these men (especially those involved in the very 
considerable armies of the 1420's) were recruited, who exactly they 
were and by what means they were brought to France. 
The means by which the companies were raised is a complex and 
rather obscure matter, dogged by a lack of clear information and 
documentation. In the 1410's and 1420's at least it seems to have 
been fairly highly organised, intimately connected with t~e wider 
question of French diplomacy since large-scale recruitment was only 
possible with the aid (or at least the benevolent neutrality) of the 
authorities in the states to which France looked for military support. 
Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that, in the case of 
French relations with such countries as Scotland and Castile, 
diplomatic relations were dominated for many years by this question. 
This becomes obvious from the very earliest period. The defeat 
of Agincourt prompted a flurry of embassies to traditional allies 
such as Genoa and Castile with the explicit aim of finding men to 
reinforce the badly mauled forces of the French crown. This 
diplomatic effort is recorded by both Jean Juvenal des Ursins and 
the monastic chronicler of St. Denis (1). Despite what the royal 
ordonnances might say, one could not rely on the unaided efforts of 
well-wishers and other volunteers in such matters (2). In fact, it 
(1) Juvena1 des Ursins p. 531, Religieux de St. Denis p. 12-3. 
(2) Ordonnances Vol. X D. 362. 
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. 
1S our great good fortune that the only full accounts for anv of 
these embassies-cum-recruiting trips which have survived relate to 
a mission to Genoa in April of 1416 by two members of the roval 
oJ 
financial administration. The activities of Hugues Combrel, Con-
seille( du Roi ~kl Chambre des Aides and Antoine Greelle, Cl~rk of 
the Chambre des Cornptes were probably fairly typical of other similar 
missions undertaken at a later date to other places. In addition to 
their very considerable expenses in the actual negotiations ~ith the 
captains who were to lead the companies raised, a sum of 2,000 ducats 
had to be set aside for Thomas de Campo Fregoso , the "Gouverneur de la 
Seigneurie de Jennes" so that he would "plus diligimrnent •.... induist 
les citadins et subjes dicelle seigneurie a ottroyer et faire aide 
au Roy •••• de gens de trait pour venir en son service en France" (3). 
Over and above this more or less discreet bribery of the Genoese 
leader (necessary, perhaps, because of the ambiguous relationship 
between France and Genoa), more direct efforts were made to encourage 
Genoese to join the six companies being formed. Among the other 
expenses of the ambassadors are ones to "plusiers ••..•. dons quilz 
ont faiz audits lies de Jennes a trompettes (et) menestriers"(4). 
Evidently some form of advertising \Vas needed to encourage Genoese 
to serve the King of France; it would be fascinating to know what 
songs the minstrels sang to this end. 
There were undoubtedly special features involved in recruiting 
men 1n Genoa; the small size of the political unit, for instance, made 
direct appeals for recruits to the populace at large possible, while 
some of the expense was no doubt forced on the French envoys by the 
(3) FLat 54l4A f60 ro-vo. 
(~) id f61 roo 
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simple fact that Genoa was in theory at least in rebellion against 
the French crown itself. Nevertheless very similar patterns can be 
detected in what evidence survived about French dealings with other 
countries. 
In Scotland, for instance, the role of embassies in the recruit-
ment of troops was crucial, as the very considerable amounts of time 
spent by leading Scottish commanders like Buchan as ambassador to 
Scotland rather than commanding troops in France indicates. As the 
chronological exposition demonstrated, the period from i4l8 to 1424 
was one of almost constant coming and going of embassies across the 
seas between La Rochelle and Scotland. At the Scottish end, the 
initial army was raised with the consent and probably the aid of the 
Estates of the realm; indeed it went to France as something very like 
a full royal army with a member of the royal house and a major officer 
of the realm as its commander (5). The later reinforcements dispensed 
with some of these elaborations, but by then a regular treaty relation-
ship had been established which must have allowed French recruitment 
in Scotland. These treaties were quoted during the negotiations in 
October 1423 (6) which formally authorised the recruitment of the 
army which crossed in the winter of that year. The government of the 
Regent Albany was, apparently, quite willing to allow the recruitment 
of Scottish troops for France. After the 1419 crossing, the actual 
mechanics of organising the armies seem to have been very much ln 
French hands. The French court seems to have maintained direct 
contacts with members of the Scottish nobility who might be tempted to 
cross to France with reinforcements. 
(5) Pluscarden p. 353. 
(6) ~~ J 677 no. 20. 
It is even possible that some 
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kind of semi-permanent French presence existed to encourage such 
movements. The letter sent by the Dauphin to the Earl of ~r on 
29th December 1419 from Sauvigny suggests this (7). In this he 
states that he has heard from "his servant" Jehan de Cernach and others 
that the Earl wishes to come over to France with a large company 
and asks Mar to persuade other lords to join him. It is pro bab Ie 
that Cernach is to be identified with John Crannath, Bishop of 
Caithness, who was prominent in diplomatic negotiations between 
France and Scotland (8) and who seems to have crossed to France him-
self, since we find one Jehan de Crenat helping to negotiate the 
return of various papers and other goods belonging to the royal 
household stolen by Scottish soldiers in March 1421 (9). If he was 
indeed the "servant" of the King of France, then his role in Scotland 
may very well have been as some kind of recruiting agent, operating 
amongst the highest nobility of Scotland. In addition, there is 
reference in Dom B~vy's compilation to the activities of an Andrew 
Kainzie who, having crossed with the army in l4~9, was paid one 
thousand livres tournois to return to Scotland on a recruiting 
mission (10). His activities may well have been concentrated on 
those of rather lm.;er social origins. It ~s hard to believe, how-
ever, that even he would have gone down to the level of such as 
Peter For~st, recruited into Darnley's company at the age of fifteen 
and too poor to pay his ransom when he fell into the hands of the 
English (11). The actual raising of the armies remains largely 
(7) NAF 1001 f13 vo-14 roo 
(8) See, for instance, note 6 above. 
( 9) AN KK 50 f13 vo. 
(10) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. III 'Kainsie' . 
(11) ANm 79 no. 136. 
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hidden from US; no douht they were put together in much the same 
way as the Kings of Scots had to assemble theirs, by a ser~es of 
noble contingents raised by the great (and not so great) of the land 
calling out their followings. Perhaps the French ambassadors 
agreed terms with the main commanders, but none of these negotiations 
have survived. 
The case of Spain provides an interesting contrast to Scotland, 
sinc~?espite very considerable diplomatic efforts no official Cas-
tilian army was ever to march across the Pyrenees (though the English 
always feared that one might). The records of the requests made by 
various French embassies to Castile, suggest that the arrangement 
sought was very similar to that achieved in Scotland. In 1419, for 
instance, a large army commanded either by the 'Infantes of Aragon' or 
if not by them,at least by some notable knight, was sought (12). 
Later embassies continued in their requests for armies of around 
2-3,000 men at arms and other forces (which ~n 1428 amounted to 5,000 
crossbowmen (13)), under competent commanders. As ~n the case of 
Scotland, what was sought was effectively the military intervention 
of the full forces of the crown to bolster the French armies; the 
participation of the members of the royal families was felt to be of 
some importance by the French as well. It is possible that equally 
detailed negotiations concerning such matters as payment and the 
timing of the arrival of the armies in France were entered into ~n 
Scotland, but none of the documentation has survived (14). In 
(12) FLat 6024 f13vo. 
(13) id f27ro. 
(14) For the documents, see i(! f12ro-vo, l3ro-16vo, l8ro-19vo, 26rJ-2,3u). 
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addition to the diplomatic activity round the court of Castile, aimed 
at encouraging the king to either enter the war or permit very large-
scale recruitment, there are suggestions that some of the French 
diplomats may have tried to interest individual Castilian noblemen 1n 
such adventures. In January 1420 the Archbishop of Tours was paid 
the considerable sum of 4,000 lt for expenses incurred in Castile for 
visits on royal business, not only to the king of that country, but 
to various other noblemen (15). As far as can be established, how-
ever, the Castilian nobility was distinctly less enthusiastic than 
its Scottish counterpart in following the banners of the king of 
France, at least on a large scale and in an organised army. 
In Italy the situation was rather different aga1n. There, one 
had a highly organised system of already-formed mercenary companies, with 
whom it should have been possible to negotiate directly. There are 
signs that the French method of recruitment (centred on Lombardy, 
apparently since Italian troops are almost invariably called Lombards 
in chronicle accounts, despite the fact that not all of them were 
from that region; no doubt the traditional connection of the Dukes of 
Orl(ans with the county of Asti helped) consisted of sending small 
groups of recruiting agents south of the Alps to collect men. It 1S 
probable that they recruited companies which existed already; perhaps 
secondary figures within large companies or the leaders of minor 
groups. It is perhaps interesting that Theaulde de Valpergue was 
Piedmontese; so was Carmagnola who was at this time in the service 
of Filippo Maria Visconti (16). It is fairly certain that Visconti 
(15) Clairambault 52 no. 78. 
(16) M 11 tt 61 0 I am l'ndebted to Dr. ~allett for suggesting La e p. --. 
the connection. 
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an ally of France, tolerated the recruitment of men by the French 
even though the formal treaty of Abiate in June 1424, by which ~ilan 
was requested to send men north was too late to have had anything to 
do with the majority of the Italians in France (17) since t~ey had 
been there for years before it was signed. ~o doubt France provided 
a useful dumping-ground for men surplus to the military needs of 
Milan. Certainly there is plenty of evidence for the sending of such 
French agents; an Ordonnance of 1421 refers to a mission headed by 
Bertrand de St. Aust and Philippe de Grimault (could he have been a 
Genoese Grimaldi?) going to Lombardy for this purpose (18) while 
accounts for 1422 refer to several captains crossing from Lombardy 
with substantial forces after a recruiting trip by Jean Cateran and 
Antoine Dosuen (19). 
The information about recruitment which we have been examlnlng 
does not, however, tell the full story. There was undoubtedly a 
very considerable number of people who participated in the wars ln 
France without ever having had anything to do with the more or less 
organised and formally recruited companies which the diplomatic 
record allows one to spot. There were undoubtedly more companies 
like that of the Aragonese knight Bernard Albert, hired by the Bishop 
of Laon for a year's service in the army of the Count of Foix in the 
south in 1426-7, which drifted into and out of royal service on short-
term contracts for specific military operations (20). Far more 
important were the Villandrandos and Salazars; those who drifted 
(17) AN J 505 no. 5. 
(18) Ordonnances Vol. XI p. 141-2. 
(19) Arsenal 4522 f17vo. 
(20) PO 20 Dossier Albert no. 3, A~ K 62 no. 33. 
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informally into France without any summonses, drawn to the seat 
of war by an irresistable attraction. In the case of Villandrando, 
this attraction operated as early as 1412 (21), but, he was merely 
early, he was not unique. The Spanish companies must have been 
formed almost exclusively in this way, and the Scottish ones maintain-
ed their strength in the face of a changing diplomatic situation after 
the release of James I by similar means. The documents can, however, 
only allow us to speculate on how this. continued. It is possible 
that a certain level of official recruitment was encouraged on a 
lower level by the French into the 1440's. One finds references ~n 
Bevy again to one Guille Bing being paid in 1441 for a trip to Scot-
land (22) and Guille Carcy being paid the year before for a similar 
expediti0n to Scotland and Ireland (23). Jehan de Montgommery was 
even paid in 1444 for bringing men from Scotland (24). By then, 
however, the tradition was well established and there were ample 
contacts between Scotland and France, both diplomatic and trading (25), 
so that those who were tempted to join the companies £ighting in 
France could do so without any need for the elaborate diplomatic 
preparations of the past. In addition, there is evidence that 
companies came to be recruited increasingly from the children of those 
who had settled in France after their own careers had ended. By the 
1460's, the need for large-scale recruitment to maintain the ranks of 
the companies established in the French army was gone. 
(21) Quicherat p. 7. 
(22) k~ AB XIX 690-3, Vol. I 'Bing'. 
(23) id Vol. I 'Carey'. 
(24) id Vol. III '~ontgomery'. 
(25) For one instance of close Scottish commercial links with :rance, 
see :1 ~101lat Le Cornrnerce Maritime ~;:)rmand } la Fin du ~~,-":er:. .\;e 
Paris 1952 p. 157-9. 
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At the time when this large-scale recruitment was common , 
however, the numbers involved were very considerable, especially 
in Scotland. Before considering just how considerable, it is per-
haps worth considering just what means the ambassadors and recruit-
ing agents of the French crown used to gain the consent of the 
governments thus approached to the removal of such large numbers of 
their subjects to France. 
Obviously money was the key; as we have already seen, the 
ambassadors to Genoa in 1416 were not above effectively bribi~g 
the ruler of the city to make sure that their mission would be 
successful. Such blatant use of financial persuasions cannot be 
documented elsewhere (though since no other accounts for similar 
embassies have survived it would be rash to claim that they never 
happened), but financial matters were evidently of key importance 
~n the arrangements and negotiations concerning all attempts to 
recruit troops. This probably explains why the negotiations with 
Castile were so unsuccessful. No doubt the increasing financial 
straits of the French monarchy in the 1420's helped to explain why, 
after 1419, the French ambassadors were forced to rely on the good-
will of the Castilians, who were expected to pay the forces they were 
being asked to supply for the first six months of their service (26) 
with the promise of repayment later. The Castilians, hardly surpris-
ingly, were not particularly enthusiastic about this offer; they had, 
one suspects, a fair idea of the dubious credit-rating of the French 
monarchy at a time when even the essential military expenditure of 
the transport of the Scottish forces to France in 1~24 was not being 
met in full. Even the suggestion made in earlier embassies that the 
(26) F Lat 602~ f18ro. 
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army thus sent could be profitably employed on attacking the weak 
English forces in the south-west, around Bayonne and in Gascony (27) 
could not counterbalance the unfavourable financial position, while 
highflown appeals to the honour of Castile and the ancient alliances 
between the countries were simply a waste of breath (28). 
One is therefore tempted to ask why the Scots were so much more 
generous to the French when they came looking for help. It seems that 
Scotland as such gained little in return for the service of its arm~es 
abroad, though this may be due to a lack of concrete evidence. Some 
privileges were certainly dangled before the Regency government of the 
Duke of Albany; the negotiations ~n October 1423 apparently dealt 
with commercial privileges in France since the final agreement promised 
Scots full rights in France (29). In addition, the French did agree 
to pay the full costs of transport, and may well have been forced to 
be more generous to a relatively poor ally like Scotland than they 
would have been· to a richer country like Castile. Nevertheless, 
the question of why the Scots were so keen to serve in France, and why 
their government were so willing to let them go rema~ns. The very 
much more liberal policy of Albany should be contrasted 1;vith that of 
James I after his release; the latter was willing to send men to 
France but extracted a very much higher price for his aid in the shape 
of the cess~on of Sainto~~e (30). Perhaps he had learned enough to be 
wary of French promises of financial aid unsupported by any concrete 
ga~ns • Certainly he was on a more difficult tightrope than his uncle 
Albany had been, due to the circumstances of his captivity and ransom. 
(27) id f13ro-16'To. 
(28) id f 12 ro. 
(29) i\..\J J 677 no. 20. 
(30 ) A.\J J 678 no. )7 - I • 
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Albany's willingness could indeed be seen in a positively 
sinister light as a further attempt to disrupt ransom negotiations 
with England (31) (and there is no doubt that the English did attac~ 
considerable importance to this ~ssue as can be seen in the initial 
instructions to their ambassadors at the negotiations, who were to 
attempt to gain the withdrawal of the Scots ~rom France (32)). In 
the end, however, this issue did not unduly affect the outcome of 
the negotiations, and the final treaty made no reference to the 
q~estion of Scots in France, who were thus exempt from the truce. 
It seems to me that, even though Albany's motives may not have been 
totally pure, they were not perhaps so simple either. I t seems /Y)o .. o" 
r'~/t that the provision of mercenary troops in fact fitted the interests 
of both Scotland and France better than the eternal Border skirmishes 
which had been the norm in the previous century (33). Granted the 
existence of a strong pro-French party ~n Scotland, it was probably 
better for Scotland to provide its aid to France in the form of at 
least partially volunteer armies fighting on French soil, rather than 
eng~ge on raiding England with all the dangers which this entailed 
(and it should be remembered that despite the activities of the Army 
of Scotland abroad the truce along the Border ~·farches was never broken). 
The French, on the other hand got much more for the money which they 
chose to invest in gaining the alliance of Scotland than the "passive 
and ambiguous" support they had received in the fourteenth century (34). 
(31) E..Balfour-Melville James I King of Scots (. .. ·7,Vtvpj 1936 p. 35 for 
earlier negotiations apparently obstructed by Albany. 
(32) id p. 45 Rymer Vol. X p. 294-5. 
(33) As described in J Campbell "England, Scotland and the Hundred :ears 
'~ar in the F~urteenth Century' in J Hale, R Highfield and B Smalley 
Europe in the Late ~iddle Ages London 1965 p. 184-216. 
(3~) id p. 2~4. 
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The Scots avoided the dangers of English devastation, the French the 
dangers that Scottish aid in the form of attacks on ~orthumberland 
and the other border counties would turn out to be of little direct 
help in easing the pressure in France. 
In addition, Albany was not perhaps totally master of the game 
in Scotland itself. He had to face the attitude of the Scottish 
nobility as a whole, and it seems probable that lavish French promises 
were being made to those who were prepared to listen. The embassy of 
1423 sailed fully equipped with very full pmvers to pledge the royal 
word and royal revenues to make sure that there \Vere no hitches (35). 
In addi tion, they brought over wi th them" certayne somme d' argent" 
(though not all that was apparently available) (36) "pour faire aucuns 
prestz a ceulx qui nous volent venir servir" (37). :Jo doubt the 
funds available were generously distributed and perhaps used to fit out 
the troops raised. It is probable too that other promises were made 
and that the considerable distributions of lands in France to the maln 
commanders of the Scottish armies on their arrival had much to do with 
this process. The Lieutenancy granted to Douglas at some time In 
1423-4, along \vith the grant of Touraine may well have been the prlce of 
his aid as one copy of the letter making the grant suggests (38). 
Douglas, indeed, despite his great power in Scotland, was apparently In 
severe financial difficulties in this period and very receptive to offers 
for his services from any source. His problems probably stemmed largely 
(35) 'larchegay, Revue des Societ~s Savantes 6th Series Vol. II 1875 
p. 161-2. 
(36) id p. 161. 
(37) id p. 162. 
(18) ~~ Xla 8604 f45ro-46vo, FLat 10187 f2ro;3vo. 
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from his incessant and uniformly unsuccessful meddling in the internal 
politics of England in the previous twenty years (the ransoms for 
those captured at Homildon Hill and Shrewsbury, for instance, must 
have strained his resources badly). Certainly he was in severe 
difficulties in 1413 when he was nearly arrested for debt in Flanders 
and even then sought salvation in contracting to serve John the 
Fearless in his wars (39). In May 1421 he was swearing on the 
Gospels to enter the service of Henry V (and thus fight against his 
own son ;/igtown in the French armies) (40); the only surprising thing 
about his adhesion to the French side in 1423 was, perhaps, that he 
actually went to France and fulfilled the terms of his contract. He 
had, one supposes negotiated favourable enough terms for himself 
both as regards concrete rewards and status. His success in this 
suggests that the real powers in Scotland, the greater nobility, 
managed to drive much better bargains for themselves than Scotland 
as a whole did. Perhaps the failure in Spain was as much a failure 
to persuade the mighty- of the land to serve as it was a failure to 
persuade the monarchy to let them do so. 
The quest for profit was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the ma~n 
apparent factor encouraging recruitment. This went down to all 
levels, one suspects even to the humblest; while academic histor-
ians of the twentieth century may argue about the actual profitability 
of ~"ar for those engaged, it seems to me undeniable that those \"ho 
joined armies at the time had the hope, however unreasonable, that 
they would come out richer. In the more professionalised atmos-
phere of Italy, the French seem to have used various incentives to 
encourage this belief ~s well. They offered longer contracts 
(39) Vaughan p. 260. 
( 4(}) R yme r Vol. X p. 1 ~ 3 - 4 . 
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(one year (41) at a time when the Italian states were only begin-
ning to match this (42))and may well have paid more, though com-
parisons are almost impossible to make due to different currenCles, 
different costs of living and even different structures of units. 
We know that Italian troops were paid 46! ecus per lance in 1422 
(43) but it is uncertain how this would have compared with pay in 
Milan at this time. Heavy down payments to stimulate recruitment 
were to be found as well; the Genoese commanders in 1416 were to be 
given three months ?ay in advance (to stimulate zeal all round, one 
assumes) and this added up to no less than 19,548 florins (44). 
Even those who never met a French agent or were beguiled by 
the promises of those working to raise companies were allured by ~he 
hope of profit to be made. Men like Villandrando started poor, if 
noble, and almost certainly looked to the wars to repair their for-
tunes. Salazar, notoriously came from nothing and sought his for-
':cilhtld hi 
tune in the wars as well; a satirist of the dayp Paulin Paris, 
. 
summed it up like this "Quant il v l (\t d 'Espaigne en France il 
estoit aussi bien garni de biens qu'un slnge de queue" (45). There 
can be little doubt that the men who came to France to aid the French 
king in his wars were mercenaries in the fullest sense of the word 
and that they had been recruited very largely by promlses of profits 
to be made in this service. 
The lure proved very attractive. Exactly how many tvere tempted 
(!tl) Arsenal 4522 f17vo. 
(!t2) :[alle tt p. 82. 
(43) Arsenal !t522 f17vo. 
(!t!t) FLat 5!tl~A f59vo-60ro. 
(~5) Quoted in Courty p. 69. 
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to seek their fortunes in France will probably never be known. 
The only quasi-official figure available concerning the Scottish 
armies relates to a muster at Bourges in 1424 when Buchan and 
Douglas are credited with 2,500 men at arms and 4,000 archers, with 
Darnley's personal company of 150 in addition (46). Even these 
figures cannot be regarded as totally reliable, since they come from 
an eighteenth~entury copy of the original documents made by a 
genealogist which is not otherwise very informative about numbers ~n 
the companies listed. Even if the copy is totally accurate, there 
is little proof that the muster totals in the original gave any more 
than a vague order of magnitude, due to the already-noted administra-
tive independence of the Scottish forces (a situation which in itself 
provided an incentive to inflate numbers). On the other hand, even 
if this represents the sum total of all the Scots in France, it does 
not count those who had crossed in earlier expeditions and had died 
in battle, deserted and otherwise left their companies. Chronicle 
estimates are, as ever, variable and probably wildly exaggerated. 
The Book of Plus carden claims that the first expeditionary force in 
1419 was 10,000 strong (47). Thomas Basin makes the Scottish forces 
at Verneuil the same suspiciously round figure (48); 
, 
Le Fevre de 
St. R~m~ claims that 3,000 were killed at Cravant (49); the list of 
vague estimates could be extended endlessly. Forbes Leith's account 
draws the main chronicle estimates together: 7-10,000 ~n 1419; 
4-5,000 in 1420-1; 6,000 in 1422 (50) though he gives no figure tor 
(~6) FF 20684 p. 541-2. 
(~7) Pluscarden p. 353. 
(~8) Basin Vol. I p. 91. 
(49) Le F~vre de St. Rem, Vol. II p. 78. 
(50) Forbes Leith Vol. I p. 13, 15-6. 
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1424. The total which this gives . ~s, simply, quite impossible, but 
the very high estimates suggest a very considerable Scottish presence 
~n France. It would seem to me that a total figure of at most 
10,000 would be the maximum possible. Even this was a very consider-
able effort from a small country whose total population was somewhere 
between 250,000 and 450,000, with the lower end of the range more 
likely to be accurate (51); a country which, moreover, had severe 
problems in raising adequate forces for its own defence at times in 
this same century (52) and which at full stretch could raise little 
more than 15,000 men as the Flodden campaign was to illustrate nearly 
a century later. 
As far as the other groups are concerned, there are even fewer 
usable figures. Basin has 2,500 Italians at Verneuil (53) and 
claims that in 1423 600 cavalry and 1,000 infantry arrived (54), but 
this does not take into account the quite considerable numbers who had 
been coming in since 1416 starting with the 660 whom the embassy to 
Genoa set out to find (55). The Spaniards are quite simply uncount-
able until the time of the Swiss campaign in 1444-5. Overall, it 
seems likely that at times in the 1420's foreign troops made up over 
half of the forces available to the French crown, with that proportion 
slowly diminishing throughout the period of this study to scabilise at 
perhaps the 15% tentatively estimated by Contamine (56). Their 
(51) S C E Lythe 'Economic Life' ~n J Brown Scottish Society etc. p. 67. 
(52) J Brown in id p. 40. 
(53) Basin Vol. II p. 93. 
(54 ) Bouvier p. 370. 
(55) FLat 54l4A f59vo. 
(56) Contamine GES p. .458 
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numbers were, then, always significant. 
The patterns of recruitment are even more elusive than the 
numbers involved. Nevertheless a few broad facts do appear to 
stand out. The Scottish armies were overwhelmingly Lowland affairs. 
One does spot one or two Highlanders here and there; the MacAusland 
from the Lennox who was one of the many men credited with the death 
of the Duke of Clarence at Bauge (57), a James MacKinnon who was l.n 
the company of Robert Cunningham at St. Flour in April 1452 when he 
was involved in a quarrel during which there is an ambiguous passage 
which suggests that the argument may have been conducted l.n Gaelic (58), 
a few apparent Mac surnames in muster rolls, half-buried by French 
spe llings. On the whole, however, the Highlands of Scotland lived 
their own life unaffected by events in France. If young men l.n 
this area felt tempted to seek their fortunes by the sword, they had 
their own well-established outlets in Ireland (59). Indeed, the 
arm1.es seem to have been raised very much from the western Lowlands, 
at least if the overall recruitment reflected the distribution of 
the commanders. Forbes Leith aga1.n provides a handy check-list of 
these (60). To enumerate all would probably be impossible, but a few 
individual cases should provide a general idea of the distribution of 
their lands. Hugh Kennedy and his illegitimate brother Gilbert came 
from a family whose lands were around Kirkintilloch l Lenzie and 
Girvan (61), hTilliam Carmichael from the family which later produced 
the Earls of Hyndford (62), Sir Robert Maxwell of Calderwood, Sir 
(57) Pluscarden p. 356. 
(58) AN JJ 181 no. 82. 
(59) J Iv :-'1 Bannerman 'The Lordship of the Isles' in J Brown Scottish 
Society etc. p. 216. For more on this subject, see G A Hayes-
McCoy Scots Mercenary Forces in Ireland Dublin 1937. 
(60 ) For be s Lei t h Vo 1. I p. 15 4 - 5 . 
(61) Scots Peerage Vol. II p. 450-1. 
(62) iJ Vol. IV p. 
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Henry Cunningham of Ki1maurs, not to mention the whole Ste~yart 
of Darn1ey connection (63). Other areas were, however, represent-
ed' , the Setons from the Lothians (64); John Smale from Aberdeen (65); 
the Douglas of Kyrros (perhaps Kinross) who died near Orleans (66) and 
Sir Patrick Ogi1vy of Auchterhouse, known to the French as the Vicomte 
d'Angus, who came from the Forfar area (67). 
In addition to this geographical distribution, and perhaps 
connected with it, one can trace strong links between some of the 
prominent figures in the early expeditions in Scotland before their 
recruitment. Indeed one can see some signs of a kind of Douglas 
connection, much involved in the exploitation of the customs revenues 
to their own benefit and often closely connected by family ties. 
The Setons, for instance were involved in the depr~iations against 
the c~stoms revenues ~n the early years of the fifteenth century (68) 
and were in addition connected by marr~age with the Stewarts of 
Darnley and the Ha1iburtons, one of whom is listed among the casualties 
of Verneuil (69). The closeness of their connection with the Douglas 
family is illustrated by the fact that the father of the Seton who 
went to France had acted as a hostage for Archibald, Earl of Douglas 
while he was engaged in negotiating his ransom (70). Another member 
(63) Stuart p. 112-9. 
(64) Scots Peerage Vol. VIII p. 574. 
(65) Pluscarden p. 355. 
(66 ) de 1a Saussey p. 596. 
(67) Scots Peerage Vol. I p. 109 • 
(68) Exchequer Rolls of Scotland Vol. IV p. LXIII. 
(69) Scots Peerage Vol. VIII p. 5 ~ I ;' -+ , Forbes Leith Vol. I p. ISS, 
(70) Scots Peerage Vol, VI II p, 574. 
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of this group seems to have been Douglas of Drumlanrig (71), while 
even the Earl of Buchan, despite his royal ancestry, was very much 
part of a Douglas connection by his marriage. It might even be 
possible to claim that the army which served in France was fundament-
ally a Douglas army, drawing on established connections within the 
Scottish aristocracy. 
On the whole, however, those who commanded in France cannot be 
found in the reference works on the Scots peerage. This in itself 
tells something; many of those involved came from comparatively minor 
families. Hhat, for instance, J.S one to make of Robert Pettilot? 
According to Francisque Michel he came from Dundee (72) but there is 
no real proof of this assertion that I can find. Even Cunningham 
J.s a shadowy figure since he does not seem to have belonged to any of 
the major families of that name, while the pretensions of the so-call-
ed Bastard of Scotland, complete with the regal style of address (73) 
adopted by him for his correspondence, remain tantalisingly obscure. 
It would appear, from what little we do know about the recruitment of 
leaders from the families where we do have evidence, that those who 
went carne very much from those traditionally footloose and insecure 
groups, younger sons and illegitimate offspring. In the case of the 
Kennedys, Hugh was the third son and his half-brother Gilbert illegit-
imate (74), Cunningham of Kilmaurs was also a third son (75) and 
others who fit this bill can be found. No t all ~.;ere in this mould 
(71) Exchequer Rolls of Scotland Vol. IV p. LXI. 
(72) Francisque ~ichel p. 165. 
(73) Indre·-et-Loire BB 25 f172vo-3ro. 
(74) Scots Peerage Vol. II p. 450-1. 
(75) Forbes Leith Vol. I D. 154. 
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(the very highest commanders were not, for instance) but it seems 
that the majority of those who went to France to seek their fortunes 
were either the cadets of important houses or the representatives of 
minor families too unimportant to have left much trace of their 
existence in this period. 
The humble, those who served in the ranks, are the hardest to 
find of all. One can do a little with surnames, certainly. Close 
examination of the muster rolls of the Guard units for 1455 and 
comparison with the standard work on Scottish surnames produces some 
results (76). Most names are either too mangled by the Frenc~ clerks 
misspellings or too common to be of any real help. A few give hints 
of local connections; Grinot (which is another form or Greenock); 
Clisdal (Clydesdale) and Atorle CAtholl). The rest give a fairly 
even spread from the Borders, through Ayrshire and Lanarkshire, i~to 
Perth shire Vla the Lothians and ,vith a scatter as far as Aberdeenshire. 
Looking at the musters of the Scottish Ordonnance companles of this 
period a similar kind of fairly even distribution from allover the 
Lowland areas of Scotland lvould appear to be the case there as well. 
It is possible that recruitment had a wider base at the humble level, 
though it is impossible to produce any statistical confirmation of 
this. 
The problems involved in tracing the origins of both commanders 
and their men become even more severe in the case of the other nation-
alities who served in France. The humble crossbmvrnen \vho served at 
the siege of Tours in 1418, for instance, give few clues as to their 
backgrounds In Castile beyond a few place-names in their surnames 
(76) id Vol. II p. 17-8, G F Black The Surnames of Scotland ~ew York 
194b. 
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(Seville, Leon, Obregon for instance (77)). The Italian ~en at 
arms of Luquin Ris reviewed at Le Mans at much the same time are 
very similar; their names mangled out of recognition by the clerks 
recording them, they are left without ancestry or genealogy or 
easily identifiable homeland (apart from one Gaultry de Modeny, who 
may have come from Modena (78)). Even higher up the social scale 
there are few clues; the aristocracy of the Genoese Riviera obvious-
ly provided a fair number of commanders in their traditional fields 
of companies of crossbowmen and galleys and the occasional refer-
ence in B~VY and elsewhere permits a few glimpses of the regional 
distribution of the Spanish and Italian commanders. 
, 
In Bevy there are 
references to a Knight from Perugia in 1422 (79) and one from Alex-
andretta in the following year (80); isolated records of payments to 
a captain from Laredo (81) in 1416, one from Bilbao in the same year 
(82) and another Perugian in 1418 (83) but nothing in sufficient 
quantity to enable one to make any real estimates of the or~g~ns and 
social backgrounds of the men involved. It is possible that they 
were very much hardened professionals of relatively low social origin, 
but this can be no more than a guess. 
Even the commanders of the Spanish and Italian troops are rather 
enigmatic. Villandrando, certainly, came from an ancient house 
(77) AN K 59 no. 20 12~, 45-6. 
(78) FF 25706 no. 760. 
(79) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. I 'Abice'. 
(80) id Vol. IV 'Vulpe' . 
(81) Clairambault 64 no. 22. 
(82) Clairambault l~ no. 182. 
(83) Clairambault 85 nos. 76, 78. 
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(with some connections with France in addition), though one fallen 
on hard times (84), but Salazar's origins are sufficiently obscure 
to be a source of learned debate (85). As for ~artin Garcia-Enri-
quez, his background was very much more distinguished; he was a son 
of the Count of Gijon (86) and thus of royal blood. He was also, 
however, illegitimate and gained his legitimisation for his services 
to France (87). The Valpergues, the only ones of the Italian 
commanders of this period to be at all traceable, came from an 
ancient Savoyard family, but where they fitted into the family ~s 
uncertain and it seems probanle that they issued from junior branches 
of the family tree. 
On the whole, then, those commanders who remained in French 
serv~ce after the 1420's were probably those who, by birth or 
fortune, had most need of their military position to make their way 
. 
in the world. They perhaps came to form, with their French equival-
ents, that class of minor nobility acting as professional soldiers 
which was to be the backbone of the French military establishment for 
many years. 
Having been recruited, these foreigners still had to be trans-
ported to the actual theatres of the war. This could be a complex 
operation, involving as much organisation as a military campaign 
itself. For some, it was relatively simple. The majority of the 
Spaniards simply walked or rode across the Pyrenees in more or less 
(84) Quicherat p. 5-7. 
(85) Courty p. 68. 
(86) Quicherat p. 195. 
(87) k~ JJ 190 no. 35. 
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organised groups looking for employment on the other side. The 
Italians, too, could generally walk to their destination, conducted 
by those who had come to recruit them. Again, the records of the 
embassy to Genoa in 1416 tell us something of this aspect of their 
recruitment methods. The troops were to assemble in Genoa at 
Easter, and progress to Aiguesmortes (a ten day march) where, on 
7th May, they would be mustered, paid and then would set off for 
Paris (88). These marches north were not always peaceful; the 
consular records of Montferrand for the following year record the 
arrival in late July of a very large group of Genoese crossbowmen. 
They had straggled badly and took three days to arrive in full, 
having also had trouble with other forces during their march. The 
consuls had to beg the commander to move his men on rather than 
remain to rescue his men who had been captured in the course of these 
skirmishes, and these entreaties were backed up with bribery (89). 
Further north, the municipal authorities of Orltans found themselves 
ln a similar situation in August of the same year and distributed 
food and Wlne to the captain to make sure that his men were kept ln 
order (90). It was a fairly slow march, though this is perhaps 
understandable in the light of Jean Juvenal des Ursin's description of 
the Genoese entering Paris in 1416; they marched in two by two and he 
was amazed to notice how very few horses there were among them (91). 
They must have marched the whole distance from Genoa to Paris on foot, 
a lengthy process which must have guaranteed that troops recruited one 
(88) F Lat S~14A f60ro. 
(89) A Thomas Annales du Midi Vol. 'V 
(90) Loiret CC 5~6 f13vo. 
(91) Jean Juvenal p. 532. 
1892 p. 69-70. 
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spring would arrive too late for most of the operations on that 
campaigning season, and which helps to explain the straggling and 
disorderly nature of their columns. 
Despite the inevitable delays and problems which this operation 
could entail, getting Genoese and other Italian troops (for whom we 
lack information, though one assumes that they marched across the 
Alpine passes and went through Provence on their way to the wars) to 
where they were needed was simplicity itself compared to the operations 
needed to ship Scottish armies to France. This was a most comp1icat-
ed and costly operation, made a great deal more vulnerable to attack 
and the hostility of the elements by the fact that the only safely 
held port on the French coast was La Rochelle. This forced those in 
charge of the operations to use a west coast route, loading the Scottish 
troops at Dumbarton (a factor which may in itself have influenced the 
patterns of recruitment in Scotland) and shipping them through the 
Irish Sea, past Cornwall and into the Bay of Biscay to La Rochelle. 
The scale of the enterprise was often beyond the shipping capacities 
of the latter, which forced the French authorities to make extensive 
use of Spanish shipping. The first Scottish army was transported by 
a Castilian fleet recruited by the formal diplomatic means. An 
agreement reached in ~arch 1419 bound the Castilians to send some 
forty ships of 150 tons each, heavily manned by troops as well as by 
the normal crews to a rendez-vous at Belle Isle followed by a voyage 
to Scotland (92). To make sure that the fleet was indeed raised, 
some 111,000 francs d'or were paid ln advance. After this, it would 
(92) Daumet p. 73-~. 
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appear that the transport fleets were organised more locallv - , 
despite further attempts to organise Spanish fleets on a fo~al 
basis (93). A heavy burden fell on the shoulders of the Governor 
of La Rochelle, whose considerable involvement in the business of 
organising shipping emerges from some surviving documents. At the 
time of the 1424 crossing, for instance, we find him deeply engaged 
in the hire of six large ships to join the fleet being organised to 
bring the Scots over (94). The cost to him was considerable; 
even before this particular crossing he had gone so far into debt 
on behalf of the crown that he was given the Lordship or Taillebourg 
to help him pay back his debts (95). Henri de Plusquallec was not, 
. however, the only man deeply involved ln the operation. The ambass-
adors to Scotland, too, were expected to play their part in the or-
ganisation of transport fleets, and indeed a part of their instruc-
tions specifically gave them powers to deal with this matter (96). 
The kinds of contracts which they made are well illustrated by 
that of the unfortunate Perruche de la Sau whose case was mentioned 
in Chapter II. He had been hired in Castile to go to Dumbarton or 
Greenock, where he was to wait for a month from hth ~ovember onwards. 
He was paid at the rate of l~ ~cus per ton of his ship, half to be 
paid by the ambassador in Scotland, the rest 32 days after disembar~-
ing his cargo of Scots at La Rochelle. In addition, there was a 
bonus sum of a thousand e'cus which would be split up among the twelve 
(93) id p. 75-77. 
(94) AN J 183 no. 141. 
(95 ) i d no. 1 36 . 
(96) Marchegay Revue des Socs. Savantes 6th Series ~ol. II 1375 p.161-3. 
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Spanish ship-masters pro rata depending on their tonnage. If 
the voyage lasted longer than expected, he would be paid extra, 
and his losses would be paid by the king if he lost his ship in 
the course of the crossing. The ambassadors even engaged royal 
property to guarantee his payment, as indeed their instructions 
fully allowed them to do (97). In practice, of course, that was 
not quite what happened. A list of some fourteen shippers, includ-
lng Perruche, has survived, drawn up after the stipulated 32 days had 
come and gone with the king unable to pay the bills for transport. 
Rather less than half of the 46,620 crowns owed were to be paid in 
the form of assignations on varlOUS unknown sources of revenue (98) 
(that Perruche felt constrained to dispose of his assignation at just 
over 80% face value indicates that he had little faith in the likeli-
hood of repayment, at least of speedy repayment (99~. The rest would 
have to wait, and there is little to allow one to be certain that they 
were ever paid ln full. 
Shipping was not, of course, the sole cost involved in this kind 
of operation. In 1422, we find traces of equally frantic activity 
In the west of France on the part of various roval financial officers 
who were engaged in moving considerable sums of money into the area 
to pay for the wages of the troops and their feeding for a month. 
One suspects that when there was a shortage of cash, these bills were 
likely to have absolute priority over the claims of the shippers. 
In this case, some of the money was to go to Scotland and the rest to 
(97) id p. 161. 
(98) Stevenson Letters and Papers Vol. II Part I p. 20-~. 
(99) Xarchegay p. 163. 
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be distributed round some twenty small depositaries ~n Niort and 
La Rochelle. The situation was sufficiently grave for part of 
one of the royal crowns to have been broken off ready to be pawned 
for hard cash. By July 1424, the list of crown jewels in pawn was 
very considerable indeed (100). 
All this frantic activity on shore to see that funds were 
available for the operation could well have come to naught in the 
face of the hazards of transport. The weather was one problem over 
which the officers of the King of France had no control, and the 
contracts which they drew up contained provision for delays due to 
weather which were all the more likely s~nce the fleets tended to 
sail either early or late in the year ~n the hope that the troops 
landed would be able to play a full part ~n the campaigning season 
of the following summer. In fact, most of the crossings seem to 
have gone fairly well, though there seems to have been some trouble 
in 1424 which lengthened the voyage and increased costs (101) as 
well as scattering the fleet somewhat; Cousinot reports the arrival 
of some of the Scots in Brittany rather than La Rochelle (102) and 
Forbes Leith talks of some ships going down (103). At a later 
period, the death of Sir Patrick Ogilvy is supposed to have been due 
to drowning while on the way back to Scotland on royal business (104). 
English interception was the other ma~n worry which affected the 
planning of the cross~ngs. The very considerable numbers of troops 
(100) AN J 475 no. 98 3-5. 
(101) AN J 183 no. l~l. 
(102) Cousinot p. 195. 
(103) Forbes Leith Vol. I p. 26. 
(10~) Scots Peerage Vol. I p. 109. 
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on board the Spanish fleet of 1419 was one consequence of this 
concern, and those in charge of the financial arrangements in 1422 
were still concerned by it (105). It remained a real danger at 
least until the crossing of the Princess Margaret of Scotland to 
France to marry the Dauphin Louis in 1436, when a large number of 
Scottish troops had to be taken over to guard her (106). It was 
not an unreasonable fear. The English did indeed make attempts to 
intercept the transport fleets on their way to France; the prepar-
ations in 1419 are recorded fairly fully, with much activity in the 
ports of the west of England to ralse an adequate fleet for the 
purpose (107). On the whole, though, English naval activity was 
conspicuously unsuccessful. The interception which the English 
managed off La Rochelle in 1419-20 was unsuccessful, and none of the 
later fleets seem to have been much troubled by even this level of 
activity. The maln English problem was quite simply that they were 
unable to ralse a strong enough fleet; the twelve ships and balingers 
which were initially raised in 1419 were hardly gOlng to be a match 
for forty and more large ships full of soldiers (108). ~ot surpris-
ingly the English shipowners requisitioned for the purpose and looking 
for profit rather than trouble had a habit of avoiding battle and 
leaving their stations to chase rather easier prey. In 1436, for 
instance, the English fleet which was intended to intercept Margaret 
of Scotland's ships sheered off in pursuit of a group of Flemish 
merchantmen instead (109). 
(105) AN J 475 no. 98. 
(106) FF 17330 f126ro. 
(107) Rymer Vol. IX p . 791-2, 794-5. 
(108) id p. 791-2. 
(109) Scotichronicon p . ~85. 
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On the whole, the transport of the Scottish troops to France 
went surprisingly well considering the difficulties involved. The 
troops which French money and diplomacy had raised beyond the 
boundaries of the kingdom to fight in the interests of the crown 
reached their destination at more or less full strength. In the 
next chapter, we shall follow them into their new environment to 
examine their careers and how far they were able to fulfil the 
hopes which had brought them from their homes to fight in a 
foreign land. 
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Chapter VI. The Structures and Rewards of the ~1ilitar~: Life. 
In this chapter, I propose to look much more often at the 
careers and rewards gained by those of lower rank than those whose 
names have come down to us as commanders, though inevitably the 
famous will still have more than is perhaps a fair share of atten-
tion, since they tend to dominate the documentation. I intend to 
address myself to such questions as the length of time that foreign 
troops remained in French service, how far the possibility of social 
advancement by military service existed and what legitimate rewards 
the soldier could hope to ga~n. 
It would perhaps be as well to begin by trying to calculate the 
normal length of time the man \vho entered the armies of the King of 
France could expect to spend under arms. This permits us not only 
to gauge something of the tone of life in the compan~es (for one 
whose personnel changed rapidly was evidently a very different sort 
of organism from one \vith a stable membership), but also to resolve 
the fundamental question as to whether there was such a thing as a 
military career at all in the fifteenth century, or whether a man 
might serve a brief time in the ranks of an armed company during his 
life without becoming anything of a professional soldier. The 
possible differences between 'foreign' and 'native' companies in this 
regard should also be investigated. 
One certainly ga~ns an impression from such unstatistical sources 
as letters of rem~ss~on that foreign troops served in the ranks for 
quite lengthy periods. 
I • • 
Two members of the Garde Ecossa~se, ~n a 
quarrel as late as 1~60, harked back to the siege of Laigny-sur-
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Marne in 1432 at which both had been present (1), one Thomas ~arshall, 
archer in Antoine de Chabannes' company in 1472, had served in the 
royal army for thirty years (2) and other appeals refer to lengthy, if 
uncounted years of service. Fortunately one can make some rather 
more detailed surveys of actual companies to gain some idea of how tar 
this impressionistic evidence squares with the facts. 
The first company which I intend to examine is that of Thomas 
Moras. This otherwise obscure body was active as part of the Count of 
Foix's army in the south between 1426 and 1441. It was apparently 
completely Scottish in its membership and by some accident of survival - a 
reasonable proportion of its muster rolls have survived spread out 
over a period of some thirteen years. T.Je first encounter the company 
on 1st March 1426 at Carcassonne, numbering thirty men including its 
commander, all described as 'esquires' (3). They continue as a unit 
/ 
until 1st July 1431, when we find them at Beziers having replaced two 
of their number (4). Another muster at Moissac reveals even more 
considerable changes by 22nd November 1435, since no less than eleven 
new names appear on the rolls and the company itself nmV' numbers 
twenty nine (5). By April the following year, however, the numbers 
have reached thirty again (6), so it comes as rather a surprise to 
find them reduced to a total strength of twelve and diminished in 
status to the rank of mounted archers on 1st June 1437 (7). Including 
(1) AN JJ 190 no. 125. 
(2) AN JJ 197 no. 279. 
(3) FF 25767 no. 137. 
(.+) FF 25770 no. 611. 
(5) FF 25772 no. 1025. 
(6 ) PO 2043 Dossier ~oras no. 19. 
(7) FF 25773 no. 11 0(1 • 
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the captain, seven had been members of the company In its grander 
formof the previous year, one had been among those who entered in 
1431 and had left in 1435 to return two years later, and four were 
apparently new recruits. The overwhelmingly Scottish nature of the 
company remained despite all the changes in the ranks, and the company 
survived in its truncated form with only one change until it vanishes 
from our sight after 1st August 1439 (8). 
On the whole, this was a fairly stable organisation, which held 
together almost completely intact for nearly ten years until it began 
to break up; a big change in the membership was followed two years 
later by a complete collapse both in numbers and in status. After 
this, however, the unit held together in its new shape with little 
disruption. What happened to cause the changes is, of course, 
unknown; one can guess that quarrels between members or the lure of 
higher pay may have played a part (since it is unlikely that combat 
losses had any role) but there is no way of knowing. The lengths of 
service which some of the men involved ran up are quite impressive 
too; three served the full thirteen year period covered by the documents 
in addition to Moras himself, while no less than twenty-four served 
rather more than nine years (and, since we cannot say for certain that 
the company was formed at the time when we first have a record of its 
existence, these figures may be regarded as minimal) and the rest 
periods varylng from two to six years. One had two separate spells 
In the ranks, totalling six years altogether; it seems probable that 
he moved on to other cornpanles n the gaps between his ti~es with 
(8) FF 25775 no. 1425. 
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Moras (thus providing on a smaller scale a parallel to the com1ngs 
and goings recorded by Contamine for the very much larger company 
of the Count of Foix himself (9)). This was, hmyever, 2. remarkably, 
perhaps unusually stable unit; its national background may well 
have played a part in this (though there never seemed to be any 
difficulty in finding Scottish replacements for men who did leave -
one can find traces of footloose Scots who served under several 
captains) • Normally the impression which one gathers of the situa-
tion in the 1430's and 40's is of rather lax company structures and 
quite considerable mobility between different groups. This 1S 
certainly the picture which letters of remission paint; men like 
Alexander Gautery, a Scot who had served under many captains (10) 
or Pierre des Tas~~es who had fought for fifteen years in the Lombard 
compan1es of Giorgio Boys and Boniface de Valpergue as well as 
several others (11) wandering from group to group at the beginning of 
the campaigning season in search of a place. There 1S, unfortunately, 
no way in which these impressions can be checked to see how far they 
reflect the realities of the situation. 
On the whole, it does seem plausible that this may have been 
more connnon than the Moras experience would suggest; the ':cry weak-
ness of royal organisation must have been an encouragement to this 
kind of nomadic life of temporary attachments to larger units whenever 
opportunity allowed. The coming of Ordonnance companies should have 
(9) Contamine GES p. 614-5. 
(10) AN JJ 178 no. 107. 
( 11) AN JJ 179 no. 2.7. 
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injected a certain degree of stability into this situation, and it 
is Cunningham's Scottish company which provides my second set of 
figures on lengths of serv~ce. Some of the calculations have al-
ready been worked out by Contamine. Taking as his two points a 
muster taken on 31st July 1469 (12) and another taken in 1475 (13), 
he produces various figures of the numbers of men-at-arms and archers 
who figure in both. These are then used to calculate annual turn-
over and average lengths of service. The results are interesting, 
especially when contrasted with comparable figures taken from 
'French' companies for the same period. On the whole, the Scots 
se rved longer. In the case of the archers, eighty out of the 189 
who figure in the later muster had served in the company six years 
earlier. This implies an annual turnover of some 9.6% and gives an 
average career of eleven years as against an average for all companies 
of 13% and seven and a half years respectively (14). The men at arms 
had very much longer careers. Doing the same calculations one finds 
fifty_nine out of ninety~ive remaining, which g~ves a turnover of 
6.3% and a career of a little under fifteen years (the average for 
the army in this period is 9%, giving a career of rather over eleven 
years (15)). 
It must be said that these figures may, perhaps, be a little ~~s-
leading. I did calculations on the same company for a period of just 
under a year (taking a second muster in March 1470 (16) as my 
(12) FF 25779 no. 19. 
(13) NAF 8609 fl05ro. 
(1 ~) Contamine GE S p. 462, 616. 
(15 ) id p. ~ 70-1, 618. 
(16) FF 25779 no. 26. 
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comparison) and produced wildly different figures, even accepting 
that all statistics culled from muster rolls are liable to be in-
fluenced by problems in identification of hopelessly misspelled 
names, illegible entries and other such matters. For this period, 
I found that no less than eleven-men-at arms left between the two 
musters, and forty five archers were missing as well. This would 
give an 11% :evel of departures among the men-at-arms (the strength 
of the company was 100 men-at-arms and 200 archers in 1469, 96 and 
190 in 1470) and 22!% among the archers, or taking the replacements 
into account and doing the same sort of calculations as Contamine 
did (i.e. taking them on the basis of those who appear on both lists) 
figures of 17.7% turnover per annum of men at arms and no less than 
45.3% for archers. These figures, needless to say, produce very 
different average careers indeed (under six years for men at arms 
and just over two for archers). 
How can these very considerable variations be reconciled? It 
~s possible that I may have hit upon a freakishly active year, ~n 
which an abnormally high number of changes ~n the ranks took place. 
The company had, after all, been in combat in Catalonia and this 
could have meant a high casualty rate. On the other hand, it ~s 
possible that the figures as calculated by Contamine conceal the real 
situation. By concentrating on the numbers remaining ~n the ranks 
over a s~x year period, and doing all the calculations on the basis 
that they are typical, he may be ignoring the possibility that they 
are in fact not so. It is possible that these men constitute a kind 
of hard core of longish term soldiers who formed the co~erstone of 
the units with a relatively high turnover go~ng on around then. It 
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is quite possible that the men who passed though more rapidly may 
have gone on to other units, especially since the 1470's were a 
period of expansion in the numbers of companies in the French army 
and one has ample evidence of groups of Scottish and other foreign 
troops in otherwise French-dominated units. 
Whether this be the explanation, or whether the figures for 
1469-70 are to be explained by losses in battle, a local outbreak of 
plague or even an abnormal number of ageing warriors leaving the 
company (for it should be remembered that the 1450's and early 60's 
had been noticeable for the stability within companies) (17), it is 
clear that, for at least some men there was such a thing as a military 
career. This obviously was a much more realistic affair for men at 
arms, who had relatively better prospects than the archers, but it 
seems to have been the case for some at least of the archers. The 
career aspect was perhaps especially marked for the Scots (and 
perhaps would be for the other foreigners as well if we had any 
figures on their companies); the longer average careers for them 
produced by Contamine's figures evidently reflect some kind of reality 
and he himself was not surprised to find this situation (18). Ten to 
fifteen years was, after all, quite a long career in the fifteenth 
century terms. It was, however, a career with limited prospects, at 
least for the archers of the companies. In the case of the Scottish 
companies, there were certainly rather better chances of promotion than 
in most French ones; over the SlX year period studied by Contanine, 
fifteen out of the ninety four men at arms of the company in 1475 had 
(17) Contamine GES p. 461, ~70-1. 
(18) id p. 462. 
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been promoted from within the ranks (19) which was considerably 
more than the average in most companies. Hhether this can be seen 
as cause or effect of longer periods of service on the part or the 
Scottish archers is uncertain, and it would be dangerous to draw the 
conclusion that the Scottish troops were thus of higher social origin 
than their French equivalents. They may just have been regarded as 
more 'professional' and their commanders may have favoured internal 
promotion because they were relatively free from the temptation to 
favour the children of good family by allowing them to leapfrog the 
lower ranks in their companies. 
On the whole, then, by the time of the Ordonnance compan~es a 
kind of military career structure had developed, with the foreign 
troops among the most professionalised in terms of length of service 
in the army. It is now time to move on to the consideration of such 
matters as pay and the other rewards which this service could bring. 
In the matter of payment, the 1445 reforms marked a fairly clear 
watershed. Before, though the evidence is fragmentary and confused, 
it is fairly certain that pay was both irregular and insufficient; 
after, it was to become much more regular and adequate for the needs 
of the troops. If, as seems likely, men were enticed into French 
service by promises of high pay, then they were as deceived as the 
unfortunate Castilian and Rochellais shipmen who transported the 
Scottish army over in 1424. The first month or two may have been 
paid reasonably fully and rapidly, but after that the problems would 
begin. In many ways, this was hardly surprising. Hell before 
(19) id p. 465, 618. 
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Agincourt, the financial resources of the French monarchy had been 
under severe pressure and warfare had been a luxury probably beyond 
its means even then. The most recent historian of the royal revenues 
and expenditure under Charles VI has estimated that it cost about 
220,000 It to maintain a thousand men for a year, which meant that the 
monarchy could only just afford about ten thousand troops (20) out of 
taxation revenues. The campaigns of 1412-3 against the Burgundians 
had gobbled up much of the revenues of Languedoc, both present and to 
come (21). The same writer estimates total taxation revenues at 
about two million livres (22); the loss of ~ormandy and much of 
Languedoil must have at least halved this income, while improved 
efforts to exploit the rest may well have been cancelled out by the 
need to maintain loyalty in troubled times by leniency in tax demands 
and increased, if temporary, strength of local bargaining by estates. 
Even in an earlier, more solvent period, the habit had grown up of 
allowing 'arrears to build up. This seems to have become the norm ~n 
Languedoil (where the traditional procedures for keeping track of 
military expenditure largely collapsed (23)). There is certainly 
evidence that commanders were expected to maintain their men out of 
private resources. Grants of land to Darnley repeatedly refer to 
debts run up in royal service (24) and even the rather unprofitable 
I, • 
(20) ~ Rey Les Finances Royales sous Charles VI Les Causes du Def~c~t 
1388-1413 Paris 1965 p. 262. 
(21) id p. 426-7. 
(22) ~ Rey Le Domaine du Roi et Les Finances Extraordinaires SOliS 
Charles VI l388-l~13 Paris 1965 p. 262. 
(23) Contamine GES p. 240-50. 
(2~) See, for instance Cher C 1046 f39vo-4lro, C 793 il/vo. 
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gift of Evreux contains such phrases as "(il) a entretenu ladicte 
armee descossoys ou grant partie dicelle par ses moyens" and "entendu 
mesmement Ie petit payment que pour gaiges estoit" (25). Some or 
this May well have been special pleading, but it seems likely that the 
general picture is accurate enough; well after his death his sons had 
to be given royal protection against creditors in France (26). The 
king himself was unable to help them meet their obligations. A 
similar process seems to have happened in the case of the Earl of 
Douglas, who died deep in debt to the town of Tours; the matter was 
still causing debate in the council well after the end of his brief 
lordship (27). The irregularity of payment was inevitably one of 
the causes of the pillaging and search for alternative employment so 
common amongst the companies in France. Indeed, the royal government 
seems to have recognised lack of payment as a standing excuse for 
anti-social behaviour and the chancery even evolved a semi-standardised 
format for letters of rem1SS10n issued under these circumstances (28). 
On the whole, the foreign troops may well have been rather better 
off than mos t. When the government of Charles VII hit upon the 
desperate expedient of disbanding all save a few chosen compan1es 1n 
1424 to save costs, the Scots and Lombards were exempt (29), while the 
unusual position of the Army of Scotland, effectively exempt from 
external financial control certainly allowed scope for considerable 
(25) AN J 216 no. 20. 
(26) Stuart p. 165, Cust p. 22. 
(27) Indre et Loire BB 23 f72vo. 
(28) AN JJ 179 no. 27 is an example of this. 
(29) Doat 9 p. 279 published in Quicherat p. 211-2 PJ II. 
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profiteering on the part of the commanders if there was any money 
to be distributed. For major operations, quite considerable sums 
could still be assembled; 30,000 lt was paid in June -September 1~23 
to persuade the Army of Scotland to take the field and join in the 
siege of Cravant (30). This was supposed to cover the wages for two 
months, which implies an annual payment to the Scots of 180,000 lt out 
of a total disbursement of 219,412 It for the year December 1422 -
December 1423 (31). One may well, however, doubt whether such a sum 
was actually paid. These were desperate times, and the majority of 
companies seem to have led a hand to mouth existence, taking money 
I where they could find it. In any case, pay was far from uniform 
throughout France, and no doubt the agreements entered into by the 
various foreign groups contained different rates of pay from company 
to company. On the whole, pay remained static in terms of money of 
account, which meant that it declined in value sharply in an age of 
rapid currency debasement (32); perhaps the irregularity of payment 
by forcing men to look for other ways of earning money took the steam 
out of any demands for better rates. In Languedoc conditions were 
rather better than in Languedo#il; the Aragonese Albert was paid the 
14,100 moutons due for his year of service, even if the money had to 
be borrowed (33), while Moras and his men seem to have been paid with 
reasonable regularity (his men were ~eing given 15 lt per man per 
month during the period when they 1;V'ere thirty esquires strong, which 
(30) Stuart p. 129, 396-7. 
(31 ) Contamine GES p. 2.41. 
(32) id p. 250, 630-1. 
(33 ) PO 20 Dossier Albert no. 3, A.~ K 62 no. 33. 
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added up to an annual cost of 5,400 It for the services of this one 
fairly small company (34)). The vast majority of the ~en involved 
were, however, employed in the north and had to face the problems 
of irregular payment in increasingly debased currency. 
The disastrous state of the royal finances is well illustrated 
by the surviving accounts for the relief of Orleans and subsequent 
campa1gns. The total sum paid out for this crucial military opera-
tion came to 12,000 It, distributed in dribs and drabs as the money 
came to hand (35). Even if one admits that there may well have been 
much more spent which never passed through the hands of the Tresoriers-
des_Guerres, it is clear that the King of France was not able to pay 
the proper costs of military operations and was reduced to reliance 
on loyalty, loans and the hope of other profits of war to raise 
armies for him. In this distribution, the foreigners aga1n did 
comparatively well; nearly a third of the total expenditure went to 
Darnley to make him collect his troops and join in the operations (36) 
but this payment of 3,900 lt hardly compares with the 15,000 a month 
which his men had been due in 1423. Even the apparently slightly 
more generous treatment accorded to foreign troops may simply reflect 
the fact that they were less able, even with royal gifts of land, to 
rely on their private resources to support them in royal serV1ce. 
On the whole, then, in the earlier period of foreign military 
involvement in France, it is highly doubtful whether anybody from the 
(34) PO 2043 Dossier Moras no. 18. 
(35) FF 7858 f4lro-52vo, Contamine GES p. 243. 
(36) FF 7858 f47vo. 
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commanders down to the humblest archer was able to live on his pay, 
let alone make any profit out of it. Indeed, many of the leaders 
may have had to go deep into debt to maintain their companies, while 
the impact of this shortage of pay pn the discipline of their ~en 
must have been considerable. Even if the foreign companles may 
have been slightly favoured in the distribution of what little money 
was available, this hardly made up for the overall shortage of pay. 
After 1445, the situation did improve somewhat. Payment 
became more regular and rather more stable; the man-at-arms in a 
lance received 15 lt per month out of which he had to maintain two 
of the non- or semi-combattant servants in the lance while the two 
archers received another 15 lt between them and maintained the sixth 
man out of this (37). How adequate this was is rather hard to 
determine with real precision. Certainly military equipment was 
highly expensive and a fairly general taste for luxury could run 
individuals into financial troubles. On the other hand, soldiers 
were notoriously poor payers for goods and services and probably 
squared their accounts by refusing to pay debts (38). Certainly the 
re-organisation did not put an end to abuses; pay was often late 
(sometimes very late) in arriving and relations with the civilian 
population were, as we shall see, rarely good (39). It does seem, 
however that at least some of those in the ranks of the companles , 
could make some savings out of their pay. 
(37) Contamine GES p. 508. 
(38) id p. 510-2. 
(3q) id p. 504-5. 
lk find in the notarial 
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records ~n Toulouse several entries concerning members of Pettilot's 
company who lent out money to local merchants while the company was 
based in the area in 1448-9. These sums could be quite consider-
able; on 27th September 1448 Sieur Phineas de Narbona confessed to 
owing no less than 250 lt to one Thomas 'Vehn' (Bain?) - man at 
arms in Pettilot's company (40). The money had been lent against 
security. Normally the sums involved were much more modest - 1n 
the 15 - 20 livres range, but they amount to quite important sums to 
those involved. The exact areas in which we find the Scots invest-
ing their money are less certain (though one seems to have chosen to 
place his money with a couple of carters from Bigorre, probably 
engaged in the profitable trade in dyestuffs or salt (41»), but the 
existence of this kind of investment by troops was a rather unexDected 
discovery and it implies a certain amount of ready cash in the hands 
of at least the more senior men at arms of the company. 
Generally after 1445 the foreign compan~es are on the same foot-
~ng as their French equivalents from the point of view of pay. They 
do not seem to have been specially favoured either in the rate of 
payment or its frequency. \{hile this was true for the ordinary 
Ordonnance companies, there was one exception. This was the guard, 
which did exceptionally well in terms of financial re~ards. Under 
Charles the men at arms (who do not seem to have had any servants to 
support) were paid 24 It per month, Archers 'du corps'18 lt and the 
archers 'de la garde' 13 lt (again without many of the expenses of 
(40) AD Hauwe~aronne 3E 1449 f4vo. 
(41) id 3E 4468 f7ro. For such carters, see Wolf~p. 126-~, ~58 etc. 
209 
the soldiers in normal companies). Under Louis, the men at a~s 
all but disappear and the pay of the archers goes up to 23 and 18 It 
respectively (42); later in the same reign the traditional gifts 
for robes and horses were consolidated into regular annual payments 
of 68llr5st and 41 It Sst respectively. This was very high pay 
indeed, especially since the consolidation did not by any means 
eliminate extra royal presents, "and, unl ike the nonnal companies, 
much of the equipment was supplied at royal expense as well. It was 
hardly surprising that men were prepared to go to quite considerable 
lengths to get themselves into these privileged units, even including 
bribery and theft (43). 
It is also no real surprise to find that members of the guard 
were able to invest money ~n land purchases. There are considerable 
traces of such activities in the region around Azay_le-Rideau in the 
archives in Tours. In 1462, for instance, one finds Jehan Asquin 
buying up rents in this area (44), while the land-acquiring efforts 
of an Andrew Gray can be followed in some detail. In 1473-4 he 
bought up properties in the parishes of Barbaten and Landeriere, 
various rents in the same parishes and at least three houses for a 
/ total investment of 90 ecus (45). How exactly he ran his newly-
acquired patrimony is unknown, and it is not certain how many other 
members of this elite unit invested their surplus money in land 
purchases and other investments, but this activity does seem indicative 
( 42) Contarnine GES p. 633. 
(43) AN JJ 182 no. 53. 
(~~ ) Indre.-e t-Lo ire E 1055, 1069. 
(45) id E 1055 nos. 1 - 6. 
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of a willingness to use their ga1ns to build a position for them-
selves in France. It also proves that the fortunate could hope to 
make a lasting improvement in their position from the profits of 
military service. 
Payment, in the strict sense of the term, was not of ., course, 
the only legitimate way in which one could hope to emerge from military 
service better off than when one entered it. Before trying to cal-
culate the actual position of those who entered French service, we 
should consider the impact of such matters as royal gifts and pensions, 
the tenure of offices of profit and the more traditional "profits of 
war" such as ransoms on the incomes of military men. 
Outright gifts from royal sources came in many forms. Some, 
I 
like payment for one's 'Etat' (an untranslatable concept ~plying a 
recognised style of life which all of a certain rank should be able 
to support and in which the king was bound to maintain his servants) 
rapidly became formalised into the regular pensions which bulk so 
largely in the accounts of the post-1445 period. These were almost 
an additional element in the regular pay for captains and can be 
regarded as such rather than as gifts in the true sense of the term, 
though they formed another part of the patronage system which presents 
given irregularly for specific reasons helped to create. Thev could 
amount to quite considerable sums; it appears that the normal 
pens10n for a captain of a company of a hundred lances in the 1450's 
was 300 It per year (46). 
(46) FF 32511 f178ro, for instance. 
211 
Presents in the proper sense of the term were of considerable 
importance even after 1445; before they may well have been crucial 
in maintaining loyalty amongst ill-paid troops. They took :1l2.nv 
forms. In the early days of the Army of Scotl~~d there was 
considerable distribution of land to the leaders of the armv (47). 
Not all of this was necessarily undiluted generosity and much may 
have been intended to make up for an inability to pay wages regular-
ly and in full. Nevertheless gifts of land were still made to those 
who had deserved well of the king at fairly late dates; the Scot 
Thomas Houston who had been the first man into Meaux was given the 
lands of Gournay-sur-Marne as a reward (48), while Pettilot received 
the lands of Sauveterre-en-Guienne in 1448 as a reward for his 
services in the wars (49). Presentations of lands on this scale were, 
by their very nature rare (the land in this case came from confiscated 
Armagnac territories which happened to be in the royal gift at that 
time), and it became more normal for favour to be shown by distribu-
tion of sums of money or in kind. Presents of MOney to loyal ser-
vants had a very long tradition, and soldiers were easily included. 
The motives for royal generosity varied \videly, from the hundred 
:cus given to one Halter Hervey for the capture of an English supply 
convoy in 1422 (50) to the fifty ~cus which Arthur Montgommer; receiv-
ed for wounds suffered at the Battle of the Herrings (51). The 
(47) Pluscarden p. 554. 
(48) Chabannes Histoire Vol. II p. 111-2. 
(49) AN JJ 179 no. 178. 
(50) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vol. III 'Hervey'. 
(51) id Vol. III '~1ontgornrnery' 
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reorganisation of 1445 did nothing to change this; indeed it may 
well have led to greater royal generosity by providing an organised 
structure for patronage to operate within, as well as improved 
financial resources to provide the necessary cash. Certainly there 
is evidence that money raised in taxation was being assigned directly 
to individual soldiers for very varied purposes; the war aides in 
Berry for 1455 were used to pay 100 lt of a total of 700 given to 
John Simple of the guard as a wedding present (52). Needless to 
say the guard units did very well out of gifts generally; in 1449, 
for instance, we find the captains being g~ven some 1160 It for 
distribution among them for the festivities of the Jour de l'An (53). 
Captains of Ordonnance companies also did well out of cash distribu-
tions; ~n 1446-7 Martin Garcia even had the costs of a trip home to 
Castile to visit his relations paid for (54). Gifts in kind were 
even more commo n; horses were especially favoured as presents. 
They came in all varieties from the expensive ones purchased in 1419 
to give to the Earl of ~.Jigtown and the other leaders of the Scottish 
army down to the small and very cheap ones deemed good enough for 
such obscure men as a Scottish archer called Sifflet, or another 
Scot called James Stonard (55) (a good horse could cost anything up 
to 500 lt, while the common soldiers were riding animals which cost 
between twelve and twenty livres). The gift of a horse was highly 
important when one would be expected to maintain several remounts in 
(52) FF 2886 f13vo. 
(53) FF 23259 f22ro. 
(54) id f8vo. 
(55) Al\J KK 53 f5vo, 75ro, l59vo. 
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case of losses in battle, and a man like Theaulde de Valpergue, 
who was at times managing to be given money for a new horse by the 
king annually in the 1430's was particularly favoured (56). Another 
favourite form of present was armour. The accounts of the Receveur 
of Languedoc in 1447 and 1449 shmv considerable amounts of armour 
being distributed to captains and individual men at arms alike. In 
1447, for instance, Garcia was given six suits of armour and Cunning-
ham three plus a gilded brigandine (it is possible that some at least 
of these suits may have been passed on by the captains in question to 
their own men; they, too, had a patronage network within their 
companies), but one also finds single suits going to individuals like 
Robin Hunter and Ursay (?), Cunningham (57). Royal generosity 
could cover all contingencies from granting money to a former member 
of the guard stricken uith leprosy (58) to repaying the losses 
suffered by Pettilot in the disastrous ambuEflof the Val de Liepire (59). 
There was a whole network of services and gifts distributed by the 
monarchy within the context of the structures set up in 1445; as 
elsewhere in late mediaeval government and administration patronage 
lubricated the wheels which made the system work. 
Perhaps the most important and potei1tially lucrative area of this 
patronage lay in the provision to offices of profit in the administra-
tion of the kingdom. There was to be an increasingly large place for 
soldiers in this area, and the foreign commanders did very well 
(56 ) PO 2 924 Do s s i e r Valpergue nos. 3 - 7. 
(57) FF 23259 f5vo. 
(58) FF 23262 f17ro. 
(59) PO 2252 Dossier ?ettilot no. 3. 
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(perhaps surprisingly well, considering the normal mediaeval 
prejudice in favour of native-born councillors). ~ost acquired 
the honourific, if not particularly remunerative titles of royal 
chamberlain or esquire of the royal stables; some, like Cunningham 
gained seats on the royal council (though one may well wonder 
whether he was a particularly zealous attender). These, though 
they could be useful by virtue of the entry to court which they 
carried with them, were essentially the small change of the currency 
of office and carried littJe in the way of financial rewards. Much 
more lucrative were the captaincies of various towns which were 
eagerly sought from an early stage, while senechalships were the most 
profitable and therefore most desired of the lot. The real champion 
in the office-hunting stakes was undoubtedly Theaulde de Valpergue. 
The details of his career were fully enough followed in an earlier 
chapter to require no repetition, and he was rather unusual in that 
he made quite a ~efinite switch from an essentially military career 
to an essentially administrative one. ~evertheless, he retained an 
interest in military affairs to the end of his days, and was quite an 
unblushing pluralist as far as office was concerned. His greatest 
success was undoubtedly in becoming Sene~hal of Lyon and Bailli of 
M~con despite the unwillingness of the town to have him as their 
captain as well. He proceeded to milk his office shamelessly, since 
he seems to have performed his duties very largely by deputy and fought 
vigorously with the city council when he did put in an appearance, 
using his powers to the profit of both himself and his family (60). 
(60) Guigue p. 416, 446 etc. 
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Despite promises in 1449 that he would live permanently in the city, 
he in fact finished his days at the other end of France busily 
engaged on royal business running the confiscated Armagnac lands, 
on commissions, building castles in Bordeaux, involved in the admin-
istration of Bayonne and collecting captaincies of castles to hold 
as sinecures in addition to his other sources of income. 
If Valpergue is an outstanding example of what was possible ~n 
the way of accumulating military and civilian functions in the 
administration, then other foreign soldier9 were not very far hehind. 
The great age of mUltiple office-holding combined with command of 
Ordonnance companies comes rather later, at a time when there was an 
increasing tendency to treat companies as offices of profit like any 
other (61), but some fairly lucrative combinations were made by 
enterprising captains. Pettilot made a very considerable amount of 
profit out of his SeneJchalship ~n the LanJ_~s. In 1451 he had him-
self granted a pension of 500 It per year on the revenues of Dax (62), 
drew his wages as captain of both Dax and St. Sever in his own 
territories (63), plus further wages as captain of Haurier in the 
Armagnac lands (64). He was appointed captain of Montoise near 
Toulouse as well in 1457 (65), but this had to be recalled in 1459 
s~nce the local financial officers ~vidently unimpressed by the 
royal grant and unwilling to pay good money to an absentee captain of 
(61 ) Contamine GES p. 434-7. 
(62) PO 2252 Dossier Pettilot no. .J • 
(63) id no. 6, FF 20580 f5ro. 
(64) PO 2252 Dossier Pettilot no. 9. 
(65) id no. 10. 
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a castle which the royal administration claimed needed well guarded~ 
had made such trouble about paying him that he had not received any 
of his due (66). The accounts for the s{n~haussee, which have 
survived for 1455, also help to explain the massive legal wrangle 
between Pettilot and the SeneChal of Gascony which occupied so much 
of the time of the Grand} Jours of Bordeaux in 1456 and 1459 (67). 
It emerges from the financial records that Pettilot was receiving 
none of the profits of justice so important to all mediaeval juris-
dictions; due to his technical subordination to Bordeaux, all the 
profits of justice went there (68). This, at least, was the situa-
tion on paper; if one is to believe the claims made in the course 
of the court hearings, there was a great deal g01ng on 1n the Lannes 
which escaped the proper control of the Sene~hal of Gascony, so 
Pettilot may well have made a fair amount from the profits of justice 
illegally administered. 
No doubt other commanders like Boniface de Valpergue and Martin 
Garcia, both of whom held several offices in plurality, and the latter 
of whom was to become a sen~chal himself, did equally well out of 
administrative positions granted by a grateful or careless crown to 
its military servants. To make some guess at the kind of 1ncome 
which a fortunate soldier could build up from the combination of his 
military command, pensions, gifts and administrative positions, we 
have to look to a man who made his money not in the service of the 
king, but of Louis Xl's rebellious brother, Charles of France. 
(66) id no. 11. 
(67) A H Gironde Vol. IX p. 180-3, 346-8. 
(68) FF 20580 f5vo. 
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Patrick Folcart is another whose career we have examined at length 
earlier. The records of his income for 1471 have survived amid 
the accounts of his master, and very interesting reading they ~ake. 
On the military side, he was being paid 800 It per year as captain 
of Charles' guard and 300 as commander of ten lances. As Sen Efcha 1 
~ 
of Saintof:.v= and captain of St. Jean d'Angely he had 1,000r and the 
same amount as Chamberlain. His wife had a pension of 600~, and to 
this had to be added the revenue of 6-700: cbrought in by lordships 
in the Armagnac, given to him by Charles. He received two velvet 
robes a year, with the promise of an exceptional gift of 4,000 It 
over two years, which he used to buy up a further lordship. This 
was quite a tidy income for one who probably had very little personal 
wealth when he started (69). No doubt the possibilities were even 
better for those who served the king rather than his disgraced and 
intriguing brother. The amount of personal profit to be gained by 
loyalty to the crown was very considerable; the patronage game 
worked precisely because the king was willing to allow an often con-
siderable level of inefficiency in his administration as long as 
loyalty was guaranteed and was prepared to allow soldiers to accumulate 
offices of profit outwith the strictly military sphere, to maintain 
their loyalty. 
Other profits did not depend so directly on the vagar~es of royal 
favour; these were the profits of war itself. They were also the 
most elusive and chancy; one needed a lot of luck. The great chance 
for many Scots came at Baug~, when considerable numbers of English 
(69) FF 20491 f65ro-vo, in Stein p. 788-9. 
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nobles fell into their hands. The most notable gainer was a 
Laurence Vernon, who had the Dnmense fortune to capture the Earl 
of Somerset; he was role to sell his captive to Charles himself 
I 
for 40,000 ecus (70). In practice, 15,000 of this came in the form 
of the Lordship of Montreuil-Bonin near Poitiers and the rest was 
repaid in instalments which were still being handed out as late as 
1451 at the rate of 500 It annually (71). Vernon had hit the 
jackpot; for one afternoon's lucky fighting, he got a prosperous 
lordship, a fairly assured annual income and probably a maSS1ve 
boost to his social status. He had trouble with his neighbours 1n 
Poitou, but his family was to hold Montreuil-Bonin well into the 
following century (72). This kind of spectacular good fortune must 
have acted as an inspiration to many in the ranks of the Scottish 
. compan1es. How many were so fortunate we shall never know; none 
had quite that level of fortune in capturing a member of a major 
aristocratic family who could be sold to the French king for exchange 
with French captives in England. We do not even know ~.,hat profits 
I 
the other Scots who took important captives at Bauge made, or how 
much the Duke of Clarence's coronet fetched when it was eventually 
sold. 
All in all, the profits of war were most elusive and hard to 
trace; there may well have been much hope but little fulfilment. 
In fact, all the supplementary sources of income had their drawbacks 
(70) AN K 168 no. 21. 
(71) FF 32511 fl40ro. 
(72) H Fil1eau Dictionnaire des FamilIes de l'Ancien Poitou Poitiers 
184t-54 Vol. II p. 791, AD Vienne C 330. 
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and hazards, and it is to these that we must turn before trying to 
make some kind of estimate of the real chances available of making 
good in the ranks of the foreign companies in the French royal ar7.1y. 
Obviously the profits of war itself were the most hazardous or 
the lot. To make money from ransoms, one had first to capture one's 
man and probably needed some resources to maintain him in captivity 
until the financial side had been agreed; one suspects that the 
whole business would be beyond the resources of a poor man who would 
be forced to sell his rights in the prisoner to someone better placed. 
In fact, it could be a very uncertain business even for those with 
/\ 
resources; the case of the Chateauvillain ransom recorded by 
Bossuat indicates just how chaotic this could become with litigation 
concerning the ransom dragging on from 1430 to 1455, by which time 
most of the principals were dead (73). Admittedly changes of 
allegiance complicated this case, but in the final period all parties 
had the advantage of being able to use the same courts; the main 
problem was simply that the initial ransom demand had been wildly 
optimistic when the resources of the captive were taken into account. 
The demands made by Villandrando after Anthon broke at least two 
Burgundian families (74); if payment was not made the only recourse 
was to the emotionally satisfying, but ultimately financially 
ineffective process of organised slander or defamation. 
If the rewards were often hard to collect even for those lucky 
(73) A Bossuat 'Les Prisonniers de Guerre au XVe Siecle - La Ran~on 
de Guillaume, Seigneur de Cha"teauvillain' Annales de Bour-:o'~c:.e 
Vol. ~~III 1951 p. 7-35. 
(74) Quicherat p. 51, 215-6, PJ V. 
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enough to make a potentially profitable capture, the hazards for 
those who were unlucky were very real. Capture was, of course, a 
two-way affair and could be a disaster, especially for foreigners 
who were often men of limited resources (at least in France) . Some 
of Darnley's troubles may have been caused by his ransom after 
Cravant, though he was given royal help in paY1ng it (this arrived 1n 
1428, some three years after it had been granted and five after 
the transactions in question) and was in fact exchanged rather than 
having to pay a full ransom (75). Royal aid was sometimes available 
to help in paying these bills, but the king could hardly be expected 
to intervene in every case, and the concept of ransom went very far 
down the social scale indeed to include those who can have had very 
few personal resources. After Cravant, Charles apparently paid 
I 
148 ecus to save twenty Scots archers from death at English hands (76), 
(a reminder of the practice of that most chivalrous monarch Henry V 
and his habit of hanging Scottish prisoners for disloyalty to his 
captive James I). Others were not so fortunate; fear of rotting 
in prison for the rest of his days because he had nobody to help him 
buy his freedom forced Peter Forrest to desert to an English 
company (77). A German squire, Baudet Lalemant, was rather luckier; 
I 
he was held and a ransom of 300 ecus demanded when he could only pay 
twenty. He prayed to St. Katherine and vowed to give up wine until 
he had been to Fierboys on pilgrimage if she would help him to escape, 
(75) Cust p. 10-1, Stuart p. 137. 
(76) Arsenal 4522 f19ro. 
(77) AN JJ 179 no. 136. 
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and, sure enough, despite being chained up and guarded by twelve men, 
he got away to tell the tale at her shrine (78). How many men were 
actually killed 'Jecause they were unable to meet the demands made of 
them is unknown, but the danger should be remembered by all those who 
are unduly impressed by the apparently gentlemanly nature of late 
mediaeval warfare where soldiers were concerned. Ran soms we re a 
highly vexatious business for those involved; another successful 
suppliant to St. Katherine was a Genoese member of the garrison of 
1\ 
Vendome who had escaped from English c~ptivity and whose captor 
demanded that he return to prison, following this by a process of 
de f ama ti on • In the end the issue came to a trial by combat, ,.ffiich 
the Genoese, with saintly aid, won (79). In the end, it seems safe 
to conclude that only a ha~dful ever benefitted from the profits of 
war, at least in legitimate forms. Far more lost all they possessed 
when they lost their horses and armour to their captors; for every 
Laurence Vernon, there may have been many like the Scottish esquire 
begging his way along the Loire valley with letters of recommendation 
from Georges de la Tremoille who turned up in search of the rather 
doubtful charity of the councillors of Tours to help him pay an 
excessive ransom (80). 
It is perhaps understandable that warfare should have been a 
hazardous affair for those who entered it in the hope of making money. 
The other sources of apparent profit could, however, be equally 
precarious. Royal gifts, for instance, were not nearly as certain as 
(78) :!iro< IJI s de SU Katherine p. 41 no. 87. 
(79) id p. 55-7 no. 104. 
(80) Indre-et-Loire BB 24 f66ro. 
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they might appear. For one thing, there was always the danger that 
one would be given rights over sources of revenue rather than cash ln 
hand; when one went to collect them the problems began to appear. 
This was probably especially common in the bad days of the 1420's 
and 30's, but it never quite disappeared. The most common problem 
was multiple assignment of the same revenues for different purposes. 
This became very apparent in one case in Lyon. In 1423, the king 
ordered payment of half the city's tax revenue to be paid to the 
Lombard captainsCaqueran and Valpergue to provide armour for their 
men (81). By 1425 it had become painfully apparent that the same 
revenues had been granted both to the impoverished membe~of the 
Parlement of Poi tiers and to the Constable Richemont, and a major 
quarrel broke out over who would actually be paid. In the end the 
Lombards (or at least Caqueran) received their money, even if the 
final payment was only made in 1426 (82). They were lucky; 
Caqueran was, in fact, a close neighbour of the city with contacts 
within the walls and his troops were at hand to enforce his rights, 
while Poitiers was far away and Richemont out of favour (even so, 
the councillors tried to give something to everybody; royal commands 
were, after all, royal commands even when they were impossible to 
fulfil). A less well-placed man could well have lost his rights, and 
a foreign soldier was likely to be especially vulnerable in any struggle 
caused by this kind of confusion. Even in the far more stable days of 
the end of the reign and under Louis XI this kind of confusion was 
(81) Cai11et p. 338-9 PJ ~XVIII. 
(82) Guigue p. 145, 160, 179, 183. 
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still possible; the king often had little idea of ~vhat he \.;as 
granting away and double assignments remained a problem for years 
to come. In addition, even in the generally orderly 1450's, local 
resistance to royal commands could be effective; as we have 
seen a duly made royal gift to an absentee captain could be made 
ineffective by an obstinate and ultimately effective refusal to pay 
his wages on the part of the local financial authorities. In 
addition, the king was apt to hand out more than he could actually 
afford ~n pensions and other presents which could mean another battle 
to get payment as well as providing a most useful supplementary form 
of control of the patronage system; who was paid and who \Vas not 
could be a good way of telling who was in favour. 
analysis, everything was in the hands of the king. 
In the ultimate 
This was especially true for the most prestigious of all forms of 
reward - the grant of land. Lands granted willingly enough in times 
of trouble would be in constant danger of being reclaimed ~vhen circum-
stances altered. The fate of the Duchy of Touraine illustrates this 
well. Despi te all the high-flmvn phrases ~n the original grant, Charles 
had not the slightest intention of letting so valuable a possess~on es-
cape into the hands of foreign nobility for long. After the Earl of 
Douglas's death at Verneuil his widow claimed her due share in the 
duchy. Charles (who, without any concern for the rights of the heir 
or the widow, had already handed it over to the Queen of Sicily) 
produced feudal law to suit his mm case and dismissed the claim. 
\fuether his claim that apanage lands only descended to direct heirs 
was true ~s uncertain; his claim that the duchy was in wardship for 
the Earl of' Wig~0~n was on the other hand sheer hypocrisy since the 
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land had already been disposed of. For good measure, he complained 
(probably with justification) about the pillaging of Douglas's 
troops, and claimed (almost certainly without justi~ication) that they 
had been paid in full. He stated his regret at the death of her 
husband, but sternly warned her about the consequences if she tried 
to assert her claims by force (one assumes he was thinking about the 
reaction of the remaining Scottish troops in the area) (83). What 
it came down to was fuat Charles had no intention of allowing her to 
take possession of any lands in France, and no amount of right on her 
side would change that fact. In practice, whatever the documents of 
donation might say, royal gratitude was not eternal, and one had to 
guard one's gains closely. ~-ligtown was pushed out of his lands at 
Dun~le-Roi in 1431 since he was not in France to protect them and 
they were needed for Richement (84). In this area the foreigner 
was much more vulnerable, since he could not rely on the support of 
his fellow nobles in the way that a native-born Frenchman could. 
It would appear that to hold on to lands in France, one had to remain 
close at hand; it is significant that the families which lasted 
(Vernon, Cunningham, and especially the Stewarts of Auhigny) chose to 
settle in France for the rest of their lives. Even this did not 
mean immunity from trouble; Darnley's widow apparently had to go to 
law to protect her lands after her husband's death (85) and as late 
as 1462 the family was having trouble with the officers of the Duchy 
of Berry, from which they had been extracted some forty years 
(83) FLat 10187 fSro-6vo. 
(84) AN XIa 8604 flO%o-llOro. 
(85) ~~ XIa 9199 f19lro. 
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before (86). The fact that rewards, especially in the later years 
of this study came very largely from confiscations, posed additional 
problems. Pettilot's lands at Sauveterre, taken from the Armagnac 
inheritance, survived the later reconciliation between the Count and 
the king, but the Stewart grants from the same source seem to have 
been short-lived affairs (87). Thomas Houston was deprived of his 
lands at Gournay in 1466 and forced into what was probably an unfair 
exchange because the king wanted to restore the lands to the 
Chabannes family as a token of reconciliation (88). The king almost 
always saw to it that his will was done. 
This was the fundamental fact of life at ~east from 1450 onwards, 
and it made all rewards contingent on continued loyalty to the crown. 
This could lead to spectacular reverses of fortune to delight moralists 
much concerned with the wheel of fate; the career of Robert Cunningham 
with its progress from favour to the dungeons and back to even higher 
favour than before at court would have made a fine illustration for such 
a treatise. In a world where even the greatest of the land were more 
or less reliant on royal income (and thus continued royal favour) to 
balance their budgets, the foreign professional soldier, without fortune 
(at least in France) beyond what he gained as a reward for faithful 
servlce, was particularly vulnerable. Patrick Folcart would have been 
in severe financial straits had he broken with Charles of France; one 
look at his income shows how much he relied on service for his living. 
(86) Lettres de Louis XI Vol. II p. 85-6. 
(87) Devic and Vais-~te Vol. XI p. 7. 
(88) Chabannes Histoire de la Maison Vol. II p. 111-2. 
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The appeal of Nicol Chambre's widow to Louis XI, even if one cannot 
be certain of how far it tells the full story, provided the reverse' , 
she claims that her husband had suffered heavily for his support of 
Louis while the latter was still Dauphin, had lost much of his 
income and offices and died burdened with heavy debts (89). To 
survive, at least at the level of captain or in the guard, one needed 
a cool head for political manoeuvring. Not all managed this, as 
the purges in the guard indicate. Folcart himself ~vas a loser, 
lucky to be able to save his career (and perhaps that of some at 
least of his expelled colleagues) because there was an alternative 
source of patronage available. This, indeed was the main internal 
balance provided by the system itself; Louis' exploitation of it for 
the purposes of revenge was dangerous and unbalanced the structure 
until he realised the dangers and reintegrated enough of those he had 
expelled to restabilise matters. 
One could then, make a career out of soldiering for the King of 
France and even hope to emerge better off than when one went in. 
For many of those, humble and noble alike, persuaded to cross the 
seas in the 1420's, however, a more probable fate was debt, poverty 
and perhaps death in prison, because one could not afford to pay a 
ransom. Depite the appare~tly generous distributions of lands to 
the 'commanders, many seem to have been in chronic debt (and it should 
be remembered that some of the most valued rewards which were handed 
out, like Darn1ey's right to quarter the arms of France on his shield 
had absolutely no cash value) (90). 
( 8 9 ) FF 20 ~ 86 f 191 ro . 
(90) Cus t p. 12-4. 
Some ce rtai nly had money ':oli th 
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them; the two Douglases buried at Orleans left quite considerable 
sums of money and gifts in kind to the cathedral, and Darnley, 
desp~te his apparent financial troubles, managed to provide for 
masses ~n perpetuity which lasted until the Revolution (91). On 
the other hand, the Scots who made their wills at Chiteaudun on the 
road to Verneuil had apparently nothing of value to leave apart 
from their horses (92). 
In more settled times the dangers of losing all by picking the 
wrong political side were rather greater, but some at least managed 
to thrive; captains like Cunningham with his castles and lands and 
lordships making him a member of the nobility of France at the top 
of the scale, members of the guard building up their own landed 
I 
fortunes on a more modest scale or able to pay fifty ecus for letters 
of naturalisation (93) (though the majority were exempted from this 
payment) on a rather lower one. T~ether the ordinary man at arms 
and archer did quite so well is harder to tell; as we shall see, 
the captain and his most trusted henchmen had a lot to do with the 
distribution of pay and could easily operate many stoppages, while 
there is evidence that some soldiers at least had trouble living on 
what eventually filtered down to them. Some at least must have been 
fairly well off (the men who invested their money in Toulouse, for 
instance) while the very fact that so many figure in letters of 
remission, which cost money and were thus beyond the reach of the 
(91) de la Saussey p. 596. 
(92) Augis p. 118. 
(93) AN K 168 no. 92 , 102 . 
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very poor (94) suggests that many had some ready cash. By 1~70 
or so, one can begin to see the start of a military career, with 
structures a'1d hopes of re~olard all its own emerging; a career 
with at least some prospects for advancement. 
This chapter has dealt exclusively with the legitimate 
prospects and profits of the military life. It is time to turn 
to the other side of the story; the problems of discipline and 
pillage which bulk so large in the writings of contemporaries and 
are still so common in the popular view of the armies and soldiers 
of the later middle ages. 
(94 ) A point underlined by B Geremek. Les ~1arginaux Parisiens aU/' 
XIVe et XVe Siecles trans. D Beauvois Paris 1976 p. 72. 
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Chapter VII. The Limits of Discipline . . 
The undisciplined, plundering soldier, along with his close 
associate, the OJermight:~ subj ect, is one of the stock figures of 
mediaeval history; carving a swathe of pillage, rape and ~urder 
through the shadows of the late mediaeval twilight, lording it over 
a cowering countryside of helpless peasants too scared to resist 
even if they had possessed the arms to do so and extorting vast 
sums from terrified towns and meetings of estates simply to make 
him go elsewhere. The stereotype was created early; it can be 
found in the writings of~~ympathetic contemporary writers from the 
privileged classes (usually the clergy) expressing their sympathy 
for the lot of the poor and trying to awaken their fellows to their 
Christian duties. How far does this venerable picture actually 
describe the real relations between soldier and society at all 
levels? It is the purpose of this chapter to ask this question. 
There can be no doubt at all that troops got out of hand 
(and indeed were out of hand perhaps more often than not). Royal 
control was weak, royal payment erratic, and there was a tacit 
recognition in the letters of remission that unpaid troops would 
plunder at will, without there being anything that the royal author-
ities could do about it. In any case, there were so many bands of 
armed men about, drifting In and out of royal service as and when 
required in the years before 1~45 that the actual authority of the 
crown over them was bound to be limited. Sometimes, it is true, 
one suspects that the pillaging had certain, clearly defined, 
functions. It seems probable that fifteenth century pillaging rou:ld 
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sensitive towns like Tours, or the capture of royal goods could 
perform the same function as mutiny did in the much more highlv 
organised sixteenth-century armies in Flanders or seventeenth ~ 
century ones in England during the Civil War; that of putti~g 
pressure on the royal government to allocate some of its available 
resources to the settlement of outstanding pay arrears (1). The 
theft of the Dauphin's household effects and papers by Buchan's 
men in 1421 was followed by payments to Buchan himself and probably 
to his men (2) while the regular plundering of the Tours area (near 
the court as it was, and thus well placed to make effective represen-
tations to the king) seems often to have ended in the delivp,ry of 
royal letters to the troops ordering them to move elsewhere. One 
can fairly assume that money changed hands as well; the case in 1433 
when two members of the Scots Guard Ivere sent to negotiate the depart-
ure of Scottish troops suggests strongly that a genuine negotiation 
with the king himself was being undertaken. It is perhaps worthy of 
note that the wors~ plunderers of the Tours reg10n were men like 
Kennedy who were in regular employment in the royal forces (3). 
Even the much-recorded agreements between commanders like Villan-
drando and local estates in the south (which are so useful to the 
historian in permitting us to follow his itinerary) concerning ?aY:.lents 
to move his men elsewhere or to maintain them where they were 1n good 
(1) For the parallels, see G Parker The Army of Flanders and the Spanish 
Road 1567-1659 Lor.don 1972 p. 185-207, id 'Mutiny and Discontent 
in the Spanish Army of Flanders' in Past and Present no. 58 1973 and 
J S ~lorrill 'Mutiny and Discontent in English Provincial Armies 
1645-1647' Past and Present no. 56 1972. 
(2) fu~ KK 50 f13vo. 
(3) Indre-et-Loire 6B 25 f166vo. 
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order can be seen as a kind of unofficial tax collection. The 
companies were down a tthe grassroots of tax assessment and collec-
tion, making sure that their dues were actually collected and . ~ . reac:-,eL. 
them without passing through the central royal treasury where thev 
might be appropriated for other purposes. It ~s clear, to take but 
one example of the genre,that the payment made to Villandrando by 
the estates of the Bas Pays d'Auvergne in ~ovember 1438 so that he 
would move his men out of the country, came from money collected as 
a grant of taxation to the king (4); at this point Villandrando was 
more or less in royal service but it was still much more effective 
for him to collect his money at the local level where his men could, 
if need be, exert pressure to see that the money came ~n. The con-
ditions of the time probably forced many troops to work out their own 
conditions of payment directly with the representatives of the tax-
granting classes without going through the officially correct channels. 
It is- perhaps significant that, even after 1443 it was not unknown for 
the monarchy to allow companies to act as their own tax-collectors ln 
places where there was resistance to the levies designed to support 
them. 
In any case, there was another side to this tale of pressure and 
apparent extortion from the local authorities. Protection was an 
important side of the activities of Villandrando and his fellows. In 
Rouergue early ~n 1438 he was prepared to replace the distant and 
ineffective Armagnac family as the effective protector of the provlnce. 
For a price he would undertake to keep the English and other r.~lltier 
companies at bay (5). In the end the dea 1 fe 11 throug~; the .\r:na g:1dC 
(~) PO 3002 Dossier Villandrando ~o. 3. 
(5) A Thomas Annales du '·tidi Vol. II p. 217-8. 
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family aroused themselves and renewed their protection (thou~h . 5 ~~ 
the end they were forced to sub-contract much of the actual work to 
Villandrando who had the effective forces in the area) (6). In 
practice, the companies were far from being universally detested bv 
the local estates; they could be used as very effective maintainers 
of law and order in the area if paid enough and could indeed be 
positively welcome in a time of chaos when the royal structures for 
maintaining the peace had all but collapsed. This kind of arrange-
ment had a long history in regions of the south where a similar 
situation had existed in the 1380's; it was perhaps more unusual 
further north, but even the burgesses of Tours were prepared to make 
deals with captains to maintain law and order in the immediate area 
of the city. The treaty between the Bastard of Scotland and Tours 
concluded in July 1433 was far from just a matter of extortion; he 
undertook to maintain security in the countryside around Tours for the 
three months following (7). In a world which seemed to be on the 
point of collapsing into chaos and where even troops hired to drive 
out the independent compan~es looted as badly as the ~en they were 
supposed to be keeping at bay, there was much to be said for paying 
those who actually possessed the strength to enforce some kind of peace 
to do so. 
In fact, in all their dealings with such established and organised 
forms of authority as local estates and town councils the soldiers 
were usually highly legalistic. The towns might well qui~er behind 
(6) id p. 218-9. 
(7) Indre,et_Loire BB 25 f172vo-173ro. 
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their walls as their surrounding lands were burned up (and no town 
in this period could ever be totally isolated from its countryside; 
witness the lamentations in Tours in 1430 as a Scottish force ~avaged 
the area around. "La grant clameur du peuple estant en ceste ville" 
was caused by massive thefts of livestock and the fact that nobody 
~ 
in the town "Nose mener lesd bestail pasturer aux champs" (8»),but 
on the whole the towns were relatively safe. Precautions were 
certainly taken, ranging from the near paranoid behaviour of Tours ~n 
expelling all Scots from within the walls in 142.5 (9) through payments 
to inhabitants to check local woods and other areas of potential 
cover lest there be any soldiers hiding there in hopes of surprising 
the town (10) to a kind of generalised edgy watchfulness as at Millau 
where the sight of strangers riding through the fields towards the 
town was enough to provoke the sounding of the alarm even though 
they turned out to be innocent travellers (11). Normally, though, 
the passing compan~es were not particularly interested in storming' 
towns even if they had had t~e capacity to do so (it seems very 
doubtful, for instance, whether even Villandrando, the greatest or 
his type, possessed any artillery). Towns were useful points of 
pressure on the royal authorities and sources of readily-tappable 
wealth, whether ~n the form of protection agreements or in more 
naked extortion. Even this latter was usually done ~n due legal 
form. In 1431, for example, Villandrando chose to extract money 
(8) id BB 24 f256vo. 
(9) id BB 23 f37ro. 
(10) de Flamare Vol. II p. 108-9. 
(11) A H Rouergue Vol. VII(Documents sur '-1illau) :;.292. 
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from ~illau by claiming (with what level of truth we do not know) 
that he was owed money by a merchant of the town and would take 
reprisals against i~ citizens and the surrounding countryside if he 
was not repaid (12). All of this was to be done in the proper for~s 
of the time, with letters of marque being taken out. This method 
was to be repeated twice at Lyon in 1433 and 1435. In the former 
case, the council did their best to ~ersuade th~ debtor to pay up 
lest disaster befall the town (though with less than total success) 
and the case eventually went before the court of the Bailli. 
There the consuls had no jurisdiction but put ~n their plea that 
justice be done to the captain (since the Bailli was his old employer 
I and comrade in arms, Imbert de Grolee, it seems at least probable 
that he got his money back in the end) (13). The second case did 
not involve him personally but one of his men; again the threats 
of distraint and reprisal (which it should be remembered were fairly 
standard commercial practices of the time, despite their military 
nature) were used, apparently with some success (14). In the lat te r 
case, it emerged that Villandrando had a kind of permanent business 
agent ~n the city; this was not un~que, since Caqueran had been 
similarly served in the preV10US decade (15). This, I think, should 
prove finally that such captains were not just simple-minded pillagers 
hut were interested in the commercial side of affairs and willing to 
invest their money in business ventures. The cities probably were 
(12) A Thomas Annales du Midi Vol. II p. 211. 
(13) ~ Guigue p. 352. 
0'-' ) id p. 411. 
(15 ) id p. 171, Deniau p. 452. 
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far from unwilling to see soldiers investing their ill-gotton gains 
in ventures inside their walls or with their merchants; like their 
counterparts in Germany during the Thirty Years Tolar, they probably 
hoped that having a stake in the prosperity of the city would encour-
age them to keep their men in order and limit their exactions (16). 
It may well have been a justified hope; Caqueran's relative patience 
in waiting while monies due to him by the city of Lyon were scraped 
together can perhaps be attributed to his investments there (17). 
Even on a rather lower level of operation, the same legalism persist-
ed; the Scot Tourenboeuf (Turnbull ?) chose to extract money from 
Tours by claiming a debt owed to him by the Archbishop (18). 
In fact, the relationship between certain tow~and individual 
soldiers could be very good, even warm. Darnley had a very close 
relationship with Orleans as exemplified by his statement recorded ln 
the tmm. accounts that if the city ever had troubles with the king, 
he would do for Orleans what he would do for his compatriots (19). 
This, no doubt, explains the very warm eulogy he is given in the 
Mystery of the Siege : 
"Le plus vaillant dessus la terre •••• 
Qui estoit tant prudent en guerre 
On ne pourroit son bruit exquerre 
Tant estoit vaillant et hardi" (20) 
Even Villandrando. whom one would hardly have expected to have been 
a popular figure outside his own immediate circle, seems to have had 
(16) For Germany, see G Benecke Society and Politics in Germany 
1500 - l7rO London 1974 p. 129-30. 
(17) Deniau p. 452. 
(18) Indre~et-Loire BB 24 f83ro, 87vo. 
(19) Loiret CC 549 f17ro. 
(20) \fist~re p. 342. 
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fair relations with Lyon; the city sent him sweetmeats and other 
presents at times (21) and when he did visit the place he had 
enough influence to persuade the cathedral chapter to take back a 
priest whom he favoured (22). No doubt his very real military 
strength had something to do with this, but the fact remains that 
the civic authorities and he found it possible to work together. 
It was not all a tale of extortion and rapine. 
In dealing with such recognised sources of authority as town 
councils and local estates the companies and their commanders found 
certain areas of potential common interest. If the relations were 
always compounded of fear and threats (as witness Villandrando's 
extraction of provisions from Montr(al~ "~-Gers by threatening to burn 
the crops and vines around) (23) th~could nevertheless be fruitful 
for both sides. The cities and estates very larg"i1 controlled the 
mechanisms for the collection of the cash needed to keep the compan-
ies in being; the soldiers could enforce their O\olIl form of law and 
order, which was better than none and worth paying for. The 
soldier could even find opportunities to make his money grow by invest-
ment with urban-based merchants; a gain, for his enterprises to 
flourish, he had a vested interest in the continuing stability of the 
city, and the profitability of the trading contacts. As for the 
estates, they were largely composed of those who were not subject to 
taxation themselves and had little compunction in passing the weight 
(21) Quicherat p. 255-6, PJ XXVIII. 
(22) Deniau p. 569. 
(23) AH Gironde Vol. XXXI (Comptes de :1ontrt'al) p. 133, Vol. xx.XII 
(id) p. 1. 
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of the demands of the companies on to those who did. The companies 
may have very largely escaped from royal control in the later 1420's 
and 30's up to 1445, but there were some quite effective constraints 
on their behaviour as far as dealing with organised and reasonably 
T·.rell-placed bodies with official s'.:atus was concerned. A r:l1.1tually 
profitable arrangement could, as often as not, be worked out. 
For those outside these bodies, however, matters were very 
different. The towns might find their salvation in doing deals with 
those who controlled their countryside, but what of those who had to 
live in that countryside? How did those who were outside the society 
of the time, with no access to the structures of bargaining react to 
the impositions and invasions to which they were so frequently subject? 
In a word, what of Jacques Bonhomme, the man who paid for all? 
In the countryside, far from the compositions and arrangements 
which took the edge off the extortions and fear which permeated the 
relations between armed and unarmed, soldier and non-soldier, the 
picture was very different. There was waged the forgotten war of 
this pe riod, a \Var wi thout any great battles but one which was none-
theless very real (indeed it was perhaps the war which affected the 
bulk of the population most of all) : the savage war between peasant 
and soldier. The small farmer \Vas, after all the man who suffered at 
every turn; it was his fields which were burned to put pressure on the 
town oligarchies and provincial estates, he who paid the taxes which 
the agreements which these bodies reached relied on, his fellows who 
were ransomed or had their houses burned dmm and he who bore the 
brunt of revenge raiding if his social betters defaulted on their 
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agreements. The extortions in the countryside came 1n ~ny 
different forms and at many different levels of sophistication. 
Perhaps the most complex ~vas that mentioned in an earlier cha?ter 
which operated in the Auvergne where a local man, the servant of an 
absentee lord, after serving an apprenticeship with Villandrando 
returned to run a reign of terror in the area using his contacts with 
the notorious Castilian to operate as a kind of sub-contractor of 
terror, passing his prisoners (and a share of the pillage, no doubt) 
on to his master who had the facilities to hold them and help with 
the collection of the ransoms. He even carried a list of those 
authorised to operate in his area, which suggests that a highly 
organised operation was being mounted. After terrorising his 
region for two or so years, he was ambushed by a band of local people, 
who liberated his pr1soners and killed him and several of his hench-
men. He was credited with some fifty murders, while others of his 
band were held responsible for ten and five respectively. Another, 
who had apparently done no harm himself, was allowed to go free (2~). 
On the whole, this level of organised extortion, in which a 
small-scale local tyrant made use of connections with one of the great 
companies to help him in his operations, is rather rare (though the 
evidence of highly formalised areas of operation and a kind or almost 
bureaucratic structure is very interesting). The norm seems to have 
been smaller scale, almost casual, extortion, interspersed with 
vendetta-like feuds between a village or group of villages ~J~ich a 
company or section of a company fought out over a certain period of 
(24) X~ JJ 191 no. 1~5 (Printed 1n Chassaing ? 524-6) 
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time. The kind of thefts recorded in the records suggest a fairly 
limited scale of exaction; often simply the taking of articles of 
immediate need without payment. We hear of cases of the driving 
off of cattle (25), the theft of a horse (26) or of bread which was 
fed to the soldier's mount (27); it is clear that, even though the 
amounts paid by the estates or towns often included a food element, 
many of the men in the companies were living off the land and taking 
what they needed as they went along. Even these apparently minor 
thefts could be deadly serious matters to a peasant community at a 
subsistence farming level struggling to pay its dues to legitimate 
authority; there was, as most economic historians of the age would 
agree, a very real limit to how much one could extract from such 
peasant communities, without posing problems, both to the community 
and to those competing for the surplus. For the more prosperous 
villager the situation was equally dangerous; \..;e hear of one man 
who had lost goods to the value of 1,000 It to the raiders (28) and 
in another case a member of the local gentry saw one of his properties 
completely destroyed (29), while a similar figure in the Beaujolais 
claimed in court (admittedly a place where the temptation was to 
exaggerate one's losses) that he had lost property and livestock 
worth 2,000 ~cus plus the devastation done in one of his villages (30) 
when an Italian company had passed through. 
(25 ) id JJ 177 no. 146. 
(26) id JJ 179 no. 16 (Quicherat p. 294-6 PJ LII) 
(27) id JJ 177 no. 225 (Quic~1.e ra t p. 298-300 PJ LIV) 
( 28) id 
(29) id JJ 178 no. 232 (Quiche rat p. 301-2 PJ LVI) 
(30) id X~a 2-'+ f257vo-263ro. 
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The response was violent; one should never forget that i~ any 
mediaeval village there were large numbers of weapons and potential 
weapons about which were likely to be as effective as anything which 
the pillaging troops carried. In some cases the resistance was 
organised and led,by the natural leaders of society; those members 
of the local nobility and gentry who had themselves suffered at the 
hands of the companies were quite willing to lead their people into 
the fray. A man like Mathelin de Cardillac in Quercy (something of 
a professional soldier and pillager himself) could lead his men 
(perhaps his own professional company as well as his tenants) into a 
fierce feud with two of Villandrando's lieutenants, Alonso de Zamora 
and Alonso de Benavent until the latter's compan~es were wiped out 
and they were themselves prisoners (31). A similar fate befell the 
Italian Cyprian de Montflour in the Beaujolais, where Tastin de la 
Garde, the local lord mentioned above, resisted to such effect that 
Cyprian claimed losses of considerable numbers of horses, three sets 
I . 1 d h (32) of armour valued at 150 ecus each, s~lver p ate an ot er property . 
In this case, the conflicting claims of the two sides reached Parlement 
as court cases which each had brought against the other. Elsewhere 
the resistance was apparently organised more or less spontaneously by 
the local community. When the Italian Jean de Baretta's men moved 
into Quercy, the men of several villages assembled with crossbows and 
other weapons to resist him, and,dug ~n at a crossroads, they succeeded 
in arnbushingthe company or a section of it and after a fight in whi~h 
(31) id JJ 178 no. 232. 
(32) id X2a 24 f257vo. 
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both sides suffered losses, drove the troops off leaving several of 
their number in the hands of the inhabitants as prlsoners. These 
latter were drowned In the River Dordogne (33). Similar orsanised 
resistance can be seen In the Auvergne as late as 1444 when Boniface 
de Valpergue's men fought pitched battles with the local people when 
they raided their herds (34). 
The most normal form of resistance, however, was on a much small-
er and more localised scale. A case, again from the Auvergne (a 
reglon much attacked in this period) illustrates this kind of affair 
perfectly. At Rochefort a company of men at arms was lodged, doing 
considerable damage locally. Finally a group of some twelve local 
men, including one who had (or at least claimed to have had) some 
military experience, in exasperation went out and caught two members 
of this company out in the countryside. These they drowned In a 
local pool. Later, the same man took part in the killing of one of 
a small group of Villandrando's men as they passed through on the way to 
the Limousin; the victim had a month before passed the same way and 
threatened to burn the village he was lodged In, after he had stolen a 
crossbow, lance, cheeses and other goods from an inhabitant (35). 
Our first suppliant for remission was, perhaps, exceptional (though in 
a time of trouble men of some military background were perhaps far from 
rare In a village community) but in other cases it seems that those 
involved in the killing of wandering soldiers were fairly normal members 
of peasant society, al though perhaps numbered among its more prosperc'us 
(33) id JJ 190 no. 22. 
(34) id JJ 177 no. 146. 
(35) id JJ 179 no. 16, JJ 177 no. 96. 
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and active elements. On the whole, the picture ~s one of isolated 
reactions to individual thefts or acts of pillage; those who died 
were not always, however, those responsible for the original incid-
ent. The killers, often confessing to their deeds twenty and ~ore 
years after they had been committed -(why they bothered at so late 
a date is a mystery. Perhaps it was a matter of deathbed confession 
since one hardly imagines that they were in any real danger of legal 
pursuit by then. The fact that they could afford to purge their 
consciences thus suggests, again, a certain modest fortune, even if 
some of the delay may have been due to the difficulties in saving 
enough money) make great play of the fact that their victims \.;ere under 
sentence of outlawry (36). One suspects, however that this was but 
another in the considerable arsenal of optimistic pleas put into 
appeals for letters of remission, ~n the hope that they might be be-
lieved, rather than a real motivating factor in their deeds. It doe s 
not seem to have restrained anybody when this was not the case. 
The standard picture, then, of the soldier lording it in arrogant 
splendour over a cowed peas2ntry is some distance wide of the mark. 
A more accurate one would depict small groups of men mov~ng nervously 
through a bitterly hostile countryside, much of the time in mortal 
fear. This J:E.rhaps explains the savageries which soldiers did per-
petrate when they had villages at their mercy. It is clear that the 
villagers feared reprisals, perhaps in the form of having the whole 
village burned down over their heads. This fear was expressed in 
their disposal of the bodies in the nearest river or pond (perhaps 
in the hope that the deaths might appear accidental as well as 
obvious effort to conceal the location of their ~urders), with ~~e 
(36) id 
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sale of the belongings and horses of the dead at the neares~. ~1 
~ ~a~~et 
(a form of war-profit which has escaped the attention of most econom-
ic historians). How often vengeance actually descended on the per-
petrators is very hard to say. It seems certain that the companies 
did not travel in large compact blocks in close contact with each 
other, but rather in small groups of two or three, always vulnerable 
to ambush (they had to sleep sometimes, after all) and without much 
way of knowing each other's fate. This fact contributes to the 
difficulties in calculating the size of Villandrando's army, as well 
as helping to give him a reputation for ubiquity and very rapid move-
ment (37). It is possible that many claimed to belong to his 
company to have the advantage of the fear inspired by his name (which 
might discourage attacks if it also guaranteed hatred all round) 
whether they actually did or not. It is possible that the core of 
his company may have moved together ~n a larger unit, but there would 
always be men travelling ~n isolation parallel to, ahead of or behind 
the line of march chosen by the captain. It is unknown how far 
Villandrando himself was able to keep track of all those who belonged 
or claimed to belong to his company; there ~s no evidence either way 
as to whether he kept muster records, and it is certainly likely that 
men could simply disappear without anybody being greatly concerned 
at their fate. On the other hand, reprisals did happen (though like 
the peasant vengeance which inspired them, they were often random and 
struck those uninvolved in the original affairs). As early 3S 1~23 
we have the case of a troop of Scottish soldiers in Berry who had be~n 
(37) Quicherat p. 87. 
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having trouble with the local population hanging a group of local 
peasants, chosen more or less at random,from the nearest tree (38). 
~o doubt this kind of behaviour was common and went unrecorded unless 
one of the victims was lucky enough to survive and tell the tale or 
his miraculous good fortune to the priest of a local shrine. In 
any case, it contributed to the vicious circle of hatred between 
peasant and soldier which degenerated into a kind of parallel war. 
This was perhaps the basic~ irreducable level of all late mediaeval 
warfare - the level to which it always tended to sink whatever the 
nominal goals of the campaign. It is possible that some at least 
of the troubles which the English suffered in Normandy came from this 
source rather than patriotic French resistance; it is clear that 
the average peasant did not bother overmuch about the colour of the 
coat worn by his military oppressors since in "French France'! the 
population had little compunction about killing men who were ln name 
at least in the service of their own king. In the end, at the 
village level, all soldiers and companies merged into one; that of 
the terrible Spaniard himself. In the mouths of those seeking 
pardon, all pillagers are always Rodrigois, with the Scots not far 
behind, as the anonymous 'Complaint et Helas du Pouvre Commun et 
des Pouvres Labourers de France' makes clear. 
noble authority is bitterly attacked: 
'Car s'ilz pensoient bien en Rodrigues 
Et Escocois et leur comp1ices' (39) 
In this, royal and 
( h however, almost cert3in-In fact, the anonymous author w 0 was, 
h II " ly not a labourer or even an authentic member of t e pouvre commun 
(38) ~iracles de St~ Katherine p. ~9 no. 95. 
(39) Monstrelet Vol. VI p. 189. 
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but most likely a priest) was very near the mark. The companies 
thri ved not jus t on the ransoms exacted from tmm counci Is and 
local estates, nor on the profits of pillage of the poorest ffild 
weakest members of French society, but on the potentially far more 
profitable and apparently honourable business of fighting private 
wars and acting as the defender of the interests of the great and 
powerful. This was the most dangerous aspect of the collapse of 
royal control over the sources of military power. After all, 
disorder of sorts was endemic in the countryside and the royal \vri t 
ran haltingly as far as the maintenance of peace and order at the 
lowest levels of society was concerned; murder at the village level 
was nothing new, as the ease with which remission was usually granted 
suggests. Had the burden of indiscipline and exaetion been confined 
to this level, it is doubtful whether the king \vould have been overly 
concerned. On the other hand, the emerging ties between the compan-
ies, their leaders and the leading nobility of the realm \Vas a threat 
to the security, not just of individuals but to the whole structure 
of royal authority. The results of these ties could produce yet 
another crop of parallel \Vars with all that that could mean ~n the ,-va'1 
of further exactions and pillages. For much of the period up to 
1445, however, this form of alternative employment was to be the main 
alternative to royal service, with its own rewards and profits to 
tempt the captain and his men into the alliance and patronage sys~ems 
run by the great and the powerful. It is to these that we must now 
turn our attention and their operations which we must now observe. 
Recruitment of men into the serv~ce of the major nobility of the 
land came ~n t\olO forms. The permanen[ private ':Jands, \.,hic~ renained 
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in being on a regular footing undoubtedly existed at an earlier 
period (and indeed the whole question of private military forces 
1S one which needs far more study), but they seem to have enjoyed a 
particularly active life 1n this period. \-le hear of La Tremoille' s 
men, largely composed of foreign groups, operating against the lands 
of his enemies iu the long-suffering Auvergne from castles of which 
they formed the permanent garrisons (40). This was in 1424; seven 
years later, such forces no doubt acted as the backbone of his army 
engaged in fighting in Poitou against the supporters of Arthur de 
Richemont, backed by Scottish companies and commanded by men of such 
rank as the Sieur d'Albret himself (41). Indeed in the south there 
seems to have been quite active recruitment on the part of the great 
families of the area of troops from beyond the often ill-defined 
borders in Spain. This is suggested by the letter of remission 
issued to a Castilian squire who had served in the forces of the Count 
of Armagnac at the ti~e of his rebellion and led something of an out-
law life after this had failed (42). Other similar figures can be 
found in the same sources (43), and it seems at least probable that 
the garrisons of many privately-held castles in the south had an 
element of foreign troops in them, some of whom might well drift into 
other companies or even into royal service if circumstances permitted. 
(40) AN X2a 18 f26vo. 
(41) A Bourdeaut 'Un Compagnon de Jeanne d'Arc et du Connetab1e de 
Richemont - Pierre de Rieux, Mardchal de France (1389-1441)' 
in Bulletin de 1a Societe Archeo10gique de ~antes et du 
Departement deiaLoire Infe'rieurr:.Vol. 53 1912 p. 120. 
(42) AN JJ 189 no. 92. 
(43) See, for instance id JJ 176 no. 156. 
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While such standing private forces were no doubt an irritation 
to the king, they had a certain tradition ~)ehind them, and were not ~n 
themselves likely to be strong enough to challenge royal authority 
openly. The real danger in this period came from a rather different 
source; the rather more complex and fluid relationships between some 
noble families and some captains and their men. Some at least of 
these lasted long enough for it to be possible to talk about real 
alignments and permanent relationships over and above the almost 
normal practice of hiring armed men to fight one's quarrels for one. 
Since these companies could be used to support the policies and am-
bit ions of the families in question, they became useful ways of exerting 
influence often far beyond the immediate lands of the family and with-
out having to run the risk of open involvement. They could, in 
theory at least, become important enough to seriously endanger the 
position of the king and become the military basis of armed rebellion. 
The traditional armed band/retinue, which could even be of use to the 
king in providing the nucleus of the companies which the great provid-
ed for his armies, was a much more limited and easily controlled 
phenomenon. Needless to say, there was little shortage of work for 
these companies to do in a world where even monks would call in 
soldiers to assert their rights to abbacies, where clerks laid sieg~ 
to each other and used artillery in quarrels over benefices and in 
which non-violent legal process was so slow in its application that 
the famous dispute over the bishopric of A1bi, begun in 1436 \Vas still 
under debate in the royal council in 1455 with no sign that it was 
anywhere near resolution (44). It should also be remembered that 
(~~) Valois Annuaire Bulletin de 1a Societ~ de l'Histoire de France 
Vol. 19 1882 p. 217. 
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Charles himself was not above using the captains in his obedience 
to aid his relatives in a semi-official way, as the case of the 
war in Lorraine mentioned in an earlier chapter illustrates. :~ever-
theless, the service of the great, intensely profitable as it could 
be, was a danger to royal authority admitted by the king himself. 
There was little, however, that he could do in the conditions of the 
l430s when this kind of service was probably more lucrative than its 
royal counterpart. 
Inevitably, we are led back to Villandrando; the most success-
ful and best documented of his breed. \Vhile he operated in the 
interest of others (the Vicomte of Turenne in 1433 (45), La Tremoille 
in 1432 (46), for instance) his abiding loyalty was to the Bourbon 
family. This was no doubt aided by his apparently close friendship 
/ 
with his fellow-Ecorcheur the Bastard of Bourbon, despite the fact 
that the dowager countess was terrified of him and had the council 
of Lyon take special care to guard the convent she was living in 
when his men passed nearby (47). This was an exception to his 
normal relations with the family; indeed after 1433 he was himself 
a member by marriage to another illegitimate offspring of the duke, 
his daughter Marguerite (48). He was given the lands of Ussel, plus 
2,000 tcus and the use of Chatildon until Ussel could be repaired. 
He also had the right of purchase over further lands when the present 
holder died (49) . In practice Ussel never produced the 1,000 It 
(45) Quicherat 9. 244 PJ XIX. 
(46) id p. 78-9. 
(47) id p. 247-8 , PJ XXII. 
(48) id p. 90. 
(49) id p. 249-51 PJ XXIV. 
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income which it should have, so he was guaranteed the monev 1n 
August 1436, along with other revenues (50). He was also to be 
paid for handing over the fortress of Charlieu which he had repair-
ed and strengthened, plus the expenses which that had entailed (51). 
Meanwhile he was well enough off to buy up lands to round off his 
properties (52) and lend money both to members of the nobility (53) 
and to the Duke of Bourbon himself (54). Much of the actual 
income which he was making in this period came from his military 
activities often undertaken on behalf of the family as well; which 
probably profited as much from the connection as he did himself; as 
I 
in 1436 when the estates of Languedoc at Beziers begged the family 
to call him off after his involvement 1n the dispute at Albi (55). 
It was a useful boost to the prestige and influence which the Bour-
bons could wield to have such a redoubtable soldier so firmly attach-
to them (indeed, he exempted his allegiance to them from the contracts 
m~de with other families (56)). He was a reliable ally on the whole, 
fighting in" their interest at Albi and lending his armed support to 
their candidate to the see and even aiding them in t\eir conspiracies 
at the cost of being chased from the kingdom by Charles himself at the 
head of a major army. He certainly prospered from the connection 
and retired to Spain a rich man leaving to his son a considerable 
landed property in France as well as many more or less collectable 
debts due to him (57) . It was a remarkable success for a man who 
(50) id p. 277-9 PJ XLI. 
(51) id p . 279-80 PJ XLI I. 
(52) id p. 275-7 ?J XL. 
(53) id p. 264-6 PJ XXXV, p. 303-5 PJ LVII. 
(54 ) id p. 261-3 PJ XXXIV. 
(55) id p. 131. 
(56) id p. 319 PJ LXIX. 
(57) id p • 342-3 PJ LXXXIV. 
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had started out as an impoverished youth of gentle birth and small 
prospects. One suspects that, by remaining largely outside the 
ranks of the royal armies (except when the terms suited him), he 
was able to avoid to risk of remaining unpaid rather better than some 
of his contemporaries. He was probably little concerned by the fact 
that his name was for many synonymous with extortion and plunder, and 
that he would figure among the legends of the countryside he had 
plundered so freely (58). 
His successor, Jean de Salazar, did almost equally well from 
betraying the Bourbon connection during the Praguerie. His career 
tied in rather more closely with royal service (latterly, after 1461, 
he was to be a firm supporter of Louis Xl), though his initial contacts 
were with Louis rather than Charles and one can see the Dauphin as 
another alternative source of favour, reward and influence rather 
than as merely a subordinate part of the royal system. He nevertheless 
managed to keep his lands at Issoudvn , Chaudesaigues and elsewhere 
even during the disgrace of his patron and his own fall from 
favour (59) even if he was to sell the latter to Charles of Bourbon 
in 1450, perhaps because he was having trouble in exploiting it. Like 
his old master, he married into the nobility by taking La Tremoille's 
illegitimate daugh~er, another Marguerite, as his second wife though 
this had rather less political overtones than Vi11andrando's ~arriage. 
On the other hand, he did very well in terms of property, collecting 
lands in Champagne which included the lordship of St. Just which gave 
him the title by which he was to be known for the rest of his life (60). 
(58) id p. 2, for instance. 
(59) Courty p. 73-~, 78. 
( 60 ) i d p. 74 - 5 . 
251 
He forms a transitional type between the lofty independence of 
Villandrando and the much more closely royally-connected careers of 
the commanders who emerged after 1445. 
Villandrando and, to a lesser extent, Salazar are easily the most 
spectacular and well-documented examples of this very close interplay 
between captains and important families. One can, however, find 
traces of others involved in this business on a rather more humble 
level. In the court proceedings concerning the Albi affair there 
are references to Scots companies involved in the war (61), while in 
a blow against the Praguerie and its Bourbon supporters a whole group 
of captains including the Scot Alain Ferlin (or Forty) and such not-
I 
able Ecorcheurs as Blanchefort and Anthoine de Chabannes were seized 
/ 
in June 1440. The destinies of many of the Ecorcheur captains were 
very closely linked with that of the Bourbon family and the king 
feared very much that they would provide the military basis for 
rebellion (62). It was, as the events of 1440 demonstrated, quite a 
justifiable fear; one of the motiv~for rebellion in this period had 
been royal plans for a reform of the military structures of the king-
dom which would have placed the majority of the commands ln the hands 
of men who had served the king with reasonable loyalty over the preVlOUS 
/ 
years and would have put many of the Ecorcheur captains out of the 
military structure altogether. This was more than just a loss of 
income and prestige for those involved; it also had considerable 
impact on the political influence of those who had alliances with 
(61) AN X2a 22 f34ro-35vo. 
(62) Vale Charles VII p. 79. 
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these men and would no longer be able to rely on their military 
support to advance their political schemes and influence. There 
seems little doubt that the most important reason for the reforms 
of 1445 was to break up this connection once and for all with the 
king now able to offer regular pay and a place in the established 
patronage structures for the professional soldiers whom he was 
prepared to trust. 
It is now time to examine just how far the changes brought in 
at Nancy in 1445 actually solved the problems which we have been 
dealing with in this chapter so far. Did they really create a 
well-ordered and disciplined force above the pillages and robberies, 
the murders and exactions which have occupied us to date? Was this 
force free from the influence of the great of the land who might wish 
to use it for their own political ends? Had its members been placed 
above temptation to supplement their proper and legitimate pay by 
unauthorised attacks on civilians, or hiring themselves out to those 
who had cases to maintain and were not unduly scrupulous about their 
methods? In a word, had the soldier, that terrible man on horseback, 
been domesticated at last and turned into a useful and even perhaps 
popular member of the society of his ti~e, a pillar and support both 
to the king and to the community as a whole? 
Certainly, one might well be led to believe this from some of 
the panegyrics which were to be lavished on the new force and those 
contained in its ranks. The poet Henri Baude, for instance, waxed 
qttite lyrical about the changes to be seen -
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"P . f ' ar qU1 ut-ce qu on chassa les pillars 
Et les courtois mis au lieu des paillers 
Dont Ie peuple fut tout morne et transy •••. 
Par justice qu'on trouva a ~ancy" (63) 
Martial d'Auvergne went into detail, putting this eulogy into the 
mouth of Labeur in his Vigiles de Charles VII 
"Quant les gens d'armes se passoient 
Par les villages pour logier 
Au moins qu'ilz povoient se passoient 
De poves gens endommager ••• 
Ains paioent leur loyre et mangier •.• 
Si d'ep~e ou javeline 
Eussent voulu frapper, blesser 
Et prendre poulaille au glaive 
II ne falloit que dresser 
A leur chef qui eust fait redresser •. 
Desditz gens d'armes doulx parloient 
Et taschoient fort a soulagier 
Toutes gens et les saluoient 
Sans injurier n'oultragier" (64) 
It should be remembered, however, that both these men were writing 
well on in the 1480's and 90's and that it is probable that these 
verses reflect a belief in a golden age 1n the already far-past 
days of Charles VII to be held up as a contrast to the behaviour of 
troops in their own day; also perhaps as a programme for the future. 
They do not reflect with any fidelity 1;vhat the majority of people seem 
to have thought of the troops in the latter years of Charles' and the 
early part of Louis' reigns. 
On one level, certainly, the reforms were very successful; that 
of the links between the companies and the potentially dangerous 
nobility of the realm. Apart from the dangerous period from 1461-5 
which I have alluded to so often, the links were never ~e£8rged and 
the royal ordonnance compan1es gave the king at least the prepondera~~ 
«63) Vers d'Henri Baude p. 92. 
(64) ~1artial c'Auvergne Vol. I p. 81. 
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possession of organised military power in his realm. Noble 
military power was ~ow to die completely and Charles of France ran 
his own parallel military household until his death, but the:-e ~';2S 
little real danger in these survivals. Charles' army was tiny in 
comparison with the royal forces, while the ease with which Louis 
was able to squash the plots of such rebellious nobles as the Count 
of Armagnac demonstrates where the reality of power lay. The main 
armed powers in the kingdom had been integrated into the complex net-
work of royal favour and officeholding and were the king's men to 
command. Some captains may have used their companies in the pursuit 
of their own private ends (there are suggestions of this in the 
proceedings of the Grand5Jours of Bordeaux (65», but this was a 
comparatively limited abuse, almost one to be expected and not, on the 
whole, unduly threatening to the crown. On the political level, 
the reforms had succeeded 1n restoring peace, discipline and order 
among the captains; all of it to the profit.of the crown. 
Below this level of hish politics, however, matters were rather 
diffe rent. It is possible that the documentation in this area may 
be a little misleading, since the letters of remission only recommence 
as a ser1es from the 1440's onwards and the shift of military activity 
( 
into the towns may have led to more being recorded, but these ~inor 
distortions do not alter the broad outlines of the picture. This was 
fairly unatrractive. Some of the worst of the troubles were trans-
ferred to the towns, 
. the new permanent compan1es were ve r': much S1nce 
more urban ~n their distribution than the old free ones had been. 
This transfer was not at all popular with the residen ts of to~ro.s t:.us 
(65) AH Gironde (GrandsJours) Vol. IX 1873 p. 26. 
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honoured; the masses of litigation which places undertook to pass 
the burden on elsewhere prove the point amply (66). The fundamental 
problem was simple; even in receipt of regular royal wages, it 
proved well-nigh impossible to get soldiers into the habit of paytng 
for the goods and serv~ces they used. This was perhaps not so 
very surprising. The men who filled the ranks of the new companies 
were very much the same men who had served their apprenticeships in 
• I 
the compan~es of the Ecorcheurs. One could replace Salazar, but 
one could not replace his men so easily, when it is certain that the 
best troops in the army before reform had been precisely t~ese 
I . • 
Ecorcheur compan~es. As a result, and unrestrained by any effective 
military bureaucracy on the model of the Italian 'provvedetori' or 
'collaterale' (67) the soldiers went on in their old ways of taking 
what they needed when they needed it and paying irregularly if at all. 
As a result, unlike the German experience where a permanent garrison 
could be popular since its members would pass the money extracted 
for its upkeep back to the citizens in the form of purchases (68), 
French companies were always bitterly disliked in the tmms ~n which 
they were placed. They remained, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, an under-employed, burdensome and violent group, ~n urban 
society but not of it, alien and disliked but also feared. Brawls 
were frequent; over payment for shoes (69) over women (70) even over 
missing pets (71). From the point of view of the townsman, reto~" 
(66 ) Solon p. 81-3. 
(67) Mallett p. 123-45. 
(68) Benecke p. 230. 
(69) A..'J JJ 188 no. 180. 
(70) id JJ 199 no. 334. 
(71) id JJ 190 no. 75 (Publ ished in Rei 1hac ~:ol. III p. 62-6 PJ CXXXV). 
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by establishing a permanent military presence within the walls of .. tus 
town, had made the situation very much worse rather than better. 
Billeting, never properly organised in this period \Vas just the beginn-
ing of a series of troubles for him, over and above the taxes \vhich 
he was expected to pay for the upkeep of these ill-disciplined and 
brutal men forced upon him. 
The countryside was not spared either. Sometimes troops were 
lodged in villages as well as in the towns, but the main area of 
exploitation was the sending of bands of armed men from the town-
based companies in search of food. This often, from the dating of 
the letters of remission which illustrate this practice, happened 
during winter when the resources of the countryside would be at full 
stretch in any case and any surplus jealously guarded to see the 
population through to the end of the season., or in the middle of 
summer when stocks were at their lowest before the next harvest. In 
theory, these groups from the companies were meant to purchase the 
grain they sought, but despite protestations to the contrary, it seems 
likely that these were much more like old-style pillages than properly 
conducted purchases. At best, the soldiers may have set their own, 
very low, price. Needless to say, such procedures could lead to much 
trouble. Garcia's men in Sainto~~e were particularly involved in 
this sort of operation; there is a record of one such expedition \vhere 
the local blacksmith resisted the troops and was eventually killed (72). 
Another case in the same area and even at much the same ti~e of year 
illustrates just how little the reforms had changed the manners of the 
(72) id JJ 190 no. 167 (Published in id Vol. II p. 271-3 PJ XCVIII -
see also p. 267-9 PJ XCVII). 
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rank and file of the new ordonnance companies. In this case, t~e 
trouble began with an expedition to the village of Porcheresse where 
the soldiers forced the local people to cut their oats to feed to 
their horses (indeed, there is some evidence that the upkeep of the 
horses in the company, whose numbers, despite a series of royal 
ordonnances on the subject, always tended to increase, was a matter 
of at least as much concern as that of the men. In a relatively 
horseless society, we tend to forget just how much effort and what 
quantities of food are necessary to maintain even one horse, let 
alone the several hundred which a company of a hundred lances would 
have. In the very much less favoured climes of ~-lest Africa, it has 
even been argued that the sheer problems of upkeep of mounted a~les 
had a decisive effect on the development of social and political 
structures (73); it should come as no surprise, then, that there 
could be bitter struggles over the efforts by soldiers to maintain 
their horses, so vital to them in their function). Some of the 
villagers resisted and in the ensuing struggle, one was killed. 
This was the beginning of a period of terror for the village, s~nce 
the soldiers persecuted the place with regularity from then on: the 
very fact of organisation and stability probably increased the dangers 
of vengeance being taken on a village which proved recalcitrant since 
men were going out from a fixed base with a known destination and would 
be missed if they failed to return). As a result the popUlation lived 
. en leurs l';tz" as they s t 3. t2 d ~n fear; "n'osoient bonnement coucher ~ 
later. On 17th March 1460 the final showdown came. A group of s~:-: or 
seven men rode into the village, whose men had all fled Since they 
(73) R Law 'Horses, Firearms and Political Power ~n Pre-Colonial ":est 
Africa Past and Present Vol. 72 1976 p. 131. 
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were under threat of death, the leader of the group produced a p1ece 
of paper which he claimed was an authorisation from the captain order-
ing him to carry out this sentence. One of the soldiers tried to 
take a woman of the village; when her pregnant sister tried to stop 
him, he beat he~ up so that she miscarried. The troops settled down 
in the village for the night. Meanwhile, the men of the villaoe o , 
reinforced by their neighbours came back and surrounded the houses 
occupied by the soldiers, calling upon them to surrender (at least, 
that is what they claimed). Hhen they did not, the villagers were 
preparing to storm the buildings when the troops sallied forth and a 
battle began by the end of ~vhich some at least of the troops were 
dead (74). This, it should be remembered took place in 1460, some 
fifteen years after the reform ordonnance had been put into effect; 
the companies were still acting very much as they had always done. 
It is hardly surprising that some more contemporary writers had 
different things to say about the troops from the pra1se of a Baude 
or a Martial d'Auvergne. To quote one anonymous author cited by 
Solon -
"Ce ne sont qu'un tas de pillars 
Meschans, coquins, larrons, paillars" (75) 
As he so succinctly puts it, "the relationship between the civilians 
and military personnel resembled limited but open warfare" (76). It 
remained in a linear succession to the warfare in the countryside which 
had been the norm all through the period before 1445. 
(74) AN JJ 190 no. 58 (Published Reilhac Vol. III J. 14-9, PJ CXXIII -
see also p. 20-4 PJ CXXIV). 
(' V 5) So 1 on p. 87. 
(76) id p. 88. 
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Indeed, in some respects things were, arguably, worse. 
place of wide sweeps, terrifying for those who were caught in them 
but often sporadic and patchy, there was a system of organised 
exploitation, of semi-permanent harassment and intimidation done by 
men who could claim to be doing it in the name of the king. In 
addition, there were the taxes, imposed in time of war but maintained 
in peace to pay for this disorderly and extortive rabble. Indeed, 
in the relatively few areas which tried to resist the tax by force, 
the king was quite prepared to put the companies to collect it by 
, 
methods which were indistinguishable from those used by the Ecorch-
eurs (77). The king might have solved the problems of loyalty and 
rebellion by integrating the companies into his established organ~sa-
tion of favours and patronage, but he did so at the expense of his 
subjectswho had to pay the bill and suffer the ravages of the army 
thus created. It was to be a long and slow process before the sit-
uation was to alter significantly, and one should remember that even 
into the eighteenth century French governments were to use the forced 
billeting of troops as a form of punishment for towns which had 
offended in some way. The army was to remain a method o£ converting 
tax revenues into patronage for many years to come as well. 
As this section shows, the soldier was only partially domesticat-
ed and integrated into society. He still retained the very poor 
image he had to the end; as late as the 1480's towns still feared 
the onset of troops (78). The reasons why are easy to understand; 
(77) Art Gascogne Vol. XII (Comptes de Riscle) p. 26-8. 
(78) Archives Municipales, BouT3es AA 13 no. 9, ~E 3. 
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we have seen enough of them in this chapter to explain all the 
hostility they encountered. Nevertheless, it is worth examining 
the actual contours of life ~n the companies to see hmv far there 
was forged in this period a life-style peculiar to the professional 
soldier. Indeed, how professional were the men who filled the 
companies, and how far did their style of life contribute to the 
tensions between them and those in whose midst they lived? \.Jha t 
was the role of the captain in the company? It is to questions 
1 ike this that we shall turn in the follmving chap ter. 
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Chapter VIII. The Realities of the ~1i litarv Life 
t • 
As we have seen in the previous two chapters, the population or 
France after 1445 paid heavily in taxation and in intermittent direct 
exactions for the upkeep of a permanent army composed of ~en who were 
in theory at least professional soldiers in a recognisab1y modern 
sense of the term. They were spread out across the country bi11et-- , 
ed with the population at large and subject to regular review bv 
royal officials to check on the standard of their equipment and their 
, 
physical presence in the ranks. It was, on paper, a very comprehens-
ive1y supervised life. 
Yet, in one very important area, this structure of inspection 
before payment was surprisingly deficient; at no point was it ever 
suggested that the men charged with making the reviews trJ to carry 
out any checks on the ability of the men they were inspecting to use 
their arms and equipment properly and effectively. Men might be 
expelled from a company for shortcomings in their armament (there is 
a record of several Scots being purged from the company of Antoine de 
Chabannes for this reason, though no way of knowing just how common 
this actually was (1)) but not for incompetence in its use. This 
suggests a certain blind spot in the regulations and poses the 
question of how far the king's money was actually buying him an army 
of full-time professional soldiers after all. 
Certainly the whole system of musters and rev~ews was plagued bv 
absente ei sm. As Contamine has shown, the permitted proportion of 
absentees at a given time tended to rise steadily from 1450 onwards, 
reaching a quarter of the effectives by 1~70 (2). In practlce, 
(1) Chabannes Histoire de la ~aison Vol. II p. ~~O-l. 
(2) Contamine GE S p. 500-1. 
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despite elaborate rules governing both the number and length or 
absences allowed and efforts made to see to it that everybody was 
present at least for the four reviews annually, it seems probable 
that a very high proportion of many companies would not be in 
the ranks at any given time. Authority was virtually powerless to 
stop this; indeed favoured captains could find it conniving at the 
breaking of the rules. In 1469, when Salazer's men recrossed the 
Pyrenees many simply abandoned the company and went off on their own 
affairs. Despite the fact that he was unable to present his men for 
review, he was granted letters allowing him to collect their wages; 
no doubt he pocketed a fair proportion of the money (3). Even the 
foreign companies suffered from this drift away to other concerns 
which tended to make many of the men in the French royal arm~es into 
part-time soldiers. One hears of a Scottish archer going home to 
St. Martin-de-Pernac in the Agenais where he found that a neighbour 
had been annoying his wife, and killed him (4). As we saw, foreign 
troops bought up land in France and presumably took advantage of the 
situation to slip away and supervise their properties whenever they 
felt the need. On the whole, though, they may have been rather less 
integrated into French society than their French fellows and rather 
more likely to remain in their billets; since it was usually in these 
places that the brawls and killings which bring so many common soldiers 
to the historian's notice happened, this may help to explain why 
foreigners are probably over-represented in the registers of the roval 
(3) PO 2609 Dossier Salazar no. 62. 
(4) AN JJ 198 no. 322. 
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chancery. (There are other, more technical, reasons why they 
appear so frequently in the lists of letters of remission, but the 
poss ibil i ty that a rather better record for s ta"';ng n; th ' 
./ .L . ~ Jne s 
company could imply a greater danger of committing violent crime _ 
is real enough to be worth noting). 
Even when the soldier was present on duty in his company, the 
curiously part~time nature of his military duties continued. The 
French monarchy never invented the concept of army exercises (perhaps 
because they were aware that many companies were permanently below 
strength) and never even laid'down any very formal rules about ma~n-
taining the military efficiency of individual soldiers ~n time of 
peace by regular training at the company level. Some captains may 
have taken part in tournaments (5) (though ~n an increasingly snobbish 
jousting world how many of them would have been welcome ~s another 
matter), but their military training value was doubtful. There are 
records of men organising competitions for archery in some compan~es; 
half a dozen members of Salazar's company staged a crossbow competit-
ion at Meung-sur-Loire in June 1471 which ended in murder after a 
quarrel over tavern bills once the day's shooting was done (6). On 
the whole, though, this seems to have been an isolated venture, set up 
by the men themselves on a semi-social basis rather than as part of a 
well-defined programme of training. The main collective military 
exercises which the majority of men indulged in were probably the more 
or less regular pitched battles which took place between ~ival 
companies when they were billeted :'.ear each other as in Ba':onr..e whe~e 
(5) Contarnine GES p . .498. 
(6) AN J J 195 no s. 535, 567. 
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the fights between the Scots of Pettilot and Cunningham and the 
Spaniards of Garcia became a major problem to the authorities (7). 
This lack of professionalism where the actual question of 
military competence was concerned spilled over into other fields. 
There was, for instance, no formal system of recruitment. I t seems 
that men in search of a place in a company simply followed it around 
waiting for a vacancy to occur. It seems that almost any methods 
went as far as gaining admission was concerned. There ~s a case 
recorded of a Scottish cook who wished to join the guard and made 
contact with one of the archers with a view to bribing the captain to 
let him . ~n. In the end, the main profit seems to have beer. reaped 
by the archer whom he had contacted initially since he it was who 
collected the proceeds of the theft designed to ease h~s way into the 
prestigious ranks of the royal bodyguard. The cook slipped a massive 
dose of laxative into the meal of his employer and made off T7ith his 
treasure chest in the ensuing confusion (8). Unfortunately the 
letter of remission which tells the tale does not say whether the 
plot was successful ~n gaining him the entry he sought (one suspects 
not, or the case would never have corne to light in this way). At no 
point did anybody pause to consider whether the man in question had 
any military abiiity; the whole affair was to be settled by a cash 
payment to those with influence. 
Admittedly the weaponry of the period was not so advanced as to 
be beyond the comprehension of the ordinary man. Indeed the main 
(7) id JJ 187 no. 289. 
(8) id JJ 182 no. 53 (pttblished ~n A H Poitou X~~II p. 36--73). 
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constraint on recruitment was probably the ability to afford the 
armour and the upkeep of the horses necessary l'f one was to pass the 
reviews rather than any concept of military efficiency. As we have 
seen, a determined group of peasants could succeed ~n worsting isolat-
ed detachments of soldiers even with such primitive weapons as the 
iron fork with which one exasperated villager avenged the attempted 
rape of his wife and the destruction of the 'four banal' or village 
baking-oven (9) despite the efforts of one of his attackers to cut 
him down with a sword; this does not, to my mind, indicate any 
very advanced level of military training or even of professionalism 
among the men of the royal armies. 
In fact, one could argue that the long-suffering French taxpayer 
was being deceived. He was paying heavily for an army, which, despite 
the regulations surrounding it, was made up of men who were as often as 
not part-timers. This close interrelationship between soldier and 
civilian should not be forgotten; many "professionals", even in the 
rather more professional foreign companies were in fact men whose main 
lncome and interests were outside the ranks of the company in which 
they served. This should always be remembered when trying to calculate 
the strength of the army at any point in time; even the muster rolls 
record paper strength rather than the actual numbers of men available 
for se rvice • As so often in late mediaeval France, the structure 
1 k d h " th . t seems to have been in 00 e muc more \mpreSSlve on paper an 1 
reality. The imposing edifice of the royal Compagnies d'Ordonnance, 
on closer inspection turns out to be a collection of largely 'Jlltrained 
men recruited in a hap-hazard way with no real effort made to maintai~ 
(9) id JJ 187 no. 208 (published in id XXXV p. 9-l~). 
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their military efficiency. Either they become something less t~a~ 
full-time professionals or they remained, as we shall see, an under-
employed and floating element of the population. Without any of the 
institutional structures which existed in Italy at this period, there 
was little that could be done about this. Four reV1ews per year to 
check that those who turned up were more or less adequately equipped 
and present (though presumably with such a large tail of hangers-on 
always present it was never hard to use the same sort of tricks which 
plagued the English army under Elizabeth; maSS1ve substitutions of 
men, the presentation of civilians as soldiers for the day and all the 
other methods used to draw pay for men who were either absent or no 
longer existed) (10) were no substitute for proper supervision of the 
companies on a permanent basis. Royal control was never, however, 
extended with any real effect into the actual workings of the companies 
on the ground. That remained as much in the hands of the captains as 
it had ever been; on their shoulders fell the main burden of responsib-
ility for the discipline, organisation and general runn1ng of the 
compan1es on a day to day basis. The army was an army of captains ln 
the first instance; they formed the crucial link ~Ietween the royal 
government and its army. 
This situation could be complicated by the fact that the captain 
might himself be an absentee. As we noted before, there was an In-
creasing tendency towards the combination of civil and military office 
in the same hands, and also an increasing likelihood that ~8~3nd of a 
company would be given to the well-born and influential, ',,'hatever the~r 
(10) CG Crui,'t'hank Elizabeth's Army 2nd edition London lOhh p .. 13~-':':, 
153-':' . 
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military talents more or less as a right which their status deserved. 
Even among the more zealous captains who did largely remain with eheir 
men, the need to see to their own private properties could lead t~e= 
away for part of the year at least. In this respect the forei~ 
companies were probably well served on the whole, at least in the 
first generation; while Pettilot, for instance, combined civilian 
and military posts, his senechalship was placed in the region where 
his men were already based and there was probably little real contra-
diction in function even if it did mean an unhealthy concentration of 
power in the hands of one man at local level. 
Hhen he was present, his IDwer over his company was great indeed. 
As we have seen, he had more or less complete control over recruit~ent 
into it (11) (even if he did not always choose to exerClse it at the 
lowest level), he had considerable influence over the payment of his 
men and acted as the main source of justice (12) certainly within the 
company itself. Indeed the company was as much his as the king's. 
It seems probable that its members wore his colours as well as the 
white cross of the French monarchy; according to one source, Salazar's 
men certainly did when a party of them sallied forth from Paris during 
the Guerre du Bien Publique. In this case it must have been rather 
splendid, since the 'uniform' consisted of violet camlet hoqueton 
with the white cross on it, black velvet hats with gold trimmings, 
silver saddle cloths for fue horses and gold chains round the necks 
oft he me n ( 13) . This, admittedly, was probably an unusual case; 
(11) Contamine GES p. 488-9. 
(12) id p. 516-7. 
(13) de Roye Vol. I. p. 126-7. 
a 
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party riding forth in their Sunday best, perha~s to cock a snoot at 
the besieging forces. Nevertheless, it does suggest that the captain 
had considerable control over how the men of his company dressed. 
This putting on of what could be regarded as a kind of liverv could 
only reinforce the sentiment that one was, in some sense part of the 
househo~d of the captain in question. There is no doubt that most 
captains did have considerable households; Pettilot had one staffed 
largely, as one might expect, by Scots (14) and it seems probable that 
at least some of his men may have formally belonged to it and served 
him in a domestic, as well as a military sense (there is evidence for 
this in other companies) (15). Nevertheless, the whole company could 
also be seen as part of an extended household to which the cap cain would 
have considerable responsibilities. He would, for instance, be expect-
ed to help in the provision of places for his men when they'became too 
old to serve in the ranks; the multi-lingual throng which filled the 
halls of Jean de Chabannes was one expression of. this expectation 
which, one suspects could become very burdensome on a captain of relatively 
limited fortune (16). He might even be expected to see to the inter-
ests of his men after their deaths; in October 1449 one John Ramsay, 
man at arms in the company (called, interestingly 'soci~te' by the 
notary) of Pettilot left a substantial sum of money in the care of a 
Toulousain merchant. Two months later, he had died and his captain 
came to withdraw the money so that his debts could be paid, his funeral 
properly seen to, and his will executed (17). 
(14) AN JJ 188 no. 5. 
(15) Contamine GES p. 484-5. 
( 16 ) i d p. 4 .4 5 -6 . 
(17) AD Haut~aronne 3E 176 :48ro,56ro. 
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It was in life, however, that the pervasiveness of th . ~l e lnJ.. uence 
of the captain became most apparent. As letters of remission show , 
his control over justice within his company was no empty phrase. 
It becomes apparent that on the slightest provocation men would 
appeal to him to arrange quarrels between themselves; if a man was 
having trouble in gaining the repayment of a loan from another member 
of the company (18), if men fell out over the payment for their 
lodgings (19), in all the inte~inab1e disputes about billets for men 
and their horses far too numerous to be listed, the captain was 
expected to judge, cool tempers before matters got out of hand, and 
produce the kind of compromise which would allow men living in 
appallingly close proximity for most of the time to endure each 
other's company. If he failed, the consequences could be disastrous, 
as the whole corpus of letters of remission (which chronicle such 
failures) shows. Despite official provisions to the contrary, it was 
not uncommon for the captain to find himself doing justice even in 
cases of squabbles between his men and the civilian population. There 
is, for instance, a case in Dax where the local popUlation tried to 
arrest a soldier to haul him before the captain (20) (in this case they 
failed; the man resisted and killed one of his potential captors). 
One wonders, nevertheless, just how far Martial d'Auvergne's confident 
statement about the efficacy of a rapid complaint to the captain in 
such cases actually reflects rea1i ty; it seems p robab Ie that he would 
normally tend to identify with his men against the importunities or 
(18) Al.'I JJ 190 no •. 9~. 
(19) id JJ 191 no. 7. 
(20) id JJ 199 no. 334. 
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civilians. This is especially probable given that the captain was 
often the channel through which his men would approach the royal 
judicial authorities for letters of remission for their various Crl::les. 
This is occas iona lly exp lici t, as in the case of Jean de ~ovara ~.,ho 
gained his remission at the intercession of Theaulde de Valpergue who 
had been his captain and may well still have been (21); more otten 
it is implicit as in the case of a group of Garcia's men who, after 
committing their crime, were hiding in sanctuary in the parish church 
I 
of St. Jean d'Angely (22), or other cases where the man was apparently 
in hiding. Certainly there must be a strong supposition that the 
captain was usually instrumental in shielding his men from the full 
rigours of justice, S1nce he was the man with the direct connections 
with the levels of the royal bureaucracy which mattered. 
It can hardly be surprising if loyalty, thus nourished, could 
surv1ve all manner of political disturbance and indeed become a factor 
in the political equation 1n its own right. One of the greatest 
dangers of the wholesale shake-up of 1461 was that the captains thus 
discarded 1;vould ei ther take men from the ranks with them or, more 
dangerous still, retain a hard core of men still fundamentally loyal 
to them within the ranks and ready to rise or desert if the conditions 
were ripe. It is at least possible that the rather mediocre pe~form-
ance of the royal army in the face of this crisis was due to this fact; 
h · . . for cons~derable desertion from the Scot~ish t ere is certa1nly eV1dence ~ 
this company and efforts made by the rebellious princes to encourage 
further by sending Folcart around the garrisons and billets to talk to 
(21) id JJ 178 no. 77. 
(2 2 ) i d J J 1 9 0 no. 16 7 . 
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the men. His audience may have increased by the fact that it 
likely that some at least of those purged from the guard units which 
he had commanded had been sent to the less prestigious Ordonnance 
units (23); this was apparently a form of disciplinary punishment 
favoured for tho se who had misbehaved or \Ve re regarded a s pol i ti cally 
unreliable. The level of identification with one's captain is well 
illustrated by the curious case of two members of Pettilot's company, 
one a Welshman and the other from "Irlanda sauvage", which would seem 
to mean Gaelic Ireland, who came to blows in an argument about the 
wealth of their former captain, MOntgommery and the wardrobe of his 
wife. Evidently commanders were a subject of conversation amongst 
the men in their billets (24). 
Of course, the captain was not always necessarily the kind of 
paternal figure which the preV10US section might suggest. He could 
equally'well be a tyrant, venting his enmity on members of the company 
who had done something to displease him. It is possible that many 
compan1es had their internal feuds cutting across any sense of commun-
ity which might have existed, with the captain's favourites and enemies 
jockeying for position. The most obvious case (indeed, something of a 
.. 10( 
cause celebre in its day) concerned Salazar's company. In 1471, while 
the company was based in Amiens, one of the men at arms \Vas murdered b:, 
a group of other members who included nephews of the captain himself. 
The victim's family took Salazar to court charging him ':vith complicity 
in the murder. He was never actually convicted, though stro~g 
(23) FF 6971 f16lro-vo. 
(24) k~ JJ 179 no. 309. 
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suspicion seems to have attached to him at least as a 1 . , n accomp_1ce 
after the fact in aiding the killers to escape from the town. The 
matter was never properly cleared up, as the ~urderers escaped to 
Spain and were involved in fighting there;despite the efforts or 
the Parlement of Paris they never returned to face justice. It lS 
perhaps significant that after Salazar's death his descendants had to 
pay indemnities to the family of the victim (25). It seems probable 
that this whole affair should be seen as an example of this potential 
tension within the company. No doubt the lieutenants (on the whole 
rather shadowy figures in companies with active captains) were verv 
much the creatures of the captain, and the scope for oppression in-
herent in the situation was, as we have seen considerable tor the 
ruling group of those in the favour of the captain. 
Considering the power that they wielded, one's natural desire to 
know more about the captains as men is rather surprisingly hard to 
satisfy. A few things can perhaps be guessed at. The majority seem 
to have been at least literate (or, perhaps one should rather put it 
that they were able to sign their names to their pay receipts), though 
in some cases it seems to have been a literacy painfully acquired and 
rarely exercised; few could match the relatively fluent signature of 
Villandrando. The Scots and the other foreigners must have been bi-
lingual to a greater or lesser extent (and indeerl,many may have ended 
more at home in French than in their native tongues after many years of 
serV1ce in France). It seems on the whole very doubtful, despi~e t:lis, 
how many of them would have read much ln the way of ch::'valric lite:-atJre. 
( ') ) • ., , I d Ch t" \TO 1 8') P 1 23- 3 5 . -5 A Thomas B1bllothegue de 1 Ecole es ar_es . - . 
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Nevertheless, even a hardened profes siona1 like Salazar ~, see!':lS ~V 
have been influenced by this culture; his sons were called Hector , 
Tristan, Ga1eas and Lance10t (26). It is doubtful T,.1hethe!"' 'TI3.nv 
captains took much part in the great tournaments (many, particul:lrly 
the hardened foreign professionals, would be rather too old for this 
sport even if they had been of higher social origin), though as iole 
noted Theau1de de Va1pergue did joust for France in a kind of joust-
ing international against Burgundy at Arras in 1429 and this aristo-
cratic sport par excellence can hardly have been unknown to then, 
I 
and as we saw in an earlier chapter, many Ecorcheurs were much attac~l-
ed to concepts of good and bad war with essentially chivalric origins. 
On the whole the foreign captains were very much gnarled professionals 
with many :rears of service between them; Salazar must have been in his 
seventies at least at the time of his death and the other commanders ran 
up careers of some thirty to forty years quite regularly. As their 
depositions in court show, they attached a great deal of importance to 
their personal battle honours (like their subordinates in t~eir compan-
ies), and tolere not above adding to them to impress a sCe,tical court 
with their traditional well-attested loyalty to the crown (27). One 
can deduce from this, I suspect, a professional pride in their past 
achievement, and perhaps a real feeling that the profession of arms 
enobled them. Alas, none of them felt the urge to leave their memOirs 
or thoughts on warfare for the edification of posterity, unlike Jean de 
Beuil, and the kind of men that they were can only be guessed at. 
These speculations, however, could be prolonged for ever. 
(26) Courtv p. 78, Contamine GE S p. 4:,6. 
(27) Courtv p. 69-71. 
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time to return to the men they commanded; for, however much a 
captain might identify with his company and however much he hi~el: 
was an integral and essential part of its life, he was never quite 
on the same level as his men. He was the dominant figure "At t':1e 
same time, tyrant, mas ter and father" as Contamine puts it so 
succinctly (28); it is now the moment to examine the kind of life 
which those whom he commanded led and which drove them to seek his 
arbitration so often. 
The worst bone of contention was undoubtedly billeting. Since 
there was never any suggestion that troops should be lodged in separ-
ate buildings from the rest of the population, men had to be placed 
among the civilian population, a process always bitterly resented by 
the towns involved. In theory, there \Ve re many regulations laid down 
concerning payment for accommodation as well as the quality and nature 
of the equipment which was meant to be provided by the local authorities; 
in practice, it seems probable that these were as much dead letters as 
those forbidding foraging in the countryside (2~). Towns tried to 
gain exemption from this particular burden, but they were frequently 
over-ridden; the main burden of complaints made by the short-lived 
local estates in the Lannes concerned this matter. Men were not pa:,'-
lng for their accommodation and the local administrative authorities, 
run by the captain of the main company in the area, the Scot Pettilot, 
were requisitioning beds even in places which should have been exe~pt 
from such exactions. In reply the soldiers claimed that their cor.rades 
in Bordeaux did not have to pay for their accommodation. Soothing 
(28) Contamine GES p. 528. 
Cg) id p. -'+93-6. 
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words were spoken and promises of redress made, but one ~ay well 
doubt their effectiveness (30), especially since the Estate G n 1 s e .. era 
of 1484 were to hear so many complaints about similar matters (31). 
As a result, all billeting was bitterly resented; towns resisted as 
-bes t they could , individual in teres t group s in the towns tr ied to 
evade their potential responsibility (the clergy were well to the 
fore in this), while the unfortunate inn and tavern keepers, upon 
whom the burden tended to fall in the first instance, were left com-
plaining bitterly that the presence of men at arms on their p=emises 
simply drove their regular customers away (32). Hhen all else failed, 
towns would simply put up the charges for accommodation, presumably in 
the hope that this might discourage troops from settling in them, and 
that some of those who did at least would pay up. (33) 
As a result, soldiers arriving in a town almost always started off 
on a bad footing with the local inhabitants. There \Vas probably a 
temptation to pack men in tightly, even beyond the statutory two men 
per bed laid down by royal edict, in a situation where men were likely 
to be isolated islands in a sea of hostility. This simply heightened 
the almost claustrophobica11y closed nature of life in the compa~y 
(which must have been even greater in the case of foreign companies). 
Perhaps this very tightly circumscribed social life had the effect of 
making companies into self-conscious entities and helped to create the 
kind of solidarity and "regimental spirit" which the barracks and 
(30) Cadier p. 45-7, 74-5, 80-1. 
(31) Solon p. 94. 
(32 ) id p. 83-5 , Contamine GES p. 495. 
(33) Solon p . 85. 
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comparative isolation from civilian society did for more modern 
armies; it certainly seems to have had the ff f' e ect 0 he~ghtening 
disputes between members. The whole matter of finding billets was 
a fertile ground for bitter dispute, since the machinery for deciding 
who actually went where seems to have been rudimentary with 8uch '~fr 
to personal initiative and ties of friendship. Letters of remission 
for murders committed as a result of quarrels over sharing billets (34), 
the stabling of horses (35) or claims to priority in billets between 
different companies (36) abound, and suggest that one of the most 
troubled times for any company was likely to be if it had to move. 
The situation was compounded by the fact that, if a quarrel did 
begin whether over billets or other matters, it was almost impossible 
in the prevailing atmosphere to escape from it, and indeed it could 
easily spread to infect other parts of the body as well. As we saw 
before, Salazar had several relatives in his company and there is 
every indication that most companies had a very strong family element 
in them. This may well have been more pronounced in the foreign 
cones, since there it might be a matter of tradition within a famil~. 
Certainly, even a rapid check of a muster of Cunningham's company in 
1469 shows some very considerable concentration of surnames. Not 
surprisingly, there were no less than thirteen Cunninghams ~n its 
ranks, but also five Chambres , five Marshals, four Ramsays and four 
Jonsons, with many other groups of three and two men with the same 
surname (37); it seems at least probable that there was a '.'ery high 
(3-'+ ) A~ JJ 185 no. 267, for instance. 
(35) id JJ 190 no. 125 (in Reilhac Vol. III "J • 55-8 P J CXXXII I) 
(36) id JJ 196 no. 87. 
(37) FF 25779 no. 19. 
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degree of inter-relationship within the ranks. If this could increase 
the sense of identity still further by making the company a kind of 
extended family or even confraternity in an age which placed so :')uch 
emphasis on such institutions, it meant that there was always a 
danger that disputes could spread rapidly among the whole company, ln 
a kind of spreading family feud. In an age where any dispute could 
rapidly turn into a full-blown fight with weapons drawn and a potential-
ly fatal outcome, this was always a case of ser10US concern; the 
poisoned atmosphere had no chance to escape and quarrels could drag on 
to disrupt the internal life of the company for a very long time. 
The very close proximity in which men lived posed other problems 
as we 11. Many hinged round money. It was natural that those shar-
ing a billet should share expenses, but this could again be a seed-bed 
of potential troubles. In one case, for instance, we hear of a 
quarrel among members of the guard ln Loches, when one of a group 
billeted together was suspected of cheating the others and (or so at 
WLr1-
least it was claimed)~eventually killed while trying to break out of 
the house arrest imposed by the captain (38). Money troubles co~ld 
manifest themselves in other ways. With pay often in arrears, the 
captain and others likely to be taking a rake-off on some occasions, 
and a generally expensive life-style to maintain, men could well fall 
into debt to their comrades. As we saw, there could be quite consid-
erable variations in wealth within a company and it is possible that 
those who might at other times invest their money ln mercantile ventures 
also went in for money-lending within the ranks of the company. 
Hhether Pedro de Salamanca, a Spanish archer \.;ho lent ::laney to a 
(38) Al"J JJ 191 no. 7. 
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comrade in Joachim Rouallt'scompany entered this category or was 
simply an ordinary soldier doing a good turn to a financially embar~­
assed friend is uncertain; what is not was the outcome when the 
borrower refused to repay the loan which, by degrees led to a fight in 
which he was killed (39). MOney problems, combined with the cramped 
social life led by so many, could be a powerful stimulus to trouble and 
quarrels within a company. 
Money, in a rather different aspect, was often at the root of the 
frequent battles with the inhabitants of the towns in which the compan-
l.es were billeted. As we have seen, soldiers had a very strong tenden-
cy not to pay for goods and services taken. There was, however, another 
side to the medal; a firm conviction on the part of many so:diers that 
civilian traders and artisans were trying to cheat them at every turn. 
The case of one of Pettilot's men illustrates this; he wanted shoes 
made for him by a shoemaker in Bayonne to replace a pair \vhich ",,,-.-(. too 
tight. These were left with the shoemaker, who after about two weeks 
had not produced anything, and when challenged said he would only make 
the new pair if he could be certain of being paid. He also refused to 
hand over the old pair left in his charge, denying having received them. 
A quarrel not surprisingly broke out which rapidly turned into a full-
scale riot as the neighbours joined in on the side of the shoemaker, \vho 
was killed l.n the affray (40). Admittedly we only have the word of the 
soldier that this was indeed the course of events, but it illustrates t~e 
suspicion with which each side regarded the other rather well. 
(39) id JJ 190 no. 96 (in Reilhac Vol. III p. 25-7 Pl C~~V) 
(40) id JJ 188 no. 180. 
There 
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are in any case other references to fights and murders started bv 
quarrels over payment for, and the quality of goods purchased by 
soldiers; a Savoyard in the garrison of Harfleur, for i:1stance, \yas 
involved in a brawl when he went to buy a brigandine (41). 
The feuds which were begun by a spell billeted in a 
particular town could outlive the transfer of the unit elsewhere. 
There is a case in Beaumarchais, for instance, where a Scot who had 
been billeted there and had had the almost inevitable bad relations 
with the people with whom he had been lodged, returned to the to\ffl 
some two years later and met the son of the house by accident in the 
street; the quarrel was taken up at once and the soldier died (42). 
It is plain that tbe situation was at times almost intolerable for 
both sides; a vicious circle of mutual suspicion degenerating into 
the occasional savagery common in an age noted for short tempers and 
violent reactions to insults. In Aurillac, for example, the page 
of one of Cunningha[~' s men-at-arms, got into a fight with the son 
of a local inhabitant and was taken to court. The rest of the lance 
rallied round to support him with a vengeance; reading between the 
lines of the petition for remission, it appears that they went to the 
boy's father to terrorise him into dropping the case and, when he 
resisted, killed him. They asked for remission not just out of fear 
of royal justice, but also of the anger of the local population (43). 
It was no doubt at moments like these that internal solidarity within 
(41) id JJ 198 no. 122. 
(42) id JJ 180 no. 78. 
(43) id JJ 179 no. 318. 
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the company would assert itself most fully, with the members acting 
almost as a family unit to uphold the quarrel of one of their 
members (and no doubt it was the company as well as the captain r..;hich 
acted as the military equivalent of the friends and family who 
appear so often as the petitioners for remission in the normal civilian 
context) • Normally the criminality involved was of the limited , 
almost elemental nature of most crime in a violent time; tavern 
brawls, petty cheating on prices or payment, tn1.nor extortion, savage 
quarrels occurring suddenly from words spoken in jest and the like. 
The more sophisticated potential criminal was as rare in the ranks of 
the companies as in society as a whole; the most intriguing exception 
being the Scot who, after the fall of Caen in the Normandy campaign 
of 1449-50 captured an Eng~ishmen with whose aid he was able to run a 
very successful protection racket aimed at those who had collaborated 
with the English authorities. He deserted with the proceeds and, 
after a series of picaresque adventures (for the Englishman turned 
out to be something of a compUlsive thief as well) was eventually 
captured (44). His tale makes a refreshing change from the staple 
fare of brawls and bloody quarrels. 
On the whole, however, the level of criminality which provides 
us with most of our information through the letters of remission was 
crude and basic, and in this it reflected a crude and basic type of 
life, marked by a claustrophobically tightly sealed social life, 
permanent distrust of the popUlation among whom the men lived, occasion-
al money troubles and generally tightened nerves liable to S~3D at the 
(44) id JJ 185 no. 136. 
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slightest provocation. There was another factor as well - deadlv . , 
killing boredom. This was almost inevitable in an army without 
regular employment at either battlefront or in their bi:lets. 
Those who had their private concerns to take them away from their 
companies for at least some of the time were perhaps lucky in that 
they were spared the worst of this factor, perhaps the most abiding 
single reality in the life of the early modern/late mediaeval 
soldier in the permanent armies of Europe as a whole. 
1;vhat diversions were available to cope with this situation? Verv 
few, it seems, apart from the familiar and dangerous ones; Wlne, 
dicing, cards and women, all of them potential breeders of further 
dissention and quarrels. All of them figure prominently in the 
evidence, especially wine which predictably appears in conjunction 
with the rest and seems to have served as the main excuse for and 
expression of sociability. Sometimes one can catch glimpses of the 
more pleasant side of life upon which we are so badly informed (only 
disaster can be relied upon to survive - In the records available to 
us); the comradeship and companionship and sense of community which 
must have existed. For instance, one letter of remission begins o~ 
a December evening in Bayonne with four Scots sitting in front of the 
fire and playing cards, two against two with the losers buying the 
wine(45) (one wonders what they were playing; some kind of pri;niti'.'e 
bridge perhaps?). Another starts with men dicing together peacefu11 v 
until the owner of the house caused trouble and started a £ight(46). 
(45) id JJ 188 no. 18. 
(46) id JJ 196 no. 289. 
\ 
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Much of the trouble seems to have been caused by h t every con-
siderable trains of camp followers which followed the companies round 
despite all royal prohibitions. They caused additional accOIDffiodation 
problems and additional resentment among the local population. So~e 
seem to have been more or less simple vagabonds following the compan-
ies in the vague hope of finding places in the ranks (or perhaps in 
the certain knowledge that they could make money at each muster :ill-
ing the places of those absent without leave), such as the Scot, 
David Regis, who followed Cunningham's men around and died 1n a dispute 
about lodgings (47). Others had more specialised and sinister 
functions, such as the man called Rodrigon who had attached himself to 
Garcia's company as a seller of cards and dice. He seems also to 
have been a professional gambler specialising in relieving men of their 
pay (indeed it is probable that many of the money proble~s so apparent 
with some of the men in the companies were due to gambling losses 
rather than lack of pay). Finally he came to a sticky end when he 
tried to cheat a potential v.ictim rather too blatantly (48). No 
doubt women figured in the motley and multi-lingual crew which could 
double the size of a company without adding to its military usetul-
ness; certainly there are plenty of complaints to this effect (49). 
This fact did not prevent continual friction between troops and the 
local inhabitants over this matter; there 1S the case of a Scot in 
Dax who went out with a friend for a night on the town 1n the course of 
which he tried to pick up a local woman (despite language problems) 
and sparked off a full-scale riot (50). As a curious story trou 
(47) id JJ 197 no. 15. 
(48) id JJ 186 no. 50. 
(49) Contamine GES p . 451-2. 
(50) AN JJ 199 no. 334. 
283 
1444 illustrates, however, the military life had some attraction 
for some women. ~ere a soldier chose to visit his wife's cousin 
at Ganache in Poitou and teok along a German friend. The population 
were not at all enthusiastic about admitting them, and the cousin had 
to take responsibility for their behaviour. Unfortunately, the abbot 
of Isle Chauvet at Ganache was looking after the daughter of a rich 
German merchant,wno had come to France as a kind of mediaeval au pa1r 
to learn French; she promptly allowed herself to be carried off by 
the German soldier (apparently quite willingly) and the unfortunate man 
who had let them in was compelled to pursue them by a furious abbot. 
In the end he killed the German and brought the girl back; one sus-
pects that the real story began then (51). It 1S a curious tale; 
evidently for one, perhaps romantically-minded and unhappy girl far from 
home the military life had its attractions. 
Normally, however, the civilian image of the soldier was not so 
favourable. Indeed, the soldiers of the companies were faced all the 
time with a fundamental contradiction hetween what they were supposed 
to be and what they actually were o In theory, all who wrote about 
such matters would have agreed that arms enobled the man; this simple 
statement made all members of the companies (or at least all those who 
fought) ipso facto noble. They were well aware of the fact; they 
claimed and obtained tax exemptions on the strength of it (a fact which 
perhaps rankled as much as anything else with the hard pressed taxpav 2rs) 
and were quite prepared to use it in their brushes with the law. ~ever-
the less it had a rather curious sound when the legal issue in question , 
(51) id JJ 176 no. 213 (in A H Poitou XXIX 1898 p. 177-85) 
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. 
was an attempt to ga~n pardon after knifing a shopkeeper in a dispt~te 
over the price of clothes (52). The claim to nobility was often 
denied more or less eA~licitly by those who had dealinoos T.T~t~. ,~. 
w ... l sO~~~2rs; 
the Bayonne shoemaker whom we encountered before had no doubt that he 
was as much a nobleman as his Scottish customer "Villain rigault 
Escossois, ,:e suis aussi gentil hormne que tu es" (53). Certainly 
these self-proclaimed nobles scarcely lived up to the ideas or the 
style of life which their alleged status demanded. There was a 
deep-seated paradox in a situation in which men who claimed nobility 
spent most of their time living lives compounded of taverns, gaming 
and general irmnora. li ty set in a context of an unemp lnyment which did 
not remind one of the ease appropriate to the noble but rather the 
shameful idleness of the beggar and the criminal. Indeed the normal 
style of life of the soldier in this period is very reminiscent indeed 
of that described for the criminal and marginal popUlation of Paris 
by the Polish historian, Bronislaw Geremek (54). There may even 
have been some direct contact betT'Teen soldier and criminal; one has 
the case in Paris of a group of Scots who nay well have been desert-
ers or expelled members of a comJany involved ~n a robbe~l (55). 
Hhether this was normal or not, there was certainly plenty i:1 t~e way 
of life of the soldier to scandalise the respectable popUlation; he 
had been consigned to a posi tion on the edges of socie ty wi thout any 
real place being found for him in the structures of the time. 
(52) id JJ 198 no. 122. 
(53) id JJ 188 no. 180. 
(54 ) Geremek pass~m but especially p. 93-8, 12 3- ~ 3, 173-'"- , 
-'" . '1-8 ,t - ' _ ....... 
(55) de Roye Vol. I 1325-6. 
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This lack of external recognit;on d d b ... 'vas compoun e y the apparent 
failure of the soldiers themselves to evolve some kind of ideal for 
thenselves to live by. Their main inheritance was the very individual-
istic and rather anarchic code of chivalric warfare, with its stress 
on the individual feat of arms. This was of very limited applicabil-
ity to an army and a style of warfare becoming steadily more organised 
and less personalised. As a code it had little or nothing to say 
about a kind of '~ar ~n which obedience to the captain's commands and 
the cohesion of the company were very much more important than individ-
ual deeds of valour or about a situation in which much of the soldiers 
time would in fact be spent miles from any wa1 in a life of crushing 
boredom. Certainly the proponents of chivalry seem to have tacitly 
recognised that that code could no longer be expressed on the field of 
battle and withdrew to the world of the court and the formalised mock-
warfare of the joust as illustrated by the refusal of the biographer of 
Jacques de Lalaing to deal with the final year of his subject's life 
when he was actually at war. The professional soldier was less fortun-
ate; the nearest to an equivalent statement of hjs position came from 
Jean du B~eil in his curious semi-autobiographical fantasy (designed 
also to teach young men about war), "Le Jouvenc ~I II. This certainly 
points to a certain kind of pride in professionalism and service (and, 
significantly, he had little time for tournaments as military training), 
but the chivalric overlay is still fairly strong (at no point, for 
instance, does he query the utility of the ransom business d2s?ite i::s 
potentially disruptive effects in battle). Certainly a literary ge~re 
was to develop late in the century about the servitudes of :-:1ilitar:: li~2, 
but one doubts if that was often written by serving soldiers and an·;~ . .Ja': 
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it rapidly became another clich'd literary exercise with little 
relationship to real life. Even in the Italian wars ~he ~~. l'~ - .• =.l:l l '- e r-
ary response to a warfare becoming :nore complex by the year \.]2.5 to 
be the life of Bayard, which simply superimposed a knight-errant 
figure on the warfare of that time and held this archaic ideal up as 
the one to follow. One is left TTith a kind of substratum of anony-
mous lyrics about captains and the problems of life in the army as the 
nearest approach to a military ethos. Some, like the one quoted by 
Solon, had grasped a few of the main points of the new situation, like 
the crucial importance of pay in the maintenance of discipline and 
efficiency alike, as well as a kind of professional solidarity i:l had 
times -
"Nous n'y porterons plus d'espee 
Ne Homme d'armes nt arch~·rs 
I • 
On nous a ronge nos quartlers, 
C'est grant pitii 
I 
Aux gens d'armes perdre soudee. 
Nos lances s' y sont dtfferr/.t, 
Nos espees n'ont point de pointe 
Nous pillerons les gens partout 
• • I 
C'est grant pltle 
I 
Aux gens d' armes perdre soudee~. 
Nous crions tous a la volee 
Ha~ Noble roy vous avez tort~ 
" . Vostre feu pere qUl est mort 
. d d
l 
" N e f e 1st J am e s per res 0 u e e (56) 
This, however, hardly constitutes an ideal to which military men night 
try to aspl re. Perhans the battles between different companies which .. 
appear in the sources from time to time constitute some kind of ~2scenc 
regimental pride (57); there seems to have been little for..al 3.tt2::-.~t 
( 5 6 ) Solon p. 94. 
(57) A ..\J JJ 189 no. 69. 
287 
to encourage this kind of sentiment, however. ~ormallv the proiess-
ional soldier was left uncomfortably poised in a hostile world wi t~cut 
any real ethos which might explain and justify his position in the 
hostile world around and this may well have encouraged him to ?ress 
his claims to nobili ty by the profession of arms as some kind of sub-
stitute. The professional soldier was still an anomaly which the 
theorists about society had not managed to fit into their categories 
and who was, by the very realities of his life, placed on the very 
edge of society to which he did not really belong any more. 
This chapter has, I think, adequately suggested that life ~n the 
army of the king of France was not particularly comfortable; condemn-
ed to live for ever on the marg1ns of an intensely hostile society, 
packed together in close association all the time, with the only solace 
available in drink and other dangerous activities likely to shorten 
already short tempers to a murderous pitch, inadequately controlled 
from above and subject to the tyranny as well as the paternal feel-
~gs of the captain. The list of shortcomings is a formidable one. 
No doubt there were good times and pleasant aspects which the sources 
only hint at; comradeship, good cheer, solidarity with one another ~n 
what could come to resemble a huge family presided over by the command-
er. As far as the monarchy was concerned, one may well doubt how far 
it was getting value for money ~n strictly military terms from this 
mass of largely untrained, often part-time and usuall~l detested me:1 
scattered across the realm and over which it had only limited control. 
As far as the foreign compan~es were concerned, the'! had all 
h . t d f r~' thev were, ~v their t ese problems only ~n a more exaggera e 0 C," -
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origins, doubly marginalised and more isolated, doubly forced in 
on their own company and more prone to internal dissension since 
fewer of them could escape to other concerns for any length of time. 
It is now time for us to draw to a close by examining their relations 
with the society of France as a whole in more detail, from the royal 
court downuards. How were they seen and what was their long-term 
fate in French society? 
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Chapter IX. Foreign Troops and Native Reactions. 
As the previous chapters will have d suggeste , the relationship 
between foreigner and native was frequently highly amb' 
~guous. Certair.-
ly our perceptions of the situation are perhaps not the same as those 
of contemporaries for whom a soldier from the deep south of the 
country fighting north of the Loire could be almost as much of a 
foreigner as a Scot or a Spaniard; nevertheless, they, too, had their 
own ability to discriminate between those born as subjects of the King 
of France and those not, and applied them in their utterances and 
writings. Indeed it was at the level of official attitudes and 
those of the literate ~lite that the ambiguity and ambivalence became 
most clearly apparent. 
As far as public consumption was concerned, of course, relations 
were always excellent. This was especially true when it was a ~atter 
of set-piece orations delivered at foreign courts, stuffed as they 
generally were with allusi6ns to ancient alliance and close friendship 
between the nations involved. Chartier in Scotland, for instance, 
provided a splendid specimen of the genre when sent to see to the 
marr~age of the Dauphin Louis and ~rgaret of Scotland. His speech 
resounds with phrases like "grandis fiduciae inter duos regnas 
Franciae et Scotia" (1) and praise of the courage and loyalty of the 
Scottish troops in France at that time. This presumably constituted the 
official line on the matter, and Char~ier himself was to echo it in 
his own writings. In the 'Quadrilogue Invectif' for instance, he was 
to allude to the foreign troops serving in France in the following 
(1) FLat 8757 f50vo. 
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terms "Nous voyons les estr' II' ang1ers a 1ez de nostre royaume qui 
pas sent les fortunerde mer pour venir a nostre secours et estre par-
fonniers de nostre adversite' et de nostre peine" (2), thou:sh this 
could be seen, as much as an implicit accusation of cowardice and 
treason against the French nobility for their lack of military 
activity as simple praise for the brave foreigners who were contribut-
ing so much to keeping Charles on his shaky throne. Neve rthel ess" 
this apparent royal praise was reinforced by the more material re,:var~s 
of land and other favours distributed to foreign soldiers. 
As we saw in an earlier chapter, however, the reality was rather 
more comp lex. The gifts distributed to such men \Vere often more 
precarious than the resounding declarations which accompanied them 
would suggest,and their continued retention depended very much on a 
combination of continued loyal service in France, a continuing family 
line and luck. As we saw, the Douglasfamily was pushed out of its , 
Duchy of Touraine after the death of the first duke at Verneuil 
despite the claims of his widow and sons for at least a share 1n the 
inheritance. One suspects that the king would not have been able to 
act nearly so high-handedly with a native member of the French aristo-
cracy whose friends and relatives would have pursued the cause of his 
son and widow with vigour. The fact of their foreignness made it 
harder for foreign soldiers to surv1ve the loss of royal favour or pass 
property in France on to their descendants if there was any complication 
in the line of descent; they had fewer allies to press their cause if 
the situation turned sour on them, and they were much less fully inte;-
rated into the structures of French society. 
(2) Alain Chartier Le Quadrilogue Invecti£ ed. E Droz Paris lU23 9.51. 
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On the other hand, there was l"ttl 
1 e apparent discrimination against 
those born outside the kingdom in terms of promotion to high office 2S 
long as they were prepared to throw their lot fully in with that or 
the dynasty. Indeed as late as the Estates of 1484, there were ~o 
be the familiar mediaeval complaints that foreigners were doing alt2-
gether too well in this field (3), and the careers of such men as Theaulde 
de Valpergue or Robin Pettilot illustrate the situation well. The 
former in particular was a splendid example of where a foreign soldier 
could rise if fortune favoured him; Bailli of Lyon (even then one ot 
the most important towns in the kingdom), trusted administrator of 
the conquered lands in the south-west, architect of the surrender of 
Bordeaux and Bayonne, loaded with special commissions, he was an object 
illustration of a man who had made good in a foreign land. Many of 
the complaints which were made about the success of foreigners in royal 
favour were no doubt inspired by such careers which limited the amount 
of patronage and offices left to go round the native French aspirants 
for high office. 
There is evidence that even at the highest level there was some 
sort of recognition that large-scale recruitment of foreign troops was 
a temporary ~asure, and a sentiment that they were a necessary evil 
rather than warmly appreciated friends in need. The passage already 
quoted from Charles' letter to Lyon after the defeat of Cravant 
illustrates this; he could attempt to minimise the scale of the disas-
ter by pointing out that very few actual Frenchmen had died and ~ost of 
the casualties were mere "Scots, Spaniards and other foreigners" < •• ;ho 
(3) Contanine GES p. ~19. 
292 
normally li~ed off the land anyway so the loss w t 11 ' as no rea v so 
very great (4). This may have been a frantic attempt to draw some 
crumb of comfort from a desperate situation, it may have attempted 
to reflect the attitudes of the recipients but it also seems to 
reflect the actual attitude of the court. It 1S notiCEable that when 
the military situation began to improve, positive offers of foreign 
troops were turned down more or less graciously; experience perhaps 
indicated by 1430 ~at the potential problems they posed more than out-
weighed their advantages to the crown. This did not necessarily 
prevent recruitment on an individual level (and indeed there were no 
means available to do this) and did not necessarily rule out generos-
ity to those who had amply proven their loyalty (though they might 
still be more vulnerable to royal pressure than their French counter-
parts, and more likely to be put under that kind of pressure if the 
ends of royal policy seemed to demand it), but it meant that they 
were not likely to be joined by vast numbers of similar figures 1n the 
future, and perhaps encouraged them to assimilate into the bulk of the 
population rather more rapidly than they might otherwise have done. 
The literary records tend to echo this royal ambivalence towards 
these desperately needed but depressingly unruly allied forces. On 
the one hand, the Chronicle of Mont St. Michel praised Buchan and his 
men warmly ("qui moult vaillement se pordr~t en gardant leur loyaulct' 
au roy nostre sire If) (5) and Basin was to pay warm tribute to the 
military capacities of Kennedy and his men at the siege of Lagny (6). 
(4) Cai11et p. 106-7. 
(5) Chronique dJ Mont St. Michel Vol. I p. 25. 
(6) Basin Vol. I. p. 169. 
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On the other, a certain lack of trust of both them and their motives 
makes itself felt. Basin, for instance, was prepared to find a happy 
side even to the slaughter of Verneuil by stating that h h d t ey a p: 3.:'.:-:'2 d 
to take over wide areas in central France for themselves and set tne:'!l.-
selves up on the lands of many French nobles (7) (a be lief which ::la'." 
well have been prevalent in the areas of Touraine and Berry in 
question, encouraged by the concentration of gifts of land to foreign 
troops in these areas). A similar attitude seems to pervade chronicle 
accounts of battles, and especially those of French defeats, where these 
are often blamed on the rashness, insubordination or even cowardice of 
foreign troops. The most extreme example of this attitude is 
Cousinot's totally unsupported assertion that the Italians fled at Ver-
neuil without striking a blow (8) but it can be found recurr~ng ~n most 
chronicle accounts. Certainly there are other views expressed; the 
Scottish writers, perhaps predictably, mirror their French counterparts 
and give the strong impression that the French were largely responsible 
for their own troubles and one can find the isolated source like the 
Orleans siege mystery play which enshrines a very different v~ew and 
reflects the close and affectionate relationship between Darnley and 
the city which we mve had cause to remark on several times in the course 
of this study. It is possible that the writers reflect the prejudices 
of their sources of information as much as their own personal ones, but 
their accounts are nonetheless revealing for that. 
In the longer term as well there seems to have been a certain dis-
comfort felt about the continued employment of a substantial number of 
(7) id p. 99. 
(8) Cousinot p. 197-8, 225. 
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foreigners in the reformed Ordonnance companies. The elegy for 
Charles VII produced by the inimitable Henri Baude claims that he 
dispensed altogether with the use of foreigners in the army a~art 
fram the Scots (who were too numerous and traditional an element to 
be completely ignored) and 25 German crossbowmen in his bodyguard (9). 
This, of course, was utterly untrue, but it is interesting that 
Baude, writing well after the event, should have regarded this as a 
reason for praise. There was on the whole little echo in French 
military writings (such as they were) of the controversy which was to 
exerc~se so many theorists in Italy and beyond,then and later,as to 
the respective merits of native and Dnported mercenary armies, despite 
the fact that the latter were so prominent a feature of the French 
military scene. Even at the height of their employnent, when a moral-
ist like Alain Chartier was trying to stir the nobility and other 
natural military leaders into activity by contrasting their sloth with 
the willingness of foreigners to die for the King of France, there wa~ 
no real debate about the theory involved. Those who did write were 
more concerned about the la~entable state of discipline in the arm~es 
which existed than about their national composition, and there was no 
real suggestion from such writers that foreigners were ~n any way more 
prone to loot and pillage than native-born Frenchmen. Their remedies 
for the ills besetting France were cam~atively simple and straight--
forward, as indicated in a section on this subject at the end of a 
brief chronicle of this period. They ran to such hallowed remedies as 
en~ur~ng regular payment and effective control of musters as well as 
the less purely military demand that captains appointed should be Gcd-
(9) Chartier Vol. III p. 130, 135. 
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fearing men who saw that their troops observed the Sabbath (10) (a ~ind 
of moralistic preoccupation which echoes Jeanne d'Arc's attempts to 
produce a godly army). There is no suggestion that matters would go 
better if the foreigners were to be sent home. ~or did Alain 
Chartier, in his comprehensive attack on the behaviour of the various 
classes in France, including the man-at-arms, have much to say on the 
matter. Even that hardened professional Jean du Buti1 has no comment 
to make on the use of foreign troops in the 'Jouvencf.l'; s~nce 
he had so much to say for himself on other matters which he regarded as 
being of importance to the young and aspiring soldier, one can on1v 
assume that the issue ranked very low indeed among the preoccupations 
of those most closely involved in the organisation of the army. Good 
discipline ranked far above the national purity of the army in the minds 
of the theorists of the day, despite certain resentments and a certain 
level of discomfort at the numbers of foreigners employed which could 
encourage men like Baude to play down their numbers as far as possible. 
These resentments appear clearly among the nobility. The Scottish 
chronicles report the jibes about the Scottish armies made by the nobles 
of Charles' court when they first arrived "mutton eaters and wine sacks" 
was the usual insult (11). It was also claimed that they tried to 
steal all the credit for the victory of Baug~ (and indeed nearly succeed-
ed until the Scots appeared with all the prisoners and plunder). Some 
of this could be written off as Scottish touchiness in a foreign ~and, 
but it seems undeniable that the appointment of Buchan as Constable of 
C 10) FF 5059 f53vo-55vo. 
(11) Pluscarden p. 354 
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France, the gift of very wide powers to Douglas and th 1 e a most com-
plete subtraction of the Army of Scotlaid from the norm 1 h' a :nac ~nerv 
of control did nothing to calm resentments. These seem tc ha\"e 
expressed themselves in bitter disputes over the tactics to follow 
which erupted before Verneuil, and the collapse of earlier operations 
due to a mixture of inadequate finance and disputes over both battle 
order and tactics. Indeed, the battle of Verneuil shows severe s~gns 
of confused preparation and lack of co-ordination between the var~ous 
cammanders; one suspects that this had at least something to do with 
the reluctance of such French nobles as the Viscount of ~arbonne to 
take orders from a Scottish commander. The same situation was to 
repeat itself with Buchan's successor, the almost equally foreign 
Breton Arthur of Richemont, and there is plenty of evidence to show 
that foreign troops were at times unwilling to take orders from 
French connnanders and vice versa. The build-up to the Battle of th~ 
Herrings with total confusion reigning about who was to attack and how 
is a good illustration. Foreign soldiers were resented because thev 
were dipping rather too successfully into the distinctly limited 
barrels of royal favours in the 1420's. To a large extent the situa-
tion regularised itself after 1445 with much more patronage available 
and the foreign element relatively less important ~n the competition for 
it, though as we saw earlier their success was sti:l causing complaint 
as late as 1484. Nevertheless, the worst of the dislike was p~st as 
the men ~n question began to sink by slow degrees into the ranks of ~~e 
French aristocracy themselves. Any snobbishnes s about fore igner S :lJ.d 
shall see later in never prevented inter-marriage ~n any case, as we 
this chapter. 
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Another reason for tension between F h rene and foreign troeps, 
especially the Scots, was caused by the political role of the Scottish 
forces. The Guard units were especially deeply involved Ln protect-
ing the king from his less ruly noble subjects, and as early as 1~2S 
an out-of-favour Arthur of Richemont was accusing his political 
enemies at the court of r ·t· f· f· ecru~ ~ng ore~gners to ~ght against him (12). 
Part of this no doubt came from the same kind of sources as the normal 
recruitment of otherwise unemployed soldiers to help in the waging of 
private and semi-private wars, but there is the hint underlying the 
letter that foreign troops are being used to suppress opposition to 
the faction in power at court as a deliberate tactic (the fact that 
Ar.thur was himself quite willing to lead the Scots and other foreigners 
in his own army against the walls of Bourges where the king himself was, 
should perhaps make one doubt just how far this was the case). Profess-
or Kiernan has discussed at length the potential role of foreign mercen-
ary troops as a prop to absolutist monarchies in early modern times (13L, 
and it would be tempting to consider the Scots of the Guard in much 
the s arne light. One thinks, for instance, of the alleged comment of 
the Dauphin that they "kept France in subjection" (l~) and prevented 
people from doing what they wanted. Tempting though this is (and it 
can be hardly denied that for those unhappy with the r{gime at court 
and who wanted to bring about a change, even a violent one, Ln the 
d " 1 d b th S ts of the Guarj situation, the high level of loyalty ~sp aye y e co 
must have been annoying indeed), I doubt if it will stand up to really 
close examination. The ordinary Ordonnance units, and even t~e Guard 
(12) Cai11et p. 92. 
(13) V Kiernan 'Foreign c.iercenaries and Absolute :lonarc~y' P:lst and 
Present ~o. 11 1957. 
(14) FF 20427 f3ro. 
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were very closely integrated into French pol;t;cs,' t . 
.... .... 00 ~ntegrated 
to perform the role of totally reliable political policemen which 
one might attribute to them. Their commanders, and the rank and 
file as well, rapidly acquired loyalties which could cut across 
those they owed to the king and the current establishment at court. 
I They were still vitally useful to the security of a g~ven reg~me, 
but could not be relied upon to stand idly by if it was replaced. 
They belonged too much to the existing structures of patronage and 
influence to be separate from them, as the large scale purges which 
dd h h f J. . f . atten e eac c ange 0 -reg~me or t~me 0 tens~on show. This is 
underlined by the comparative failure of the Ordonnance army ~n the 
Guerre du Bien Publique and the apparent collapse of discipline ~n 
the Scottish company under the crisis when a substantial section 
marched off to join the rebels (15); such a force could hardly serve 
as a prop for tyranny and absolutism. On the whole, the Scottish 
and other foreign companies were rather too well integrated into the 
delicate balances of the French political system of the day to serve 
efficiently ~n this role, and, despite the grumbling of a few noble 
intriguers, it is unlikely that foreign troops were particularly dis-
liked for upholding royal despotism. 
Even at the worst, however, the foreign soldier of a certain rank 
and his French noble equivalent had certain attitudes and modes of 
thought in common. Chivalry might wear very thin in actual war, but 
it was a common set of values to which all would pay lip-service (at 
least) equally; it could provide a certain solidarity between ~en of 
(15) FF 6971 fl6lro-vo. 
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similar rank but different national background. Many of the worst 
tensions, and most violent clashes, occurred further down the social 
scale. This point perhaps hardly needs any labouring, since ~uch of 
the information on this subject has already been presented in prev~ous 
chapters in some considerable detail, whether in the consideration or 
the role of plunder or in that of life in the companies on the day to 
day basis. One hardly needs to repeat the ample evidence for mutual 
distrust, dislike and viole~ce which marked relations between native 
and foreigners whether in the action of Tours in expelling all Scots 
from within its walls or in the unorganised, instinctive violence of 
the peasant farmer or town artisan. This was not, of course, con-
fined to foreign troops, but all the familiar tensions between soldier 
and civilian were considerably heightened by the difference ~n 
nationalities; the soldier was made even more isolated from normal 
civilian society by his origins. Yet, despite this amply document-
ed hostility and hatred, can this be the full story? Can one safely 
reduce a whole society to the tale told by its criminal records? 
It seems probable that on the human level relations were much more 
complicated than this picture might suggest. After all, it is 
fairly plain that the majority of those who served for any time ~n 
France tended to settle down there for the rest of their lives (and, 
one assumes, inject what profits they had made from their military 
service into the local economy). The lists of those quitting the 
ranks of the Guard suggest this strongly. Some died in harness, 
some retired due to old age, some fell victim to the scourges of 
leprosy and internal quarrels leading to murder, some died in battle, 
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some were transferred to Ordonnance companies, but only one 
actually left to return to Scotland (16). The rest probably follow-
ed the example of the man we met earlier and built up a small 
patrimony out of their wages to which they retired in due course. 
The Ordonnance companies seem to have gone much the same way. The 
review made in July 1469 of Cunningham's company shows the process 
at work, with men of the same name being distinguished by their place 
of residence in France (Jehan Bron of Bordeaux as against Jehan Bron 
of Bayonne (17). This was, however, hardly a new situation. The 
very list of Scots expelled from Tours in 1425 illustrates that there 
was a small but apparently, at least partially permanent, Scottish 
population in the town. In addition to a passing friar, there were 
considerable concentrations in a few houses (four, for instance, 
lodged with one Norwi1, who might have been the Scottish commander of 
that name), ~vhile the Lord of Poloc apparently had a house in the 
city and one Jehan Bel was stated to be married and resident in the 
town (18). Probably mos t had connections ~vi th the Army 0 f Scotland 
in some way or other, and there are hints that some at least of the 
commanders had begun to buy property inside the walls even at this 
early date while others had settled down in the city on an equally 
permanent basis. One can find evidence of foreigners being accept-
ed as part of the community even in judicial records. One finds, 
for instance, the case of a John Vernon, perhaps a relative of the 
Lord of Montreuil-Bonin, since he was certainly resident there. 
(16) Forbes Leith Vol. II p. 31, 34, 36, 38-42. 
(17) FF 25779 no. 19. 
(18) Indre,et-Loire BB 23 f37ro. 
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While he had probably served ~n the armies, he had lived auietlv in 
. -
Poitou for a period of some twelve years before becoming involved in 
a quarrel which led to him killing a man in a fit of uncontrollable 
rage; a case which had nothing to do with his background at all. 
He found enough friends and relations to plead his case and see to 
it that he gained remission, and it would appear that he at least had 
become a part of local society (19). A parallel case can be found 
in the Sainto~e (20). In other cases again, it is apparent that 
men who were actually serving in companies nevertheless maintained 
what they regarded as permanent homes in some towns in France. 
Thomas Marshall, a Scot in a French-commanded company, gave his home 
address as Aubigny-sur-N~re when he sought remission for a murder he 
had committed (21). In both these cases we have discussed, the 
French towns chosen for settlement by Scots were hardly surprising; 
both Montreuil-Bonin and Aubigny had Scottish overlords and it is 
probable that men retired from the armies to the lands held by their 
old commanders (the paternalistic ethos which surrounded command of 
men could, presumably, be more effectively stimulated by those near 
enough to the eye of their former commander to be able to calion his 
aid in times of need) or to places where others similarly placed had 
done so, but it is li~:ely that there were small groups of Scots and 
other foreigners outside the bounds of these lordships and the other 
concentrations unearthed by nineteenth century romantics and antiquar-
. 
~es. 
(19) AN JJ 180 no. 93 (printed ~n AH Poitou ~~XII p. 75-7). 
(20) id JJ 176 no. 188. 
(21) id JJ 197 no. 279. 
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This process of integration operated at all levels of society. 
We have, of course, traced it for the h~gher uk. f h . 
L ra sot e ar1stocracy 
at an earlier point in this study (and ~t ~s k bl . 
~ ~ remar a e Just how 
tenaciously rooted such family trees as that of the Stewarts of 
Aubigny could become). Often settlement could mean the splitting 
of a family; the Stewarts were a good example of this with their 
French lands going to a cadet branch which remained permanently 
settled in France (as we have seen, the surest way of guaranteeing 
possession of lands in France). Usually, however, once settled, a 
family would remain in France. Beyond a semi-mythical account of 
how Hugh Kennedy came back to Scotland to spend the profits of his 
campaigning on building himself a position in Scotland (22) there seem 
to have been very few newly-enriched Scots recrossing the Channel to 
impress their neighbours with the wealth gained in France. There was 
no real Scottish equivalent to Sir John Fastolf, though Rodrigo de 
Villandrando's career in Spain after his return t~ere had certain 
paralle ls. He certainly exploited the reputation he had gained out-
side the kingdom to further his ambitions within it and to aid his 
allies (and, perhaps slightly surprisingly, his king; it seems a 
curious paradox that the greatest Ecorcheur of them all died as a 
pillar of monarchical authority in Castile), and there seems little 
doubt that he brought considerable wealth back over the Pyrenees 
with him. As so often, Villandrando is exceptional; the rule was 
that those who had served for many years in France would settle down 
in France and spend their profits and plunder on establishing a niche 
for themselves and their children in FLench society (unless, that is, 
(22) Francisque-~lichel Vol. I p. 170. 
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they were ill-advised enough to set themselves up in an area where 
they had become too notable for their pillaging exploits, like one 
of Pettilot's men who tried to settle in the Limousin near a churc~ 
which he had plundered, and found himself taken to court over the 
af f ai r ( 2 3)) • Very few of the profits of war actually left France 
in these cases, and it would be very hard indeed to make any of 
Macfarlane's optimistic claims about the possible profits of war to 
England (at least in the fourteenth century) about Scotland's 
position (24). 
The integration process was much aided by this strong tendency 
for those who had made their pile in France to spend most of it in 
France and concentrate their efforts on making a position for them-
selves in France rather than recross~ng the seas and mountains home. 
It was not confined to the very grand; many a successful Scottish 
or Spanish or Italian man-at-arms seems to have invested his modest 
gains in lands which would enable himself and his descendants to sink 
slowly into the ranks of the minor nobility and what one could call 
semi-nobility of France. The Stud family ~s a good example. \~a 1 te r , 
captain of Avallon and member of the Guard was g~ven land in the 
Gatinais by a grateful king and left it to his brother who founded a 
family which endured in the area for many generations, becoming known 
as the Destutt de Tracy (25). No doubt a comprehensive search of the 
(23) AN JJ 179 no. 40. 
(24) The standard articles on this debate as far as England is concern-
ed are K B Macfarlane 'England and the Hundred Years ;~ar' Past 
and Present no. 22, 1962 and M :1 Postan 'The Costs of the :~'-..:r:Jred 
Years War' Past and Present no. 27 1964. It will be apparc':lt 
that as far as Scotland goes I would tend to lean ~\) the latter's 
, , , 1 d' ~ k 
interpretation though, of course, individuals certa~~ y ~G ~a e 
profits which could have inspired many more to hunt :or them. 
(25) Contamine GES p. 458. 
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lists of the minor gentry of provo . 1 F ~nc~a rance would uneartj ~any 
more such figures. There was certainly no prejudice against 
marriage to foreigners " fore;gn sold;er f d' -.... .... s oun w~ ves l: rom a~o~.gs t 
the ranks of the nobility without any real difficulty and, while 
the early commanders like Buchan and Darnley brought their w~ves 
over from Scotland, there does not seem to have been any regular 
importation of wives from abroad on the part of foreign troops 
(the only case which might indicate this comes in a letter of remiss-
ion concerning a dispute over a girl who had come over from Scotland 
to marry a Scot ~n Dieppe, but there ~s no concrete evidence that 
any of the parties involved in this affair were soldiers rather than 
merchants (26)). This, combined with the well-attested rush to 
buy naturalisation documents from the royal chancery by foreign 
soldiers, suggests that by the time such men settled down in France, 
they had come to regard it as home. No doubt the lack of obvious 
difficulty in gaining French brides reflects the fact that the for-
eign soldier, as long as he retained royal favour, was by no means a 
bad catch. Members of the royal Guard for instance, could look with 
some hope to the King for very considerable wedding presents; witness 
the considerable sum of seven hundred livres given to lehan Simple on 
the occasion of his wedding (27). 
Nevertheless, despite this process of integration, there were 
still differences, and it could be a surprisingly long tL~e before a 
Scottish family could be regarded as having become completely Frenc~. 
One sees with some surprise Commynes refer to B~raud Stuart or AubisnY, 
(26) AN JJ 199 no. 362. 
(27) FF 2886 f13vo. 
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born in France of a French mother d· f an ~ssued rom a family which had 
served the French crown loyally from the 1420's as being of the 
'Nation d'Escoce' in the late 1490's (28). Perception of foreign-
ness lasted well after the real national differences had been very 
much diminished and the 'Scottish' companies of the French army 
filled by second-generation Frenchmen with Scottish names. 
Slow though this process might sometimes be, it was ~ided by one fact; 
foreign troops showed an apparent eagerness to learn the language 
of their employers. At times this must have been essential, S1nce 
one should not forget the fact that many foreigners served in mixed 
companies alongside Frenchmen. They have been rather excluded from 
this study, since they are impossible to trace except when they fell 
foul of the law or appear very clearly on muster rolls, but the isol-
ated references which one can find suggest that there can have been 
very few Ordonnance companies after 1445 without a lance or two of 
I 
foreigners in their midst, while the Ecorcheur companies prior to 
that had always been very mixed in composition. Even t~e foreign 
companies may have contained some Frenchmen initially (as the roll of 
part of Pettilot's company taken at Libourne in 1461 indicates; the 
group was commanded by a Valpergue and several French names appear 
among the men at arms (29)) - perhaps survivors of the old companies 
which had been incorporated in the new structure. While the Scottish 
company tended to become uniformly Scottish at least in the surnames 
of its members, the other foreigners serving in the ranks of French 
(28) Commynes Vol. III p. 136. 
(29) FF 25778 no. 1905. 
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compan~es remained until well ft h a er t e end of our period, as the 
case of Thomas Marshall who gained remission ~n 1473 for the murder 
of an Italian member of the company of Antoine de Chabannes to 'vhic~ 
he also belonged indicates. He had been aided by another Scottish 
member of this nominally French company (30). Under these circum-
stances, a willingness to pick up the French language was probably 
essential. Not all succeeded. Michel Ambleton, ~.,ho came to Fier-
boys to tell of how St. Katherine had saved him from death when a 
group of Bretons hanged him in 1429 must have told his tale through 
an interpreter since it is clear from his story, that he could not 
speak French; when recovering from his ordeal in the convent of La 
Regrippiere he was forced to communicate with the abbess by sign 
language (31). Others were more linguistically active since the 
anonymous and observant author of the 'Livre des Trahisons' noted 
the behaviour of the Scottish troops at Cravant after the Italians on 
their flanks ran for their horses; "La povoict on ouyt les Escochois 
en leur mauvais franchois, tel que communernent Ie scirent parler" 
apparently swearing vigorously at the runaways (32). As this pass-
age suggests, ability to make oneself understood in French did not 
necessarily imply greater harmony with those around. In fact, some 
of the best evidence for the ability of foreign soldiers to speak and 
understand French with fair fluency comes from letters of remission 
for murders sparked off by quarrels which in their turn had been caused 
by insults flung about between foreigners and Frenchmen. It is 
(30) AN JJ 197 no. 279. 
(31) 1>1iracles ,4.t St.:. Katherine p. 57-60 no. 105. 
(32) Livre des Trahisons in Chrons. ReI. a l'Hist. de Belgique sous 
Bourgogne Vol. II p. 170. 
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likely that the vast majority of those who served in France learned 
the language with some degree of fluency, a fact which must have 
helped to integrate them into French society in the long term. 
In fact, at the literary level, the foreign soldier 1;.;as well 
on the way to integration at quite an early stage. The third tale 
ln the 'Cent Nouve1Ie{Nouve1les' concerns a member of the Garde 
~ 
Ecossaistand his courtship of the wife of a burgess of Tours. It 
is interesting that the noble author (allegedly the Duke of Burgundy 
himself) should have chosen a Scottish soldier as a major protagonist 
in what is very much a mocking of the cowardice of the non-noble 
townsman unable to face the ferocious Scot in battle. Agains t this 
ludicrous figure, the Scot emerges as a representative of the martial 
and noble virtues; his pursuit of the lady is always described in 
terms like "Grand courtoisie" (33). The general tone is admiring; 
it may be that it partly reflects a Scottish reputation for ferocity 
ln combat, but on the whole the Scot is a good gentleman and very much 
a part of the French scene. It is some distance from the shoemaker 
ln Bayonne quoted in the last chapter who thought himself at least 
as good a man as his Scottish customer, or even the kind of mental 
attitudes reflected in another letter of remission where an archer, 
hearing a riot in the street outside his billet, immediately assumed 
that Scots were responsible (34). The wild foreigner, and especial-
ly the wild Scot, was in process of transformation into a French 
gentleman or, at the very least, into a Frenchman of some sort. 
(33) Les Cent Nouvel1e.iNouvel1es du Roi Louis XI ed. :1 Rat Paris 
19 56 p. 49-5 3 • 
(34) AN JJ 179 no. 164. 
The 
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loss of identity might be slow and the possession of Scottish 
ancestry might mark a man off from his neighbours even after he hi~ 
self was indistinguishable from them In any very obvious way, but 
in the long run the foreign soldier, if he chose to settle In France 
to keep a grip on his profits, was fated to merge into the general 
population of the countryside. This suggests that attitudes were 
less clear-cut than some statements and actions might imply. Cer-
tain1y fifteenth century attitudes to foreign troops never reached 
the rather simple-minded romantic admiration for "nos allies fid'eles 
I 
les Ecossais" which appeared so often in the nineteenth century and 
remain in some books to this day. From the point of view of the 
royal government, all foreigners (apart ~erhaps from a few special-
ist companies) were essentially a necessary evil endured only because 
the military situation of the day demanded a major injection of troops 
from outside the kingdom to maintain some kind of army in being to 
face the English; I doubt whether they ever really believed that 
mercenaries were any better trained or more professional than native 
troops, but since the latter were not available in adequate numbers 
the foreigners had to do. In return, they were rewarded lavishly 
when needed but cast aside if possible when their services were no 
longer required. The rewards distributed to them certainly caused 
resentment among the native French nobility who were displaced from 
their place in the royal patronage structure, and their generally 
unruly behaviour made them unpopular with much of the rest of the 
population. On the other hand, they tended to integrate into the 
French population on an individual basis without too mnch hostili~y 
being directed at them and managed to settle down to a kind of 
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accepted place in the French scene; one in which they might even 
become models of chivalry and admired for their loyalty to the 
crown. Certainly by 1460, the foreigners who were in the French 
armies mostly belonged nowhere else but in France. The picture 
is rather confused; no doubt many different and conflicting attitud-
es prevailed amongst both the foreigners and the French but it helps 
to place the foreign troops in France in perhaps an unexpected 
historical slot - that of the first large group of immigrant workers 
in French society. 
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Conclusion 
We have now reached the end of our survey, which it 1S hoped 
has restored the international aspect of the second half of the 
Hundred Years War to its proper place 1n the historical record. 
The employment of foreign troops on a very large scale was perhaps 
an expedient forced on the French royal government by circumstances 
rather than a policy deliberately planned, but one 1S tempted to 
wonder if the regime of Charles VII at Bourges could have survived 
the 1420's without their help. Certainly for this period their 
recruitment was to be one of the major, if not the predominant, 
theme of French diplomacy as reflected by a whole series of diplomat-
1C missions to potential suppliers of men. These efforts were to 
be backed by very considerable expenditure, both for advances of pay 
and other sweetners to persuade the great in the countries in question 
to allow recruitment or even cross over themselves, and also for the 
hire of shipping to see to the transport of the armies thus raised. 
No doubt they were exceedingly generous in promises of great rewards 
which would await those who entered the service of the King of France. 
They were most successful in Scotland, where their efforts drew some 
of the greatest members of the nobility and where they managed to 
recruit several quite substantial armies from the resources of the 
Scottish Lowlands; elsewhere recruitment was rather more patchy 
and often men headed for the theatre of war without any formal re-
cruitment in the hope of finding places in the French military struc-
tures and thus making their fortunes. How far these hopes, often 
carefully fostered by French recruiting agents,were ever really justi:-
ied is another matter. Royal generosity to the commanders of foreign 
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units was often apparent in the shape of considerable land grants, 
but this perhaps reflected a shortage of ready cash to pay wages 
rather than anything more elevated in sentiment. There was certain-
ly a severe crisis in military organisation in this period especial-
lyon the financial side, which the occasional very large payment to 
a commander like Darnley cannot disguise. If men pillaged, it was 
often a means of stimulating the king to pay monies due or, alternative-
ly a method of collecting their dues for themselves before the money 
vanished into the royal ooffers where there would be many other calls 
upon it. The simple fact was that Charles was for much of the 
1420's and 30's trying to maintain armies far beyond his resources 
to pay them regularly. Perhaps foreign troops did rather better 
than most in the collection of their payment despite the circumstances 
of the moment (as witness the mass disbandment decreed in 1424 from 
which only the Scots and Italians were to be exempt), but there was 
probably never enough money available to keep all the men involved 
fully paid all the time, and in any case it could take much time, 
influence and luck to collect monies due from those charged with 
collecting them. Since le3itimate profits of war were only for the 
lucky, and far more probably lost than gained on the field of battle, 
the temptation to move into other areas of activity was immense. 
There was no shortage of potential employers seeking armed forces 
whose activities could be used to bolster what might be a rather 
shaky case in the courts, and at the very highest level close and 
dangerous connections grew up between the commanders of organised 
compan~es and members of the higher nobility who were thus equipped 
with military forces which could back up their political ambitions as 
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well. Further down the scale came the extortion of protection 
money and simple pillage. Even here matters were perhaps more 
nuanced than traditional accounts might suggest. For those able to 
negotiate, those who had a certain position in society, contacts 
with these companies might not be a disa ter after all. Protection 
could be sought as well as imposed in a period when the legitimate 
powers of the royal government might be very shadowy and ineffective; 
any kind of protection was better than none and exactions could be 
legitimised in a variety of different ways. For those below this 
rank and outside the city walls, which few captains ever felt tempted 
to assault, matters were rather different. , The kind of prevailing 
legalism which influenced even such a man as Villandrando to find 
some kind of justification in law for his threats against town councils 
did not apply here. It rapidly ~ecame a war to the knife; a war 
whose persistence, savagery and disregard for the allegiance of the 
troops involved suggests a great deal about peasant society and its 
, 
response to this kind of pressure. One is tempted to wonder if some 
at least of the ambiguous resistance at village level to the English 
occupation in Normandy did not owe more to the same kind of resentment 
of pillage and military exactions than to loyalty to the rather remote 
figure of the true King of France; certainly the evidence should 
make one wary of generalisations about the passivity in the face of 
suffering of the peasant majority in the popUlation. 
In theory at least the royal reform of 1445 should have meant the 
end of this situation. Pay was regularised, companies were integrat-
ed into the royal patronage system via their captains and the close 
relationship between soldiers and members of the aristocracy ~~~!tly 
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weakened if not totally de~troyed. The king aspired to a monopoly 
of organised military force in his kingdom and . , d h , ,prov~ae e was 
careful and did not disturb the balances of the system unduly for 
his awn ends, this he retained until well after the end of our 
period. It did not, however, do very much for the relationship 
between soldier and civilian; a massive improvement in the discip-
line of the companies was never to be achieved if it was even sought. 
This was partly due to a lack of close supervision; the limited 
numbers of those royal officials charged with the payment and inspec-
tion of the troops saw to that. There were other causes, however. 
The reform had not purged the ranks to any extent, and soldiers did 
not change their ways overnight. Pay was often in arrears and the 
life-style of the majority of them demanded far more money than it 
could ever have provided. The regular forces were resented bv all 
those who had to pay the taxes to maintain them in idleness, and 
tensions frequently erupted into open violence. In any case, the 
army was far from being fully profes s ionalised; many men \vould 
leave their billets for greater or lesser periods to return to their 
homes or see to their own private businesses while the rest had 
little in the way of military training to occupy their time. They 
formed a marginalised group, much given to drink, gambling and all 
the other signs of anti-social behaviour of the times, living a life 
of intense and claustrophobic sociability under the sometimes 
paternal, sometimes tyrannical absolute authority of the captain (or 
his lieutenant, for the captain himself might have many other calls 
on his time, both in the maintenance of his estates or in the e:-:ecution 
of other functions held in plurality). On the whole, foreign troops 
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suffered from this more than native Frenchmen,· h t ey were rather 
less likely to have alternative occupatl.·ons to d raw the8 away from 
the closed world of the billet and the tavern, h rat er more likel? 
to be resented by the local population. This does not mean that 
they were to be locked out of French society for ever; the major-
ity settled in France and found integration into French societv 
possible. Those who had money to spare often invested it in land 
purchases to ensure their position when they retired from the pro-
fession of arms or lent it out to local merchants in the hope of 
increasing their stake. Over the longer term, they slowly sank 
into the main body of the French population. 
What signs of their passage did they leave, either ~n France or 
in their countries of origin? It is surprisingly hard to find much 
tangible information. Contamine, on what evidence he does not say, 
claims that the transformation of the French lance structure from two 
men-at -arms and one archer to one man-at-arms and two archers was due 
to Scottish influence, though it could equally well have been borrow-
ed from the English (1). On a less tangible level, the already close 
contact between Scotland and France was further reinforced by the 
servl.ce of so many Scots abroad. Scotland, though, did not gain verv 
much from the service of so many of her people overseas in France. 
The fact that continued residence in France was essential if a foreign 
soldier wished to retain all the rewards of his efforts made sure 
that little of the money which the fortunate made was ever repatriated; 
even the proceeds of plunder would largely be spent within France. 
Perhaps the most that Scotland gained was the occasional gi:~ to a 
church like that of Darnley who presented vestments to Gl~sgow 
(1) Contamine GES p. 272 note 181. 
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Cathedral on a visit home (2). Even the profits of shipping 
escaped her; since most of that was done by Rochellais and 
Castilian vessels. The other suppliers of manpower probably did 
little better; Castile had to face the influx of many of 'i.'illan-
drando's company when he recrossed the Pyrenees to aid his king. 
This caused much terror amongst those who had to face the invasion, 
but it seems likely that most of his men went back to France once the 
war ~n Castile was over. If he himself remained to spend his profits 
in Castile, most of the Spaniards he had led seem to have settled ~n 
France. The Italians went the same way. Cultural contacts may 
have followed in the wake of the closer diplomatic ties which the 
recruitment of foreign armies and the continuing alliances entailed; 
it is interesting that Sir Gilbert de la Haye, the first translator 
of "The Tree of Battles" and other French works in the same vein into 
Scots, had been at the court of Charles VIr as a chamberlain, and, 
while he seems to have been a university man himself, it is at least 
possible that he was connected in some way with the man of the same 
name who served in the Army of Scotland until the early 1430's (3). 
On a rather different level, the success of the Lombard cavalry and 
the qualities of Milanese armour seem to have encouraged a fairly 
regular level of purchasing of equipment from this source for to~rna-
ments and also for high-quality suits intended to be used on the battle-
field. 
Certainly, military serv~ce by foreigners provided the only 
source of outside recruitment to the French aristocracy in this period, 
(2) FF 26295 no. 881. 
(3) , h L" of F~fteenth Century Scotland' 1n J Mcqueen T e ~terature L 
Scottish Society etc. ed. J Brown p. 197-8. 
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and in many small ways such soldiers helped to rewrite the tenurial 
structures of some areas with quite consider~ble b f f . Q num ers 0 ore~gn 
settlers coming in to settle on the land. This created a genera-
tion of Franc~-Scots and Spaniards and Italians to man future units; 
perhaps the first group to have a genuine military tradition of 
service in an organised and full-time professional army rather than 
as feudal vassals following their lord. Certainly the Scottish 
units, the most tenacious of all in terms of long-term survival, 
created traditions of their own which led many younger sons of the 
Scottish aristocracy to go to France for shorter terms and serve in 
these units where their French cousins could also be found, a fact 
which must have had some effect on those who undertook it in terms of 
culture and outlook. 
The foreign companies, then, were important. They matter both 
for their part in the actual fighting of the war and for the light 
which their experience casts on the military institutions of the day. 
It was a period of great change and great events; from near disaster 
the French monarchy went on to triumph over its ancient English enemy 
and from conditions of near complete chaos, emerged an army which can, 
with some use of the imagination, be seen as a remote ancestor of 
modern permanent forces. In these events and changes, the foreign 
troops played their full part; their procurement was a major factor 
in the organisation of French diplomacy, while for fully a decade the 
problems which they raised as well as the necessity of rewarding 
their leaders adequately occupied much of the time and effort of the 
royal administration. Even after the period when foreign troops 
perhaps comprised the majority (and certainly the most effective, if 
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least easily controlled element) of the French army was over, they 
were a significant part of the forces which Charles had available to 
him and played a prominent part in his campaigns. The reforms of 
1445 recognised their place in the military structures or the 
nation and institutionalised it in the shape of permanent companles 
whose ranks were to be filled with foreign troops. Their commanders 
held positions of importance, and even supreme command in this period, 
finding themselves as a consequence at the heart of the political 
manoeuvrings and manipulations of the court; as a result, the fate 
I 
of such units as the Garde Ecossaise is a highly sensitive litmus 
for spotting times of political change and disturbance. As a group, 
their fate lS worth studying for the light which it throws on the 
ambitions, rewards, problems, and general realities of life within the 
organised and semi-organised military forces which began to sprlng 
into existence allover Europe in the fifteenth century as well as 
the light it casts on one of the central problems of French society 
in this period; the relationship between royal government and 
patronage, and the control over aristocratic society which this 
government might seek. Without the foreign soldier, fifteenth 
F b that much harder to understand as a whole. century rance ecomes 
